51 Nothing can be said about provision 13 other than that it is part of the law’s second section (i.e., it addressed matters that occurred while the democracy is overthrown: thus the provision begins ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τυράννου ἢ ὀλ[ι|γαρχίας).
52 As Koch notes (1996: 61), the possibilities are endless: individuals could hire mercenaries, bribe people in the regime to act against the regime, etc. Recall the inscription from Erythrai (I. Erythrai 21), discussed in the section in chapter 5 titled “Erection of the Statue in Wake of Alexander’s Conquest,” that records honors for Phanes because he (line 7) χρήματά τε ἐσήν[ε]γκεν ἄτοκα. That money, as noted, was used both to help overthrow a nondemocratic regime and to ensure the permanence of the new, democratic regime.
53 It is unclear what these “special boards”—the translation provided by LSJ s.v. ἀρχεῖον II—were. Note that I take τὰ ἐπίτιμα ταὐτὰ εἶναι (line 148) to refer soley to the penalty of atimia articulated in lines 140–44, not both to the penalty of atimia and (somehow) to the fines articulated in lines 136–40.
54 For the difficulties surrounding the honoring of those involved in the assassination of Phrynichos, see ML 85. For the difficulties surrounding the honoring of those involved in the overthrow of the Thirty, see the comments in RO 4. Friedel (1937: 97) concluded that the final provisions of the Ilian anti-tyranny law indicate that the Ilians had experienced a serious decline in civic morality. If that is the case, the Ilians nevertheless expected behavior like that found in late-fifth-century Athens.
55 Friedel (1937: 96): “und diese Bestimmungen sollen das erste Jahr lang gelten.” Frisch (1975: 70): “und diese Regelung soll mit diesem Jahr in Kraft tretten.” IJG (II: 35): “Il en sera ainsi dès la présente année.” Dössel (2003: 205): “und es soll dies das erste Jahr sein.”
56 It should be noted that Frisch concluded that lines 158–62 (i.e., provision 16) also indicate that the Ilians experienced a tyranny before they promulgated their anti-tyranny law: “And whoever receives [money] from them and does not spend it so that democracy is established, or whoever holding [money acquired] from them does not reveal the expenditures for those matters, he shall pay back double of what he received if convicted in court.” Frisch (1975: 71) argues that it would be foolish to enact such a provision governing future efforts against a nondemocratic regime because doing so would practically force those who accepted money in good faith to spend it immediately, lest they still hold the money when the tyranny is overthrown. This is not an unreasonable suggestion. But it is perhaps more likely that Frisch has identified an unintended consequence. Also, Lund (1992: 121) suggests that the frequent use of imperatives in the law’s final section might suggest that the Ilians had overthrown a nondemocratic regime.
Scholars who believe that there was a tyranny in Ilion before the promulgation of the Ilian anti-tyranny law: IJG (II: pp. 36–37), Friedel (1937: 83), Frisch (1975: 71–72), and Dössel (2003: 205–6). Scholars who have concluded that the Ilians might not have experienced a tyranny before they promulgated their anti-tyranny law: Dittenberger (OGIS 218); Magie (1950: 924–25n19); Funck (1994: 320). Koch (1996: 42–45) and Berve (1967: 422) are rather noncommittal. Maffi (2005: 141) suggests that the law was likely inspired by recent events in Ilion, but states that the nature of those events is unknowable.
57 See Dittenberger’s description of the letterforms at the introduction to his commentary on the text. Berve (1967: 419), Friedel (1937: 83), IJG (II: 37), Funck (1994), and Koch (1996: 41) accept a post-Kouroupedion date.
58 For the arguments on the date of OGIS 219, see Ma (2000: 254–59).
59 In a well-known passage, Strabo (13.1.26) appears to state that Lysimachos was Ilion’s benefactor: he built a temple and extensive city walls, and transferred to it several of the surrounding towns. But Strabo was quite likely referring to Alexandria Troas, not to Ilion. See Rose (2003: 31–35).
60 Billow’s suggestion is strengthened by the fact that Demetrios (the son of Antigonos) sent forces to relieve the people of Abydos (Diod. Sic. 20.107.3). It is also worth pointing out that the decree praising Seleukos (I. Ilion 31) is fragmentary and might have noted the liberation of Ilion. Note that I. Ilion 18, a decree of the Ilian koinon (ca. 300), refers (line 7) to a military context. It is possible that it could be tied to the difficulties of 302. On Prepelaos’s campaign of 302, see Magie (1950: 89, 916–17nn2–3).
