Egyptian efforts to keep the date of attack a secret were both comprehensive and remarkably effective, adhering strictly to the principle of “need to know.” Foreign Minister Mohamed Hassan al-Zayat, for example, had no idea that war would break out on October 6 because he had been at the United Nations in New York and was out of the loop regarding military moves.7 Sadat was careful, moreover, to keep the date a secret from other Arab leaders, including King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, with whom he was closest, as well as Muammar Gaddafi, who had been no small nuisance to him. If the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Libya didn’t need to know, then neither did the man in the President’s Office in charge of relations with those states. True, Marwan had excellent sources of his own who might have tipped him off. But even they may have been cut off or kept the information to themselves. Although more people in Sadat’s office knew about it as the day of the attack drew closer, Marwan had left the country by October 3, when the number of people who knew was still relatively small. Only on October 3, for example, were the commanders of the infantry divisions at the front told that the attack would be launched three days later.
Other sources who reported to Israel in late 1972 and then again in the spring of 1973 that war was about to erupt, some even giving specific dates, gave no similar warning in the fall of 1973. The most likely reason is that Sadat did a much better job at keeping the secret this time around. Marwan’s access was better than that of any other Israeli source in Egypt at the time, but even that was not enough to ensure that he’d know every secret. Moreover, he, too, had erred in the past, for example, when he reported in the middle of January 1973 regarding the supposedly upcoming hostilities the following May, that the Egyptians had no intention of crossing the Suez Canal; or when he reported in early September 1973 that the war would be pushed off to the end of the year.
It is thus far more likely that Marwan learned only on Friday, October 5, that war would break out the following day, and only as a result of the EgyptAir rescheduling. Israeli intelligence also picked up the unusual order given to the airline, but none of the intelligence reports presented on Friday mentioned it. It was fortunate for Israel that the news reached the Angel as well, who knew what it might mean, and whom to call for details. The result was that when he met Zamir that night, he had new, concrete intelligence to share—intelligence that would, once and for all, shatter the paradigm that had, for so many months, frozen Israeli intelligence in the conviction that war was unlikely.
AT 5:45 A.M. on Friday, October 5, IDF Military Intelligence sent out a report that, on the basis of reconnaissance air photography from the day before, presented Egyptian deployments along the Suez Canal. The final sentence said all that needed saying: “From the data we may conclude with clarity that the Egyptian military along the canal is arrayed in an emergency deployment the likes of which we have never seen before.” Defense Minister Dayan saw the report just after it went out. “One can get a stroke,” he said, “just from looking at the numbers.” This report, as well as other intelligence that continued to pour in about the unexplained evacuations of Soviets from Syria and Egypt, was the main topic of the meetings that took place on Yom Kippur Eve.
In the early morning hours, MI chief Eli Zeira held a meeting in his office. Zeira was apparently more worried about the Soviet evacuations than about the deployments along the southern front—deployments that included equipment for bridging the canal. During this meeting, the question was raised about whether to activate the “special means of intelligence gathering” that were under the sole and direct responsibility of the MI chief. Their specific nature remains a secret, but according to Howard Blum in his book on the Yom Kippur War, these were “a series of battery-operated devices attached to phone and cable connections buried deep in the sand outside Cairo.” They could pick up not only telephone and telegraph signals but also conversations taking place in rooms where the telephones and telexes were located. The problem was that ongoing activation would require the occasional replacement of batteries, a dangerous operation deep in enemy territory that MI was reluctant to undertake.8 According to an Israeli source, these devices had been planted on February 16–17, 1973, in Jabel Ataka, west of the city of Suez, near the headquarters of the Egyptian Third Army, by a commando team that had reached the location by four American-made CH-53 helicopters.9 In the meeting on the morning of October 5, Zeira, who still believed war was unlikely, refused requests to activate the equipment.
