Although everywhere Spee turned there were powerful squadrons gathered against him, the oceans were vast and he might elude his pursuers and turn up in an unexpected place, if only he could solve his coal difficulty. What were the German plans? The Admiralstab, before they knew of Coronel, had warned Spee in a message he received when he called at Valparaiso that the rendezvous positions with colliers in the Atlantic were compromised and that the trade lanes were strongly patrolled. Cruiser warfare could only be carried on by ships operating in groups, and the Admiralstab intended to concentrate ships operating abroad and order them to break for home. The lack of a base in which to refit or replenish ammunition, and the knowledge that news of the Battle of Coronel would hasten an Allied combination against him, meant Spee had no interest in staying long on the west coast of South America.
Spee returned to Mas a Fuera, where he found both the Leipzig and Titania had made prizes full of valuable coal. He finally made his decision to proceed around Cape Horn into the Atlantic, and sailed on 15 November. The faithful tender Titania, old, slow, and not up to the dangers of the trip around Cape Horn, was likely to have only delayed them and was scuttled. The German Squadron proceeded to the Chilean coast, and in the sheltered Saint Quentin Bay (Gulf of Peñas) met colliers that had slipped out of Chilean ports. The German cruisers crammed all possible coal and supplies into their ships for the voyage to the Atlantic. When they sailed on the 26th into the rough seas, some of the small cruisers had to heave to and throw some of the coal overboard for stability.
Spee had three supply ships with him, but the last letter he received from Berlin amplified the difficulties of coaling in the Atlantic: the Germans could anticipate that British pressure on neutral governments to restrict the supply of coal would intensify. The Admiralstab recommended carrying on a vigorous cruiser warfare but left it to his discretion when to break off, collect all the ships he could, and then break for home. The auxiliary cruiser Kronprinz Wilhelm, with her huge fuel consumption and scant military value, could be disposed of. The Admiralstab did not believe the breakthrough to Germany, with luck, would be impossible if sufficiently prepared. Allied forces operating separately for trade protection must not be given the time to concentrate, and Spee was advised to communicate his intentions in advance so the High Sea Fleet could assist. The Admiralstab did not, however, accept the recommendation of Korvettenkapitän von Knorr, the Etappen officer in San Francisco, that the battle cruisers of the High Sea Fleet make a raid into the Atlantic to support Spee’s squadron. The difficulties of providing sufficient coal and maintaining these big ships at sea ruled this out.64
These recommendations had a vague, uncertain quality to them. Would they have produced the encounter in the North Sea that the Grand Fleet desired if the High Sea Fleet had made a significant sortie to cover Spee’s return? Again, we have a question that can never be answered, another “what might have been” to be played out by today’s wargamers. Tirpitz apparently favored authorizing Spee to refrain from undertaking cruiser warfare on the east coast of South America, where strong British forces were known to be gathering. He preferred that Spee should move out into the center of the Atlantic and break for home. Pohl, however, did not want to impinge on Spee’s freedom of action.65
Spee had been proceeding in a surprisingly leisurely fashion since Coronel. Ultimately it proved disastrous. He captured a British bark loaded with coal and spent 3–6 December anchored off Picton Island in the Beagle Channel transferring coal while the sportsmen among the officers hunted on shore. On 6 December he called a conference of his captains and announced his fatal decision to attack the Falkland Islands. According to his intelligence, there were no British warships there, and other British warships had been drawn from the South American coast to South Africa because of the Boer revolt. Spee hoped to destroy the British wireless station and stocks of coal known to be there, and perhaps to capture the governor in retaliation for the imprisonment of the German governor of Samoa. The Gneisenau and Nürnberg would carry out the operation, screened by the remainder of the squadron. While Spee’s chief of staff and the captain of the Nürnberg supported the plan, the captains of the Gneisenau, Dresden, and Leipzig were opposed and recommended avoiding the Falklands in order to appear off the Plate without advance warning. Unfortunately for Spee, he was out of wireless contact with German intelligence sources and could not receive the warnings about the approach of Sturdee’s battle cruisers.66 Certain wireless operators had been guilty of indiscreet chatter about the big ships, but the intelligence never reached Spee.
