The recovery of Detroit in the west was more than balanced by disasters far to the north-east. Here, during the autumn, the Americans had evolved a complex plan for the capture of Montreal. Dearborn’s replacement, Brigadier-General James Wilkinson, was to move down the St Lawrence from Sackett’s Harbor with 8,000 men and effect a junction with Brigadier-General Wade Hampton who, with a further 4,000 men, was pushing north from Lake Champlain. It was optimistically envisaged that the combined force would then proceed with the capture of Montreal, despite the fact that it was outnumbered by the British garrison and protected by formidable fortifications.
Hampton came to grief first. On 25 October he found himself confronted by a British and Canadian force of unknown size in close country near the Chateaugay river. His opponent, Colonel George Macdonnell, had only 1,500 men at his disposal but by having bugle calls blown at different points around the Americans he created the impression of much greater strength. Hampton tried to break through with a combined frontal and flank attack, but when these failed he meekly withdrew to winter quarters in Plattsburg, although neither side had sustained more than a handful of casualties.
Wilkinson’s slow passage down the St Lawrence had been harassed by a British force of 800 regulars and Indians under the command of Colonel J. W. Morrison. On 11 November, near Cornwall, he landed 2,000 of his own regulars under Brigadier-General John Boyd to deal with the threat. When the two forces clashed at Chrysler’s Farm, the Americans, coming into action piecemeal, were routed and driven back to their boats with the loss of 249 killed and wounded and 100 captured. The following day, having learned of Hampton’s retreat, Wilkinson abandoned the expedition and went into winter quarters at French Mills on the Salmon river. Thus, apart from the recovery of Detroit, the US Army ended 1813 with very little to congratulate itself upon.
Nor did the campaigning season of 1814 begin very differently. Wilkinson resumed his ill-considered offensive against Montreal in March, this time with only 4,000 men, using the Richelieu river as his axis of advance. A few miles beyond the border he mounted an attack on a fortified stone mill at La Colle, only to be sharply repulsed by its 600-strong garrison. His spiritless reaction was to fall back on his base at Plattsburg. For the War Department, this proved to be the last straw and he was summarily removed from his command.
His replacement was Major-General Jacob Brown who, it will be recalled, had successfully resisted the British raid on Sackett’s Harbor. Brown was an unusually efficient New York militia officer who was able to get the best out of his troops. He did not believe that a war with Great Britain served the best interests of the United States, although this did not prevent him from doing his duty when the time came. He was particularly fortunate in the appointment of Brigadier-General Winfield Scott as his second-in-command and commander of his 1st Brigade. Scott, a towering presence six feet five inches tall and proportionately broad, was a regular officer who had received a captain’s commission in the light artillery shortly before the outbreak of war. A dedicated professional, he placed a high value on the study of military history, constantly adding to his collection of books on the subject. His normally sound judgement could be prejudiced by flashes of impetuosity, and by temperament he could be stubborn and argumentative – indeed, throughout his long career he somehow managed to quarrel with everyone with whom he was professionally associated. As a lieutenant-colonel Scott had assumed command when Van Rensselaer had been wounded on Queenston Heights, negotiating the American surrender. Subsequently exchanged and promoted, he had been present at the capture of Fort George and taken part in Wilkinson’s abortive expedition the previous year, being mortified by the performance of the American regulars at Chrysler’s Farm.
Brown and Scott established their base at Flint Hill near Buffalo. Neither of them agreed with the saloon bar historians’ view of the Revolutionary War, namely that citizen soldiers had thoroughly whipped King George’s redcoats from start to finish. If that had indeed been the case, asked the more thoughtful, why had it taken so long to bring the matter to a conclusion, and how was it that the British had won most of the battles? The truth was that the army of the new-born republic had only begun to make tangible progress when it adopted the same high standards of discipline and training as its opponents. That lesson seemed to have been forgotten in the intervening years, especially by Revolutionary War veterans like Wilkinson, whose skills now lay in politicking rather than fighting a very professional enemy. Now, after numerous humiliating reverses, the War Department was prepared to let younger, harder and more determined officers have their way, and in this respect Brown and Scott were of one mind – in a stand-up fight, the British could only be beaten by thoroughly trained and disciplined troops.