At 8:25 a.m., a brief meeting took place in the office of the IDF chief of staff, David Elazar. In light of the new information about the Egyptian deployments and Soviet evacuations, Elazar decided to put the regular army on Alert Level 3, the highest alert level since the Six-Day War. He also put the air force on full alert, moved the rest of the 7th Armored Brigade up to the Golan Heights, and dispatched another tank brigade to the Sinai. To call up the reserves would require cabinet approval, and this was not yet possible. But Alert Level 3 meant that all the preparations were in place for a full call-up. Zeira at this point evidently still had not mentioned the warning Zamir had received from Marwan, and it is unclear whether Elazar knew about it when he made his decisions.
At 9:00 a.m., the weekly security briefing was held in the office of Defense Minister Dayan. Zeira presented an overview of the intelligence, again focusing more on the Soviet evacuations than on the offensive posture taken by the Egyptian deployment at the canal, which he saw as reflecting Egyptian anxiety about a possible Israeli preemptive strike like the one that had taken out Egypt’s air force in the opening minutes of the Six-Day War. This was the meeting in which Zeira told the others present about Zamir’s emergency trip to London, saying that they were waiting for his report that evening, and then “we will be wiser men.”
During the meeting, Dayan asked Zeira whether the special means of intelligence gathering had provided anything useful. Not only did Zeira fail to tell him that they hadn’t been activated, but he also led Dayan to believe that they simply had failed to provide any indication of war. The effect of Zeira’s misleading statement was to allay Dayan’s fears about an imminent attack. Because he believed that the equipment had been activated but gave no warnings, it was not unreasonable for him to conclude that Egypt was not on the verge of attacking. As for Chief of Staff Elazar, who was present as well and knew all about the special equipment, Zeira’s words merely confirmed what he had already heard three days earlier, on Tuesday. Then, and possibly on Monday as well, Elazar had asked Zeira if he had activated the special equipment, and he had answered, falsely, that indeed he had.
This was no simple misunderstanding. Zeira was under pressure from top officers in MI to activate the equipment, and he had refused since he had not felt that the circumstances warranted its deployment, as there was, in his view, no imminent threat of war. In lying to his superiors, however, he directly and significantly contributed to both Dayan’s and Elazar’s serious underestimation of the threat at hand.10
During the meeting, Dayan gave his approval to the various decisions Elazar had made. He also decided that a message should be sent via Washington to Moscow, Cairo, and Damascus, to the effect that Israel had no hostile intentions but was fully aware of the actions being taken on the Arab side, and that if the Arabs attacked, they would find Israel ready for battle.
The issue of calling up the reserves was also raised at the meeting, and again at the next meeting, at 10:00 a.m. in the prime minister’s office at IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv. Here it was Elazar who took the lead, updating Prime Minister Golda Meir about the actions already taken to prepare for war. Elazar said there was no need for a full call-up yet, because if Egypt and Syria were about to attack, MI’s intelligence-gathering capabilities, as well as those of the Mossad, would have given clear indications to that effect. “We’ll prepare for war,” he concluded, “and hope that the indications come early enough.” Meir expressed her concerns but accepted his position and approved the message Dayan wanted sent to the Soviets, Egyptians
, and Syrians through Kissinger.
The fifth meeting that day involved a much broader forum—the full cabinet. This unscheduled meeting started at about 11:30 a.m., and it included all available government ministers. After the MI chief gave an overall survey of the intelligence picture, which did not mention Zamir’s trip to London, the IDF chief of staff spoke. Elazar agreed with Zeira’s assessment that Egypt’s and Syria’s offensive postures, combined with the absence of anything that would clearly prevent them from attacking, had forced the IDF’s hand, requiring that measures be taken in response, including putting the army on Alert Level 3 and rushing reinforcements to the Sinai and the Golan Heights. “As for calling up the reserves and other measures,” he added, “we are waiting for further indicators” of war.
