Abruzzi, who had always regarded Pelagosa as merely the complement of the occupation of Lagosta, continued to argue in favor of the new landing. Lagosta would then be an important part of a line of observation posts running from the Gargano headlands on the Italian mainland through Pelagosa in the center of the Adriatic. Abruzzi warned that if they were going to take Lagosta, they ought to do so at once, and if they were not, they should then consider the possibility of being obliged to withdraw from Pelagosa as well. Revel did not agree that the occupations of Pelagosa and Lagosta were strictly linked. He believed that the uncertain military situation, in which the Italian army was held up on the Isonzo River, precluded a new landing. It would also be much more difficult to supply Lagosta than Pelagosa, for whereas the latter was halfway between the Austrian and Italian ports, Lagosta was much closer to the enemy coast and would require a larger garrison. The disagreement between the capo di stato maggiore and the commander in chief of the fleet was fundamental.
While their chiefs debated, the Italian garrison worked hard to fortify Pelagosa, bringing in another four 76-mm cannons, two more machine guns, and another thirty sailors. Abruzzi wanted to keep the garrison to a minimum because fresh water had to be brought to the barren island in tank ships. The Italians also suffered severely from the summer heat. The Austrians decided the issue by convincing Revel that the inhospitable little island was more trouble to hold than it was worth. On 17 August the Austrian First Torpedo Flotilla and Twelfth Torpedo Division deployed around Pelagosa while the light cruiser Helgoland, two destroyers, and a torpedo boat closed the island to shell the Italian positions. They were later joined by the light cruiser Saida, another two destroyers, and seaplanes. The Austrians subjected Pelagosa to a thorough bombardment, destroying installations, including the freshwater cistern. Later that day Revel ordered an immediate evacuation, destroying all matériel that could not be quickly embarked. He and the naval staff justified the evacuation in the official account by stressing the lack of resources on the island and the steep slopes that made it difficult to enlarge the Italian positions. A strong cruiser and destroyer force from Brindisi covered the withdrawal, which took place without incident the following day.22 Richmond’s reaction to the evacuation was scathing: “They have by this admitted that the Austrians have command of the sea in the Adriatic in spite of inferior naval force & without fighting an action! They have surrendered to them. They had better sell their Fleet & take up their organs & monkeys again, for, by Heaven, that seems more their profession than sea-fighting.”23
It would be misleading to think that the Austrians were completely unscathed during the period of the Pelagosa occupation. They lost their first submarine, U.12, on 12 August when the boat struck a mine off Venice and sank with all hands. On the 13th U.3 was sunk by the French destroyer Bisson northeast of Brindisi, and on 9 September a torpedo from the French submarine Papin blew the bows off the Austrian torpedo boat T.51, which had been conducting a reconnaissance of Pelagosa. The craft was towed to safety.
