Conclusion
Philip II posed the most serious threat to democratic governance on the Greek mainland since—at least—Sparta’s victory in the Peloponnesian War. On the one hand, he could threaten a democratically governed polis from the outside: he had accumulated sufficient military and economic resources to simply overpower a polis.61 On the other hand, and perhaps most noteworthy, he could threaten a democratically governed polis from the inside. He appears to have known that democracy’s weak link was the difficulty its supporters had in mobilizing effectively in its defense. And he certainly knew that he could find reliable partners in the various cities to help him exploit that vulnerability. Indeed, such a partnership would be “win-win”: Philip would acquire loyal puppet regimes on the cheap; anti-democrats would be able to dominate their domestic opponents. It thus was with reason that Demosthenes feared for the future of democracy.62
Eretrian pro-democrats, however, demonstrated that it was possible to counter Philip’s attempts to overthrow a democratic regime from the inside. Their main weapon, of course, was a thoroughly crafted tyrant-killing law—a tool that facilitated coordinated mass action by the (majority) pro-democrats in response to a coup attempt by the (minority) anti-democrats. Philip, despite the promulgation of that law, likely still could overthrow the Eretrian democracy. But he would have to do so from the outside. And that would be much more costly.
It is tempting to connect the success of the Eretrian democrats to the subsequent popularity of tyrant-killing legislation. Arguments from silence are problematic, of course. But it is quite striking to note, first, that all extant (i.e., on stone) tyrant-killing enactments were promulgated during the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods—that is, during a period wherein the nature and extent of a king’s influence in the domestic affairs of the various Greek poleis was being worked out for the first time. Second, the law from Eretria is the earliest such enactment. Perhaps the Eretrians (and, of course, the Athenians) taught the wider Greek world that tyrant-killing law could facilitate pro-democrats’ efforts to maintain control of their city—and not just in Athens.
* * *
1 The Macedonian supported invasions of Eretria: Dem. 9.57–8. The Macedonian invasion of Oreos: Dem. 9.59–62. It should be noted that Cawkwell (1978b: 131–32) doubts that Philip was behind the invasions of Euboia. His reasoning: (1) Philip does not appear to have supported those regimes subsequently; (2) Demosthenes did not emphasize the Macedonian invasion in Euboia in his speech On the Chersonese, a speech likely delivered only a few weeks before his Third Philippic and wherein reference to the invasion of Euboia would have strengthened the case that Diopeithes should not be recalled—the argument advanced in that speech. Denis Knoepfler (1995: 347n144) understandably rejects Cawkwell’s position as being too dismissive of Demosthenes’s repeated assertions. The date of the invasion of the Macedonian sponsored invasion of Euboia is also debated. The chronology accepted above is that of Ellis (1976: 162–66). Sealey (1993: 260), however, argues that the first invasion of Eretria (led by Hipponikos) took place in 343 and before the trial of Aischines, which took place in autumn of 343. This disagreement of date is largely due to different interpretations of Demosthenes’s repeated references in De Falsa Legatione—a speech delivered at the trial of Aischines—to Philip’s action in Euboia (87, 204, 326, 334). Sealey (1993: 260) concludes that Demosthenes referred to Hipponikos’s mission in that speech. Ellis (1976: 279n109), however, argues that Demosthenes simply amplified Philip’s diplomatic (as opposed to militaristic) moves in Euboia. Ellis rests his case on the fact that that Hegesippos, in chapter 32 of On Halonnesus (a speech perhaps dating to early 342 and wrongly attributed to Demosthenes), does not mention an invasion of Eretria as one of Philip’s misdeeds.
2 On the importance of Skiathos, see Dem. 4.32. It is to be noted that the Athenians had troops there at least as late as 344/3 (IG II2 1443, 106–8). Demosthenes often wrote that Philip intervened in Euboia in order to secure a “base of operations” against Athens and Athenian interests: Dem. 8.36, 66; 10.8, 68; 18.71; 19.326 (hormētēria).
3 Karystos was important for Athens’s grain supply due to the proximity of Cape Geraistos: Strabo 10 C444; cf. Dem. 4.34. Twice, in his De Corona (230, 241), Demosthenes wrote that, if the Athenians had not controlled Euboia in the war with Philip, pirates (lēstai) would have harassed Attika and disrupted shipping routes.
4 This unfortunate period in fourth-century Athenian history began when the Athenians invaded Eretria in order to support Ploutarchos (the pro-Athenian “tyrant”) in his struggle against Kleitarchos (the man subsequently secured in power by the Macedonian-led invasions of 342). The Athenian invasion backfired in large part because Kallias and his brother Taurosthenes mobilized a pan-Euboian response. For this episode, see Parke (1929); Cawkwell (1962); Carter (1971); Picard (1979: 240–45). The primary ancient sources: Plut. Phok. 12–14; Aischin. 3.86–88.
