Death to Tyrants!
Death to Tyrants!
Ancient Greek Democracy and the Struggle against Tyranny
David A. Teegarden
Copyright © 2014 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
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Jacket Art: Attic stammos. Harmodios and Aristogeiton murder the tyrant Hipparchos.
ca. 470 B.C., L 515 © Martin von Wagner Museum, University of Würzburg,
Germany. Photo: P. Neckermann.
All Rights Reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Teegarden, David Arlo, 1973–
Death to tyrants! : ancient Greek democracy and the struggle against tyranny / David A.
Teegarden.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-691-15690-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Tyrannicide (Greek law) 2. Greece—History—Age of Tyrants, 7th–6th centuries. I. Title.
KL4372.T44 2014
342.3808′54—dc23 2013015337
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
This book has been composed in Minion Pro and Myriad Pro
Printed on acid-free paper ∞
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Paola
Contents
List of Illustrations
ix
Preface
xi
List of Abbreviations
xiii
Introduction
1
Part I The Invention of Tyrant-Killing Legislation
Chapter 1
The Decree of Demophantos
15
Part II Tyrant-Killing Legislation in the Late Classical Period
Chapter 2
The Eretrian Tyrant-Killing Law
57
Chapter 3
The Law of Eukrates
85
Part III Tyrant-Killing Legislation in the Early Hellenistic Period
Chapter 4
The Anti-Tyranny Dossier from Eresos
115
Chapter 5
The Philites Stele from Erythrai
142
Chapter 6
The Ilian Tyrant-Killing Law
173
Conclusion
215
Appendix
The Number and Geographic Distribution of Different Regime Types from the Archaic to the Early Hellenistic Periods
221
Bibliography
237
Index
249
Illustrations
Figures
Figure 1.1. Roman copy of the Kritios and Nesiotes statue group.
33
Figure 1.2. Panathenaic prize amphora, circa 402.
46
Figure 3.1. Law of Eukrates, 337/6.
107
Figure A1. Regime type occurences over time.
223
Figure A2. Regime type distribution over time.
223
Tables
Table 1.1. The Law of Eukrates and the Decree of Demophantos
51
Table 4.1. Persian and Macedonian Games
123
Preface
Twice in the past quarter century the world watched in amazement as popular uprisings in multiple countries suddenly overthrew seemingly stable authoritarian regimes. Enough time has now passed to conclude that the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 led to the establishment of genuine democracies in several states. The outcome of the (still ongoing) Arab Spring is yet to be determined. But the recent elections in Tunisia and Egypt provide democracy supporters some basis for cautious optimism. At the very least, authoritarianism is in retreat in that part of the world.
These uprisings provoked such widespread amazement because they are difficult to accomplish and thus surprising. This is somewhat ironic, of course: one would initially suppose that, if an overwhelming percentage of the population wanted to overthrow the ruling regime, they would do so. But that obviously is not the case. Authoritarian regimes know that, through intimidation and the control of publicly known information, they can prevent the people from acting together in numbers sufficient enough to pose any real threat. A few brave radicals might protest the regime; but the majority will stay silent out of fear, all the while hoping that their fellow citizens join in the protest. Thus despised regimes maintain their hold on power.
These modern-day examples from Europe and the Arab world suggest that the capacity to effect a large-scale popular uprising, although difficult, is virtually a necessary condition for combating tyranny and preserving democracy. If the majority cannot draw upon their collective strength and impose their will, elites will dominate the state with varying degrees of benevolence or (more likely) malevolence. If the masses learn to work together and take advantage of their numerical superiority, however, the tyrant is helpless. Thus all tyrannical regimes seek to hinder their citizens’ efforts to coordinate, while genuinely democratic regimes do the opposite. And history tells us that most often the anti-democratic forces win. But there are two conspicuous exceptions: the modern world and the ancient Greek world.
In this book, I demonstrate that the ancient Athenians invented, and the citizens of many Greek poleis subsequently adopted, an institution that facilitated large-scale, pro-democracy uprisings: tyrant-killing law. This peculiar law type essentially harnessed the dynamics of bandwagoning. It encouraged brave individuals to strike the first public blow against a nondemocratic regime—to “kill a tyrant”—and convinced everybody else that, should he follow the tyrant killer’s lead, other individuals would follow. Thus, in the event of a coup, somebody would likely commit a conspicuous act of political defiance and thereby precipitate an ever-growing pro-democracy cascade. It was a simple, yet profound invention. And I will argue that it contributed to the success of democracy in the ancient Greek world.