The power of the submarine in the Adriatic greatly reduced the likelihood of a classic encounter between the capital ships of the opposing forces. The Italian deployment split the Italian fleet in three portions and thereby to a certain degree invited attack. The dreadnoughts, better predreadnoughts, and British battleships were at Taranto; the four Regina Elenas—fast light battleships (with two 12-inch guns each)—were at Brindisi to compensate for the Pisas, along with the French and Italian destroyers and submarines; and the old Sardegna-class battleships, Pisa-class armored cruisers, as well as Italian destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines were at Venice. Abruzzi had some intelligence the Austrians might seek to profit from this by attacking with their entire fleet—perhaps on 20 July, the anniversary of Lissa—or possibly bombard Brindisi with the objective of drawing the Italian battle fleet out of Taranto and into submarine-infested waters around Cape Santa Maria di Leuca. He planned to meet the danger by essentially defending Brindisi with submarines; the Italian warships in port would not exit but would cooperate with the defense with their artillery from inside the port. Abruzzi’s dreadnoughts certainly would sail to meet the Austrians if they came out of the Adriatic heading for Taranto, and they would engage them, but if the Austrians chose to avoid contact, the Italian dreadnoughts would not follow them into the Adriatic because of the danger of a submarine ambush. Admiral Haus could therefore have steamed southward and bombarded Brindisi at leisure without having to worry about meeting the superior forces of the Italian battle fleet. He would, however, have exposed his precious assets, the handful of dreadnoughts and modern battleships, to the same danger of submarines that Abruzzi was so anxious to avoid, and he never chose to take the risk. Aside from the opening shots of the war on 24 May, the newer and best Austrian capital ships never approached the Italian coast. The submarine threat was one of the major reasons the Italian navy rejected in August a request from the French army general staff and the king of Montenegro for long-range guns and heavy howitzers to be established on Mount Lovčen so as to make the stay of the Austrian navy in Cattaro impossible. If the Italian fleet then attacked from the seaward side, the Austrian base might surrender. Revel did not agree. Aside from the fact that the Italian army was not likely to be forthcoming with the heavy artillery, munitions, and men necessary to force a surrender, the difficulties of transport and supply would only grow. Revel emphasized that those risks were much graver because of enemy submarines, whose numbers, aggressive spirit, and commanders’ ability in maneuvers were manifestly superior to what could rationally have been foreseen before the opening of hostilities.24
After the evacuation of Pelagosa and toward the end of the summer, the war in the Adriatic seemed to be winding down. Revel warned his admirals to be careful to conserve matériel; the activities and services of light craft, torpedo boats, and submarines were to be kept within proper limits to avoid excessively frequent repairs and long periods out of service for what the Italians had found to be relatively fragile craft. They were not to be risked in bad weather if it was not absolutely necessary. The war was likely to last for a long time, and the necessity for energetic action might only come after many months. The Italians also tried to obtain ships abroad, approaching the Admiralty about purchasing two to four of the latest light cruisers under construction for the Royal Navy. The requests were of course politely denied.25 In October 1915 the British did send five (later six) old B-class submarines to Venice. They were replaced after approximately a year by three of the more modern H class, which were eventually transferred to Brindisi in August 1917. The British submarine operations in the northern Adriatic were another example of the Royal Navy working under unusual and difficult conditions. They achieved no striking success, although they probably inhibited the movements of Austrian heavy ships.26
The setbacks and losses suffered by the Italian navy in 1915 and the stalemate at sea seemed to exacerbate tensions within the Italian navy. There were some admirals who objected to Revel’s cautious strategy. There was also the problem of public opinion. Italian cities and ports along the entire Adriatic coast were in effect on the front line of the naval war, and their protests and those of the politicians who represented them could not be ignored. The situation was much different than that in England after the German raids on the east coast. The enemy in the Adriatic was much closer, his raids far more frequent, and more people were affected. Vice Admiral Viale, the minister of marine, Revel, and Abruzzi all differed in the policies they recommended, and the prime minister and cabinet were not satisfied with the performance of the navy in general. Viale, attacked for his lethargy and lack of performance, resigned on 24 September. The situation was not helped when the battleship Benedetto Brin mysteriously blew up and sank with heavy loss of life in Brindisi harbor on the 27th. The new minister, Vice Admiral Camillo Corsi, inherited the latent conflict between the minister, the various directorates at the ministry, and the capo di stato maggiore. Revel finally resigned on 11 Octob
er to become commander in chief at Venice. Corsi did not replace him but combined the office of chief of naval staff with his own office.27
The word stalemate is the most accurate description for the naval war in the Adriatic by the end of the summer of 1915. Captain Daveluy, the French liaison officer with the Italian fleet, described it in these terms:
From these facts one can draw the following conclusion: submarines prohibit large warships from keeping to the sea, each party scratched their heads to “do something” but one has not found any other thing to do except small operations which have no real significance [portée] and are, above all, intended to give the illusion one is acting. But, as one cannot fire indefinitely on the same bridge, the same station, the same railways, the same lighthouses and the same semaphores, it seems clear that now the Italians and Austrians are at the end of their resources; after having wanted to do “something,” one no longer knows “what to do.”
