Thanks to two lengthy articles written by Denis Knoepfler and published in Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique, scholars now have a much longer text of the Eretrian anti-tyranny law.15 Knoepfler’s original project was to publish the editio princeps of an inscription, found near ancient Eretria in 1958, that contained anti-tyranny language. In the course of his study, however, Knoepfler (following a suspicion first articulated by V. Petrakos and then by many others) concluded that the newly discovered stone and the fragment discovered by Baumeister in 1854 were, in fact, part of the same stele.16 Knoepfler then re-edited the old, lost fragment (with significant restorations) and published it along with the editio princeps of the new, much larger fragment. As a result, scholars now have much of the original law: only (perhaps) four or five lines are missing completely.
Here is Knoepfler’s text of the Eretrian tyrant-killing law and an original English translation. “Old Fragment” refers to the stone fragment discovered by Baumeister in 1854. “New Fragment” refers to the stone fragment discovered in 1958. The vast majority of the Greek text of the old fragment and about one-third of the text of the new fragment have been restored by Knoepfler. The underlining in the following translation attempts to demonstrate what parts of the translation do not come from restored sections (i.e., the underlined parts are actually on the stone).17
ΣΤΟΙΧ. 51
(Old Fragment)
[θε]ο[ί].
[οἱ πρόβουλοι καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ εἶπον· τύ]χει ἀ[γα]θεῖ τοῦ δ[ήμου το]-
[ῦ Ἐρετριῶν· ὅπωρ ἂν καθιστῆται ἐν τεῖ πόλει ἡ] μ[ετὰ] ἀλλήλω[ν ὁμόν]-
[οια καὶ φιλίη, ἔδοξε τεῖ βουλεῖ καὶ τοῖ δήμοι· ἄτι]μ̣ον εἶναι τὸ[ν τ]-
5
[ύραννον καὶ γένος τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὃς ἂν] τύραννίδι ἐπι[θ]ῆται· ὃς [δ]-
[ὲ ἂν ἀποκτείνει τὸν τυραννίζοντα ἢ τὸ]ν τ[ύ]ραννον, ἂμ μὲν π[ο]λ[ίτη]-
[ς εἶ, δίδοσθαι αὐτοῖ ---- 10 ---- καὶ στῆσα]ι αὐτ[οῦ π]αρὰ [τὸν βωμὸ]-
[ν τὸν --------18–------ εἰκόνα χαλκῆν] καὶ εἶ[ναι αὐτοῖ προε]-
[δρίην εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας οὓς ἡ πόλις τίθηριν] καὶ σίτηριν αὐτο[ῖ ἐμ]
10
[πρυτανείοι ἕως ἂν ζεῖ· ἐὰν δὲ ἀποθάνει ὁ ἀπ]οκτε[ίν]ας τὸν [τύρανν]-
[ον ἢ τὸν ἡγεμόνα τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ?, ἐκείνου] τοῖς π[αɩ]ρὶ δ[ίδ]ο[σθαι,]
[ἂμ μὲν ἄρρενες ὦριν, ἑκάστοι τὴν δωρειὰν] τὴν γεγραμμέ[νην ὅταν]
[εἰς τὴν νομίμην ἡλικίην ἀφίκωνται· θυγ]ατέρες δὲ [ἂν ὦριν, λαμβά]-
[νειν ἑκάστην αὐτῶν εἰς ἔκδοσιν χιλίας ?] δραχμ[ὰς ὅταν τεττάρω]-
15
[ν καὶ δέκα ἐτέων γέγωνται ---- 12 ----]ΙΝΑ[------ 15 ------]
(New Fragment)