61 Note, however, that I. Ilion 66 (a fragment of an honorary decree) possibly dates circa 300 since its lettering is nearly identical to I. Ilion 24. The word dēmos is restored in the former (line 8). It is possible that both inscriptions date to the pre-Ipsos period. Perhaps they should be associated with the resistance to the ravaging of the Troad by Lysimachos and his general Prepelaos. Note, too, that there are no extant inscriptions from Ilion that securely date to the reign of Lysimachos. I. Ilion 66 and 24 possibly do (if dated post-Ipsos). But the aforementioned pre-Ipsos scenario is more likely. Kent Rigsby (2007: 43–44) suggests that a newly found inscription that records an oath of synoecism between Ilion and Kokylion likely dates to the first half of the third century and might date to the reign of Lysimachos. Friedel (1937: 83n157) suggests that the lack of inscriptions dating to the period of Lysimachos’s rule might be attributed to the “damnatio memoriae” provisions in the tyrant-killing law (i.e., provision 12).
62 There are four relevant inscriptions (numbers refer to I. Ilion): 31 (281, refers to the dēmos; it is very fragmentary and almost certainly contained the democratic motion formula); 32 (ca. 280, refers to dēmos and contains the motion formula, lines 19–20); 33 (ca. 274, refers to dēmos but, since it records letters written about and to Ilion, does not contain the motion formula); 34 (ca. 275–269, refers to the dēmos and contains the motion formula, lines 8–9). And one might also include I. Ilion 40. It records an honorary decree of the Ilion dēmos that contains the full motion formula (lines 6–7) and is dated to the third century, perhaps the first half of the century. The change of language in Ilian decrees after circa 280 is clearly demonstrated by a comparison between I. Ilion 23 (recording an honorary decree dated ca. 359) and I. Ilion 34 (an honorary decree dated 275–269). I. Ilion 23 reads, Ἰλιεῖς ἔδοσαν … προξενίαν καὶ εὐεργεσίαν. I. Ilion 34 reads, δεδόχθαι τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι … εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ πρόξενον καὶ εὐεργέτην τῆς πόλεως.
63 Burstein (1976: 87). Note that I. Ephesos 1377 is likely an anti-tyranny law. It is dated to “4th/3rd c.” Also, sometime during the first half of the third century, each citizen of Kalymna swore “I will establish neither oligarchy or tyranny nor any other regime other than democracy” (ὀλγαρχίαν δὲ οὐδὲ τύραννον οὐδὲ ἄλλο πολίτευμα ἔξω δαμο|κρατίας οὐ καταστάσω) (Tit. Calymnii Test. XII, lines 21–22).
64 Funck (1994) argues that the Ilian tyrant-killing law was promulgated pursuant to Seleukid royal policy aimed at gaining the loyalty of Ilion (“ein Meisterstück seleukidischer Städtepolitik”: p. 320). This is certainly possible but, because of the state of the evidence, speculative.
65 Koch (1996: 43–44) suggests that the Ilian democrats might have crafted their tyrant-killing law while in exile. IJG (II: 37) refers to the law as a loi révolutionnaire (which accounts for its sloppiness and apparent lack of order).
66 Note the agreement between Eumenes I and his mercenaries (OGIS 266). In line 2, we learn that the mercenaries were called stratiōtai and were stationed at Philetaireia (base of Mount Ida—to protect the northern boarder) and Attaleia (near the source of the Kaïkos river—to protect the eastern boarder).
67 See I. Erythrai 201 (and commentary) for an elaborate example of this phenomenon: over fifty priesthoods are listed. It dates to the first half of the third century.
68 This was suggested at least as early as Hicks and Hill (1901: 266).
/> 69 See Magie (1950: 725n2). King Demaratos and his descendants (the Demaratidae) controlled Teuthrania and Halisarna: Xen. Hell. 3.1.6; Xen. Anab. 2.1.3, 7.8.17; cf. Hdt. 6.67–70. The Eretrian Gongylos and his descendants (the Gongylidae) controlled Gambrion, Palaigambrion, Myrina, and Gryneion: Xen. Hell. 3.1.6; cf. Thuc. 1.128.6f and Diod. Sic. 11.44.3. It would appear that the Gongylidae controlled Pergamum in the early fourth century (Xen. Anab. 7.8.8), but it is not certain. See, too, McShane (1964: 16).