Democracy ultimately represents a victory of the nonelite masses over the elite and powerful few. But the victory is not “once and for all.” I think it is safe to say that there always have been and always will be enemies of democracy: individuals and groups that seek to overthrow the people and hold the reigns of power themselves. The ancient Greeks learned how to combat those forces and thereby helped to ensure the success of democracy for several generations—the world’s first democratic age. I suspect that the length and scope of our modern democratic age will likewise depend on how well pro-democrats learn to draw upon their collective strength and combat the modern “tyrannical” threats.
I received a lot of support during the years that I worked on this book. Josiah Ober’s advice and encouragement has been crucial; he oversaw this project when it was in its dissertation phase (Princeton 2007) and has been very helpful ever since. The Loeb Classical Library Foundation awarded me a generous fellowship so that I could devote the entire academic year of 2010–11 to research and writing. The Department of History at Cornell University kindly provided me a home for that year as a visiting scholar. At Cornell, I learned a lot about Greek history from my many conversations with Barry Strauss. The University at Buffalo generously granted me a leave for the academic year of 2010–11. My colleagues in the Department of Classics at UB have been very supportive; I would like to thank Martha Malamud in particular. The two anonymous readers of both Hesperia (which published in article form what is now chapter 1) and Princeton University Press provided many helpful suggesti
ons for improvement. And finally, my wife Paola. I could not have written this book without her support, good humor, and sage advice. I dedicate it to her.
Abbreviations
ARV2
J. D. Beazley, Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963).
ATL
B. D. Meritt et al., Documents on the Athenian Tribute Lists, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939–53).
Austin
M. M. Austin, The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
CIG
A. Boeckh, Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1828–77; repr., Hildesheim: Subsidia Epigraphica, 1977).
DK
H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed., 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1952).
FGrH
F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, 15 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann and Brill, 1923–58).
HD
Phillip Harding, From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
I. Ephesos
H. Wankel et al., Die Inschriften von Ephesos, 8 vols. (Bonn: Habelt, 1979–84).
I. Erythrai
Helmut Engelmann and Reinhold Merkelbach, Die Inschriften von Erythrai und Klazomenai, 2 vols. (Bonn: Habelt, 1972–73).
I. Ilion
Peter Frisch, Die Inschriften von Ilion, (Bonn: Habelt, 1975).
I. Labraunda
J. Crampa, Greek Inscriptions, in Labraunda: Swedish Excavations and Researches, 2 vols. (Lund: Gleerup, 1969–72).
I. Priene
F. Hiller von Gaertringen, Die Inschriften von Priene (Berlin: Reimer, 1906).
IErythMcCabe
D. F. McCabe and J. V. Brownson, Erythrai Inscriptions: Texts and Lists (Princeton, N.J.: Institute for Advanced Study, 1986; online edition at http://epigraphy.packhum.org/inscriptions/.)
IG
Inscriptiones Graecae (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1873–).
IJG
R. Dareste, B. Haussoullier, and T. Reinach, Recueil des inscriptions juridiques grecques: Texte, traduction, commentaire, 2 vols. (Paris, 1894–1904; repr., Rome: Studia juridica 6, 1965).
IOSPE
B. Latyšev, Inscriptiones Antiquae Orae Septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: Petropoli, 1885–1901).
LSJ
A Greek-English Lexicon, compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, revised and augmented by Sir Henry Stuart Jones, 9th ed., with supplement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968).
ML
Russell Meiggs and David M. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).
OGIS
W. Dittenberger, Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1903–5; repr., Chicago: Ares, 2001).
RC
C. B. Welles, Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period: A Study in Greek Epigraphy (New Haven, 1934; repr., Chicago: Ares, 1974).
RO
P. J. Rhodes and Robin Osborne, Greek Historical Inscriptions: 404–323 B.C. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
SdA
H. Bengtson and H. H. Schmitt, Die Staatsverträge des Altertums, 2 vols. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1962–69).
SEG
Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum (Leiden: Brill, 1923–).
Syll.3
W. Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, 4 vols., 3rd ed. (Leipzig, 1915–24; repr., Chicago: Ares, 1999).
TGR
P. C. Rossetto and G. P. Sartorio, Teatri greci e romani: alle origini del linguaggio rappresentato (Rome: Edizioni SEAT, 1994).
Tit. Calymnii
M. Segre, Tituli Calymnii (Bergamo: Instituto italiano d’Arti Grafiche, 1952).
Tod
M. N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1933–48).
Death to Tyrants!
