16.Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 244.
17.Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep, pp. 84–85.
18.Shalev, Failure and Success in the Warning, n. 3 of ch. 4, p. 81, where he quotes from an MI document from May 1969.
19.“Intelligence Summary from Operation Dovecote,” December 17, 1972; Shalev, Failure and Success in the Warning, n. 3 of ch. 4, pp. 80–81; Eli Zeira, Myth Versus Reality: Yom Kippur War—Failures and Lessons (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot, 2004), pp. 89–90. The first edition of Zeira’s book came out in 1993.
20.Zvi Zamir interviewed on the Israeli television program Fact (Uvda), Channel 2, “The Last Spy,” December 27, 2007.
21.Interview with Zvi Zamir, July 8, 2008.
22.Conversation with Amos Gilboa.
23.Shalev, Failure and Success in the Warning, n. 3 of ch. 4, p. 186.
24.Interview with Aharon Levran.
25.Moshe Dayan interview with Rami Tal, in Ronen Bergman and Gil Meltser, The Yom Kippur War: Real Time (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot, 2003), p. 180.
26.Interview with Yonah Bandman.
27.Zeira, Myth Versus Reality, pp. 155–56.
28.Ibid., pp. 151–63.
29.“Supplement of Supplements,” Israel Television Channel 1, interviewed by Dan Margalit, September 23–24, 2004.
30.Interview with Arieh Shalev.
31.Interview with Aharon Levran.
32.Bergman and Meltser, The Yom Kippur War, p. 175.
33.Zamir and Mass, With Open Eyes, p. 133.
34.Ibid., pp. 132–35.
35.Interviews with Zvi Zamir and Freddy Eini.
Chapter 6: Sadat’s Emissary for Special Affairs
1.Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 145; Robert Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (New York: Henry Holt, 2006), p. 151; Gerald Posner, Secrets of the Kingdom (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 80–82; Said K. Aburish, The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (London: Bloomsbury, 2005), p. 301; Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), p. 347; Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 226.
2.Mohamed Hassanein Heikal interview with Al Jazeera Television, December 17, 2009.
3.Fawzi, Secrets of the Assassination of Ashraf Marwan, p. 31. Other sources about the deal include: Jamaa, I Knew Sadat, pp. 216–18; Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, p. 653; Tharwat, Ashraf Marwan: Fact and Illusion, pp. 27–36.
4.Jeffrey Robinson, The Risk Takers (New York: HarperCollins, 1985), p. 122.
5.Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), pp. 346–47.
6.Gideon Gera, Gaddafi’s Way in Libya (Tel Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuhad, 1983), pp. 118–19.
7.John K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1982), pp. 6–7, 68.
8.Mohamed Hamad, “Egypt-Libya Relations from Revolution to War: Recollections of Salah al-Din al-Saadani, Egypt’s First Ambassador to Libya After the Revolution,” part 13, Al-Rei al-A’am (Kuwait), October 15, 1997, p. 12.
9.Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, pp. 652–53.
10.Tharwat, Ashraf Marwan: Fact and Illusion, p. 34.
11.Ibid.; Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, pp. 652–53.
12.“For 100,000 dollars a month . . . the ‘prophetic,’ one of the great weapons dealers of Egypt,” Al-Shaab, December 2, 2009.
13.Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, p. 652.
14.Fawzi, Secrets of the Assassination of Ashraf Marwan, p. 29.
15.Jamaa, I Knew Sadat, pp. 217–18; Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, p. 652; Fatah, Who Killed Ashraf Marwan?, p. 26.
16.Fatah, Who Killed Ashraf Marwan?, p. 31.
17.Jamaa, I Knew Sadat, pp. 184–85; Tharwat, Ashraf Marwan: Fact and Illusion, pp. 27–36.
18.Jamaa, I Knew Sadat, pp. 184–85; Tharwat, Ashraf Marwan: Fact and Illusion, pp. 35–36.
19.Jeffrey Robinson, Yamani: The Inside Story (London: Simon & Schuster, 1988), pp. 85–86.
20.Shazly, Crossing the Suez, pp. 148–49.
21.Conversation with Howard Blum, September 1, 2010.
22.Ronen Bergman, “The ‘Khotel’ Code,” Yediot Ahronot (7 Days Supplement), September 7, 2007, pp. 29–30.
Chapter 7: Egypt Girds for War
1.Eyal Zisser, “Syria and the October War: The Missed Opportunity,” in The October 1973 War: Politics, Diplomacy, Legacy, ed. Asaf Siniver (London: Hurst, 2013), pp. 67–83.