During this time commercial navigation remains forbidden to both parties, in a way that none of them can claim mastery of the sea; the latter belongs to submarines of all nationalities.28
The entry of Bulgaria into the war leading to the overrunning of Serbia and the evacuation of the Serbian army soon brought considerable action to the Adriatic, although when the movements were over, the essential stalemate remained unchanged.
EVACUATION OF THE SERBIAN ARMY
On 6 September the Bulgarian government concluded an alliance with the Central Powers and on the 21st began the mobilization of its army. The stage was set for the collapse of Serbia, which until now had successfully resisted successive Austrian offensives. On 6 October Field Marshal August von Mackensen, commanding the German Eleventh Army and the Austrian Third Army, began an offensive. The Serbian capital of Belgrade fell on the 9th. Two Bulgarian armies joined the invasion on the 11th, and the British and French attempted to assist the Serbians by landing at Salonika and marching up the Vardar Valley. But it was a classic case of “too little, too late” and ended with the British and French having to fall back to the vicinity of Salonika, committed to a new campaign.
The need to cover the troop movements to Salonika caused the withdrawal of the French destroyers from Brindisi. The French assured the Italians this was only temporary, but it caused a serious shortage of destroyers for Abruzzi, which was not helped by the fact Italian destroyers were slightly built and, according to Thursby, could not stand much rough work, with too large a proportion of them continually under repair. The Italians could only transfer a few destroyers from Venice to the south because of the need to protect the right wing of the Italian army at the head of the Adriatic. The necessity of dividing destroyers and torpedo boats between Venice and the south nullified the numerical advantage the Italian navy enjoyed over the Austrians.
The Adriatic grew in strategic importance once the Bulgarian invasion cut off Serbia’s supply route from Salonika. The attempt to assist the Serbians now had to make use of Adriatic ports. These ports lay in the Italian zone of command, and the Italians had already assumed the responsibility for escorting the supplies to Montenegro after they entered the war. The supplies for Montenegro were in relatively small quantities and went through the small port of San Giovanni di Medua in northern Albania and then overland to the Bojana River. Montenegro’s only port, Antivari, was an open harbor, partially blocked by sunken ships and too close to Cattaro to be safe. Supplies to Serbia—which lacked direct access to the sea—were to be on a much larger scale, and the French naval commander in the Mediterranean would have preferred to use the better ports of Valona or Santi Quaranta in southern Albania. Unfortunately, Valona then had no communications with the interior and the roads from Santi Quaranta ran inland toward the east and Monastir rather than to the north where the Serbian army was fighting. The situation in Albania approached anarchy after the attempt of the European powers to set up the prince of Wied as ruler of the new state collapsed following the outbreak of the war. The prince departed and the Italians attempted to reinforce their claims by occupying the island of Saseno in September 1914. In November they prepared an expedition to take Valona and fortify the surrounding area. The first troops began to land at Valona on 3 December. The Italian navy after Italy entered the war gave priority to the transport and supply of their expeditionary corps in Albania rather than assistance to Serbia.
The British and French were disgusted with the Italian attitude toward protecting supplies sent to the Serbians. Abruzzi did not think it was possible for large steamers to go directly to San Giovanni; cargo had to be unloaded at Brindisi and transferred to small sailing craft that could get up the Bojana River or be towed to Scutari. The coasters would be protected on the approximately 100-mile journey from Brindisi to the mouth of the Bojana by a submarine patrol between Cattaro and the Bojana. The French considered the amount of supplies that could be carried this way inadequate and the protection illusory. The Allies finally reached an agreement on 13 November after hard bargaining. The bulk of the supplies, whatever the danger, would go to the Serbians by means of the northern Albanian ports of San Giovanni and Durazzo, or in small ships sent up the Bojana to Scutari. The British would provide the supplies sent to Brindisi; the expenses would be shared by Britain, France, and Russia; and the Italians, supported by the Allies, would provide the protection for the transit of the Adriatic. The Serbian Relief Committee, an inter-Allied commission, was established to supervise the operation.
