The Italians also were not confident of their real superiority in capital ships, especially after losses reduced their strength. The battleship Benedetto Brin blew up at Brindisi in September 1915, and on 2 August 1916 one of their best ships, the dreadnought Leonardo da Vinci, caught fire, blew up, and capsized in Taranto harbor with heavy loss of life. Sabotage was suspected, and apparently confirmed, by Italian espionage activities, notably the ransacking of a safe at the Austrian consulate in Zurich in 1917.40 At the close of the year, the Italians lost another battleship, the Regina Margherita, to a mine at Valona on 11 December. The Austrian capital ships, secure in their bases, had not yet suffered any equivalent losses. They were not likely, however, to seek a classic battle. Regardless of the ratio of strength between the Austrian and Italian fleets or the outcome of an Austro-Italian encounter, there was always the French fleet at Corfu. The French were capable of handling the Austrian fleet on their own. The Italians, with the addition of some French capital ships—the six semidreadnought Danton-class were often mentioned—would have been equally confident of facing the situation on their own. However, assistance to the Italians raised the touchy subject of command. The French commander in chief, Vice Admiral Gauchet, from December 1916 until the end of the war was also titular Mediterranean commander in chief. The French would not consent to his being placed under the orders of an Italian admiral, particularly as they had the larger number of battleships. On the other hand, it was unthinkable for the Italians to accept anyone but an Italian admiral commanding operations in the Adriatic. The French were also loath to break the homogeneity of their squadrons and detach just a few ships to fight under the Italians. What would happen to the remainder of the French battle fleet? Without going into the details, the issue was the subject of sterile discussion between the French and Italians throughout 1916, and was never resolved during the entire war. It led to a substantial waste of resources. There were essentially two battle fleets watching the Austrians—the Italians at Taranto and the French at Corfu—when one would have been sufficient. The British managed to end at least some of the waste in January of 1917 when they gained Italian agreement to the withdrawal of the old British battleships at Taranto. Only one remained, reduced to the status of a depot ship. The battleships’ crews were desperately needed for new construction or for the antisubmarine campaign, and there was little real chance the battleships at Taranto would ever be used.41
Offensive operations by the Italians, notably a landing on the Austrian islands or Dalmatian coast, continued to be ruled out in 1916. Corsi asked Abruzzi to reexamine the Lagosta project early in the year, but Abruzzi was no longer very enthusiastic about a landing only on Lagosta; its capture might be the consequence of a larger and more significant action. Abruzzi prepared a plan to seize the most important places on the Sabbioncello Peninsula and adjoining island of Curzola. Sabbioncello had been the object of Churchill’s interest in 1915. The plan called for the area between the southern shore of Sabbioncello and the northern coast of Curzola to be turned into a base for the Italian fleet. The Italians would virtually abandon the more distant Taranto as a major base and use Sabbioncello, Brindisi, and Valona to form a “strategic triangle” to envelop the Austrian forces at Cattaro. The operations required the substantial participation of the Italian army, and the plans floundered on this point. Cadorna would have nothing to do with it, especially as the navy approached him in May when Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Austrian chief of staff, had launched his famous Strafe (punishment) offensive in the Trentino. In September, after the Austrian offensive had halted and the military situation had improved for the Italians, the navy approached Cadorna about the possibility of a landing on the Istrian Peninsula between Salvore and Cittanova with the idea of drawing Austrian forces from the main front, taking Trieste from the rear and possibly isolating Pola. Once again Cadorna preferred to use all his forces on the main front. Given this attitude on the part of the Italian high command, any use of sea power for an amphibious landing on the enemy coast was out of the question.42
Haus also had ruled out participation by the capital ships of the Austrian navy in Conrad’s Strafe offensive. AOK wanted the navy to enter upon a “ruthless undertaking” aimed at inflicting serious damage and similar to the bombardment they had executed at the beginning of the war. Haus resisted, arguing that the situation had altered since May of 1915, and that the Italians were fully alert with strong coastal defenses, minefields, armored trains on stretches of the railway line along the coast, and, of course, both Italian and Allied submarines. The naval bombardments, even if they succeeded in destroying coastal fortifications, could not alter the situation in the Tyrol, and if all they wanted the navy to do was to inflict injury on the Italians, they could probably do more with air raids.43 The Austrian capital ships remained in port, the ultimate fleet-in-being, like the Italian battle squadron to be used only under special circumstances against their peers.
