9 On the Areopagos, especially in the time of the promulgation of the law of Eukrates, see the section of this chapter titled “The Areopagos.”
10 The meaning of atimos here is unclear. As is well known, originally an atimos was an outlaw and could thus be killed with impunity. Yet, later, an atimos was a man who had lost only certain rights. Demosthenes (9.44) noted this change in a way that suggests that people had forgotten that the word originally meant outlawry. Thus one might conclude that the word is used in its more lenient sense in Eukrates’s law. However, use of the archaic sense of atimia seems more likely. First, since the law of Eukrates is traditional legislation (going back to the old legislation—called a thesmos—quoted in Ath. Pol. 16.10), the archaic flavor of atimia would be welcomed; see the section in chapter 1 titled “Solution to Coordination Problem.” And, second, because Areopagites who convened after the democracy was overthrown would most likely be considered to be “joining in establishing a tyranny” (line 8 of Eukrates’s law), they presumably could be killed with impunity, which, again, is the archaic sense of atimia. On atimia, see Hansen (1976).
11 For a comparison of the language of the decree of Demophantos and the law of Eukrates, see Table 1.1 in chapter 1. It should be noted that, subsequent to the promulgation of the decree of Demophantos, provisions concerning the overthrow of the democracy (katalusis tou dēmou) became part of the nomos eisangeltikos (part of which is quoted, apparently verbatim, in Hypereides’s speech In Defense of Euxenippos [7–8]). The significance of that transfer concerns the punishment for the crime: pursuant to the decree of Demophantos, a guilty man may be assassinated, while the nomos eisangeltikos states that a suspect is to be denounced and subsequently tried in a dikasterion. Thus Eukrates’s law restored the self-help provision for katalusis tou dēmou found in the decree of Demophantos. For the likely rationale behind that change, see the section in this chapter titled “The Tyrannical Threat.” With respect to the date for the nomos eisangeltikos, Ostwald (1955: 115–19) suggests after the fall of the Thirty. Hansen (1999: 213) agrees with that date.
12 In addition: he was granted citizenship (Plut. Dem. 22.3); and, after granting him an honorific crown, the Athenians promised—a promise made at the wedding of Philip’s daughter Kleopatra—to punish anyone who might plot against him (Diod. Sic. 16.92.1–2).
13 The Athenians honored, for example, the pro-Macedonian Euthykrates from Olynthos (Hyp. frag. B.19.1).
14 Arrian (Anab. 1.1.3) provides a particularly fine glimpse into the Athenians’ use of honors to buy security. After the assassination of Philip, the Athenians planned to revolt from the Macedonians. But, after Alexander approached Athens with an army, the Athenians “conceded to him honors still greater than had been given to Philip.”
15 Demades is a fine example. He captured the goodwill of prominent Macedonians and was thus quite powerful in Athens. For example, he convinced Alexander to drop his demand, after the sack of Thebes, that the Athenians hand over several prominent political figures. The Athenians rewarded him for that success with a statue and sitēsis. But he was also considered to be dangerous and to have successfully proposed decrees (several of which honored Macedonians and friends of Macedonians) that were seen as being against the interests of the dēmos (e.g., Din. 1.101; Tod 181 provides a list of decrees moved by Demades). See Worthington (1992: 271–72) for ancient sources and modern discussions. For the general dynamic, see Aischin. 3.250.
16 The date of both speeches is debatable. Hypereides’s speech is likely exactly contemporary with the law of Eukrates (see the Loeb introduction to the speech for an explanation). [Demosthenes’s] speech is notoriously difficult to date; scholars have dated it anywhere between 336/5 (before Alexander’s destruction of Thebes) and 330. Cawkwell (1961) dates it to 331 BCE. Ostwald (1955: 124) dates it to the winter of 336/5.
17 The orators often noted that law upholds the rule of the dēmos: Dem. 21.223; Aischin. 3.6, 233–35; Lykourg. Leok. 4.
18 One of course thinks of the indictment lodged by Aischines against Ktesiphon for proposing that Demosthenes be crowned in the Dionysia for his work—after the battle of Chaironeia—as Commissioner for the Repair of Walls (Aischin. 3). There the alleged illegality was threefold: (1) Demosthenes had not yet undergone his financial audit (euthynai) for his time in office; (2) the crown was to be awarded during the Great Dionysia and thus in the theater of Dionysos (instead of in the Pnyx, as required by law); (3) Demosthenes did not deserve such an honor.
