Since previously also King Alexander sent back a transcript and ordered the Eresians to hold a trial concerning Agonippos and Eurysilaos, as to what should be done to them…. And when [or since] Alexander sent a letter also about the family of Apollodoros and his brothers Hermon and Heraios…. Be it resolved by the damos: That there shall be valid against the tyrants … the law against the tyrants … and the transcripts of the kings.
The pro-democrats’ realization that the Hellenistic kings would not interfere in their internal actions against tyrants and the descendants of tyrants had very significant consequences. Simply put, the pro-democrats acquired a much firmer control of their polis. There no doubt would be future exogenous events that threatened to undermine the democratic equilibrium. But perhaps the single most significant exogenous threat had been royal intervention on behalf of the anti-democrats. And now it was reasonably certain that the kings’ policies in that regard would be predictably benign; they had been “endogenized” (i.e., made part of the known variables of the interior game). It thus follows that, if the democrats had a clearly credible and capable threat, it would be quite unlikely that anti-democrats would defect: to do so would be irrational.
This decree (text 6) thus records the dēmos’s attempt to demonstrate—one last time—the credibility of their threat against tyrants, thereby securing as permanent the basis of the “new game” established by Alexander a generation earlier. The means toward that end, predictably, was the generation of common knowledge of credible commitment via discussion and subsequent vote in an assembly of citizens. The same dynamic as described in the first and second sections of this chapter was in play; thus there is no need to articulate its generic characteristics again. But it is important to appreciate how impressive that assembly meeting must have been. Each text was (most likely) brought before the audience, read out loud, discussed, and then deemed by majority vote to be kurios. The meeting was an opportunity, then, for the Eresians to affirm the past thirty years of democratic rule and thus the dēmos’s control of the polis. Nobody would doubt the anti-tyranny stance of the Eresian dēmos.
Soon after the assembly adjourned, the Eresians had their decree inscribed on the same stones that recorded the original trial against the tyrants and each of the subsequent “anti-tyranny episodes” that transpired during the subsequent thirty years. But this would be the final installment, the last action against tyrants. The dēmos’s threat was clearly credible, and thus defection was clearly irrational. After one generation, the new game was secure.32
Conclusion
The events analyzed in this chapter underscore the importance for pro-democrats to maintain their threat credibility. A dramatic, foundational “moment”—such as a public trial or oath against tyrants—certainly was essential: it established the initial credible commitment. But, due to the passage of time and changing circumstances, individuals may begin to doubt whether or not their fellow citizens remain committed. As a consequence, individual pro-democrats might lack the confidence to potentially risk their life in the defense of their democracy; thus they raise their revolutionary threshold. If anti-democrats detected that dynamic, they would conclude that the pro-democrats could not respond adequately to a coup. That is, they would conclude that the pro-democrats’ threat was not credible. Those anti-democrats would thus defect and try to establish a nondemocratic regime. To fight against that, pro-democrats had to continually generate common knowledge of widespread credible commitment to defend their democracy.
The need to maintain threat credibility would be particularly important for new democracies. The citizens of older, more established democracies benefit from the accumulated effect of past commitment demonstrations—by word or, most effectively, by deed. That is not to say that established democracies did not have to ensure that their threat remained credible. It is just that the regime likely would receive the benefit of the doubt: individuals, pro-democrats and anti-democrats alike, would more likely assume that the citizen population is defined by a “pro-mobilization” threshold sequence. Defending the democracy would thus be rational; staging a coup would be irrational. The citizens of new democracies, however, would not have such a reservoir of trust. They thus would readily doubt that their fellow citizens have maintained their commitment to defend the regime. In such an epistemic environment, it would be foolish for an individual to keep a low revolutionary threshold: he could not really be sure that, if he acted in defense of the democracy, a sufficient number of his fellow citizens would follow him. One would thus expect the citizens of new democracies to expend a considerable amount of energy to maintain common knowledge of widespread credible commitment to defend the democracy.
It is thus quite interesting to note that Alexander promoted anti-tyranny ideology during his conquest of—and attempt to democratize—the cities of western Asia Minor. This chapter analyzed one particular example, of course: it was Alexander himself who sent “the tyrants to the cities from which they came, to be treated as the citizens pleased” (Arr. Anab. 3.2.7). Those men almost certainly were sent back to their home poleis with some sort of written document that authorized and justified their execution specifically because they were “tyrants.” Alexander was thus sending a very clear message that “tyrants” are bad for the community and thus must be killed. And by brutally punishing them, the citizens of the various poleis would have internalized and normalized that anti-tyranny ideology.