2.Uri Bar-Joseph and Amr Yossef, “The Hidden Factors That Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 4, pp. 584–608.
3.Arieh Braun, Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1992), p. 17.
4.Ibid., p. 18.
5.Ibid., pp. 17–18.
6.Rabin, Record of Service, p. 380.
7.Braun, Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War, p. 18.
8.Ibid., p. 19.
9.Interview with Avner Shalev, Tel Aviv, August 29, 1998. In 1973 Shalev served as the Chief of Staff’s aide-de-camp.
10.Branch 6, Intelligence Survey 15/73, January 24, 1973.
11.Lon Norden and David Nicole, Phoenix Over the Nile: A History of Egyptian Air Power, 1932–1994 (Washington, DC,: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1996), pp. 269–70.
12.Arieh Shalev, “Intelligence Assessment Before the War,” in National Trauma: The Yom Kippur War After Thirty Years and Another War, ed. Moshe Shemesh and Zeev Drori (Sdeh Boker: Ben-Gurion University, 2008), p. 117.
13.Commission of Inquiry—The Yom Kippur War, Additional Partial Report: Justifications and Additions to the Partial Report of 9 Nissan 5734 (January 4, 1974), vol. 1, Jerusalem (1974), p. 93 (hereafter: Agranat Commission, Third and Final Report).
14.Shalev, “Intelligence Assessment,” pp. 118–19.
15.Interview with Yonah Bandman.
16.For a detailed description of this discussion, see: Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep, 2005, pp. 69–70.
17.Ibid., pp. 71–73.
18.Shmuel Gordon, Thirty Hours in October, Fateful Decisions: The Air Force at the Start of the Yom Kippur War (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 2008), p. 193.
Chapter 8: Final Preparations and an Intermezzo in Rome
1.Braun, Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War, p. 28.
2.Time, July 30, 1973, p. 13.
3.Robinson, Yamani, pp. 84–86.
4.Hanoch Bartov, Dado: 48 Years and Another 20 Days (Or Yehuda: Dvir, 2002), pp. 237–39.
5.John K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm (New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1982), pp. 106–09.
6.Aaron J. Klein, The Master of Operations: The Story of Mike Harari (Jerusalem: Keter, 2014), pp. 16–20; Zamir and Mass, With Open Eyes, pp. 142–46; Mohamad Hamad, El-Rai el-A’am (Kuwait), October 15, 1997, p. 12; interview with Zvi Zamir, September 1, 2009; Oded Granot, “How Gaddafi and Sadat Conspired to Shoot Down an El Al Plane,” Maariv Sabbath Supplement, December 2, 1994; Nadav Zeevi, “The Betrayed: Senior Mossad and MI Officials Talk for the First Time About the Handling and Abandonment of Ashraf Marwan, Israel’s Number One Agent,” Maariv, December 28, 2007; Ilana Dayan, “The Last Spy: The Life and Death of Dr. Ashraf Marwan,” Fact (Uvda), Israel Television Channel 2, December 27, 2007; Maariv, September 6, 1973.
7.See, for example, Shalev, Failure and Success in the Warning, p. 133.
8.Agranat Commission, Third and Final Report, vol. 1.
Chapter 9: Signing at Sundown on Saturday
1.Mohamed Heikal, Mubarak and His Time . . . From the Podium to the Square (Cairo: Dar al-Shorouq, 2013), p. 257.
2.In a personal interview conducted with Zamir on August 19, 1998, Zamir rejected the commission’s report that he had used the word “imminent.” That, he claimed, is a word he ne
ver uses.
3.Transcripts of telephone conversations among Freddy Eini, Zvi Zamir, and Eli Zeira, in The Commission of Inquiry—Yom Kippur War: Additional Interim Report: Reasoning and Addenda for the Interim Report of April 1, 1974, vol. 1, Appendix A, “Actions of the Mossad in Early October,” pp. 51–52.
4.Braun, Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War, pp. 58–59, 61.
5.Shazly, Crossing the Suez, p. 213; El-Gamasy, The October War, p. 197.
6.“Mohammad Nusseir to the TV Show ‘Ahatraq’: Ashraf Marwan Didn’t Know When the October War Would Begin, and His Relations with Arab Intelligence Were Strong,” Al-Mizri Al-Yum, November 7, 2008, quotes from television interview given November 6, 2008. “So He Was in London on the 5th of October 1973!!” Egyptian Chronicles, October 23, 2008, http://egyptian chronicles.blogspot.com/2008/10/so-he-was-in-london-on-5th-of-october.html.