19 One thinks here of Aristotle’s advice (Pol. 1307b31–37) that small breaches of the law must be vigorously addressed—“for transgression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as a small expenditure occurring often ruins men’s estates … for the mind is led astray by the repeated small outlays.”
20 For statements in the oratorical corpus that support this conclusion (apathy, subversion by evolution), see: Aischin. 3.250–51; Dem. 18.45–46, 149; 19.224–28.
21 One should note that—per this chapter’s hypothesis—it is unnecessary to posit a large “pro-Macedonian” faction to suppose that Macedonian interests were vigorously advanced in Athens.
22 It is to be noted that, before the end of the fifth century, the Athenians did not distinguish between a decree and a law. Thus the decree of Demophantos was a law, not a decree, in the fourth-century sense: it articulated general norms to which all Athenians were beholden.
23 Eukrates apparently availed himself of the so-called repeal law in order to propose his legislation: (1) the law does not date to the first prytany, so the law is not a result of the “review law”; (2) there is no reason to think that the thesmothetai initiated the procedure as a result of using the “inspection law.” On nomothesia in the fourth century, see, above all, Hansen (1999: 161–77). See also MacDowell (1975); Hansen (1985); Rhodes (1985b).
24 The dēmos likely also chose five advocates to defend the old law—in this case, provisions concerning katalusis tou demou contained in the nomos eisangeltikos—at this assembly (Dem. 24.36).
25 The evidence for this step must be inferred from Dem. 24.21 (describing the step in the so-called review law). All potential nomothetai had already sworn the heliastic oath for that year (and were thus also eligible to be jurors in the dikasteria). The nomothetai for a particular case (e.g., deciding on Eukrates’s legislative proposal) were selected by lot from those eligible men who presented themselves for service on that particular day.
26 The boulē was also involved in the nomothesia process: not only did it establish the agenda for the ekklesia, it also had a legislative secretary (Ath. Pol. 54.4; Hansen [1999: 256–57]). Therefore the ekklesia, the boulē, ho boulomenos (the interested citizen), and nomothetai were formally involved in the discussion. And that is in addition to informal discussion that would have begun after Eukrates placed his proposal on the white boards.
27 This conclusion is based on the facts that (1) Leokrates was spared conviction by one vote (Aischin. 3.252) and (2) Autolykos, an Areopagite, was condemned for removing his wife and children from Athens after Chaironeia (Lykourg. Leok. 53, frag. 9). Thus it would appear that the law was passed after Leokrates left Athens and before Autolykos sent away his wife and children.
28 On Phrynichos during the coup of the Four Hundred, see the section in chapter 1 titled “Mobilization.”
29 It should be noted that Lykourgos mistakenly wrote (124) that the decree of Demophantos was promulgated after the fall of the Thirty. That is certainly a peculiar error. Perhaps he attempted to link the famous decree with that famous “tyranny.”
30 Ober (2005b: 43–68).
31 It should be noted that Ober presents the scenario differently. In the dynamic presented above, individual A appeals to the moral authority of individual B in order to persuade individual C. In Ober’s dynamic, individual B accepts a decision made by individual A because of individual A’s moral authority. The variation on Ober’s presentation is made because it brings this type of use of moral authority (i.
e., “record of past judgment”) in line with the following two types mentioned below in the text. The fundamental dynamic is not changed. Indeed, the altered presentation is in line with Ober’s general configuration on the borrowing of moral authority: “So the social fact of moral authority emerges from a three-way relationship: an external source, an individual or institutional borrower, and the public that determines whether or not the loan is valid” (Ober [2005b: 51]).
32 For the Areopagos council, see Wallace (1989). The stripping of the Areopagos’s power was part of the full democratization of Athens: henceforth, there would be no check on the assembly.
33 On the apophasis, see Wallace (1989: 113–15); Worthington (1992: 357–62); Hansen (1999: 292–94).
34 Wallace (1989: 113–15) sought to reconcile Demosthenes’s account of the Antiphon affair with Plutarch (Dem. 14.4). Thus he concludes that Demosthenes brought Antiphon before the Areopagos; the Areopagos, that is, did not initiate the matter. That is debatable since, according to the known rules, either the assembly or the Areopagos initiated an apophasis procedure.