5 The invasions were pursuant to a decree drafted by Demosthenes: Dem. 18.79. The date for the overthrow of the regime at Oreos: Philochoros, F 159 with Schol. Aischin. 3.85 (confirming the month Skirophorion, which must be restored in the Philochoros fragment). The date for the overthrow of the regime at Eretria cannot be pinpointed to a certain month within the year 341/0. But the entry in Philochoros (F 160) apparently cited the Athenian-led liberation of Eretria after the words ἐπὶ τούτου (“during that man’s [sc., archonship]”—that man being Nikomachos, archon in 341/0). And it is widely held that citations immediately following that chronological marker (i.e., ἐπὶ τούτου) occurred early in the year. Additional sources for the liberation of Eretria: Diod. Sic. 16.74.1; Schol. Aischin. 3.103 (where it is explicitly stated that the tyrant was killed).
6 That the Athenians mounted catapults on ships during the siege of Eretria is inferred from Athenian naval inventories (IG II2 1627, B, lines 328–41 [year = 330/29]). Knoepfler (2002: 196n256) accepts the use of ship-mounted catapults during the siege. Marsden (1969: 57–58), however, does not; he suggests that the “frames of the catapults from Eretria” (πλαίσια καταπαλτῶν ἐξ Ἐρετρίας) were given to the Eretrians by Philip II in order to help defend Eretria against the Athenian-led invasion. According to that interpretation, the frames (πλαίσια) were subsequently brought home by the victorious Athenians as booty. It should be noted, however, that Alexander used ship-mounted machines during the siege of Tyre (Arr. Anab. 2.21.7). It is thus conceivable that the Athenians used ship-mounted catapults nine years earlier.
7 For this inscription, see Knoepfler (1995: 346–59).
8 Knoepfler (1995: 364) supports this general conclusion.
9 It should be noted that a few months after the Athenians and Eretrians made their alliance, Eretria and Oreos joined the Euboian League and thus no longer paid “contributions” (syntaxeis) to the Athenians—although they were still in a bilateral alliance with Athens (Knoepfler [1995: 355–59]). The joining of those two poleis (Eretria and Oreos) to the Chalkis-dominated Euboian League was done pursuant to a successful decree of Demosthenes (Aischin. 3.85–105). Some scholars (e.g., Cawkwell [1978a], Sealey [1993]), however, believe that the Athenian assembly promulgated Demosthenes’s decree in late 343/early 342—that is, before the liberation of Oreos and Eretria. Those scholars thus associate the decree with Athens’s resistance to Philip’s advance on Ambrakia. But the arguments for dating that decree to late 341/early 340—i.e., after the liberation of Oreos and Eretria—are stronger. See Brunt (1969) and Knoepfler (1995: 352–55). For a concise presentation of both cases, see Sealey (1993: 262–64).
10 One might note here the letter that Philip sent to “the Euboians” (Dem. 4.37–38). The letter—which dates to the late 350s—has been lost. But a scholiast wrote that Philip advised the Euboians “that they should not put hope in an alliance with the Athenians since they [the Athenians] are not able to help themselves.” The scholiast’s report is likely correct, since Demosthenes cited the letter while
bemoaning the fact that the Athenians were unable to act in defense of their interests.
11 See above, note 4. Eretria’s mistrust of the Athenians is also behind an interesting Athenian inscription (RO 69) that perhaps dates to 343. That inscription records a decree whereby the Athenians pledge to punish any Athenian (or any Athenian ally) who invades Eretria. As Knoepfler (1995: 338–46) argues, the Athenians likely promulgated that decree in order to assure the Eretrians that Athens would not intervene in Eretria’s domestic affairs—that is, they would not support another pro-Athenian strongman like they did in 348.
12 Baumeister’s facsimile was actually published in Vischer (1857: 352).
13 Wilhelm (1905).
14 It is somewhat surprising that Friedel, in his 1937 book titled Der Tyrannenmord in Gesetzgebung und Volksmeinung der Griechen, did not even mention the law from Eretria. Martin Ostwald also chose not to mention the Eretrian tyrant-killing law in his classic article (published in 1955) titled “The Athenian Legislation Against Tyranny and Subversion.”
15 Knoepfler (2001b and 2002).
16 Knoepfler’s argument for joining the new fragment with the old: (2001b: 197–206). The argument is based on (1) find spot (the old fragment was found in Aliveri, 20 km east of Eretria; the new fragment was found right next to Aliveri [likely ancient Porthmos], at port Karavos); (2) orthography (letterforms are similar, spellings share features of dialect, and the old fragment—like the new fragment—was written in stoichedon [51 letters per line]); (3) content (the new fragment is not the beginning of a law, the old fragment is the beginning of a law, and the new fragment refers to information found in the old fragment).
