The apparent objective of provision 9 is to render special tribunals ineffective. It is necessary to realize that the votes referred to in this provision would have been conducted openly: if they were conducted by secret ballot, no one would know who voted for the execution and thus the provision would be impossible to enforce. In such a scenario, the votes of a few enthusiastic and influential radicals could put tremendous pressure on everybody else to vote for an execution: the less radical individuals think that others will also vote for the execution and thus do not want to be seen as dissenters. Thus the less radical individuals, too, would vote for the execution.46 The harsh penalties included in this provision, however, might convince such individuals not to follow the lead of the more hardcore regime members. And that might prevent a cascade of votes in support of the execution.
SHAM ELECTIONS
Provision 11 addresses the possibility that someone, “during an oligarchy” (ἐν ὀλιγαρχίαι), might participate in a sham political processes (literally, misuse the laws) in order to make it look like he became a magistrate or council-member “during a democracy” (ὡς ἐν δημοκρατίαι). Should someone do that, his selection is invalid and he may be treated as a leader of an oligarchy—that is, he may be assassinated. There appear to be two possible imagined scenarios, depending on what “during an oligarchy” means.
In perhaps the most likely scenario, Ilion is obviously ruled by an oligarchy when the fraud takes place: “during an oligarchy” is thus stating the acknowledged political reality. In this situation an individual might manipulate the laws to make it look like the regime is liberalizing or somehow becoming more democratic. To accomplish that, someone might remove other candidates’ “names from the hat” (technically, remove their pinakia from the kleroterion—or the Ilian analog thereof); lie about the selection results; bribe or use force to convince other people not to seek the office. In any case, he is working to maintain the status quo, while apparently participating in a fully democratic process.
Another possible scenario is that Ilion is a democracy when the fraud takes place: “during an oligarchy” is thus stating the postfraud political reality.47 In this situation an individual might manipulate the laws in order to disguise a silent oligarchic coup. For example, he might somehow convince the people to change the laws, thus allowing him to serve multiple terms in office.
The Ilians clearly crafted provision 10 in order to prevent anti-democrats from deceiving the population about the real nature of the ruling regime. This provision ensures that the people of Ilion will be aware of such tricks—that they will realize that “democracy in form” does not equal “democracy in substance.” And they warn anybody who might engage in such deceptive practices that he very well might be assassinated.
PARTICIPATION IN A REVOLT IN ANY CAPACITY
Provision 12 addresses, very generally, anybody who participates in an anti-democratic coup in any capacity: a tyrant, a leader of an oligarchy, someone who sets up a tyrant, someone who joins in a revolt, or someone who overthrows the democracy. Such individuals will incur a “memory sanction” (often referred to as damnatio memoriae).48 Specifically, the law states that their names must be chiseled off priest lists, votive offerings, and tombstones. No further directions are given for names engraved on a tombstone: they would simply be chiseled off, it seems. If an offender’s name is on a priest list, that spot—after chiseling off the name—will be sold, presumably to the highest bidder. And the spot’s new “owner” may engrave the name of anybody he wants, provided that that individual is (or was?) eligible to serve as priest. If an offender’s name is on a votive offering, the nature of the sanction depends on the type of votive. There are two possibilities.
• It is a private votive offering—that is, one dedicated solely by the offender. In that case, the dēmos must ensure, first, that there will be no indication that it was, in fact, dedicated by the offender. It thus appears that the votive will still stand; perhaps the dēmos would rededicate it. The law also states that the dēmos must ensure that there is no mnēmeion. This is difficult to interpret since the word can mean “memory,” “monument,” and “record.” I have chosen to translate the word as “record.” Thus the people of Ilion must ensure not only that the offender’s name is removed from the votive but also that there is no record of any kind that the offender made such a dedication.49
• It is a public votive offering that is also inscribed with the names of non-offenders. In this case the dēmos must ensure that only the offender’s name is chiseled off. Thus, the votive offering itself will remain.
