D, E and F Companies had trained very hard for their mission, climbing cliffs of similar size on the Isle of Wight and at Swanage in Dorset. The problem was that these consisted of chalk while those of the Pointe du Hoe were made of clay which, if wet, would become slimy and offer no grip. To counter this, special equipment was to be employed. Each LCA was fitted with three pairs of rocket projectors, capable of firing ropes or rope ladders to the top of the cliff, where grapnels would dig into the soil or snag the enemy’s wire. In case these devices failed to work, portable rocket line throwers were also issued to platoons, as were lightweight tubular steel ladders in sixteen-foot lengths that could be hauled up and connected in succession until the necessary height had been attained. As a further precaution, four DUKWs (amphibious lorries) fitted with London Fire Brigade 100-foot extension ladders would beach immediately behind the assault craft, two light machine guns being mounted at the top of each ladder to provide covering fire. During the climb itself the leaders would be armed with pistols or carbines and grenades. Those with Browning Automatic Rifles, light mortars and demolition charges would follow. Once the assault was under way, two assault boats would touch down with the companies’ 81mm mortars, ammunition, rations, more demolition equipment, personal packs and the means of hauling these up the cliff face. Every aspect of the coastline and the defences had been repeatedly studied on maps, photographs and models, and every man knew exactly what to do and where to go without the need for further orders. Almost every contingency had been thought of, the only unknown factor being the reaction of the enemy. The German formation holding this sector of the coast was, in fact, the 352nd Infantry Division, which had been formed the previous autumn and consisted of the 914th, 915th and 916th Grenadier Regiments plus supporting arms. Although the division had never been in action before, the presence of numerous Eastern Front veterans in its ranks ensured that it would give a good account of itself when the time came.
Nothing connected with this operation could be taken for granted. Indeed, so high were the risks that Colonel Rudder had been forbidden to participate in the assault. He chose to ignore the order and embarked on one of F Company’s craft, quickly recognising the truth of the old saying that in war chaos is the natural state. Having already seen one of the LCAs swamped, he watched helplessly as the same fate overtook one of his supply boats while the crew of the second flung C and D Companies’ packs overboard in a desperate attempt to stay afloat. For obvious reasons his assault on the Pointe du Hoe had been scheduled to begin at 06:30, some 30 minutes before the main landings. Visibility had improved very little and as that moment approached the coastline began to emerge. At first, to his horror, Rudder did not recognise any of it and then, remembering that the tide had a strong easterly set, he was able to identify the Raz de la Percée. This meant that his three companies had been carried some three miles to the east of their objective. He immediately gave his Royal Navy coxswain orders to come hard to starboard. The rest of his command conformed, the speed of the blunt-bowed LCAs falling away as they butted their way into the tide. His heart sinking, Rudder realised that he could not possibly eliminate the battery on the Pointe du Hoe before the main landings began; furthermore, his LCAs were now running parallel to the cliffs and in full view of the enemy, who opened fire from several positions, sinking one of the DUKWs.
Escorting the little flotilla were two destroyers, HMS Talybont and USS Satterlee. Talybont’s captain had been aware that the LCAs were running off course and he had repeatedly tried to communicate the fact, in vain. Now, seeing the German defences springing to life, he began to plaster them with a rain of 4-inch and 2-pounder high explosive shells, supplemented by 20mm cannon fire, closing in steadily from a range of two-and-a-half miles. On the Pointe du Hoe the huge eruptions of earth and clay thrown up by the explosion of Texas’ 14-inch shells ceased a little before 06:30, those aboard the battleship believing that the assault was about to commence. Lying 2,500 yards off the point, the Satterlee’s captain saw the surface of the headland suddenly transformed into a disturbed ants’ nest as troops ran from their bunkers to man defensive positions. He promptly engaged them with gunfire from his 5-inch main armament and raked the crest with the destroyer’s ten .50-calibre anti-aircraft machine guns.