Admiral Sturdee was also steaming for the same destination as the Germans and also proceeding in a surprisingly leisurely fashion, stopping to examine merchant ships and spending forty-eight hours coaling and transferring stores at the Abrolhos Rocks. These islets, about 300 miles south of Bahia and 30 miles off the Brazilian coast, were uninhabited except for a Brazilian lighthouse keeper. There were treacherous reefs and navigation was tricky, but it was possible for ships to anchor in shoal waters outside the limits of territorial waters. The British therefore had a base where they could coal, although it was exposed to an unpleasant swell. In the absence of any base on the neutral coast of South America, the place sufficed. The English Bank, outside of Argentine and Uruguayan territorial waters in the Plate, served a similar function farther to the south.
Stoddart’s squadron waited at Abrolhos for Sturdee, who intended to proceed to the Falklands, coal, and then go on to the west coast of South America where Spee had last been reported. Sturdee sailed on the 28th, still at a leisurely pace to conserve fuel, conducted battle practice, and wasted still more time when a towing wire used for a target fouled one of the Invincible’s screws, necessitating the use of divers to clear the problem.
The Falklands, contrary to Spee’s intelligence, were not devoid of British warships. The Admiralty decided that if operations against the German Squadron on the west coast of South America were necessary, the Falklands would be valuable as a coaling base, and the wireless and coal stocks therefore must be defended. The Canopus had been en route to join Stoddard’s concentration when the Admiralty ordered her on 9 November to return to Port Stanley and anchor (beached if necessary for a good berth), so that her guns could command the entrance to the harbor, with an extemporized minefield laid outside, observation stations on shore, and the governor of the Falkland Islands to assist in organizing a local defense force to cover possible landing sites.
Sturdee finally arrived at the Falklands on the morning of 7 December and began coaling, an operation that was expected to take forty-eight hours. The British were therefore in the midst of coaling and only the Kent had steam at less than two hours’ notice when the arrival of German warships was signaled by British lookouts just before 8:00 A.M. the following morning, 8 December.
Spee neglected the opportunity to inflict serious damage while the British were still unprepared. The Gneisenau reported the presence of British warships but initially believed them to be only cruisers, or possibly a slow old battleship like the Canopus. The Kent, first to leave the harbor, might have been overwhelmed, but the Canopus fired a salvo at her maximum elevation overland toward the Germans. The large columns of water from the shell splashes surprised the Germans and indicated the island was defended. Spee may have concluded a battleship was present but that it could not catch his squadron. The Germans did not approach closely and Spee’s squadron turned away, thereby failing to take advantage of the British lack of readiness.
Sturdee, however dilatory he had been in reaching the Falklands, was calm in the crisis and is quoted as saying the Germans came at a most convenient hour, for he was able to give the order to raise steam and then go down for a good breakfast.67 He was also assisted by good luck. Most of the day was fine and clear, unusual weather for that area, and the Germans could not take advantage of the frequent mist to escape. By 11:00 A.M. the Bristol, having had an engine open for repair, had sailed, the last of Sturdee’s ships to leave harbor
. She was, however, diverted from the main action. Spee had ordered his three colliers to remain off Port Pleasant, roughly 30 miles south of Port Stanley. They were observed and reported by a Mrs. Felton, one of the few residents.68 Sturdee ordered the Bristol and the armed merchant cruiser Macedonia to find and destroy the German transports. There was always the possibility they might contain German reservists from South America who had been detailed to invade the colony.