70 Paus. 1.10.4; Strabo 13.4.1; see McShane (1964: 30–31). The independence of Pergamum was solidified militarily, when Eumenes, shortly after inheriting control of Pergamum in 263/2, defeated Antiochos II in a battle near Sardeis. See Magie (1950: 733n16).
71 Although not explicitly referring to the Troad—but the Troad would no doubt have been included—Seleukos II “wrote to the kings, dynasts, cities, and leagues” requesting that they consider the temple of Aphrodite Stratonikē to be inviolable (asylon) and Smyrna to be sacred and inviolable (OGIS 229 line 11). According to Thucydides (1.138.5–6), Themistocles ruled (ἦρχε) Magnesia on the Maiander, Lampsakos, and Myous. Themistocles issued personal coinage in Magnesia: Gardner (1913: 165).
72 According to Strabo (13.1.27), the Gauls briefly occupied Ilion.
73 For an interesting analysis of the codependency between mercenaries and tyrants, see Polyb. 11.13.3–8. See also Xen. Hier. 4.9 (and passim).
74 It is also worth noting that Thrasyboulos (tyrant of Miletos) apparently advised Periandros (tyrant of Korinth) to assassinate the city’s best men in order to maintain power. For the famous story, see Hdt. 5.92.
75 Aristophanes’s comedies Wasps and Knights reveal this phenomenon. On the dynamic here noted, see Henderson (2003) and Ostwald (1986: 199–229).
76 The paranoia of tyrants was proverbial: “there is nothing more timorous than a tyrant” (Plut. Arat. 6.5). Writers of the Athenian dissent community also stressed that point: e.g., Xen. Hier. 5; Pl. Resp. 579 B-C.
77 Note that the rule of the Thirty was preceded by the rigging of the selection to the boulē; see Munn (2000: 207–9).
78 For such deceptive rhetoric in late-fifth-century Athens, see the section in chapter 1 titled “Coordination Problem.” For concern over the use of deceptive rhetoric in Eretria, see the section in chapter 2 titled “First Particular Layer of Defense.”
79 There are at least twenty-one relevant inscriptions that are more or less securely dated to the third century, yet after the tyrant-killing law: I. Ilion 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 51, 61, 67 (third/second century), 38, 44, 202, 203, 204, 205 (third/second century), 207 (third/second century), 201 (early Hellenistic); Rigsby (2002), (2004), (2007). Eleven of those inscriptions suggest that the dēmos controlled the city: I. Ilion 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 (dēmos restored), 36, 40, 51, 61, 67; Rigsby (2002). Nine of the remaining ten are quite fragmentary and give no indication of the ruling regime: I. Ilion 38, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 201; Rigsby (2004), (2007). That leaves I. Ilion 44. But it is a private dedication of a woman from Pergamum, dated 209–205, to the gods in Samothrace on behalf of Ptolemy IV and his family; it would not be expected to indicate the nature of Ilion’s regime.
80 Also, the tribute of the Lokrian maidens was revived in the middle of the third century. That practice, as suggested by Rose (2003: 57), “functionally … parallels the office of the arrhephoroi on the Athenian acropolis.” On Athens as the architectural model for Ilion, see Rose (2003).
81 Aylward and Wallrodt (2003: 96) also suggest that the people of Ilion followed the Athenian model in making the Acropolis the backdrop for their theater. And the koinon of Athena Ilias, founded, perhaps, in 310, appears to have looked to democratic Athens as its model: the festival of the Panathenaia was likely similar to the Athenian festival and the theater perhaps inspired by the Lykourgan-era example. See Rose (1992).
82 Lawall (1999: 215), Aylward (1999). Also, Antiochos II minted silver tetradrachms in Ilion (Magie [1950: 933n27]).
83 See Aylward (2005). Heirax held the Troad from 241 to 228. After he was defeated by Attalos, Ilion apparently entered into alliance with Attalos (Magie: 1950: 9).
84 The economic improvement is likely due to a better political equilibrium. Ober (2008: 13) writes: “because social cooperation produces economic value (as well as being valuable in nonmaterial ways), more cooperative and (in changing environments) more dynamically adaptive equilibria perform relatively well in economic terms.” Compare this to Herodotos’s famous explanation for the Athenians’ prosperity after the overthrow of the Peisistratids (5.78). A similar dynamic might have been operative in Ilion after the overthrow of their nondemocratic regime circa 280.