Most of the training of what became known as the Left Division US Army was left in Scott’s hands. Throughout April, May and June he drilled the troops endlessly, imposing a firm but fair discipline. Some men lacked uniform altogether while that of the majority was ragged and worn out. Recognising the importance of this item to unit morale, he requisitioned fresh supplies. Instead of blue uniform coatees, however, he received a consignment of grey woollen fatigue jackets, with which he had to make do.1 He also insisted that the troops pay strict attention to their personal hygiene and sanitation, with the result that the sick list shrank and only two men died from disease during this period.
In the meantime President Madison’s administration had agreed to enter into peace negotiations with Great Britain. Far from furthering American interests, the war was actually damaging them. Furthermore, with the downfall of Napoleon clearly imminent, it could only be a matter of time before Wellington’s Peninsula veterans were shipped to North America and matters would go from bad to worse. What was needed, Secretary of War John Armstrong informed Brown, was an unqualified success that would strengthen the hand of the American negotiators. After considering various alternatives it was decided that the best prospects were offered by a limited offensive on the Canadian bank of the Niagara, involving the capture of Fort Erie and an advance to the Chippewa river; in the event of Brown winning a victory he was to exploit this by advancing north to capture Forts George and Niagara in cooperation with the American squadron on Lake Ontario, which would also deliver the necessary heavy artillery. The problem was that the American squadron, under Commodore Isaac Chauncey, was balanced by a British squadron under Captain Sir James Yeo, and although each watched the other’s movements closely, neither was prepared to risk losing control of the lake by bringing on a general engagement. When approached about the idea of cooperating with the projected Niagara offensive, Chauncey commented that his movements would be governed by Yeo’s, adding: ‘I shall sail on or about the 10th (July) but I shall not leave this vicinity (i.e. Sackett’s Harbor) unless the enemy’s fleet leads me up the lake.’ Although Brown unwisely took this to mean that Chauncey’s ships would be lying off Fort George on 10 July, he had sufficient reservations to discuss the matter with his two senior brigade commanders, Winfield Scott and Eleazar Ripley. Scott, aggressive and confident that the troops were fully trained, urged immediate action. After due consideration Brown, mindful of the risks involved if he had misconstrued Chauncey’s intentions, but equally concerned to restore the Army’s reputation, decided to proceed.
During night of 2/3 July the Left Division began its crossing. Its overall strength amounted to some 5,000 men, about 900 of whom were left behind to garrison Buffalo, Schlosser and Lewiston, the remainder being organised as follows:
DIVISIONAL TROOPS
Cavalry (Captain Samuel Harris)
One troop each of US Light Dragoons and New York Volunteer Dragoons,
Estimated total 70.
Artillery
Major Jacob Hindman’s Battalion of four companies, each with three guns Artillery Reserve
Engineers
Lieutenant David Douglass’s Company
First Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General Winfield Scott)
9th Infan
try (now 5th Infantry)
11th Infantry (now 6th Infantry)
22nd Infantry (now 2nd Infantry)
25th Infantry (now 6th Infantry)
Estimated strength 1,319
2nd Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General Eleazar Ripley)
21st Infantry (now 5th Infantry)
23rd Infantry (now 2nd Infantry)
Estimated strength 992
3rd Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General Peter Porter)
Composite regiment of New York Militia
5th Pennsylvania Militia
Willcocks’ renegade Canadian volunteers
Indian warriors
Estimated total 926
As the first wave of boats neared the Canadian shore they were fired upon by a British picket. This soon withdrew into Fort Erie, the commander of which, Major Thomas Buck, despatched his small detachment of 19th Light Dragoons to the north to give warning of the American landing. During the morning Brown’s troops isolated the fort, incurring a handful of casualties from its cannon. Most believed that they would have to storm the work, yet within a discreditable scene was being played out. Buck’s orders from Major-General Phineas Riall had assured him that the defences were quite capable of withstanding any attack ‘short of an invasion in force.’ The Americans were clearly not the only people capable of producing ambivalent correspondence, for Buck took this to mean that he should surrender the fort when confronted by an invasion in force. Most of his officers believed that further resistance would only result in useless loss of life, but there were others, backed by many of their men, who took the more professional view that their only purpose in being there was to do the Americans as much damage as they possibly could until necessity compelled their surrender. Buck nevertheless accepted the majority view and in mid-afternoon, just as the first of the newly landed American field pieces was being emplaced, he sent out a flag of truce to conclude the details.