17 For a description of the new fragment and its lettering, see Knoepfler (2001b: 214).
18 Dössel (2007: 115–16) restores the clause differently: καὶ ἄν τις [τὸν ἐ|πιχειροῦντα ἀπο]-κτ̣είνει, κτλ.
19 Parker (2005: 154), following a suggestion of Peter Thonemann, tentatively suggests μὴ γίνεσθαι αὐτῶν [ὅ]ν̣ηρι|[ν μηδὲ τέρψιν, αὐ]τ̣οὺς δέ πανοικίει κτλ.
20 Gauthier (2004: 251) suggests a different restoration: βοη|[θεῖν πάντας Ἐρετρι]ᾶς τοῖ δήμοι κτλ.
21 It is tempting—and perhaps correct—to conclude that the expression κατὰ νόμον refers to legitimacy, as opposed to bastardy, in this context. But that interpretation would seem to be incongruent with the following clause that refers to the possibility that wives of men under the curse might, despite the curse, give birth to boys. In that case, the curse declares, in Knoepfler’s restoration, that such boys would be μὴ γνηρίους (i.e., illegitimate: not the biological son of the woman’s husband). Thus the Eretrian law appears to use the noun νόμος in its old sense as “custom.” On the meaning of γνήσιος (in the Eretrian dialect = γνήριος) as both legitimate and blood related, see Ogden (1996: 17–18).
22 For an informative discussion on the role of counterfactuals in historical inquiry, see Morris (2005).
23 Eretria in the Second Athenian League: RO 22 (line 81). Knoepfler (1995: 321–22nn45–46) presents some evidence and reasoning to suggest that the Athenians liberated Euboian cities from Spartan dominance in the spring of 377. There is very little evidence for internal Eretrian politics during the second third of the fourth century. However, Knoepfler (2001a: 84–88) suggests that the proxeny decree IG XII, 9, 187B, a decree of the boulē and dēmos, should be dated to around 370. In his discussion of that decree, Knoepfler considers a possible anti-tyranny context.
24 Themison took Oropos from the Athenians in 366: Diod. Sic. 15.76.1; Xen. Hell. 7.4.1; Dem. 18.99; Aischin. 2.164; 3.85. As noted by Knoepfler (2004: 405–6), Themison was the leader of a pro-Theban faction. He likely came to power soon after the battle of Leuktra (371), when the Eretrians left—at least de facto—the Second Athenian League, allied with Thebes, and, “with all the cities of Euboia” (Xen. Hell. 6.5.23), invaded Sparta.
25 Diodoros (16.7.2) wrote that all of Euboia was in stasis in 358/7, torn apart by pro-Thebans and pro-Athenians. The Athenians, led by Timotheos, invaded the island and expelled the Boiotians (Dem. 8.74–75; 21.174 [cf. 22.14]; Aischin. 3.85). The Athenians made treaties with the four major cities of Euboia (RO 48). On the inscription recording that treaty, see Knoepfler (1995: 335–37). On Thebes’s treaty of surrender to the Athenians: Aischin. 3.85; Dem. 21.174; 22.14.
26 As Knoepfler (2002: 197n262) notes, Xen. Vect. 3.11 might refer to Menestratos.
27 On this nontraditional dating of the fall of Ploutarchos’s regime, see Picard (1979: 240–45). The traditional date of his fall is 348. For a clear presentation of the traditional view, see Parke (1929).
28 Dem. 9.57–58. See Ellis (1976: 164 and 282–83nn22–23) for the date of this coup.
29 This is suggested by the fact that Kleitarchos led a popular revolution against the tyrant Ploutarchos. The evidence: Schol. Dem. 5.5 (“Ploutarchos was tyrant of Eretria. Kleitarchos rose up in rebellion against him and then the citizens joined in with him.”). Kleitarchos almost certainly posed as a democratic champion. It is also likely that he posed as a tyrant killer—he struck the first blow, and then the citizens (earlier afraid of Ploutarchos and his mercenaries) joined him.
30 There is no reason to conclude that Eretrian strongmen enjoyed widespread support. First, there were rebellions against their rule (e.g., against Ploutarchos [scholion to Dem. 5.5] and Kleitarchos [Dem. 9.57–58]). Second, the strongmen relied on mercenaries (e.g., Ploutarchos [Dem. 9.57]). Third, they relied on outside support (Themison relied on Thebes; Ploutarchos relied on Athens; Kleitarchos relied on Macedon).
31 Aischines referred (2.14) to Demosthenes as a “Philip hater” (misophilippos) and sarcastically declared (2.8) that everybody but Demosthenes is a traitor. The same orator asserted at length (3.82–83) that Demosthenes intentionally interpreted any of Philip’s actions in a negative light.