85 Ilion was a small polis: the city walls were 3.6 kilometers in length. For a discussion of the walls (built circa 250–220), see Aylward and Wallrodt (2003). On the population of Ilion in the first years of third century, Cook (1973: 100) suggests “about 5,000”—but the population soon increased significantly. The Ilians celebrated the Panathenaia by at least the end of the fourth century (I. Ilion 24 line 18; I. Ilion 1 lines 50–51). That festival would have performed the function of a “rational ritual.” And it is important to note that many of Ilion’s inscriptions—including the one engraved with the tyrant-killing law—were likely placed in the temple of Athena; thus attendees were encouraged to discuss politics. On the placement of inscriptions in the temple of Athena, see Rose (2003: 60–63).
86 In their resistance to the tyrant Hiero, the exiles of Priene sent psephismata to King Demetrios, Lysimachos, and the citizens of Rhodes (I. Priene 37 lines 73–77); that likely implies the sending of ambassadors to read them (cf. the fifth text in the dossier from Eresos). Lysias (in exile at Megara) provided funds and two hundred shields to help the democrats reclaim Athens during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants: Plut. Mor. 835f. Aratos hired mercenaries to help reclaim Sikyon (Plut. Arat. 6).
87 The citizens of other cities in the koinon would presumably be among the first foreigners to help the citizens of Ilion since all of the cities were quite closely bound. See the brief remarks about the koinon in Frisch (1975: xv).
88 One should also recall (from chapter 4) that the people of Nasos (an Aeolian city) promulgated a law against overthrowing the damos (τῶ νόμ[ω π]ερὶ τῶ καλλ[ύο]ντος τὸν δᾶ[μον]. The law is referred to in OGIS 4 (lines 106–10), an inscription dated 319–317. Also, an epigram celebrating Harmodios and Aristogeiton (and commemorating the Athenians’ decision to build a grave monument for them) has been found in Chios. Trypanis (1960:70) suggests an inscribing date of late third or early second century, admittedly not during the “early” Hellenistic period.
Conclusion
The persistence of democracy within the ancient Greek world during the Classical and early Hellenistic periods was an achievement of profound historical significance. In scores of cities, from Attika to Euboia, from the Troad to Karia and beyond, the nonelite masses controlled their state; the elites were forced to share political power. It was the first time in history that democracy became a normal regime type within an international system of independent states. And it would be well over two millennia until anything even remotely like that would happen again. How were Greek pro-democrats able to maintain such a historical anomaly for so long?
I have argued in this book that the promulgation of tyrant-killing law contributed significantly to the persistence of democracy in the ancient Greek world. The previous six chapters demonstrated that that law type was effective in five different states in different times. And I also have demonstrated that those examples represent just the tip of the iceberg. In the conclusion to chapter 6, for example, I argued that tyrant-killing law contributed significantly to the successful democratization of Hellenistic western Asia Minor. And, as noted in the introduction to this book, literary sources indicate that, by the second quarter of the fourth century, tyrant killing became a widely accepted and celebrated means to overthrow nondemocratic regimes and usher in democ
racy.
In these concluding remarks, I provide a simple conceptual framework within which we might interpret the long and complex history of tyrant-killing legislation. The framework has two parts. The first focuses on the dynamics of learning and innovation in Athens. The second briefly explores the likely dynamics of learning and adoption outside Athens.
Learning and Innovation in Athens
The origin of ancient Greek tyrant-killing legislation is directly tied to the Athenians’ failure to respond to the coup of the Four Hundred. In the years before that coup, pro-democrats had some reason to be confident in the long-term durability of their regime: they had already controlled the city for generations, and even anti-democrats concluded that it could not be overthrown.1 It seemed invulnerable. But that confidence was shattered in the summer of 411, when a small number of committed anti-democrats overthrew the democracy and established a narrow oligarchy. The loss of power was no doubt a psychological blow to Athens’s pro-democrats. But it did force them to seriously identify the foundations of their democracy and how they might defend their regime against future tyrannical threats. The coup, that is, was a learning experience.
The fundamental lesson that the Athenian pro-democrats learned from their experience in the coup of the Four Hundred is that the survival of their democracy ultimately depended on whether or not they could mobilize en masse even if their democracy was overthrown. It is not enough, that is, simply to have institutions that help individuals prevent a coup: people can be manipulated, and those institutions can thus fail. That lesson became clear when the pro-democrats, intimidated and misinformed by the anti-democrats’ policies, annulled the graphē paranomōn, an institution specifically designed to prevent a coup d’état.2 Again, Athenian pro-democrats realized that they must have the ability to draw upon their collective strength after a successful coup—when established institutions are no longer functioning. If they do not have that ability, their numerical superiority is meaningless.
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