Alexander also promoted anti-tyranny ideology in a proclamation he made after his victory in the battle of Gaugamela (331). According to Plutarch (Alex. 34), Alexander sought to increase his prestige among the Greeks. He thus “wrote to the states saying that all tyrannies are now abolished and that henceforth they might live under their own laws” (ἔγραψε τὰς τυραννίδας πάσας καταλυθῆναι καὶ πολιτεύειν αὐτονόμους). This proclamation certainly was read aloud in the assemblies of the newly democratic poleis. And it is quite reasonable to suppose that the pro-democrats in those cities inscribed the proclamation—or, perhaps more likely, a decree or law pursuant to the proclamation—on a prominently placed stone stele: thus the anti-tyranny proclamation would have become a concrete, permanent fixture of the newly democratic public space. A possible analogy here would be Philip Arrhidaios’s exile decree (Diod. Sic. 18.56.1–8): it specifically ordered the citizens of the various poleis to pass a decree not to engage in war with each other and not to act in opposition to the king’s rule.
A final (potential) example of Alexander’s promotion of Athenian-style anti-tyranny ideology concerns the returning to Athens of the original statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton. The matter is confused. Arrian wrote that Alexander returned the statues to the Athenians but gave two different dates: 331, during Alexander’s first stay in Babylon (Anab. 3.16.7–8), and 325/4, during his second stay at Babylon (Anab. 7.19.2). Pausanias, however, wrote (1.8.5) that Antiochos I returned the statues. And Valerius Maximus (ii 10, ext. 1) attributed the deed to Seleukos. In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting accounts, Bosworth (following the original suggestion of C. Seltman) concluded that the statues were returned to Athens during the joint reign of Seleukos and Antiochos I (292–281) and that Alexander “merely promised” to do so.33 That is certainly a reasonable position. But it should be noted that Pliny (NH 34.70) agrees with Arrian in attributing the deed to Alexander. In any case, if Alexander did not do it, he certainly was thought to have done it and thus (most likely) publicized widely his “promise” throughout the Greek world. (And it would be fine propaganda for Alexander to make his promise widely known: he is the ultimate tyrant killer.)
It is reasonable to conclude that Alexander heavily promoted anti-tyranny ideology to facilitate his efforts to democratize the cities of western Asia Minor.34 He utilized it, that is, to support his favorite faction—pro-democrats—in the various internal games. First of all, the democracies in those cities would certainly be new: Persia controlled the western coast of Asi
a Minor since (at least) the King’s Peace of 387/6. The pro-democrats in the various cities would thus likely have required assistance in establishing a collective credible threat to deter supporters of the “old guard” from reestablishing a nondemocratic regime.35 Second, as demonstrated in this chapter, Alexander himself ordered the citizens of Eresos to try their “tyrants” in order to establish a credible threat for the supporters of Eresos’s new democracy. And finally, Alexander almost certainly knew that the Athenians and the Eretrians had recently demonstrated that tyrant-killing law could facilitate the pro-democrats’ efforts to maintain control of their polis.36 It thus simply makes sense that he would use it to advance his interests in Asia Minor.
If Alexander heavily promoted anti-tyranny ideology, one would expect to find multiple examples of its use by supporters of the newly constituted democracies of Asia Minor to defend their democratic regime. The next two chapters analyze two significant instances: in Erythrai and in Ilion. Both of those instances should—and will—be interpreted within the general historical and theoretical framework articulated in this chapter. And we will return, at the conclusion of chapter 6, to assess the role of tyrant-killing law in the democratization of Hellenistic western Asia Minor.