Further out to sea the second and larger group of Ranger LCAs, carrying the 5th Battalion and the 2nd Battalion’s A and B Companies, was still not in visual contact with the shore. When 07:00 came and went without any signal from Rudder, Colonel Schneider was forced to assume that the Pointe du Hoe was not in American hands and gave orders for the craft to head for Vierville. This meant that Rudder’s men were now completely alone and would remain so. The odds against them were also lengthening all the time. It was not until 07:10 that the first of their LCAs touched down on the narrow beach below the cliffs of the Pointe du Hoe. As they did so, Satterlee’s guns ceased firing for their own safety. Rudder’s original intention had been that five of the craft should come in on each side of the point so that a converging assault could be launched against the summit. In the event, all nine surviving LCAs beached on a 500-yard stretch of shore below the feature’s eastern face. The cliffs had been pitted by bursting shells, as a result of which huge piles of fallen clay covered the sand below; the beach itself was also extensively cratered.
As each craft ground to a standstill the ramp dropped and the rocket launchers were fired. Although the ropes soared upwards most had been saturated with spray, doubling their weight, and they came tumbling back to earth when the rockets failed to cope with the additional burden. Aboard LCA 862, however, the crew had kept the ropes sheeted so that two of their grapnels reached the clifftop and held. The three remaining DUKWs came in, but hope of using their extending ladders vanished when they were unable to manoeuvre because of craters on the 30-yard-wide beach. Time now being of the essence, the Rangers employed their portable line-throwers, saving the sectional ladders as a last resort. German helmets now began to bob along the edge of the cliff. Potato-masher grenades rained down to explode among those below, who also began to take casualties from snipers. The BAR teams replied as best they could and Satterlee, observing the desperate situation ashore, went into action for a second time. Grapnels began to dig in along the cliff edge or catch in the enemy wire. Suddenly small groups of men were climbing the half-inch ropes, their boots scrabbling for support on the slippery clay. Some ropes were cut by the Germans, sending those on them plummeting to the beach below. Satterlee, observing the progress of the distant, tiny dots up the cliff face, again ceased firing.
First over the edge was Private First Class Harry W. Roberts. Only five minutes had elapsed since his LCA had touched down, but it seemed like a lifetime. He was joined shortly after by Lieutenant Lapres and four more men. Despite their long study of photographs, none of them could recognise a single feature, so torn up and cratered by bombing and naval gunfire was the terrain. Nevertheless, there being no Germans visible in the immediate vicinity, they set off for their objective. Four more men reached the top by the same route, then another five up LCA 862’s lines, then a steady trickle in ones and twos.
Working in pairs, they closed in on the battery position. They had expected a hard fight but such opposition as they encountered was light and quickly overcome. The reason for this soon became apparent. The observation and command casemates were heavily damaged and the concrete gunpits had been blasted apart; furthermore, the latter were empty save for one which contained the wreckage of a 150mm gun. It began to look as though the Rangers’ careful preparations and efforts had all been for nothing.
However, the situation atop the Pointe du Hoe remained fluid. The enemy gunners might have abandoned their position but plenty more Germans remained who had gone to earth among the network of battered communication trenches and other works. Now, relieved of the attentions of Texas, Talybont and Satterlee, they began to surface and engage the Americans in a series of small battles that were to last throughout the day.
The Rangers had incurred fifteen casualties on the beach but by 07:45 all of the remainder had completed their climb. When an anti-aircraft position to the west of the point began sweeping the area with its fire Rudder despatched a twelve-strong team to deal with it. This ran into an ambush from which only one man returned. A second assault was improvised but was stopped dead by artillery fire half-way to the objective, sustaining heavy casualties.