Both the Austrian and Italian naval commands changed early in 1917. In Italy there was a growing malaise about the apparent lack of success of the navy, and a campaign in the press was directed against the Duke of the Abruzzi. The experiment of combining the offices of minister of marine and capo di stato maggiore was also an apparent failure, and on 3 February a royal decree was signed naming Thaon di Revel “chief of the naval staff and commander of the mobilized naval force.” The return of Revel and the title he received implied he would replace Abruzzi, and the duke relinquished his command, ostensibly for reasons of health. Abruzzi retained the loyalty and affection of a substantial portion of the fleet, as well as the respect of Italy’s allies.
On the Austrian side, Haus died of pneumonia aboard his flagship in Pola on 8 February. He was replaced as Flottenkommandant by Vice Admiral Maximilian Njegovan, who apparently shared the strategic thoughts of his predecessor as to the stalemate in the Adriatic and the folly of risking capital ships. The decisive weapons would be submarines. Njegovan was not the commanding presence Haus had been, nor did he ever enjoy the latter’s authority and prestige. He faced increasing difficulties as the strain of war began to tell on the Habsburg monarchy and its navy, which also lost the good luck it had so far enjoyed.44
The lack of action by capital ships or use of the term stalemate does not mean that no operations of any kind took place in the Adriatic. There were many, and both the Italians and Austrians were far more active than most people, especially their allies, realized. The actions, however, were small in scale, a form of naval guerrilla war, a war of ambush and counterambush. One would have to read the detailed and multi-volumed official histories to realize their scope; by their nature they are difficult to summarize in a general history of this sort. Aircraft also played an increasing role. Again, their actions are difficult to recount in detail, but one could say that the Italians gradually whittled down the initial Austrian advantage. British aircraft, operating out of southern Italian bases, also became very active in 1918, undertaking what was virtually a strategic bombing offensive against Cattaro. On 15 September 1916, Austrian aircraft sank the French submarine Foucault 10 miles off Cattaro. They were aided no doubt by the extreme clarity of the water on the Austrian side of the Adriatic, which worked to the disadvantage of the Allies, but the incident also demonstrated the potential importance of the airplane as one of the antidotes to submarines all navies were desperately seeking.45
The Italians developed a weapon well suited to Adriatic conditions. In April 1915 they ordered the first group of small craft, which subsequently became known as Mas, the initials standing for motobarca armata silurante. They were, as the name implies, motor torpedo boats capable of 22–25 knots, fitted with two torpedoes and with a crew of eight. There were later versions dedicated for antisubmarine work, but it was as torpedo boats that they won their fame.46 The Mas showed what they were capable of on the night of 7 June 1916, when Tenente di vascello Pagano di Melito in Mas.5 and Tenente di vascello Berardinelli in Mas.7 were towed by torpedo boats to t
he Albanian coast, an escadrille of French destroyers serving as an escort. Pagano di Melito and Berardinelli penetrated Durazzo harbor and torpedoed the small steamer Locrum (924 tons). They raided Durazzo again on the night of 25 June, after aerial reconnaissance reported the presence of two steamers. The scout Marsala and Italian destroyers served as an escort. Once again they were successful, the steamer Sarajevo (1,100 tons) was sunk, although later salved. The Mas boats were by no means a weapon that would automatically win the war; they were relatively fragile, and their range was limited. The Austrians also worked to improve their boom-and-net defenses, and not all Mas operations were successful. But they were another factor for naval commanders to worry about, and given the limitations of First World War fire control, under the right conditions they could and would be deadly. They were probably the naval weapon that captured the imagination of the Italian public, a weapon ideally suited for bold and dashing young officers.47