From Elazar’s words, it was clear that his own position had evolved. If earlier that morning he believed that putting the military on full alert and deploying more forces along the fronts was sufficient to address the present threat, as the hours passed he started talking more and more about calling up reserves. In light of the possibility of a call-up during the Yom Kippur holiday, the cabinet formally empowered the prime minister and defense minister to make such a decision on their own, a decision that would normally have required the full cabinet’s approval.
The final meeting of the day was an emergency meeting of the IDF General Staff, immediately following the cabinet meeting. There, Zeira told the IDF’s top generals that “the likelihood of war initiated by Egypt and Syria is very low.” More likely, he estimated, was a limited Syrian attack on the Golan Heights, or limited Egyptian fire, possibly a helicopter assault along the Suez Canal. Least likely was a broad, joint assault by the Egyptians and Syrians together, including a crossing of the canal with the aim of reaching the Mitla and Gidi Passes. This assessment, which was similar to the one he had given to the cabinet an hour and a half earlier, completely contradicted the assessment of MI’s Research Department, where the IDF’s top intelligence analysts were located. MI-Research had concluded that if Egypt were to attack at all, it would go for a full-blown assault on the canal rather than something limited, and that the present deployment by Egypt and Syria on both fronts pointed to just such an assault, in accordance with the Egyptian and Syrian war plans that had been in MI’s possession for some time.
Elazar, however, was much more worried than Zeira. He still felt that the likelihood of war was not high, but it was certainly not “very low.” His own relatively mild optimism stemmed from his belief that “if in fact they intend to attack simultaneously from Syria and Egypt, we will get the warning.” This belief, it now seems, was based on his familiarity with Israeli intelligence’s two strategic-level sources of information: the special means of intelligence gathering under the MI chief’s authority, and the Mossad’s Angel. But Elazar did not know that the special measures had not been activated. And though he had heard Zeira mention Zamir’s trip to London, it was not presented with the urgency it demanded. Zeira hadn’t told Elazar about the contents of his phone conversation with Zamir from the night before. As a result, the IDF chief of staff, according to the testimony of his own deputy, was unaware throughout Friday that Zamir had gone to meet the Angel because of a warning of immediate war. For the kind of warning that would justify calling up the reserves, Elazar’s sights were set on the MI’s “special intelligence-gathering measures.”
One bit of intelligence that could have turned the tide that day was picked up by surveillance equipment, though not of the “special” variety. At 5:00 p.m. on Friday, members of Intelligence Unit 848 intercepted a message from Iraq’s ambassador in Moscow to his own foreign ministry in Baghdad. The ambassador reported that he had checked with the Soviet Foreign Ministry to find out the reason for the emergency evacuations that had begun the day before and was told that Egypt and Syria had alerted the Soviets that they were about to attack Israel. Under normal circumstances, such a message would have been sent out within half an hour from the moment it reached MI-Research. But despite the IDF’s being at Alert Level 3, most MI-Research officers were at home or in synagogues for Yom Kippur. The officer on duty hesitated, for he was reluctant to send out a message that might trigger a massive call-up on Yom Kippur. He began consulting with other officers and commanders, and after six full hours Zeira ordered that it be withheld because he was waiting for further information.11
THAT “FURTHER INFORMATION” was, of course, the Mossad chief’s report from his meeting with the Angel. At that very hour—11:00 p.m. Israel time, 10:00 p.m. in London—Zamir and Dubi were making their way to the rendezvous point. Zamir was unaware of the latest developments back in Israel. He didn’t know about the reconnaissance photos from the day before showing the entire Egyptian military on a war footing. Neither was he aware of the string of meetings that took place that day in Tel Aviv, in which it became increasingly clear how badly the Israelis needed just one more piece of hard evidence showing that Egypt and Syria were about to attack, in order to bring the IDF chief of staff to seek government approval of a massive call-up of reserves on the holiest day in the Jewish religion. Neither was he aware that just such a piece of information had reached MI six hours earlier but hadn’t been forwarded to the chief of staff; or that the latter was under the false impression that the special surveillance equipment was operational when it wasn’t, and that he therefore had a completely misguided impression of the overall intelligence picture.
