Prince Heinrich had not been pleased with Mischke’s handling of the expedition and decided to entrust future offensive operations against the Russian coast to Rear Admiral Behring. However, Behring’s first sweep against the Russian patrols at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland led to what would turn out to be one of the most serious German losses during the war. Early on the morning of 26 August, the Magdeburg ran aground at Odensholm lighthouse off the Estonian coast. The Magdeburg’s escort, the destroyer V.26, tried unsuccessfully to free the cruiser and then took off part of the crew. V.26’s rescue attempts had to be broken off when the Russian cruiser Bogatyr and armored cruiser Pallada arrived on the scene and opened fire. The Germans blew up the fore part of the Magdeburg, but the Russians later recovered those precious German code books, which they subsequently passed to the British.17
By the beginning of September it was apparent that the Germans were using only second-line forces in the Baltic. Moreover, Great Britain was in the war as an ally, something that had not been anticipated in the Russian plans. Essen, naturally inclined to be aggressive, began a much more active use of his fleet, whose operational zone was extended up to the meridian of Dagerort. Russian cruisers now sortied against the German patrol lines, which had to be pulled back to the meridian of Windau. The Russians shifted a portion of their fleet farther to the west in the Gulf of Finland. A division of cruisers was kept at Lapvik on the Finnish coast; other light forces moved out to the Åland Islands, and the Russians began to prepare a forward base in Moon Sound.
Essen’s activity was annoying enough for Prince Heinrich to make a sweep in the Baltic from 3 to 9 September with the hope of enticing the Russian fleet out to battle. The German force included the Fourth Squadron of Vice Admiral Ehrhard Schmidt, composed of seven old Braunschweig- and Wittelsbach-class battleships mobilized from the reserve, joined by the powerful armored cruiser Blücher, five cruisers, and twenty-four destroyers. Although the Augsburg detected the Russian cruisers Bayan and Pallada on patrol to the north of Dagö Island and tried to draw them close enough for the Blücher to destroy them, the Russians escaped into the Gulf of Finland and the Germans did not follow. The Augsburg and the destroyer V.25 sortied into the Gulf of Bothnia on the 7th and sank a Russian steamer off Raumo. Essen did steam out of the Gulf of Finland into the northern Baltic with the Russian battleship squadron on the 8th, but the Germans by then were to the south of Gotland on their way home.18
Essen remained anxious for a more aggressive use of the Russian fleet. On the night of 27 August, taking advantage of the stormy and moonless night, he sailed in the British-built armored cruiser Rurik, in company with the Pallada and without any escort, to raid communications between Germany and Sweden along the line Bornholm-Danzig. Essen returned without meeting any German craft, but the raid bolstered the morale of the Baltic Fleet, not to mention Essen’s reputation. Nevertheless he was not successful in his proposal that the Russian fleet be used in the southern Baltic and that at least some of the Russian battleships be used to cover mining expeditions against the German coast, with the understanding they would accept battle outside of their prepared positions in the Gulf of Finland only with the prospect of certain victory. The tsar would not approve any active use of the Baltic Fleet without his special permission, and that permission also would be required for the use in battle of the new division of dreadnoughts when they entered service. He did authorize the extension of the zone of operations of the Gulf of Finland up to the meridian of Dagerort, including Moon Sound.19
Essen had been using his cruisers in a bold fashion, but the Russians learned the same hard lessons the British had about the danger of submarines. On 10 October U.26, one of three German U-boats patrolling off the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, fired a torpedo but missed the Admiral Makarov. The submarine commander was luckier on the 11 th, torpedoing the armored cruiser Pallada, which blew up and sank with no survivors. The Russians withdrew their large ships from the patrol line.