The Mas boats’ most spectacular achievement yet was in December, but by then the Italians were sorely tested and in need of a success. On 24 October the Austrians, reinforced by seven German divisions, broke through the Italian lines in what is generally known as the Battle of Caporetto. The Austrian and German offensive was only halted on the Piave River, barely 30 miles from Venice, and more than 70 miles deep into Italian territory. The Italians had lost more than a thousand cannon, and more than 320,000 had been killed, wounded, or missing. The British and French doubted that the Italians would be able to hold Venice and feared that Italy would be compelled to leave the war. Five British and six French divisions were rushed to Italy from the western front. The Allies’ worst fears proved unfounded. The line on the Piave held, and the Italians underwent something of a national renaissance in the crisis. The Italian navy participated in the defense of Venice, employing ingenious floating batteries in the lagoons north of the city.48
The fog of war and the fighting on land had obscured the fact that the situation for the Allies had actually been improving in the Adriatic. The Austrian flotillas at Cattaro, under orders to avoid combat with superior forces close to enemy bases, had been unable to disturb communications with Valona or repeat their success of 15 May. The drifters may have been in a less effective position, but the Austrian sorties against them were frustrated by either bad weather or Allied patrols. Njegovan’s leadership was subjected to increasing criticism because of the apparent lack of initiative by the navy in exploiting the Caporetto success on the seaward flanks of the armies. The Italians had indeed been worried about extensive raids or amphibious landings. They did not take place. The old coast-defense battleships Wien and Budapest were shifted to Trieste to support the army, and on 16 November, escorted by fourteen torpedo boats, they bombarded the coastal batteries at Cortellazo near the mouth of the Piave. Mas boats tried to attack them, without success, although the bombardment was broken off. The old battleships at Trieste were, however, a magnet for the torpedo flotilla at Venice, and on the night of 10 December the Italians scored their most spectacular naval success of the war. Mas.9 (Tenente di vascello Rizzo) and Mas.11 (Capotimoniere Ferrarini) were towed by torpedo boats to the vicinity of Trieste and succeeded in breaking through the obstructions and entering the port. Rizzo torpedoed the Wien, which sank within a few minutes. The Italians escaped unharmed.49 It was the worst loss the Austrians had suffered to date, and the success was all the sweeter to the Italians for coming at such a critical moment.
The k.u.k. Kriegsmarine, like the Habsburg monarchy that it represented, was feeling the strain of war as the year 1918 began. There were already signs that it could not remain totally immune from the nationality problems that plagued the monarchy (and would eventually tear it apart). The crew of the small torpedo boat Tb.11 locked their officers in their cabins and, led by a Slovene and a Czech rating, brought the boat from Sebenico to the Italian coast on 5 October. The boat itself had little military value and the mutiny was an isolated event, but the Austrian authorities did not know exactly what had happened and were therefore even more disturbed.
A serious mutiny broke out in some of the ships stationed at Cattaro on 1 February 1918. The center of the revolt was in the armored cruiser Sankt Georg, flagship of the cruiser flotilla. It was strongest in the large ships, notably the armored cruiser Kaiser Karl VI and the depot ship Gäa. The captains of the cruisers Helgoland and Novara, which had seen so much action in the past, managed to preserve their authority, but even their ships and all the destroyers and torpedo boats eventually were compelled to raise the red flag. There is a good case for the argument that the events at Cattaro were motivated primarily by social and economic causes rather than the nationality conflicts. The sailors demanded peace without annexations, demobilization, complete independence from other powers, self-determination for all peoples, democratization of the regime, and a loyal answer to the peace proposals of President Wilson of the United States. There were very specific demands related to naval issues, which included better food and an equitable distribution of food between officers and men, a common kitchen for officers and men, regular leave, and improved conditions. The sailors, however, loyally promised to resist any Italian attack on Cattaro.