Rudder, despite having been hit in the leg by a sniper, was anxious to complete the second part of his mission, which was to cut the coastal highway between Grandcamps les Bains and Vierville-sur-Mer. Leaving a party, consisting mainly of F Company, to sit on the opposition at the headland, he struck inland. The move attracted sporadic artillery and small-arms fire which inflicted a further fifteen casualties. By 08:15, however, having established himself in a position beyond the road, he sent out patrols. At 09:00 one of these, consisting of Sergeants Lomell and Kuhn from D Company, discovered the coast defence battery’s five missing 150mm guns, camouflaged on the edge of a wood beside a lane. Ammunition had been stockpiled ready for use yet, once again, there was no sign of the gunners. Lomell wrecked the recoil buffers of two of the guns with thermite charges and smashed the sights of a third, then the pair set off to obtain more explosives. While they were away an E Company patrol also came across the battery and completed its destruction. Subsequent interrogations revealed that the guns had been withdrawn from their gunpits on the point to avoid the worst effects of the naval bombardment. The intention had been that they should be moved back in time to counter the assault landings, but this idea had been abandoned when the Rangers were seen to have reached the top of the cliff. They were, in any event, able to shell Utah or Omaha Beaches from their present position; why they had not done so, and why the gun crews and prime movers had so mysteriously vanished, remained two of the day’s unanswered questions.
Meanwhile, F Company had been slowly but steadily obtaining the upper hand back at the headland, enabling it to send forward reinforcements to join Rudder, who eventually managed to assemble about 60 men. Among them, quite unexpectedly, were three paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division which, together with the 82nd Airborne Division, had been dropped the previous night into the area behind Utah Beach. The drops had been badly scattered and these men, having landed east of the Vire, had made their way towards the sound of the fighting. Shortly after noon Rudder was able to transmit the following message:
‘Located Pointe du Hoe – mission accomplished – need ammunition and reinforcements – many casualties.’
Some two hours later he received a reply to the effect that no reinforcements were available. He estimated that about a third of his force were dead, wounded or missing; ammunition was running so low that captured German weapons were being taken into use; rations were also in short supply and everyone’s pack now lay at the bottom of the Channel. There was also the added responsibility of about 40 German prisoners, mainly men of the 914th Grenadier Regiment who, in trying to make good their escape from the Pointe to the south, had wandered into the Rangers’ position. Snipers remained a menace. During the afternoon two weak counterattacks were beaten off but towards evening it became apparent that the Germans were concentrating for a greater effort. Since no improvement in the overall situation could be expected before the morrow, the prospects for the night ahead looked dubious at best.
Rudder’s predicament had its roots in the shambles that had taken place on Omaha Beach to the east. There, V Corps’ assault landing, made with 29th Division on the right and 1st Division on the left, had been stopped dead at the water’s edge by withering fire. It was sheer bad luck that 352 Division was engaged in an anti-invasion exercise at the time, but the launching of the assault craft so far out, the restriction of the naval bombardment to 40 minutes, the decision to assault the enemy strongpoints head-on rather than land between them, and the rejection of specialist armour with which to neutralise them, were all mistakes that had to be paid for in blood. The four-mile beach and its shallows were quickly strewn with bodies and smashed equipment while the survivors frantically scraped some cover for themselves in whatever dead ground they could find; new arrivals simply added to the carnage. At one stage Lieutenant-General Omar Bradley, commanding First US Army, seriously considered abandoning the landing and diverting the follow-up waves to the Utah beachhead, which had been secured without undue difficulty. At 07:30, the situation began to improve when eight American and three British destroyers, having observed the chaos ashore, closed to within 1000 yards and began battering the strongpoints. As the pressure eased, small groups of infantry began courageously working their way forward through the beach obstacles, wire and minefields to eliminate fire positions. By 09:00 they had secured footholds on the plateau overlooking the beach. Thirty minutes later elements of the 1st Division broke out towards Colleville-sur-Mer and thereafter the remaining beach exits were stormed in succession. By mid-afternoon the situation on Omaha had been brought sufficiently under control for reinforcements to be landed, but so stubbornly did the German 916th Grenadier Regiment contest possession of the villages beyond, that when night fell the beachhead was nowhere more than two miles in depth. This had been achieved at the horrific cost of 3,000 casualties, one-third of them killed, approximately 30 per cent of the total Allied loss on D-Day.