German submarine activity did not deter Essen from mining, the major and most effective Russian activity for the remainder of the year. He began an offensive against the German lines of communication in the southern Baltic, beginning the night of 31 October, when three Russian destroyers taking advantage of surprise and secrecy laid 105 mines off Memel. The destroyers could carry approximately 33 mines each but then could not train their aft guns or torpedo tubes and were therefore extremely vulnerable should they meet the Germans. On 5 November the destroyers laid another 140 mines approximately 40 miles southwest of Memel, and 50 mines approximately 15 miles off Pillau. Less than a fortnight later the Russians could claim a major success. Early in the morning of 17 November, the old large armored cruiser Friedrich Carl exploded two of the Russian mines and after a few hours capsized and sank. The steamer Elbing.9 proceeding to assist ran into another Russian field and also was sunk.20
Admiral Essen was encouraged by the results, especially because the arrival of British submarines in the Baltic during October made the Germans much more cautious about risking larger ships such as cruisers on patrol. The approach of winter, with storms, intense cold, and ice, made it more difficult to use the destroyers for minelaying, but it also provided the long nights of the northern latitudes to conceal movement. Essen decided to fit six cruisers, including the invaluable Rurik, as temporary minelayers. In the meantime destroyers and the minelayer Amur kept up their work with minefields off the northwest Stolpe bank, Brüsterort, and Scholpin. These fields ultimately claimed eleven German steamers and three mine hunters. The Germans retaliated; on 6 December the auxiliary minelayer Deutschland laid mines off Björneborg and Raumo in the Gulf of Bothnia, which soon sank three steamers (as well as two Swedish ships the following month) and stopped traffic between Finland and Sweden for several days. The action caused Swedish protests, and the Germans realized that in the absence of a base nearby, the minefields could be easily swept once discovered.
The Russians lost two minelaying torpedo boats on 12 December when their own mines exploded off Odensholm, frustrating an expedition to lay a field southwest of Libau. Essen’s major offensive with the cruisers was, however, successful. Admiral Kerber in the Rurik led the Admiral Makarov and Bayan in one group and the minelayer Yenisei covered by the cruisers Oleg and Bogatyr in a second group to lay fields to the north of Rixhöft and Leba, northern and western entrances to the Gulf of Danzig. Essen had wanted to bring the newly commissioned dreadnought Sevastopol out in support, but the request was denied by the Russian high command.
Essen continued the minelaying offensive into the new year, as long as ice conditions permitted. On the evening of 12 January 1915, the cruisers Rossija, Oleg, and Bogatyr sailed with mines, covered by the cruisers Rurik, Bayan, and Admiral Makarov. On the 13th and 14th the Oleg and Bogatyr laid their mines east of Bornholm and the Rossija laid hers north of Cape Arkona on the island of Rügen. These were the farthest penetrations into the western Baltic by the Russians, and on the night of 24–25 January, the German cruiser Augsburg was mined in the field east of Bornholm and the old cruiser Gazelle was mined north of Cape Arkona. Although both cruisers were towed back to port, the Gazelle was not considered worth repairing.
With the hardening ice ending the possibility of operations in the northern part of the Baltic, Essen undertook his last minelaying operation on the evening of 12 February when the Oleg and Bogatyr with four destroyers, all carrying mines, covered by the Rurik and Admiral Makarov, sailed for Danzig Bay. The Russians, who had been lucky so far, nearly suffered a disaster when the Rurik ran aground in the fog near Farö light on the 13th and had to return with her bottom ripped open, one-third of the boiler room flooded, and 2,400 tons of water in the ship. The Russian cruisers returned with her. The four destroyers continued on to lay their mines the night of the 13th, approximately 30 to 40 miles north of Hela in the Bay of Danzig. They returned unharmed.