He did, however, know that back in Israel, there was serious concern about the possibility of war and that they awaited his word. But Zamir was not fully prepared for the dramatic news that Marwan brought.
It was close to 10:00 p.m. London time when Dubi and Zamir reached the apartment where the meeting would be held. Mossad agents, who had been in place for several hours, gave the area around the building a final once-over. Dubi and Zamir went in and waited. It was a long wait. Marwan had rarely been late before. Slightly after 11:30 p.m., they finally heard a knock on the door. Dubi opened it, and in walked the Angel.
Handshakes and formalities were exchanged. Dubi took a seat near the large dining table, notebook open and pen in hand. Marwan sat in an armchair by the coffee table, facing Zamir.
THIS WAS THE first meeting between Marwan and his handlers since the failed attack on the El Al jet in Rome a month earlier. The Israelis wanted to make sure their source hadn’t been compromised, and they wanted him to know they were concerned. This is why Zamir’s first line of questioning was about whether any suspicions had been raised after the Italian forces raided the apartment in Ostia—a raid that clearly was based on advance warning—and whether Sadat had shown any interest in the question of how the Italians knew about the attack. Marwan reassured them that the episode had not caused him any trouble. Sadat probably figured that Marwan had tipped the Italians off; since the terror attack wasn’t in Egypt’s interest anyway, this in itself was unlikely to trouble the president. But nobody suspected he had said anything to the Israelis.
From the abrupt manner in which he deflected Zamir’s questions, however, it was clear that Marwan had something more pressing on his mind.
Marwan was tense. “I have come here,” he announced, “to talk about the war, and nothing else. I came late because I have spent the entire evening at our consulate in Kensington. I’ve been on the phone with Cairo, trying to get the most up-to-date information. He [Sadat] intends to go to war tomorrow.” From the way Marwan expressed himself in what followed, one gets the sense that he thought the Israelis already knew about it. It was a belief held widely by the Egyptians that the Israelis would know about the attack two full days before it was launched. But it is also possible that he was trying to gloss over the fact that—despite presenting himself to the Israelis as the oracle of all knowledge worth knowing in Egypt—here he now was, less than twenty-four hours before the attack, having learned about it only a few hours earlier.
Zamir was taken by surprise. He had come to the meeting worried because from the
latest information he had, especially the Soviet evacuations, he could see that Egypt and Syria were heading for war. But he had not imagined that the attack would be launched in less than twenty-four hours. And he was also worried that, just as with past warnings, this one, too, would prove a false alarm. So his immediate response was, “On what do you base your assertion?”
For Marwan, who had previously given false alarms of war, both his credibility in the eyes of the Israelis and his image as a central player in Cairo were obviously important. Nor is it clear where he got his information—to whom, in other words, he had made those phone calls throughout the evening. And because his information was based on telephone conversations rather than face-to-face meetings, it is fair to assume that what he heard had been phrased cautiously or even ambiguously. He had not spent the crucial days before the war in Sadat’s presence, so he couldn’t know what the atmosphere was like in the presidential offices, where there were people who already knew the secret. The dissonance between the information he had received, in whose credibility he had no doubt, and his intimate knowledge of Sadat’s psyche—the president had changed his mind many times about the date of attack—had its effect on him. The more Zamir pressed him to give his own independent take on whether war would in fact erupt the next day, the more Marwan grew agitated, at least once raising his voice. “How should I know?” he shouted. “He [Sadat] is crazy. He can march forward, tell everyone else to march forward, and then suddenly march backward.” Marwan was giving voice not only to his frustration at his inability to give a straight answer to the most important question of his career as a spy, but also to his personal aversion toward Sadat, his inclination to disrespect him and see him as unreliable.
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