32 Demosthenes delivered his Third Philipic in the spring of 341. The anti-democratic coups at Oreos and Eretria likely took place in the summer of 343: see note 28 of this chapter. Philip began the mercenary invasions of Euboia in the summer of 342: see note 1 of this chapter.
33 See Dem. 9.10–14: Demosthenes wrote that Philip “deceived” (ἐξαπατᾶν) the Olynthians (sending ambassadors to assure them of his good intentions), the Phokians (pretending to be their ally), the Thessalians (pretending to be a friend and ally), and the people of Oreos (sending words of goodwill). For his deception in Eretria: Dem. 9.58 (where it is reasonably clear that Philip claimed to be an ally [symmachos] to the Eretrians). Also note: Philip’s deception—as a means to take a city—was the theme of Demosthenes’s speech to the Messenians in 344 (6.20–25). Philip’s deception is also emphasized in Dem. 2.6–7.
34 See Dem. 9.63; cf. 9.53 (with reference to Athens in particular); cf. 9.57 (where the Eretrian prodemocrats are referred to as “those speaking on behalf of themselves [i.e., in the best interests of the Eretrians]”).
35 Demosthenes often asserted that Philip’s agents intentionally deceive their fellow citizens about Philip’s actual intentions: Dem. 19.259–62 (it is described as the spread of an epidemic [nosēma]); 19.68, 300; 18.47–49, 247, 294–96; 8.52–53.
36 With respect to Athens, Demosthenes wrote (9.7), “there is grave danger that anyone who proposes and urges that we shall defend ourselves may incur the charge of having provoked the war.”
37 For intimidation of anti-Macedonian speakers, see Dem. 3.32; 6.3; 8.68–69; 10.17.
38 Reber, Hansen, and Ducrey (2004: 652). Note, too, that there was a procession in Eretria’s Artemesia of 3,000 hoplites, 600 cavalry, and 60 chariots: Strabo 10.1.10, C448; Knoepfler (2002: 176n148). See, too, Hansen (2006b).
39 According to the Ath. Pol. (40.2) Thrasyboulos proposed, unsuccessfully, a measure to give citizenship to all individuals who “joined in the return from the Piraeus.” Importantly, [Aristotle] notes
that many “clearly were slaves” (cf. Aischin. 3.195). In Rhodes (Diod. Sic. 20.100) the democrats gave citizenship to slaves who helped the city resist Demetrios’s famous siege. (Note, however, that, in both cases, these honors were apparently announced after the slaves had already participated.)
40 Knoepfler (2001b: 213).
41 Statues were a well-established reward for tyrannicides: Harmodios and Aristogeiton in Athens; Metapontion (Berve 1967: 159); Xen. Hier. 4.5; Ilion (chap. 6); Erythrai (chap. 5), Konon in Athens (Dem. 20.70). And it is worth pointing out that there is evidence for the Eretrians erecting statues of individuals—but not tyrannicides—just a few years after the promulgation of their anti-tyranny law (IG XII, 9, 196 and 198).
42 A cash payment as a reward for tyrant killing or acting in defense of the ruling regime was standard: Ilion (chap. 6); both laws from Thasos (ML 83); a decree from mid-fifth-century Miletos (ML 43); Demophantos (chap. 1). It should also be noted that the Eretrian law likely also deemed the tyrant slayer to be “pure,” although that is not restored in Knoepfler’s text.
43 It is to be noted that this is the only direct quote in the extant remains of the Oxyrhynchos Historian. Bruce (1967: 100) suggests that an eyewitness informant might have provided the quote of the short speech to the historian.
44 For a detailed discussion of the oath of Demophantos’s ritual, see the section in chapter 1 titled “Reconstruction of the Oath Ritual.”
45 On the dates for the Dionysia and the Artimisia: Knoepfler (2001b: 232). It is important to note that citizens from Chalkis and Karystos regularly attended Eretria’s Artimisia. See Knoepfler (1972). The primary evidence is Livy 35.38 and Paus. 1.31.4–5.
46 Knoepfler (2001b: 199 with notes 23–24) suggests that the extant stele was placed in the temple of Artemis Amarynthos—halfway between Porthmos and Eretria. His evidence: (1) several stelai set up in that temple have been found in the vicinity of Aliveri (most notably the important lex sacra [RO 73]); (2) the tyrant-killing law mentions a 10 percent tax that would be given to Artemis and the curse was pronounced at the Artimisia. (Although he notes [2001b: 199n25] that the lengthy swamp clearing inscription [IG XII, 9, 191A] was placed in the sanctuary of Apollo despite the fact that it contains the “10 percent to Artemis” stipulation.) In the second part of his editio princeps (2002: 191–92) Knoepfler suggests that the Eretrians inscribed the law on two stelai (like the law of Eukrates: see chapter 3)—one placed in the temple of Artemis, the other in the temple of Dionysos.
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