* * *
1 For generations, scholars have worked under the impression that the two extant stones were originally part of a single, large stele (see Heisserer [1980: 28] for an Illustration). But Heisserer (1980: 27–32) has demonstrated that the two extant stones did not originally form a single stele. (See now, however, Ellis-Evans [2012].) Heisserer refers to the two stones as beta and gamma. He posits a lost stone (which he refers to as alpha) that recorded both an anti-tyranny law and an agreement to join Eresos in the Korinthian League. Stone beta has legible writing only on its right lateral (text 1 below). Stone gamma has legible writing on its obverse (text 2 and much of text 3), right lateral (end of text 3, text 4, and most of text 5), and reverse (end of 5 and all of 6). Note that earlier editors (e.g., OGIS 8 and Tod 191) concluded that the dossier contained seven—not six—texts: they concluded that the opening lines of gamma’s right lateral was not a continuation of the text that begins near the end of gamma’s obverse; that is, they concluded that what this chapter (following Heisserer) calls text 3 was really two different texts.
2 Dittenberger (OGIS 8) restored this line differently: [τάν τε ἀ]κ[ρ]όπολιν [ἀ]νοικο[δ]όμ[η]-σε κτλ. IG XII, 2 526 prints: [ἰς τὰν ἀ]κ[ρ]όπολιν [ἀ]νοικο[δ]όμ[η]σε κτλ.
3 Hansen, Spencer, and Williams (2004: 1024) suggest that Eresos had at least one thousand adult citizens and a total population of about four thousand citizens, plus foreigners and slaves.
4 Note that, according to the stipulation articulated in text 2 (lines 26–29), a prayer was to be made “in the assembly” concerning the conduct of the trial of the two tyrants. Note, too, that, with respect to the later trial of the descendants of “the former tyrants,” those descendants told Alexander that they were willing to stand trial in Eresos “before the damos” (ἐν τῶ δά[μω]: text 3, line 40); the judges in that trial are referred to as “the citizens who are judging” (text 3, lines 10–11); text 6 (lines 21–22) states that “the damos” should decide whether or not they would be allowed to return. All of this suggests that the trials referred to in this dossier took place in the assembly convened as a law court. And it is reasonable to suppose the space where the assembly met was large enough to hold all, or at least most, of the roughly one thousand citizens.
5 Text 2 (lines 24–5); text 6 (lines 26–27, 31–32). The law is alluded to in text 6 (lines 16–17), where mention is made of a “law in the stele.” In text 6 (lines 31–32) the law against tyranny is referred to as “the law against the tyrants that is written on the old stele.” Thus the law referred to in text 6 (lines 16–17) is almost certainly the anti-tyranny law.
6 Actually, text 2 (24–25) refers to “one who destroys the stele about the tyrants and their descendants.” That clearly is the law: as mentioned in the previous note, in text 6, the law against tyrants is said to be “on the old stele.” Note the destruction of stelai by pro-Persian oligarchs in 333 in Tenedos (Arr. Anab. 2.2.2) and Mytilene (Arr. Anab. 2.1.4).
7 Heisserer (1980: 67n32) doubts that the Eresians promulgated their anti-tyranny law in 336 because it is referred to in circa 300 (text 6, line 32) as being inscribed on an “old stele.” He thus suggests that it might have been promulgated when Eresos joined the Second Athenian Confederacy (an unknown date, but post-377: RO 22 line 117) or at the end of the Social War (355). Knoepfler (2001b: 206n47) is of a similar mind: he prefers the restoration [λιθίν]α (“stone”) instead of [παλαί]α (“old”) since, in his opinion, it is strange to qualify a law still on the books as “old.” It should be noted, however, that the Eresians of circa 300 referred to the Eresians of 332 as their “ancestors” (progonoi) (text 6, lines 34–35). Bosworth (1980: 179) suggests, without argument, that the Eresians promulgated their anti-tyranny law in 332, after the fall of Agonippos and Eurysilaos.
8 It is true that the Eresians conducted a trial. But the trial was ordered by Alexander (text 6, lines 9–12) and conducted according to the laws (plural) (text 1, 1ine 19; text 3, lines 7, 14–15; text 6, line 14). One need not conclude, therefore, that the anti-tyranny law mandated a trial. Do note, however, that text 6 states (lines 24–25) that the Eresians held the trial concerning the descendants of the former tyrants according to “the law” (singular) and Alexander’s order.
9 Note the decree of nearby Nasos (OGIS 4). It dates to 319–317 and refers (lines 106–10) to their “law concerning katalusis tou damou” (τῶ νόμ|[ω π]ερὶ τῶ καλλ|[ύο]ντος τὸν δᾶ||[μον]). Thus the neighbors of Eresos had a “general” law against subversion of the democracy: so too, quite likely, the Eresians—their anti-tyranny law.