7.Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Books, 1975), pp. 15–16.
8.Howard Blum, The Eve of Destruction: The Untold Story of the Yom Kippur War (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), p. 120.
9.Yigal Kipnis, 1973: The Road to War (Charlottesville, VA.: Just World Books, 2013), pp. 46-47.
10.Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep, pp. 116–17, 148–49, 248–50. True, Zeira tried to claim on a number of occasions that he gave the order to deploy the special equipment forty hours before the war was launched (that is, Thursday night at 10:00 p.m. Israel time). However, Col. Yossi Langotsky, who at the time commanded the unit responsible for deploying them, stated that forty hours before the start of war, Zeira approved conducting a check of the equipment’s readiness (“tool check”) and insisted that they be turned off again on Friday at 6:00 a.m. The commander of the 848th Intelligence Unit, Col. Yoel Ben-Porat, told him personally that the equipment had been shut down at that time. Langotsky, who also checked with the soldiers who were physically involved (that is, who actually pushed the button), said that they were deployed operationally only “on the morning of Yom Kippur, a couple of hours before the war.” Yossi Langotsky, “The Truth About the ‘Special Means,’” Haaretz, December 20, 2005; personal correspondence with Yossi Langotsky.
11.Account of the events of Friday, October 6, according to Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep, pp. 141–86.
12.Zamir and Mass, With Open Eyes, p. 150.
Chapter 10: Dovecote
1.Personal interviews with Freddy Eini, Arieh Shalev, Avner Shalev, and Zvi Zamir.
2.Quoted from the transcript of the conversation, as it was recorded by Maj. Gen. Shlomo Gazit, coordinator of the territories, who was present at the meeting. Haaretz Weekend Supplement, January 1, 1999.
3.Bar-Joseph,The Watchman Fell Asleep, p. 199.
4.Prime Minister’s Office, National Archive, Summary of Consultations with the Prime Minister, October 6, 1973, 8:05 (recorded by Eli Mizrahi), http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/66FC5A72-27F7-41A6-9969-7ED71A097F57/0/yk6_10_0805.pdf.
5.For example: Prime Minister’s Office, National Archive, Meeting with the Prime Minister, October 7, 1973, 1450 hours (recorded by Eli Mizrahi), http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/0FC0ABE9-C023-466D-9B65-2502586EE0AF/0/yk7_10_1450.pdf.
6.Elchanan Oren, The History of the Yom Kippur War (Tel Aviv: IDF-History Department, 2013), pp. 112–13; Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amnon Reshef, We Will Never Cease! Brigade 14 in the War of Yom Kippur (Ot Yehuda: Dvir, 2013), pp. 94–95.
7.Motti Ashkenazi with Baruch Nevo and Nurit Ashkenazi, Tonight at Six There Will Be War (Tel Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuhad, 2003), pp. 61–67.
8.Braun, Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War, p. 82.
9.Telephone conversation with Eitan Karmi, August 27, 2010. “In the Middle of Yom Kippur, the IDF Spokesman Announced: ‘At approximately 2:00 p.m., the forces of Egypt and Syria launched an attack in Sinai and the Golan Heights. Our forces are working to fight the attackers,’” IAF website, http://iaf.org.il/843-13277-he/IAF.aspx.
10.Shimon Golan, Decision-Making of the Israeli High Command in the Yom Kippur War (Ben Shemen: Modan and IDF History Department, 2013), pp. 318–19, 328–29, 341–42, 369–70; Amiram Ezov, “‘Ministerial Recommendation’: The Southern Command During the Yom Kippur War—October 7, 1973—Thwarted the Counter-Attack,” in War Today: Studies of the Yom Kippur War, ed. Hagai Golan and Shaul Shai (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 2003), pp. 204–58, 208.
11.Ibid., p. 227.
12.Prime Minister’s Office, National Archive, Meeting with the Prime Minister, October 7, 1973, 2350 Hours (recorded by Eli Mizrahi), http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/FD8B4764-23C7-4D0B-8466-EA5FDB1C507B/0/yk7_10_2350.pdf; Prime Minister’s Office, National Archive, Meeting with the Prime Minister, October 8, 1973, 1950 Hours. Report of M-G Bar-Lev and Minister Alon After Surveying the Front (recorded by Eli Mizrahi), http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/A6A68F84-86A8-488D-8A3C-216644051639/0/yk8_10_1950.pdf.
13.Personal interview with Zvi Zamir, August 13, 1998.
Chapter 11: The Rise and Fall of Ashraf Marwan
1.“Sekretarijat za informacije,” Yugoslav Survey, vol. 17, 1976, p. 68.