The most obvious function of the memory sanction was to ensure that the people of Ilion would permanently forget that the anti-democratic revolutionaries ever existed.50 It is tempting to take that line of reasoning one step further and conclude that the implementation of the sanction would also facilitate the Ilians’ collective effort both to “forget” about their troubled past and to forge a present as a unified, successful, democratically governed polis. But that is likely only half true. On the one hand, the people of Ilion would, over time, perhaps forget the exact identity of those who participated in an anti-democratic coup d’état. Yet, on the other hand, the chiseled-off names would be a constant reminder that there had been a coup and that one must be vigilant in order to prevent another one.
THIRD SECTION
The third extant section of the law (provisions 14–17)51 addresses the dispensation of honors and financial compensation to those who “contributed or spent money” (εἰσενέγκας ἢ ἀναλώσας) in an effort to overthrow a nondemocratic regime and reestablish the democracy.52 It is clear, and was perhaps explicitly articulated in a lost (early) section of the law, that the magistrates, after the democracy is reestablished, were required both to return to such men the money they contributed and to ensure that (1) their generosity is announced in the Great Dionysia; (2) they received an honorary crown; (3) they are officially recorded as benefactors of Ilion. The extant provisions of this section focus on four contingencies that might arise in those matters.
Provision 14 addresses the possibility that the archons do not ensure that deserving individuals are correctly compensated and honored. Should that occur, there are, first, fines: each archon must pay a fine of thirty staters; each member of the boulē must pay a fine of ten staters; the treasurer must pay a fine of one hundred staters. In addition to fines, the archons, the members of the boulē, the treasurer, and the members of the special boards (τοῖς ἐνεστῶσιν ἀρχείοις) shall be without rights (atimoi) until such matters are settled.53
Provision 15 addresses the possibility that an individual is improperly compensated after the restoration of the democracy. The provision articulates three scenarios. First, someone is compensated despite the fact that he did not “contribute or spend money” to reestablish the democracy. Second, an individual “recovered what was not owed.” Dittenberger (ad loc.) provided a plausible explanation for this perplexing scenario: somebody might make two successful claims for reimbursement—in which case he was “not owed” the second payment. Third, an individual recovers more than what is due. In all three cases, the guilty party must pay back twice the amount of money that he received, if he is convicted in court.
Provision 16 addresses the possibility that someone does not properly spend money that a contributor gave him. Specifically, the provision targets, first, those who do not spend the money to reestablish the democracy. And, second, it targets those who do not demonstrate that they spent the money in order to reestablish the democracy. In both cases, the guilty party must pay back double the amount he received, if convicted in court. It is quite likely, but not certain, that he would pay the fine to the individual who gave him the money initially.
Provision 17 addresses those guilty of breaking provisions 15. That is, it targets (1) anybody who is compensated although he did not contribute or spend money according to the law; (2) anybody who recovered wha
t was not owed; (3) anybody who recovered more than what was owed. Those individuals shall not be crowned or inscribed as benefactors.
The third extant section seeks to accomplish three objectives. The first objective is to arrange for an orderly dispensation of rewards and honors after the refoundation of the democracy. The issue is potentially problematic. Without clear guidelines, for example, there can be confusion with regard to both which individuals deserve rewards and what those rewards should be. Also, people might try to become famous by falsely claiming to have participated in the liberation movement. The Athenians famously experienced both of those problems in the last decade of the fifth century: after the fall of the Four Hundred and after the fall of the Thirty.54 The second objective is to ensure that the articulated rewards are perceived as credible—to ensure, that is, that everybody believes that, should he “contribute or spend money” to help overthrow a nondemocratic regime, he will be rewarded as promised. To accomplish that, the Ilians vowed to punish harshly both magistrates who do not provide the rewards and individuals who try to acquire rewards that they do not deserve. The third objective—and closely related to the second—is to assure potential contributors that any money that they might contribute would actually be spent to reestablish the democracy: if it were not, the person to whom they gave the money would have to pay back twice the money he received—likely to the initial contributor himself.