The main British force, Sturdee in the Invincible with the Inflexible, Glasgow, Kent, Carnarvon, and Cornwall, followed the fleeing Germans in a southeasterly direction, the British working up to full speed with the battle cruisers belching great clouds of black smoke that all participants remarked on and that would later hamper gunnery. The battle cruisers pulled steadily ahead of the British armored cruisers, and at 10:50 A.M. Sturdee successively reduced speed to give them time to catch up. At 11:30 Sturdee signaled for the crews to take their midday meal and for those still in the coal rig to use the opportunity to clean up. The Inflexible was close enough to fire the first shot at the Leipzig at 12:50 P.M., and the Invincible followed shortly afterward. Spee decided that he might yet save something from the situation, and at about 1:20 he signaled the three light cruisers to break off and scatter in a southerly direction. They might escape to resume cruiser warfare. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would sacrifice themselves to cover their withdrawal. Sturdee’s battle instructions had provided for this contingency, and without any further signal, the British light cruisers turned away in pursuit of their German counterparts. The German light cruisers were not in the best of condition after hard steaming and a long time without docking, and in the end only the Dresden, the fastest, was able to escape.
As the German forces diverged, there were three separate actions. The Glasgow, joined by the Cornwall when she was able to catch up, sank the Leipzig. The Nürnberg was eventually caught and sunk by the Kent. In the main action, Sturdee skillfully kept the range at about 12,500 yards, just beyond the maximum range of Spee’s 5.9-inch secondary armament, which the Germans repeatedly tried to employ. The dense smoke of the battle cruisers hampered gunnery on both sides, but the weight of metal on the British side slowly began to tell, and by 4:17 the Scharnhorst had sunk with no survivors. The Invincible and Inflexible, joined by the Carnarvon, which had finally managed to catch up, finished off the Gneisenau, which sank a little after 5:45. The day ended in rain and mist, and in the cold, choppy waters there were few German survivors; many died of exposure after they had been picked up. There were 215 survivors from the four cruisers whose officers and men had numbered about 2,200. Neither Spee nor two of his sons in the squadron were among them. None of the British ships suffered serious damage; ten men were killed or died of wounds. Far to the north, the Bristol and Macedonia found two of the German colliers, the Baden and Santa Isabel, and sank them. A third ship, the Seydlitz, managed to get away without being seen and eventually made port in Argentina, where she was interned.69
The Germans had fought hard and well; their gunnery was excellent as usual, but in the end, as at Coronel, superior matériel had been decisive. The general law of the sea that big fish eat smaller fish and are in turn eaten by bigger fish appeared to have been demonstrated once again. The effects of Coronel were undone. Except for a few raiders soon to be interned, there was no organized German force at sea. Fisher was furious with Sturdee for having let the Dresden escape, and he behaved ungenerously toward the admiral. He was the exception: Sturdee received a baronetcy for his victory, and for most Coronel had been avenged. The battle cruisers were ordered home long before the Dresden was found—to the immense relief of Jellicoe. The Dresden, hiding in the numerous bays and inlets of Tierra del Fuego and the wild coast of southern Chile, accomplished little in terms of cruiser warfare. She was finally caught almost out of coal in Cumberland Bay at the remote island of Mas a Tierra on 14 March 1915 by the Glasgow, Kent, and the armed merchant cruiser Orama. Captain Luce of the Glasgow disregarded Chilean neutrality—which the Dresden also had violated by staying since the 9th instead of the customary twenty-four hours—and opened fire. The Germans hoisted a white flag, sent an officer in a boat to parley, and scuttled the ship.70
The destruction of Spee’s squadron was an immense relief to the Admiralty, for, coupled with the virtual elimination of the other surface raiders, it freed a considerable number of ships for other purposes. For Great Britain and Germany, the two major naval antagonists, the war became much more concentrated in the North Sea and the Mediterranean. German surface raiders appeared again later in the war, but the losses they inflicted, although not negligible, paled in comparison to those inflicted by submarines, which came to be Germany’s major hope in the war at sea. Even Spee, however dangerous his squadron, had accomplished little in terms of cruiser warfare. The ships attached to his squadron had accounted for very few merchantmen. His disappearance in the vast emptiness of the Pacific Ocean had not seriously harmed the British or French. There were few important trade routes in this area, and the destruction of an old gunboat like the Zélée was not much for a powerful squadron of cruisers in three months of war. There are some historians, such as Captain Bennett, who argue he would have accomplished far more had he operated in the Indian Ocean, despite the difficulties of coaling.71
The large number of cruisers and armed merchant cruisers released by the elimination of German surface forces on the world’s oceans also gave the British the wherewithal to try the traditional maritime strategy of overseas expeditions, which will form the subject of the next chapter.