The mutineers never succeeded in winning over the army garrison at Cattaro, and coastal batteries opened fire the next day when the old guardship Kronprinz Erzherzog Rudolph attempted to shift position and move toward the center of the mutiny in the middle of the gulf. The Novara and Helgoland, which had been under the big guns of the armored cruisers, broke away to the innermost gulf. They were joined by nearly all the torpedo boats and destroyers. They had the support of the German submarines at Cattaro, which were ready to torpedo any of the mutineers’ ships that tried to break in. The red flags were lowered. On 3 February the Third Division of three Erzherzog-class battleships arrived from Pola, and the army forces on land delivered an ultimatum to the mutineers. Germans and Magyars, for the most part, led a counter-revolt on the armored cruisers, and one of the leaders of the revolt, a young ensign, joined by two petty officers fled to Italy in a seaplane. He left his comrades in the lurch; forty sailors were tried and four were promptly executed. More than eight hundred men were considered of questionable loyalty and were removed from their ships.50
The mutiny resulted in significant changes in the leadership of the k.u.k. Kriegsmarine. The slogan seemed to be the need for “rejuvenation.” Njegovan was relieved and the young Kaiser Karl I, who had succeeded Franz Joseph on the latter’s death in November 1916 and was far more interested in the navy than his aged uncle had been, skipped over a number of senior officers and went down to the list of captains to choose the forty-nine-year-old Horthy, whom he promoted to rear admiral, to be the next Flottenkommandant. The choice surprised most, but Horthy had gained a reputation for aggressive handling of the light cruisers, and the kaiser assumed he would be the “new blood” who would bring an innovative spirit to the navy. There was also a rejuvenation of ships. Even before the mutiny, the three old Habsburg-class battleships were taken out of service to obtain crews for the submarine and air services. Now other obsolete ships, such as the two old armored cruisers Sankt Georg and Kaiser Karl VI, also were laid up. The Erzherzog-class battleships, with their primary armament of only four 9.2-inch guns, could no longer be considered first line battleships and remained at Cattaro in place of the old armored cruisers. The battle fleet was reduced to only the most modern: the four Viribus Unitis-class dreadnoughts and three Radetzky-class semidreadnoughts.51
The k.u.k. Kriegsmarine needed this general shake-up in the high command, for its problems and challenges were growing. The Austrians also had new enemies, notably the United States. The 110-foot wooden submarine chasers of the United States Navy arrived at Corfu in June to participate in the Otranto barrage (see below). However, the Americans also had plans for the Adriatic well before they arrived. The Adriatic schemes originated with the Planning Section of the staff of Vice Admiral William Sowden Sims, the commander of United State
s naval forces in European waters. The general idea was to seize the Sabbioncello Peninsula and establish a base between the peninsula and Curzola Island. Once again, Sabbioncello, the objective of Churchill and later Abruzzi, came under discussion. The naval base would enable the Allies to cut all traffic between the northern Adriatic and Cattaro, and would serve as a point from which troops could raid inland to cut rail communications in Dalmatia. They might seize other islands when more troops became available. The American staff also spoke of laying a mine barrage from Gargano Head on the Italian mainland to Curzola. They also considered a surprise raid on Cattaro itself, forcing their way into the gulf with five Virginia- or Connecticut-class predreadnoughts and sinking all enemy vessels found in the gulf. The Americans also suggested that U.S. Marines join the Italian troops who would probably make up the landing party. The Americans formally introduced their proposals at a meeting of the Allied Naval Council in Rome in early February. There was considerable discussion, and the Italian position was not surprising. Revel and the naval staff would be forced to limit the Italian contribution, but if the Americans were willing to employ sufficient force, there was no reason why at least part of the project could not be implemented provided an Italian admiral commanded. The Navy Department back in Washington was also more cautious about the operation than Sims may have assumed. Would the U.S. Marines have added “Curzola” and “Sabbioncello” to their battle honors? We will never know what the results of the operation might have been, for the question was resolved by General Ludendorff and the German general staff. Ludendorff, profiting from the elimination of Russia from the war, launched his great offensive on the western front on 21 March in a desperate attempt to win the war before the American army could arrive in Europe in force. The Germans at first made unprecedented gains on the western front, and even Sims realized the Adriatic plan could not even be considered until the Germans were checked there.52 The Americans experienced what others who had proposed schemes for landings in the Adriatic had experienced before: there always seemed to be more urgent uses for the troops.
A Naval History of World War I Page 30