Historical Context
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN PROMULGATED
It is difficult to construct the historical context within which the people of Ilion promulgated their tyrant-killing law. To begin with, the law does not refer to known people or historical events: it does not, for example, contain an archon date (vel sim.) like the law of Eukrates or refer to Alexander like the dossier from Eresos. Much more fundamentally problematic, however, is the fact that we know very little about Ilion’s internal history during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods. Archaeologists have certainly shed important light on Ilion’s domestic history through their analysis of the city’s material culture. Work published in the journal Studia Troica, in particular, has laid the foundation for all subsequent historical analyses of Classical and Hellenistic Ilion. And the epigraphic and literary sources occasionally provide important information. But the gaps in our knowledge are still frustrating and, at times, paradoxical: there is no direct evidence for a tyranny at Ilion during the Hellenistic period, yet it is from Hellenistic Ilion that we have the most detailed tyrant-killing law.
Despite these difficulties, the comments presented in this section argue that the people of Ilion promulgated their tyrant-killing law circa 280, after having overthrown a nondemocratic regime that was in power sometime during the reign of Lysimachos. This is, admittedly, not an original thesis (although not every scholar agrees with it). But I defend it more thoroughly than it is defended elsewhere. I demonstrate, first, that internal evidence—evidence provided, that is, by the inscribed law itself—supports the thesis. I then demonstrate that external evidence also supports the thesis. Certainty is impossible. But the combined weight of both the internal and external evidence does make a reasonably solid case.
The law’s language in lines 144–49 provides compelling internal evidence that, at the time of the law’s promulgation, the people of Ilion had recently overthrown a nondemocratic regime. The law states, “and there shall be access always to the magistrates and the standing council—and this shall be [permissible] during the present year (ἔστω τοῦτο πρῶτον ἔτος)—and the penalty shall be the same for the members of the standing special boards.” That stipulation, it will be recalled, addressed the possibility that the archons might not reward individuals who financially contributed to the successful overthrow of a nondemocratic regime. The relevant clause, of course, is “and this shall be [permissible] during the present year.”55 Funck (1994: 335) suggests that the Ilians inserted that clause in order to articulate the well-known legal principle that a law takes effect immediately after it is promulgated. But that just begs a question: why state a well-known principle? It is much more likely that the Ilians inserted the clause in order to ensure that people who contributed to the recent overthrow of a nondemocratic regime would be compensated.56
Additional internal evidence is provided by the inscription’s letterforms. Brueckner noted in his editio princeps (1894: 468–69) that the inscription’s lettering is similar to that found in OGIS 221, an inscription from Ilion that likely dates to the early 270s (or 280–260). This observation has found widespread acceptance.57 But letterforms are not always a reliable indicator of an inscription’s date. One might cite OGIS 219—a decree from Ilion honoring “King Antiochos, son of Seleukos”—as an example: it has been dated as early as circa 280 and as late as 197/6.58 Thus the letterforms merely indicate that the Ilians possibly inscribed their tyrant-killing law circa 280.
Internal evidence thus suggests that the Ilians might have promulgated their tyrant-killing law circa 280, after having overthrown a nondemocratic regime. And that implies that the nondemocratic regime was in power sometime during the reign of Lysimachos. Several external points corroborate that preliminary finding.