[------------------------ 33 ------------------------ εἰ δ̣ὲ] μή, ὅσ̣[οι] ἂ̣ν̣ βούλων-
[ται------------------ 23 -------------- εἰς τὴν] βουλὴ̣ν̣ ἢ̣ εἰ̣[ς] τὰ ἱερὰ ἐν Τ̣-
[------------------------ 32 ------------------------]Ι̣ΑΝ ἤ̣ τ̣ι̣[ς] τ̣ῶν βουλευτέ-
[ων ἢ ἀρχόντων, καὶ(περ or τῆς) βουλῆς ἀπα]γορ̣
[ευ]ούρης αὐτοῖ, ἀποδημεῖ, πα̣-
5
[ραχρῆμα ἐκεῖνος τῆ]ς τε ἀρχῆς [ἀποπαυέσ̣]θω καὶ ἔστω ἄτιμος καὶ [α]-
[ὐτὸς καὶ γένος ὡς ὁ] τ̣ὸν δῆμον καταλύ[ω]ν̣, καὶ ἐάν τις τήνδε τὴν πο[λ]-
[ιτείην ἐπιχειρε]ῖ καταλύειν τ̣ὴ̣ν̣ ν̣ῦ̣ν̣ οὔρην ἢ λέγων ἢ ἐπιψηφίζ[ω]-
[ν, ἄν τε ἄρχων ἄν τε] ἰδιώτης, ἄτιμος ἔστω καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δ̣[ημ]-
[όσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς] Ἀρτέμιδος τῆς Ἀ̣μ̣αρυρίης ἱερὸν τὸ ἐπιδέκατ[ο]-
10
[ν καὶ ταφῆναι μὴ ἐ]ξέστω ἐν τεῖ γεῖ τεῖ Ἐρετριάδι καὶ ἄν τις [αὐτὸ]-
[ν ἤ τινα αὐτοῦ ἀπο]κ̣τείνει,18 καθαρὸς ἔστω χεῖρας καὶ αἱ δωρεια̣ὶ̣ [ἔ]-
[στων κατὰ ταὐτὰ κ]α̣θάπερ γέγραπται ἐν τεῖ στήλει ἐάν τις τὸν [τύ]-
[ραννον ἀποκτείν]ει. τοῖ δὲ λέγοντι παρὰ τοῦτα ἢ πρήττο[ν]τ̣ι κατ[α]-
[ρᾶσθαι ἱερέας κα]ὶ̣ ἱερίδας Διονυρίοις τε καὶ Ἀρτεμιρίοις μ̣ή̣[τ]-
15
[ε παῖδας ἐξ αὐτῶν] γυναῖκας τίκτειν κατὰ νόμον, μήτε πρόβατα μ[ή]-
[τε γῆν εὐθηνεῖσ]θ̣αι· εἰ δὲ καὶ γίνοιντο, μὴ γίνεσθαι αὐτῶν [γ]ν̣ηρ̣[ί]-
[ους παῖδας, ἀλλὰ] τ̣ούσδε πανοικίει πάντας ἀπολέσθαι.19 ἐάν τις ἐ[πι]-
[ψηφίζει ἢ γράφει] ἢ φέρει, ἄν τε ἄρχων ἄν τε ἰδιώτης, ὡς δεῖ ἄλλην τι-
[νὰ καθιστάναι πο]λιτείαν Ἐρετριᾶς ἀλλ᾿ ἢ βουλὴν καὶ πρυτανείη-
20
[ν ἐκ πάντων Ἐρετρ]ι̣ῶν κληρωτὴν καθάπερ γέγραπται· ἂν δέ τις κ[αθ]-
[ιστεῖ ἢ τυραννίδα] ἢ ὀλιγαρχίην καὶ ἐγβιάρηται, παραχρῆμα βοη-
[θεῖν πολίτας ἅπαντ]ας τοῖ δήμοι20 καὶ μάχην ἅπτειν τοῖς διακωλύ-
[ρουρι τὴν ἐκκληρίη]ν καὶ πρυτανείην, ἕκαστον ἡγείμενον αὑτὸν
[ἱκανὸν μάχεσθαι ἄνε̣]υ̣ [π]αρανγέλματος. ἂν δέ τι συμβαίνει ἀδυνα-
25
[τέον κατασχεῖν τὸ Ἀγ]ο̣ρ̣αῖον παραχρῆμα ὥστ᾿ ἐ̣[ξ]ε[ῖν]αι τεῖ βουλεῖ
[καθῖσαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ ἂν] ἀποκλεισθεῖ ὁ δῆμος τῶν τειχέων, καταλ-
[αμβάνειν χωρίον τι τῆ]ς Ἐρετριάδος ὅ τι ἂν δοκεῖ σύνφορον εἶνα-
[ι πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ συνελθεῖ]ν τοὺς β[οη]θέοντας πάντας· καταλαβόντα-
[ς δὲ ὑποδέχεσθαι τὸν ἐλθ]όντα καὶ βολόμενον τῶν Ἑλλήνων βοηθε-
30
[ῖν τοῖ δήμοι τοῖ Ἐρετριῶν.] ἂν δέ τις Ἐρετριῶν μὴ βοηθήρει τοῖ δή-
[μοι, εἰσανγέλλειν τεῖ πρυ]τανείει καθάπερ γέγραπται καὶ μάχη-
[ν συνάπτειν αὐτοῖ· ὁπόροι] δ᾿ ἂν Ἐρετριῶν καταλαβόντες τι τῆς χώ-
[ρης τ᾿ αὐτόνομον καὶ ἐλεύθ]ερον ποιήρωρι τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἐρετριῶ-
[ν, τούτοις μέρος τι διαδιδ]όσθω τῆς γῆς καὶ τῆς οὐσίης τῶν ὑπομε-
35
[ινάντων ἄρχεσθαι τεῖ τυρα]ννίδι ἢ ἄλλει τινὶ πο�
�ιτείει ἀλλ᾿ ἢ β-
[ουλεῖ ἐκ πάντων κληρωτεῖ.] vacat
(Old Fragment)
Gods.