The experience of Colonel Schneider’s Rangers was typical. Two companies landed opposite strongpoints and only half of them survived the 250-yard dash from the shallows to the nearest cover; yet only two or three hundred yards to their right the rest of the 5th Battalion landed between strongpoints and, screened by the dense smoke of a grass fire started by the preparatory bombardment, sustained just five casualties before it reached the foot of a bluff where the plateau met the beach.
Schneider was one of the original Rangers and he had obtained a great deal of experience under Darby. He had no idea what had happened to Rudder but the fact that no 150mm shells were landing on Omaha suggested that he had taken his objective. According to the overall plan, the next task for Schneider’s own battalion and the two attached companies from 2nd Rangers was to join Rudder in the area he was already holding; given the present situation, however, that would be no easy matter.
It was about the time that the first cracks began to appear in the German defence that Brigadier-General Norman D. Cota, the Assistant Divisional Commander of the 29th Division, strolled into the area below the bluff. Throughout the morning’s terrifying confusion and bloodshed Cota had displayed a total disregard for his own safety as he toured his division’s sector of the beach, providing encouragement for individuals and suggestions as to how tactical objectives could be taken. His conduct was to earn him a Silver Star, the Distinguished Service Cross and the British Distinguished Service Order – plus a reprimand from General Bradley, who disliked the idea of senior officers with heavy responsibilities taking needless personal risks. Schneider reported to him and Cota indicated that the bluff would have to be taken. There are two versions of what was actually said. The first, recorded in David Irving’s book The War Between the Generals, is that Cota, having noticed the distinctive orange diamond on the back of the 5th Battalion’s helmets, called out: ‘You men are Rangers – I know you won’t let me down!’ The second is that his final words to Schneider were, ‘Lead the way, Rangers!’ While the former seems the more probable, it was the latter which caught the imagination of the troops and the general public alike, to the extent that the phrase and the philosophy it embodies has remained the Ranger motto ever since.
Schneider wasted no time in briefing his officers; companies were to attack independently and at once, reassembling at a designated rendezvous point south of Vierville-sur-Mer. The sides of the bluff were so steep that the Rangers were forced to pull themselves up, using their bayonets in the manner of ice-axes. Having reached the top, they stormed the remaining beach defences and pressed on towards the village, where they became involved in bitter street fighting
with 916th Grenadiers, who were determined to hold it to the last. By good fortune, one platoon of A Company 5th Rangers, commanded by Lieutenant Parker, walked straight through a gap in the enemy line and reached the rendezvous point unopposed. Parker, unaware that the rest of the battalion was heavily engaged in the village, reached the conclusion that it had already left for the Pointe du Hoe and set off in that direction. On the way his platoon took a number of prisoners and worked its way round an enemy position during a fire-fight, making contact with Rudder’s perimeter to the west of St Pierre-du-Mont at about 21:00. If Rudder’s men were pleasantly surprised to see Parker’s, Parker himself was surprised that the rest of his battalion had not arrived and he told Rudder that he believed them to be close behind. Greatly relieved, Rudder decided to hold his ground for the night and integrated the new arrivals into his defences.
In fact, the 5th Rangers were still locked into the fight for Vierville. The village was finally cleared at about midnight, although the roads to the west, south and east of it remained firmly under German control. Rudder’s position was attacked three times during the night. At about 23:30 an attack ended almost as soon as it began when charges in the abandoned battery suddenly erupted in an immense sheet of flame that silhouetted the enemy, sending them to ground. Ninety minutes later they came on again, evidently unsure where the Rangers’ position was, but reached a point 50 yards from the perimeter before they were stopped. The third attack, mounted at about 03:00, was a much heavier affair, supported by sustained machine gun and mortar fire. When part of the defences were overrun, resulting in the capture of twenty men from E Company, most of them wounded, Rudder gave the order for the rest of the Rangers to retire across the coast road to the headland, where an improvised defence line was established. The order did not reach part of D Company, which found itself cut off and remained hidden in a deep drainage ditch throughout the following day.
Impossible Victories Page 23