10 See, for example, the mid-fourth-century decree from Amphipolis (RO 49). Like the aforementioned mid-fifth-century decree from Miletos, it orders the permanent exile of two men and authorizes their assassination “wherever they are found” (lines 7–9).
11 Note, in this regard, that Alexander sent Apollonides and his captured Chian associates to Elephantine Island (Arr. Anab. 3.2.7). While this is not an execution, it is an example of Alexander delivering justice personally at the same time that he ordered Agonippos and Eurysilaos to stand trial in Eresos.
12 This is questioned by Bosworth (1980: 89–90). Drawing attention to Arr. Anab. 1.9.9 (wherein “the allies” [τοῖς ξυμμάχοις] are said to have decided Thebes’s fate) and Diodoros’s abuse of the word synedrion, he suggests that an ad hoc assortment of league members rendered the famous verdict.
13 Matters surrounding the handling of the captured pro-Persian Chians are disputed. The dispute arises because (1) in Alexander’s “First Letter to the Chians” (RO 84, lines 13–15), the king ordered those men to be tried by “the synedrion of the Greeks” (i.e., the synedrion of the League of Korinth); (2) Arrian (Anab. 3.2.7) notes that Alexander—in 332—sent captured Chians (among whom was included Apollonides) to the city of Elephantine in Egypt. Resolving the matter depends on the date of Alexander’s letter to the Chians. Heisserer (1980: 83–95) dates it to 334. Thus, in Heisserer’s view, there were two sets of captured pro-Persian Chians: the first (captured in 334) were, indeed, tried by the synedrion; the second (captured in 332) were sent by Alexander to Egypt. Bosworth (1980: 268) accepts the more traditional (i.e., pre-Heisserer) date of 332 for Alexander’s first letter to the Chians. He thus suggests the possibility that the synedrion—per Alexander’s order as contained in his letter to the Chians—deliberated on the matter but was unable to come to a conclusion. Thus they sent the men to Alexander, who, in turn, sent them to Elephantine Island. Bosworth compares that possibility with the actual dealings with the Spartans in 330: Antipater submitted the matter to the synedrion and the synedrion subsequently referred the matter to Alexander (Diod. Si
c. 17.73.5–6; Curt. 6.1.19–20; Aischin. 3.133).
14 For Alexander’s conquest of Asia Minor, see Badian (1966).
15 For the difficulties facing Alexander after the assassination of Philip, see Diod. Sic. 17.2–4. Arrian (Anab. 1.1.1–3) largely ignores the matter.
16 Like his father, Alexander announced that his intention was to liberate the Greek cities of Asia: Diod. Sic. 17.24.1
17 There are three basic historical interpretations. The traditional interpretation (advanced by Pistorius and then modified by Heisserer) argues for three tyrannical periods, each of which is followed by a pro-Macedonian democracy: (1) before Eresos joined the Korinthian League; (2) in 335, after Memnon’s gains in the Troad; (3) in 333, after Memnon’s naval counter offensive. According to this interpretation, Philip established or at least strongly supported a democratic regime in Eresos when the city joined the Korinthian League and Memnon did, in fact, engage in naval operations in 335 (and took Eresos). Bosworth (1980: 179; 1988: 192–93) offered a second interpretation according to which two different tyrannical regimes dominated Eresos back to back: Hermon, Heraios, and Apollodoros ruled from some unknown time until circa 338; Agonippos and Eurysilaos succeeded them and ruled until they were expelled by Alexander’s forces in 332. In this interpretation, Agonippos and Eursilaos were originally loyal to Philip but medized during Memnon’s naval campaign in 333. Lott (1996) offered the third interpretation according to which there were two separate tyrannical periods: (1) Hermon, Heraios, and Apollodoros came to power circa 338 and ruled until they were expelled by Alexander’s forces after the battle of Granikos in 334; (2) Agonippos and Eurysilaos seized power in 333 during Memnon’s naval campaign, but were expelled by Alexander’s forces in 332. In this interpretation, Philip supported a tyranny in 338 and Eresos did not fall to Memnon’s forces in 335.
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