The situation in the Baltic, when ice ended active operations by the Russian fleet after s
even months of war, is subject to differing interpretations. Certainly the Germans had their setbacks, as, for example, on 24 January when Admiral Behring’s cruiser Prinz Adalbert, proceeding to bombard Libau while returning from a reconnaissance to the Åland Islands, ran aground off Steinort causing the operation to be broken off. The Germans suffered further loss during the same operation when the Augsburg was mined east of Bornholm. However, the German official history could claim that thanks to the bold sorties of German cruisers against the Russian coast, the command of the sea (Seeherrschaft) in the Baltic remained in their hands despite the numerical inferiority of their Baltic forces. They may have suffered heavier losses, but this was because they were on the offensive. Russian historians hotly dispute the contention that the Germans were in control of the Baltic, and claim that the Russian minelaying offensive forced the German fleet to shift from offensive to defensive operations and concentrate on sweeping mines in the southern portion of the Baltic. They also claim that the minelaying offensive forced the Germans to detach considerable forces from the North Sea and that this has never been acknowledged by British historians.21 There is some merit to both viewpoints, but it is important to remember that the Baltic was essentially a secondary theater for the Germans and that one of their major strategic interests, the crucial traffic in iron ore from Swedish ports, remained essentially undisturbed. The greatest potential threat to that important traffic could come from submarines. In the early months of the war, the Russians lacked suitable submarines for long-range operations, but that situation had the potential to change when the first British submarines were detached to the Baltic.
BRITISH SUBMARINES
We have already seen how the Baltic held a certain fascination for British naval leaders in the early stages of the war. Unfortunately, the bravest and most skillful sailor cannot change the realities of geography. Fisher’s great plans for Baltic operations ultimately came to nothing; the potential losses far exceeded the potential gains for any operation aimed at surface ships breaking into that closed sea. But if it was impracticable to send surface ships, what of submarines? The possibility was raised by the commodore of submarines, Roger Keyes, at the Loch Ewe conference on 17 September. The German submarines had quickly demonstrated their potential, but British submarines operating under difficult conditions in the Helgoland Bight had few and fleeting targets. Their chances for success were not improved by the fact it initially had not been realized that the warheads caused the torpedoes to run deeper than the lighter, practice warheads on torpedoes before the war. The Admiralty authorized Keyes to carry out submarine reconnaissances of the Kattegat, and on 10 October Keyes submitted a plan for a submarine attack on the German patrols at the southern entrance to the Sound. The Admiralty approved the proposal and decided the submarines would remain in the Baltic.22
Three boats of the new E class, E.1, E.9, and E.11, departed for the Baltic on 15 October, delayed for a day because of E.11’s defects. The submarines attempted to pass the Sound at two-hour intervals during the night. E.1, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Noel F. Laurence, succeeded in reaching the Baltic by 11:30 P.M. on the 17th, but the presence of a submarine in the Skaggerak had been reported to the Germans, and E.1’s unsuccessful attack on the old training cruiser Viktoria Luise between Möen and Falsterbo Reef confirmed the fact. The Germans realized that it was not likely to be a Russian submarine this far from the Russian coast and that it was therefore British. They strengthened their patrols. They also withdrew all heavy ships exercising in Kiel Bay (including the Third and Fourth squadrons of the High Sea Fleet and the new battle cruiser Derfflinger on trials) into harbor, thereby depriving the British of very attractive targets. The southwestern Baltic until now had been a relatively secure area for training.
The second submarine, E.9, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Max K. Horton—the future commander of Western Approaches in the Second World War—did not get into the Baltic until the night of the 18th, and Horton had to cut short a planned sweep into Danzig Bay because of a defect in his main motor.
The third submarine, E.11, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Martin E. Nasmith, was prevented by patrols from passing the Sound and eventually had to return to England. On the 19th Nasmith fired two torpedoes at what he assumed to be the German submarine U.3 but fortunately missed: the submarine turned out to be the Danish Havmanden. The diplomatic repercussions were slight; it was an honest mistake, for the Danes had, unknown to the Admiralty and therefore not represented in the recognition books, changed the appearance of the submarine by adding two wireless masts. The Danes also admitted that the numeral 3 was painted on the conning tower; the submarine’s ensign was old, dirty, and clinging to the mast; and the incident took place outside of territorial waters.23 The incident demonstrated the very real dangers to neutral warships when the great powers were at war. E.11 subsequently enjoyed brilliant success, and Nasmith earned a Victoria Cross at the Dardanelles the following year.