Brown had thus secured the first of his objectives at virtually no cost, even before the Left Division had completed its crossing. At about noon on 4 July Scott’s 1st Brigade began marching north towards Chippewa. Having covered only four miles, Scott encountered a British force holding the far bank of Frenchman’s Creek. This consisted of the light company of the 1st Regiment, both flank companies of the 100th Regiment, two 24-pounder guns under Lieutenant Richard Armstrong RA, and a troop of 19th Light Dragoons under Lieutenant William Horton. In command was an experienced light infantry officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Pearson, who had been seriously wounded at Albuera and sent to Canada to fill a less physically demanding post as an inspector of militia. Now, once more, he was in the thick of the fighting. He opened fire on the American column, forcing Scott to deploy, then withdrew. He repeated this at every creek along the route, so that it took almost seven hours for the Americans to cover the next thirteen miles. At length he broke contact just short of the unfordable Chippewa river and, having set fire to those houses near the south bank in order to deny them to the enemy, retired across the bridge into Chippewa village, removing the bridge decking as he did so. Scott, following up, crossed a area of cleared farmland, subsequently known as the Plain, measuring approximately 1,200 yards from north to south and 600 yards from east to west, bounded on the left by dense forest and on the north by a thick belt of trees. Passing through the latter, he came under fire from the north bank of the Chippewa, on which gun emplacements had been dug the previous year. The light was now fading, it was beginning to rain and, recognising that he could proceed no further, he withdrew across the Plain and established a camp on the southern bank of Street’s Creek. At about midnight Brown arrived with Ripley’s 2nd Brigade and the artillery.
Before proceeding further it is necessary to examine what was taking place on the other side of the lines. The regular regiments of the British Army in Canada were of identical quality to those serving in the Peninsula and, having won their battles for the past two years, they saw no reason why they should not continue to do so. However, it was to the Peninsula that the best British commanders were being sent and Canada, being a secondary theatre of war, had to put up with what was left. The senior British officers serving in Canada were competent enough in a run of the mill sort of way, but they lacked imagination and their successful defence of the long frontier for the past two years with very few troops had engendered a sense of complacency; Brock had been a notable exception, but now he was dead.
Major-General Phineas Riall, responsible for the Niagara sector, had been at Fort George when the news of the American landing reached him at about 08:30 on the morning of 3 July. He had acted with commendable speed in mobilising his troops and directing them to concentrate at Chippewa, where the river offered the best line of defence against a continued American advance to the north. By the morning of 5 July he had assembled one squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons,2 the 1st (Royal Scots) Regiment, the senior line infantry regiment of the British Army with a lineage so ancient that it was known as Pontius Pilate’s Bodyguard, the 8th (The King’s) Regiment, also of considerable seniority, the 100th (later the Prince of Wales’s Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians)),3 the 1st and 2nd Lincoln Militia (later the Lincoln and Welland Regiment), mainly of Loyalist stock and fighting on their own home ground, part of Captain James Mackonochie’s Brigade, Royal Artillery, with three 6-pounder guns, two 24-pounder guns and one 5½-inch howitzer; and about 300 Indians, giving an overall total of approximately 2,400 men.
Riall was worried that the Americans might make a second landing at Queenston to his rear and to guard against the threat he sent back the 1st Lincolns, for whom he had a high regard. He had no reason to believe that Fort Erie was not still holding out and, having personally scouted the American camp, which his snipers were bringing under fire, he decided to advance south from the Chippewa and drive the enemy back to their boats. His engineers therefore set about replacing the decking of the Chippewa bridge.