2.Interview with Zvi Zamir, July 8, 2008; telephone conversation with Freddy Eini, October 1, 2010; Shimon Golan, “The Yom Kippur War: The Debate About Crossing the Canal on October 12, 1973,” in State Army Relations in Israel, 1948–1974, ed. Yehudit Ronen and Avraham Zohar (Tel Aviv: Golda Meir Memorial Association and the Israeli Society for Military History, 2004), pp. 128–45; Uri Bar-Joseph, “When the Gates Were Locked: MI in the Yom Kippur War,” in Mlechet Machshevet: 60 Years of Israeli Intelligence—A View from Within, ed. Amos Gilboa and Efraim Lapid (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot, 2008), pp. 70–77; Zeira, Myth Versus Reality, p. 162.
3.Hagai Tzoref, “The Director of the Mossad, Zvi Zamir, and Israel’s Leadership During the War of Yom Kippur.” An unpublished paper. Dr. Tzoref is a senior archivist in Israel’s National Archives, in charge of the archive’s collection of documents during Golda Meir’s tenure as prime minister (1969–1974).
4.Victor Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 103–14.
5.Tzoref, “The Director of the Mossad.”
6.Maariv, November 9, 1973; Maariv, December 4, 1973; Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 2008), p. 184.
7.Maariv, December 19, 1973.
8.Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 1061.
9.Maariv, May 7, 1974.
10.Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 844.
11.Le Carré, The Secret Pilgrim, p. 193.
12.Fawzi, Secrets of the Assassination of Ashraf Marwan, p. 17; Maariv, August 23, 1974.
13.Gerard Chaliand, ed., People Without a Country: Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 170; Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969–1977 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 185.
14.“Memorandum of conversation between: Mr. Ismail Fahmy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Dr. Ashraf Marwan, Presidential Secretary for Foreign Contacts, and Dr. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff, August 13, 1974, Madison Room, 8th Floor, Department of State,” National Security Archives, Washington, D.C., pp. 10–11.
15.“After the Jehan Sadat Interview: Shocking Secrets Revealed by Her Husband’s Friend,” Al-Arabiya Network, March 4, 2007.
16.Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 161, 167.
17.John Cooley, Unholy Wars (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 17; “Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Turki Al-Faisal Interview with the Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS),” March 2, 2006, http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2006/transcript/Page19.aspx.
18.Jo
seph J. Trento, Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America’s Private Intelligence Network and the Compromising of American Intelligence (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005), p. 5; Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), p. 111.
19.Heikal, Mubarak and His Time, p. 248.
20.Tharwat, Ashraf Marwan: Fact and Illusion, pp. 38–40.
21.J. C. Louis and Harvey Z. Yazikian, The Cola Wars: The Story of the Global Battle Between the Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo, Inc. (New York: Everest House, 1980), pp. 177–178.
22.Jamaa, I Knew Sadat:, p. 181.
23.Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, p. 653.
24.Jamaa, I Knew Sadat, pp. 216–18.
25.Maariv, October 15, 1975.
26.Al-Ahram, March 22, 1976.
27.Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, p. 655; Fawzi, Secrets of the Assassination of Ashraf Marwan, p. 32.
28.“The Arabs Diversify into the Arms Business,” BusinessWeek, October 31, 1977, pp. 31–32; Thomas Lippman, “The Arab Organization for Industry Signs Secret Agreements with France and Britain for Joint Production of Modern Weaponry,” Maariv, September 11, 1978.
29.Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, pp. 654–55; Fatah, Who Killed Ashraf Marwan?, pp. 33–34.
30.Fawzi, Secrets of the Assassination of Ashraf Marwan, p. 29; Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, p. 656.
31.Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, pp. 656–57.
32.Ibid., pp. 657–59; Tharwat, Ashraf Marwan: Fact and Illusion, pp. 36–38.
33.Al-Akhbar, October 12, 1978.
34.Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, pp. 656–57; Fatah, Who Killed Ashraf Marwan?, p. 43.
35.Fatah, Who Killed Ashraf Marwan? p. 44.
36.Maariv, October 17, 1978.
37.“Statement from Ashraf Marwan, Responding to Claims in the Book by (The Engineer) Osman Ahmed Osman,” Al-Akhbar al-Youm and Al-Ahram, April 16, 1981; Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, p. 665.
38.Sabri, Sadat: The Truth and the Legend, pp. 662–65.
Chapter 12: An Angel in the City, a Son-in-Law Exposed
1.Interview with Tom Bower; New York Times, December 28, 2004.
The Angel Page 34