The two British submarines in the Baltic had been extremely lucky. They had been ordered to proceed to the Russian base at Libau when their fuel ran low. The Admiralty, incredible as it may seem, apparently did not know that the Russians had evacuated the base and blocked the entrance with sunken ships, or that there was a German minefield off the port through which E.1 blithely passed. It is even more incredible to learn that Admiral Essen had not been advised British submarines were on their way.24 As the British naval attaché in Petrograd reported:
The Admiralty, and Admiral von Essen [sic], are greatly pleased by the despatch of these boats to the Baltic, where it is hoped that they can produce considerable effect; if not immediately, on account of the lateness of the season, at any rate next spring. At the same time Admiral von Essen confided to me that he would have been even more pleased had he received timely notice of their coming, or been informed beforehand as to whose orders they were intended to be subordinate, since through ignorance on these points his own plans for a full fortnight were entirely upset. . . .
Essen was forced to cancel a planned minelaying operation off Danzig until he could learn more about their movements.25
The Germans in the Baltic now had an attack of “submarine-itis” similar to that which plagued the Grand Fleet that autumn. On 19 October there were positive reports of periscopes and torpedo tracks in Kiel Bay at a time when neither E.1 nor E.9 was within 100 miles. They also made what turned out to be an ineffective attempt to net the Fehmarn Belt, using herring nets because nothing else was available, in the hope they might foul a submarine’s propeller and force it to the surface. By the end of the month, the nets had drifted into Kiel Bay where they hampered shipping. The Germans also prevailed upon the Swedes to extinguish most lights and remove navigational marks in the Sound, and the Danes increased their patrols so submarines could not use channels in Danish territorial waters.26 The presence of a mere two submarines complicated—but did not stop—German operations at sea for the remainder of the year.
E.1 and E.9 proceeded from Libau to Lapvik, which was to be their base on the Finnish coast. The Admiralty placed the submarines under the orders of Admiral Essen to work with Russian submarines in Baltic operations. After their refit, Essen ordered them on 13 November to take offensive action against the German fleet near and to the west of Bornholm. In December they were ordered to cooperate with the Russian fleet on the minelaying operations. There is no space here to recount the story of these submarine operations in detail. Neither the British nor Russian submarines scored any major success that year. The British submarines also were plagued with engine defects and other mechanical difficulties, and their supply line for parts and spares from England was a tenuous one, by way of the northern Russian ports and then by slow journey over Russian rail lines to the submarine bases. Furthermore, in 1914 Essen used the boats exclusively against German warships rather than against the vital German shipping carrying ore from Sweden. Unfortunately, the British submarine cruises usually did not coincide with period
s when the German squadrons were at sea. The prevalence of mines throughout the Baltic tended to confine submarine operations to waiers west of Bornholm, and beyond antisubmarine patrols hardly any Germans were sighted. The winter conditions caused other problems; spray froze, making the bridge a mass of ice and requiring continuous efforts to keep the conning-tower hatch free of ice.27 The handful of submarines could not accomplish miracles, and it would have been erroneous to have expected them to radically transform the situation in the Baltic. Nevertheless, they would be reinforced and much more successful after the thaw in 1915.
THE 1915 CAMPAIGN
The essential lines of the German and Russian strategies in the Baltic in 1915 did not change. The situation was complicated, however, by the defeats suffered by the Russian army, which gave the German army control of much of the Courland coast and enhanced the importance of operations in the vast Gulf of Riga and its southern entrance at the Irben Strait. British submarines in the Baltic, later reinforced, caused additional problems for the Germans. Prince Heinrich did not expect Russian battleships to undertake any offensive operations against the German coast except in strategic liaison with some British objective. The Germans would therefore with small forces and minor offensive operations discourage the Russians from an offensive. German light forces were deployed as far forward as possible into the Gulf of Finland in order to give prompt intelligence of any threatening movement by the larger ships of the Russian fleet. The Germans did not have a base available for their own battleships in Danzig until that summer, and then it was only sufficient for ships of the Deutschland class. The observation of the Gulf of Finland, therefore, had to be as continuous as possible. Offensive and defensive mining secured the approximately 320 miles of German coast from Memel to Swinemunde. As for submarines, the Germans had only a very few generally old craft available for the Baltic.28
A Naval History of World War I Page 33