Would the Austrians attempt to disrupt the supply route to Serbia by sea? Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf, chief of the Austrian general staff, advised Haus at the end of October that Serbia had been cut off from Salonika and could only be supplied through the northern Albanian or Montenegrin ports and that it was important to cut the route. Haus took three weeks to react, but on the night of 22–23 November, Linienschiffskapitän Heinrich Seitz led the light cruisers Helgoland and Saida with the First Torpedo Division—the most modern destroyers of the Tátra class—on a sortie to the Strait of Otranto and a reconnaissance along the Albanian coast. The Austrians intercepted and sank a small Italian steamer and a motor schooner carrying supplies of flour to Serbia. The Austrians initially were reluctant to send surface vessels into the Strait again, because they considered it to be closely watched. The navy changed its mind, however, and on 26 November warned its ally that German submarines should be careful in the southern Adriatic to attack only ships they clearly recognized as being enemy. Furthermore, AOK, the Austrian high command (Armeeoberkommando), explicitly ordered Haus on 29 November to establish a permanent patrol of the Albanian coast and to disrupt enemy troop transport. Haus responded by sending the light cruisers Helgoland and Novara, six Tátra-class destroyers, approximately six T-74-class torpedo boats, and an oiler to Cattaro. This meant that the newest and fastest units of the Austrian fleet had been transferred to the southern Adriatic, where they remained until the end of the war.
The Allies soon felt the effects of the Austrian deployments. Austrian aircraft and Austrian and German submarines increased their operations, and on 4 December an Italian transport and destroyer were lost to mines laid by the German submarine UC.14 in the vicinity of Valona. On 5 December the Novara, four destroyers, and three torpedo boats raided the Albanian coast from the Bojana to San Giovanni, sinking three steamers and a number of sailing craft, and on their return caught the French submarine Fresnel aground on a sandbank off the mouth of the Bojana. The submarine was destroyed and its crew taken prisoner. The next day the Helgoland led six destroyers to Durazzo, where two destroyers entered the port and sank two large and three small steamers.
The first attempt to supply the Serbians via the northern Albanian ports had met with heavy losses, provoking a crisis in Franco-Italian naval relations. Durazzo and San Giovanni were open harbors, devoid of facilities for unloading, and within easy reach of Cattaro. The submarine menace prevented escorts from hanging about after they had escorted supply ships, and the latter were therefore left without protec
tion with disastrous results. The Italians linked the issue to the French destroyers withdrawn to cover the Salonika operation. Until they were returned, the Italians argued, they would have to use Valona, a protected harbor, for the Serbian supplies. But what about the lack of roads running northward from Valona to Serbia? The pressure of events was at least partially solving the difficulty. By the end of November, the relentless advance of the Austrian, Bulgarian, and German armies had caused the first civil and military Serbian refugees, along with thousands of Austrian prisoners taken in earlier fighting, to straggle into the northern Albanian ports. The retreat of the Serbian army through the mountains of Albania was one of the epics of the world war. The survivors in northern Albania suffered severely from cold, hunger, and disease. The situation was critical, for the Italians halted the supply of the Serbian army through the northern Albanian ports and declared they would only resume it when at least one of the two escadrilles of French destroyers was returned to them. The Italians argued that they were not asking for an increase in assistance but merely for fulfillment of the engagement made to them in the naval convention. Sonnino, the Italian foreign minister, bluntly told the French ambassador in Rome that it was not Italian good will that was lacking but rather the means, and that destroyers and submarines could not be created by royal decree. They could not defend the transports with what they had, and supply via San Giovanni di Medua appeared to be impossible. The Italians suggested that the exhausted Serbians make their way overland southward to Valona. The situation was critical, however. The number of Serbs in Albania grew constantly while the supply of flour at San Giovanni and Durazzo was altogether insufficient. The specter of mass starvation was very real.
A Naval History of World War I Page 27