35 See Hansen (1999: 291–92). Wallace (1989: 115–19) presents the possibility that Demosthenes’s decree was the decree that instituted apophasis—that is, the powers of the Areopagos council were augmented once, not twice, during the period of Athenian resistance to Macedonian imperialism. But Wallace himself acknowledges the difficulties posed by that conclusion (especially Deinarchos’s claim that, pursuant to Demosthenes’s decree, the Areopagos had “absolute authority to punish”). Hansen’s conclusion should be accepted.
36 Mossé (1970: 75–76).
37 Sealey (1958) and RO (79) advance this view.
38 For example, Aischin. 3.20, 1.92; Dem. 23.65; Lykourg, Leok. 12; Din. 1.9.
39 Schwenk (1985: 33–41). It should be noted that Wallace (1989: 267n13) refers to Schwenk’s conclusion. He states that she accepted answer number one (i.e., that advanced by Meritt and Ostwald).
40 Noted by Knoepfler (2001b: 215n94).
41 One might also note that, around the middle of the fourth century, the Athenians started to rely on expert management of important governmental affairs (e.g., the Controller of the Finances and the Board for the Theoric Fund). Appointing the Areopagos to watch for subversive activity would be in line with that trend.
42 The council met on the terrace just north of the summit of the “hill of Ares”: Wallace (1989: 215–18). Also important is the fact that the Areopagites were very prominent individuals—all were ex-archons—and many would have served in the council for years. Consequently, individuals who did not go to the agora would also quickly notice or learn of the councilors’ refusal to convene. One might also note, of course, that individual Areopagites could publically announce why they had chosen not to “climb the hill of Ares.”
43 One should note, however, that if the democracy were clearly overthrown by intimidation and force, it would take an individual with a low threshold to “go first” and not climb the hill of Ares; it would be tantamount to rebelling against a regime.
44 Attic Stelai: ML 79. Other well-known, similar monuments include the “stele commemorating the wrong-doing of the tyrants [i.e., the Peisistratidai] that was set up on the acropolis of Athens” (Thuc. 6.55.1); a stele recording the banishment of the followers of Isagoras due to their attempt at tyranny (Schol. Aristoph. Lys. 273); decrees concerning Phrynichos and other prominent members of the Four Hundred ([Plut.], X orat. 834b). And although not concerning an Athenian, the dēmos’s decree against Arthmios of Zeleia was quite popular (Dem. 9.41–45; 19.271–72; Aischin. 3.258; Din. 2.24). For the decree against Arthmios of Zeleia, see Worthington (1992: 309–10).
45 On the sculptured relief, see Lawton (1995: 99–100n38, with plate 20); Blanshard (2004); Ober (2005c: 222–24).
46 In Homer’s Iliad, Odysseus articulates the ideology of kingship particularly well (2.204–6): “No good thing is a multitude of leaders; let there be one leader, one king, to whom the son of crooked-counseling Kronos has given the scepter and themistai so that he may take counsel for his people.” It is interesting to note that, according to Theophrastos (Char. 26.2) the only Homeric line known by the “oligarchic man” is the line just quoted. Perhaps the sculptured relief adorning Eukrates’s law is to be interpreted as the dēmos (the collective) agreeing with that basic sentiment but for democratic ends: dēmos is the one, unitary ruler in Athens. On the power of kings’ speech in Archaic Greece, see Detienne (1996).
47 See Ober (1989: 145–46) on the conflation of dēmos and dikastai.
48 Laws preserve democracy: Aischin. 3.6; Dem. 21.188, 24.206. Note that Aristotle (Pol. 1285b30) describes an absolute monarch as πάντων κύριος. That is how Demosthenes (21.223) described the jurors. And note, too, that Demosthenes (18.201) describes Philip as κύριος ἁπάντων.
49 Hdt. 3.82 is the classic, early formulation, admittedly articulated by a non-Athenian. An early Athenian discussion is Eur. Supp. 411–25.
50 Kingship seen as the optimal regime in the mid-fourth century: Plato, Resp. 473B–D; Isok. 3.16–26. Also note that Isokrates (5.14–16) called on Philip to unite the Greeks because he, as king, was powerful enough to do so.
51 Note Demosthenes’s (18.120) observation that the dēmos publically proclaims the granting of crowns in order to encourage other individuals to serve the polis.