The probouloi and the strategoi proposed: for the good fortune of the dēmos of Eretria: in order that concord and friendship with one another may be established in the city, resolved by the council and the dēmos. The tyrant, his offspring, and whoever makes an attempt at tyranny shall be without rights. And whoever kills a member of the tyrant’s faction or the tyrant, if he is a citizen, … shall be given to him … and stand near the altar his … bronze statue. And he shall have a front seat at the festivals that the polis sponsors and public maintenance in the town hall as long as he lives. And if the killer of the tyrant or the leader of an oligarchy dies, to his children, should they be male, to each shall be given the written reward whenever they reach the legal age. And should they be daughters, each shall receive one thousand drachmas as a dowry whenever they turn fourteen.
(New Fragment)
Otherwise, whoever wishes … to the council or to the holy places in … or a councilor or magistrate, although the council forbids him, travels abroad, he shall be deprived of office immediately and be without rights, both he and his offspring, because he is dissolving the dēmos. And if someone attempts to dissolve this regime—the one now in existence—by making a proposal or putting a measure to vote, should he be a magistrate or a private citizen, he shall be without rights and his property shall be confiscated with one tenth consecrated to Artemis Amarynthos, and he shall not be buried in the land of Eretria. And if someone kills him or his family member, his hands shall be pure and he shall receive the rewards for these things just as is written in the stele if someone kills the tyrant. And against one speaking or acting contrary to these [measures] the priests and priestesses shall pronounce a curse at the Dionysia and Artemisia that [their] wives do not bear their sons as is customary (κατὰ νόμον) nor [their] flock nor land flourish; and if [sons] are born, that they are not their legitimate sons, but that all of them, together with their house, be utterly ruined.21 If someone, either magistrate or private citizen, puts it to a vote, writes up a draft, or votes that the Eretrians must establish some regime other than a council and prytaneia appointed by lot from all Eretrians just as is written; and if someone establishes either a tyranny or an oligarchy and uses force, all citizens must assist the dēmos immediately and join in battle against those who will prevent [a meeting of] the assembly and prytaneia, each considering himself competent to fight without an order. But, if it is impossible to secure the Agoraion immediately in order for the council to convene according to the law, or if the dēmos is shut out of the walls, secure some Eretrian stronghold, whatever seems advantageous for all helpers to arrive at; after securing [the stronghold], receive any Greek who arrives and wishes to help the dēmos of Eretria. And if an Eretrian does not help the dēmos, impeach him before the prytaneia just as is written and join in battle against him. To the Eretrians who secure some territory and make the dēmos of Eretria autonomous and free shall be distributed a part of the land and property of those who remained behind to be ruled by a tyranny or some regime other than a council appointed by lot from all.
Eretrian pro-democrats clearly promulgated their tyrant-killing law in order to defend their democracy against attacks launched by anti-democrats (variously referred to in the law as tyrants, partisans of tyrants, and, obliquely, as oligarchs). It is also clear that the threat posed by those anti-democrats was very serious: one need note only that the law envisions as a distinct possibility the anti-democrats shutting “the dēmos” out of the city walls. One might thus wonder whether or not the promulgation of this tyrant-killing law actually helped the Eretrian democrats maintain control of their polis. The primary objective of this chapter is to answer that simple question. Doing so, however, will require a thorough analysis of the law’s provisions and its historical and sociopolitical context.