Introduction
A deciding factor for the survival of a democratic regime in an ancient Greek polis was the capability of its supporters to defeat their domestic opponents in an armed confrontation. If they had that capability, pro-democrats (the dēmos) would have the power (kratos) to impose their will. The polis would thus be governed by a dēmokratia. If pro-democrats did not have such capability, however, anti-democrats would take control of the polis and impose their will. The polis then would be governed by either an oligarchy or a tyranny.1
Whether or not the pro-democrats of a given polis could defeat their domestic opponents depended largely on the number of men who would mobilize on the pro-democrats’ behalf. It is true that, on average, anti-democrats likely had important advantages, such as greater financial resources, superior weaponry and training, important interpersonal connections, and more free time to plot and to plan. Thus one pro-democrat did not necessarily “pack the same punch” as one anti-democrat. Nevertheless, the deciding factor in an armed confrontation almost certainly would come down to numbers: the pro-democrats’ chances for victory increasing in more or less direct proportion to the extent of their numerical superiority over their anti-democrat opponents.
This logic is simple, but it could be quite challenging for pro-democrats to mobilize in response to a well-organized coup. The most crucial explanatory dynamic is straightforward: an individual pro-democrat who publicly defended his regime with insufficient support from his fellow pro-democrats would almost certainly be killed. In the event of a coup, therefore, individual pro-democrats likely would give no clear public indication of their actual political preference and would wait for a large number of people to join the fight before they thought it safe enough to join. As a result, an insufficient number of pro-democrats would fight in defense of their democracy and the anti-democratic regime would retain power. The pro-democrats would thus have had what I call a “revolutionary coordination problem.”
Despite the apparent difficulty involved in mobilizing in defense of a given democracy, democratic regimes flourished in the ancient Greek world during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods. Data culled from Hansen and Nielsen’s Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis supports two crucial points. First, with respect to those cites for which the Inventory provides information on regime type, the percentage of cities that experienced a democracy, however briefly, increased over time: 8 percent (6 out of 76 cities) experienced democracy at some point during the second half of the sixth century;2 18 percent (16 out of 89) did so in the first half of the fifth century; 40 percent (51 out of 126) did in the second half of the fifth century; 46 percent (54 out of 117) did in the first half of the fourth century; and 46 percent (52 out of 112 cities) did at some point in the second half of the fourth century. Second, the number of geographic regions that contained at least one polis that experienced democracy increased over time: during the second half of the sixth century, there is evidence for democratically governed poleis in five (out of thirty-nine) regions; during the first half of the fifth century the number rises to twelve; in the second half of the fifth century it is twenty-one regions; for the first half of the fourth century it is also twenty-one; and the number of regions rises to twenty-four in the second half of the fourth century. The data, admittedly, are noisy and often problematic. But the trend is clear: the ancient Greek world became increasingly more densely democratic during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods.3
In light of the preceding comments, it appears reasonable to suspect that democratic regimes flourished in the ancient Greek world in large part because their supporters developed methods or mechanisms to mobilize en masse in response to coup d’états—to solve the revolutionary coordination problem. That is, admittedly, a simple conclusion. But there would seem to be only three principal objections. And each may be countered.
The first objection is that most democratic regimes survived, in large part, because they did not have motivated do
mestic opposition. That there were anti-democrats in most cities is obvious—there can be very little doubt about it.4 But it does not necessarily follow that the anti-democrats in the various cities were sufficiently motivated to overthrow democracies. They might have concluded, for example, that the democratic status quo—despite its injustice (in their minds)—was tolerable. Or perhaps they had been effectively socialized by pro-democracy ideology. They might actually think that democratic governance advances their interests.5
This “lack of credible domestic opposition” theory is not particularly persuasive. First, stasis was a common problem for most poleis from the Archaic through the early Hellenistic periods. Hansen and Nielsen’s Inventory (index 19), for example, records 279 instances of stasis in 122 different poleis. And, as Hansen and Nielsen note (p. 125), those numbers—impressive as they are—do not capture the full extent of the phenomenon. It is thus reasonable to conclude that most regimes, be they democratic, oligarchic, or tyrannical, had motivated domestic opposition.6 Second, literary passages clearly suggest that, generally speaking, oligarchs in most cities were eager to overthrow the governing democracy. The fifth-century author known as the Old Oligarch, for example, wrote (1.5) that “everywhere on earth the best element (to beltiston) is opposed to democracy.” And according to Aristotle (Pol. 1310a8–12) the oligarchs in some poleis swore, “I will be hostile to the dēmos and will plan whatever evil I can against them.”7
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