52 In 333/2, the boulē erected a statue of Dēmokratia; the strategoi are known to have sacrificed to Dēmokratia in 332/1 and 331/0. See Raubitschek (1962: 238–43).
53 It should also be noted that, if Pnyx III had not yet been completed by 337/6—a reasonable possibility—there would have been two entrances to the Pnyx (i.e., to Pnyx II). See Hansen (1999: 353–54).
54 Kourouniotes and Thompson (1932: 162).
55 Ober (2005a: 21–22) makes this important point.
56 For the overthrow of the Athenian democracy in 322, see Diod. Sic. 18.18.4–5; Plut. Phok. 27–28.
57 For pro-Macedonian, anti-democratic coups after the battle of Chaironeia, see the section of chapter 2 titled “Stability.” One should note here that Demosthenes, likely shortly before his trial concerning the Harpalos affair (spring of 323), impeached Kallimedon for consorting with Athenian exiles in Megara with the intention of overthrowing the democracy. He also alleged that there was a conspiracy threatening the dockyards (Din. 1.94–95). See Worthington (1992: 264–66). Other evidence alleging the existence of pro-Macedonians after the battle of Chaironeia: Hyp. Euxen. 22; Hyp. Phil. 8–9; Dem. 18.52, 297, 323.
III
Tyrant-Killing Legislation in the Early Hellenistic Period
4
The Anti-Tyranny Dossier from Eresos
Introduction
The earliest extant inscriptions from Eresos record punitive actions taken by the Eresian dēmos against tyrants and their descendants. There are, in all, six texts—five of which are fragmentary—written on two nearly identically sized stones.1 The first two texts concern a trial, ordered by Alexander the Great, of Agonippos and Eurysilaos, two men who ruled Eresos as “tyrants” in 333. The third, fourth, and fifth texts record the official responses to the requests of certain descendants of tyrants—the two aforementioned tyrants and others who ruled as tyrants before Agonippos and Eurysilaos—to return to Eresos: text 3 (circa 324) establishes a public trial on the matter pursuant to an order of Alexander the Great; text 4 (circa 317) is a royal transcript from King Philip Arrhidaios forbidding the return of the exiles; text 5 (circa 305) is a fragment of a letter from King Antigonos to the people of Eresos wherein he apparently supports the Eresians’ decision to refuse the exiles’ return. The sixth text, dated circa 300, is a decree of the dēmos validating all the actions taken by the Eresians against the tyrants and their descendants during the previous three decades.
This dossier is arguably more challenging to interpret than the texts examined in the previous three chapters. The decree of Demophantos, the Eretrian tyrant-killing law, a
nd the law of Eukrates are single enactments, promulgated in a single moment in time. Their interpretation, therefore, required a rather straightforward negotiation of one text and its particular historical context. The dossier from Eresos, however, contains several different types of texts (decrees of the dēmos, a royal letter, a royal transcript) inscribed over a thirty-year period characterized by extraordinary change: 332, the likely date of the first text, was a quite different world than 300, the rough date of the last text. Yet the events documented in the dossier are clearly related, part of a single story or experience: a point emphasized by the fact that the Eresians had the texts inscribed on the same stones. The challenge, then, is to create a single, unified interpretation of the dossier that accounts both for the whole and its particular parts.
I argue below that the “anti-tyranny dossier” documents Eresos’s transition from an unstable, nondemocratically governed polis to a stable polis governed by an authoritative dēmos. The argument is presented in three parts. The first and longest part interprets the actions recorded in the first two texts of the dossier. Therein I argue that Alexander ordered the Eresians to try the two tyrants in order to establish the pro-democrats’ threat credibility and thus stabilize the new democratic regime. The second part interprets the actions recorded in the third, fourth, and fifth texts. The argument in that section is that the exiles’ attempts to return to Eresos were potentially destabilizing because they suggested that exogenous factors (i.e., events outside of Eresos’s new unilateral deterrence game set up by the trial) might undermine the dēmos’s threat credibility. The third part interprets the action documented in the sixth text. I argue that the pro-democrats, now confident that the kings would not intervene on behalf of tyrants, proactively ended their potentially destabilizing struggle with tyrants by definitively proclaiming the permanent credibility of their threat.
Death to Tyrants! Page 18