This chapter defends the following thesis: the promulgation of the Eretrian tyrant-killing law played an important role in defending Eretria’s newly reinstated democratic regime against internal subversion during the years immediately following the Athenian led liberation of 341. The arguments in support of that thesis are presented in three sections. In the first section, I argue that the Eretrian pro-democrats quite likely would have lost control of their polis shortly after the Athenian-led liberation, if no serious attempt were made to facilitate their efforts to mobilize in defense of their regime (i.e., to solve a revolutionary coordination problem). I next argue that, by promulgating their tyrant-killing law, the Eretrian democrats greatly increased the likelihood that they would successfully mobilize in defense of their regime (i.e., overcome a potential revolutionary coordination problem) and thus likely would have deterred anti-democrats from attempting a coup. And in the final section, I argue that the Eretrian democrats maintained secure control of their polis, under very difficult circumstances, for several years after they promulgated their tyrant-killing law.
Threats to Stability
The comments presented in this section demonstrate that the Eretrian pro-democrats quite likely would have lost control of their polis shortly after the Athenian-led liberation of 341, if no serious attempt were made to facilitate their efforts to mobilize in defense of their regime. Counterfactuals are problematic, of course: it is impossible to say for certain what would have happened if something else did not happen. It is important to note, however, that it is, in fact, necessary to answer a counterfactual in order to determine whether or not any attempt to solve a particular problem actually “worked.” For example, in order to determine whether or not the United States’ massive bank bailout of 2008 stabilized that country’s financial system, one must first determine what would have happened to their financial system if no action had been taken. Only after it was demonstrated that the banking system would have failed if nothing had been done could someone determine persuasively whether or not, and to what extent, the bailout helped prevent that failure. The same logic applies to the study of the Eretrian tyrant-killing law.22
This section’s argument rests on two complementary points. The first point is that, during the generation prior to the Athenian-led liberation of 341, Eretrian democrats had been consistently unable to maintain control of their polis, instead regularly being subdued by strongmen. The historical record is clear on that point. The Eretrians joined the Second Athenian League in 377 as a democratically governed polis.23 But quite likely in 370, and certainly by 366, they lost control of the polis to a strongman named Themison.24 The date of Themison’s fall from power is not known. It is almost certain, however, that Eretrian democrats again controlled the polis in 357/6, after the Athenians invaded Euboia in either 358/7 or 357/6 (Knoepfler [1995: 334n100]) and drove out the Thebans.25 But their regime was not long lasting: by 352, Menestratos, another autocrat—whom Demosthenes (23.124) politely referred to as a dynastēs—dominated Eretrian politics.26 He fell quickly too; and by 349, another strongman, not the dēmos, named Ploutarchos controlled the polis. When Ploutarchos fell from power (perhaps in 344/3), the Eretrian democrats governed their polis yet again.27 But, true to form, they retained control for only a matter of months: in 343 (perhaps in the summer), a faction led by Kleitarchos and two other men seized control of the polis.28 Thus during the generation prior to the Athenian led liberation, the Eretrians had three different (all failed) democratic regimes covering (collectively) about twelve years (377–370, 357–353, 344–343) and four different “strongman” regimes covering about eighteen years (370–357, 353–349, 349–344, 343–341).
The second complementary point is that, after the Athenian-led liberation of 341, would-be Eretrian strongmen, enjoying Philip’s support and encouragement, almost certainly would have attempted to overthrow the recently reinstated Eretrian democracy. In defense of that point, one might note, first, that Philip had a motive to assist a would-be Eretrian strongman’s efforts to overthrow the
Eretrian democracy. The fact that he sent mercenary forces to Eretria on three different occasions within one year clearly demonstrates that Philip thought that the control of that city was in his strategic interest. And it is also possible that Philip believed that his credibility was at stake: Macedonian sympathizers in other poleis might no longer trust him if he did not follow through with his commitment to the strongmen in Eretria. In addition to motive, Philip would have had ample opportunity to assist would-be Eretrian strongmen in overthrowing the Eretrian democracy. As the previous paragraph suggests, there seems to have been no shortage of Eretrians who wanted to dominate their polis. And even an apparently pro-democratic leader could be “flipped” and support a narrow oligarchy; such was quite likely the case, for example, with the “tyrant” Kleitarchos.29 And finally, the chances were quite good that a would-be Eretrian strongman would succeed in taking control of the city: the Eretrians clearly had a bad track record of defending their democracy; and the fact that they recently lost control of the polis once again might very well have lowered their moral even further.30 It would thus be worth the risk to stage a Macedonian-backed coup.
Death to Tyrants! Page 10