In the meantime the 5th Pennsylvania and some 380 Indians of Porter’s brigade had crossed the Niagara during the previous night and were marching north from Fort Erie. When, at noon, they reached the American camp at Street’s Creek they were allowed to rest until Brown, tired of the constant sniping, asked Porter to clear the woodland to the west. Porter asked for volunteers but the Pennsylvanians were tired and hungry and only 200 of them came forward, together with 300 Indians. They entered the woods at about 15:00 and at first they succeeded in pushing the sharpshooters back. The British committed their own Indians and the 2nd Lincolns, followed by the light companies of the three regular regiments. A wild, savage and frequently hand-to-hand struggle surged back and forth among the trees until the Americans gave way and fled.
At about the same time Porter had entered the forest, Riall’s engineers finished their work on the Chippewa bridge and the British main body began to cross. At first its progress was concealed by the belt of trees bounding the northern edge of the Plain, but at length Brown, who was visiting the picket north of Street’s Creek, observed the head of the column marching along the river road, then begin to deploy smartly into a battle line across the open grassland. He immediately sent his adjutant, Colonel Charles Gardner, galloping back to the camp with orders to bring up Scott’s brigade. Although Scott had just provided his men with the Fourth of July Dinner they had missed the previous day he saw no reason why the celebration should interfere with their training programme and had just assembled the regiments for drill when Gardner arrived. Believing that he was being called forward to support Porter, he passed some disparaging remarks on militiamen in general but said that he had intended to hold his parade on the Plain anyway and formed the brigade into column of march. As he approached the Street’s Creek bridge he encountered Brown coming the other way. ‘You will have a battle!’ shouted the divisional commander. Grumpily, Scott repeated his comments on the militia, adding his doubts as to whether there were more than 300 British south of the Chippewa. Almost immediately, the first roundshot smashed into the head
of his column and shell splinters ripped through the ranks.
Riall had deployed his line with the 100th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Hay, the Marquis of Tweeddale, on the left and Lieutenant-Colonel John Gordon’s Royal Scots on the right; there was insufficient space available for Major Thomas Evans’ Kingsmen in the line, so they took position in reserve and were then moved behind the Royal Scots’ right rear, in echelon. Two 24-pounder guns and the 5½-inch howitzer under Lieutenant Richard Armstrong were placed on the river road to the left of the 100th, with Major Lisle’s 19th Light Dragoon squadron some distance behind, and three 6-pounder guns under Lieutenant Edmund Sheppard were positioned immediately to the right of the Royal Scots.
Observing the fine target presented by Scott’s brigade as it neared the Street’s Creek bridge, Armstrong opened fire at between 500 and 600 yards and was pleased to note that it began to take effect immediately. Riall, watching the approach of the drab grey column, commented that he seemed to be faced by nothing more serious than ‘some Buffalo militia.’
The Americans, however, gave no hint that their casualties worried them and continued to come on. About 200 yards north of the bridge Scott wheeled his brigade off the river road and began to form his line parallel to the British. On the right and closest to the road was the combined 9th/22nd Infantry under Major Henry Leavenworth, which was joined by the company-strong picket belonging to the 21st Infantry; then Colonel Thomas Campbell’s 11th Infantry; and finally, on the left, Major Thomas Jesup’s 25th Infantry. The entire line was now under fire from the British artillery but Scott continued to adjust the position of its units until he was entirely satisfied. Noting that the British light companies were active on the edge of the forest, he ordered the 25th to change front in their direction, despite the fact that this exposed the regiment’s right flank to the fire of Sheppard’s guns, giving Jesup authority to act as circumstances dictated. Next, realising that the opposing line was now longer than his own and anticipating, correctly, that the British would attack, he ordered the 11th Infantry, now commanded by Major John McNeil, Campbell having been wounded during the deployment, to take ground to its left and wheel through some 45 degrees to the right, so enabling it to rake the enemy’s ranks when the time came. The effect of this was to open a gap between the 11th and the 9th/22nd on their right, but Scott was little worried by this and in due course it would be put to good use. On the river road Captain Nathan Towson’s artillery company, armed with two 6-pounder guns and one 5½-inch howitzer, had come into action on the immediate right of the 9th/22nd and had opened a duel with Armstrong’s gunners. Quite early in this Towson’s howitzer landed a shell on a British limber, which blew up with a shattering roar, but was then knocked out itself by a 24-pounder ball. The principal effect of the duel, however, was to reduce the volume of fire directed at the American infantry.
Impossible Victories Page 6