Some corroboration is provided by the apparent fact that the people of Ilion did not enjoy Lysimachos’s reign. One might note, first, the fact that the dēmos exuberantly honored Seleukos I after he defeated Lysimachos at Kouroupedion and subsequently took control of the Troad. The decree (I. Ilion 31) is fragmentary, but the apparent sentiment is fully evident: the dēmos decreed to build an altar inscribed with his name on it and placed in the agora; a month was named after him; and festivals and sacrifices were to be held in his honor. It is certainly possible, of course, that such honors did not reflect genuine enthusiasm for the Troad’s new political order. And it is also possible that the people of Ilion were angry with Lysimachos not because he supported a tyrant but because he favored Alexandria Troas over their own polis.59 To counter both of those objections, note that I. Ilion 1 (lines 24–26) refers to an embassy sent by the koinon of Athena Ilias to Antigonos “concerning the freedom and autonomy of the cities sharing in the temple and festal assembly” (ὑ[πὲρ] | τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ αὐτονομίας τῶν πόλεων τῶν κοινωνουσ[ῶν τοῦ] | ἱεροῦ καὶ τῆς πανηγύρεως). Billows has reasonably suggested (1990: 219) that this embassy was sent in 302, when Lysimachos and, later, his general Prepelaos ravaged various poleis in the Troad: Lysimachos besieged and subsequently garrisoned Sigeum; Prepelaos besieged Abydos, a polis in the Ilian koinon (Diod. Sic. 20.107). At that time (i.e., 302), the democrats of Ilion likely suspected that, were Lysimachos to gain control of the Troad, they would lose their freedom. And that is conceivably what happened.60
Additional corroboration is provided by the fact that a new democratic political order was established in Ilion after the battle of Kouroupedion. The evidence for that assertion is entirely epigraphic. There are only two extant, nonfragmentary inscriptions that carry public decrees from Ilion that antedate that battle (I. Ilion 23 [circa 359] and 24 [circa 300]). Both record honorary decrees and neither refers to the dēmos; they both refer, instead, to the “Ilians.”61 There are several extant inscriptions that date to the years immediately after that battle, however. And all refer to the dēmos, and most include the motion formula “be it resolved by the boulē and dēmos” (δεδόχθαι τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι).62
A final corroborating point is that there were several anti-tyranny movements in and around Asia Minor after the battle of Kouroupedion. Such was the case in Erythrai, as chapter 5 demonstrated. Also, an interesting fragment of a plausibly contemporary inscription from Nisyros (Syll.3 1220) is possibly part of an anti-tyranny law. And, after the battle of Kouroupedion, the residents of Herakleia Pontica destroyed the citadel walls of the tyrant Klearchos, who had been installed in power by Lysimachos.63 It thus appears that a wave of anti-tyranny activity swept through
much of the region after Lysimachos’s death. Seleukos might have promoted that.64
The previous comments support a brief historical reconstruction. A nondemocratic regime came to power in Ilion sometime during the reign of Lysimachos. During that time the people of Ilion watched Alexandria Troas prosper, while their own hopes for economic improvement were dashed; there are no known building projects in Ilion that date to this period. But the dynamic changed after the battle of Kouroupedion: the pro-democrats, perhaps with outside help, rallied and took control of the city, overthrowing the supporters of the nondemocratic regime. They then promulgated their tyrant-killing law in order to defend their own, reestablished regime.65
THE TYRANNICAL THREAT
In this section, I identify the nature of the tyrannical threat that confronted the people of Ilion. What, in particular, were the people of Ilion worried about? As noted above, we know very little about Ilion’s domestic political history during the Hellenistic period. We do have, however, an elaborate tyrant-killing law that the people of Ilion promulgated in order to prevent anti-democrats from maintaining a nondemocratic regime. And a careful reading of that law provides at least a general answer to a couple of important questions. First, what is the basic profile of the expected tyrant or “leader of an oligarchy”? Second, how were such anti-democrats expected to maintain control of the polis?
WHO?
Two of the law’s provisions suggest that the people of Ilion expected the would-be tyrant to be a wealthy local or regional military man. Provision 4 of the Ilion tyrant-killing law incentivized “fellow soldiers” (sustratiōtai) to kill the tyrant—the prefix sun [sus here] meaning “fellow.” Stratiōtai can refer to both soldiers in general or hired mercenaries more particularly.66 In the above analysis of the law, I suggested that this provision particularly addressed mercenary soldiers. Thus the Ilians possibly imagined the potential tyrant to be or to have been a mercenary and thus have “fellow mercenaries.” (And it will be recalled from the opening of this chapter that Chares and Charidemos, two of Ilion’s tyrants during the fourth century, were mercenary generals.) But it is also possible that the Ilian pro-democrats used the word stratiōtai in the law because it is more general and would thus include both run-of-the-mill mercenaries (commonly called μισθοφόροι) and more elite soldiers in the tyrant’s inner circle (i.e., his hetairoi). In both cases, however, the Ilians imagined the tyrant to be a military man, as opposed, for example, to a banker (like Euboulos of Bithynia) or a philosopher (like Hermias, Euboulos’s successor), both tyrants of nearby Atarneus, or a historian (like Douris, the tyrant of Samos).
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