5
THE OVERSEAS CAMPAIGNS
ABORTIVE NORTH SEA AND BALTIC PROJECTS
A common and traditional view in Great Britain was that the British army was a “projectile” to be fired by the British navy. How could the British make use of their naval superiority to strike the Germans at a strategic point where relatively small land forces could have a disproportionate effect the way they were perceived to have had in the Napoleonic Wars? Well before the outbreak of the war, the fertile mind of Winston Churchill had been seeking to use the navy in an offensive fashion and had ordered studies of possible landings on the Dutch, German, Danish, or Scandinavian coasts. The objective was to establish bases close to the major German ports. Rear Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly; Rear Admiral Arthur Leveson, the director of operations; and Major-General Sir George Aston (Royal Marines) prepared reports on the North Sea Islands of Borkum, Sylt, Helgoland, and Esbjerg (on the Danish Peninsula) as well as a scheme for seizing the western end of the Kiel Canal and a raid by destroyers on the Elbe. On 31 July, shortly before Britain entered the war, Churchill sent these reports to the prime minister and asked the War Office to study the plans. He then asked the War Office to study plans for (in order of priority) landings at Ameland or Born Deep (Holland), Ekersund (Norway), Laesø Channel (Denmark), and Kungsbacka Fjord (Sweden). Significantly, these all involved neutral rather than German territory, and, because he knew the requisite troops were not likely to be available, he assigned a lower priority to other studies he desired concerning Esbjerg, Sylt, Borkum, and Helgoland.
Churchill’s proposals aroused little enthusiasm among the naval or military authorities, and one can imagine the horrified reaction of the Foreign Office to the idea of turning neutrals into enemies. The rationale behind the seizure of these points on neutral coasts or North Sea islands was to establish a secure base for destroyer and submarine flotillas as well as for aircraft to be used in a close blockade of the Helgoland Bight. This would, it was hoped, create an intolerable situation for the Germans and force their fleet to sortie.
The naval staff managed to deflect Churchill from his scheme to capture Ameland with three thousand Royal Marines. The island could be taken easily and shelter a flotilla much closer to the Helgoland Bight than British bases, but the protection of this new base would tie up a strong force exposed to attack from both the Dutch and German bases close by. The Dutch would almost inevitably declare war and h
ad torpedo craft and a few submarines that could be troublesome, while adequate defenses against cruiser attack at the new base would take considerable time to prepare.1
Helgoland was another potential objective. The little island was strategically placed at about 20 miles off the entrances to the Elbe, Weser, and Jade rivers and consequently would have been an ideal place from which aircraft could subject German naval movements to close observation. The island could also serve as a base for destroyers and submarines and provide early warning of sorties by German warships for British submarines. The seizure of Helgoland was a pet project of the former First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Arthur K. Wilson, despite the results of the 1913 study by Bayly that regarded the cost of its seizure as prohibitive. The island, not surprisingly, was heavily fortified. Wilson submitted plans for Helgoland’s capture shortly after the outbreak of the war and continued working on them after he returned to the Admiralty in an unofficial capacity in October. Wilson was convinced improvements in range-finding gave ships an advantage over the land-based forts and that Helgoland could be seized without excessive cost by a landing party of marines covered by a fleet of predreadnoughts. The island could be defended, according to Wilson, by a small garrison equipped with a dozen machine guns to cover possible landing places and by a handful of 4-inch or 6-inch guns to ward off destroyers or light cruisers. The real defense would come from mining the mouths of the rivers the German fleet would have to use and then closely watching those exits with submarines.
A Naval History of World War I Page 18