The Breslau arrived at Trebizond with 107 officers and men, 5,000 rifles, and 794 cases of munitions on 3 April. The cruiser then sailed to shell the Russian positions at Sürmene Bay, followed by U.33, which remained 4 to 6 miles off during the bombardment. The Breslau’s gunnery set fire to the Elpidifor-type minesweeper T.233, and after she departed, U.33’s gun finished her off. The Breslau proceeded northward and sank a small sailing vessel off Tuapse. The next morning, however, she ran into the Imperatritsa Ekaterina and Kagul, well screened by destroyers, which had been ordered to patrol off Novorossisk after the Russians learned of the Breslau’s attack on the Russian positions at Sürmene Bay. The Breslau came under fire for about fifteen minutes from the big guns of the Imperatritsa Ekaterina.44 She managed to escape without serious damage, but she was well splashed, and the Germans commented on the excellence of the dreadnought’s gunnery. This phase of the Turco-German naval response ended the same morning when U.33 returned to Sürmene Gulf and attempted to attack two transports. She was sighted by the destroyer Strogi, which rammed and seriously damaged her periscope, and the submarine had to break off operations and return to base.
The Germans and Turks failed to disrupt a major reinforcement of Rize by sea to strengthen the Russian advance on Trebizond. Preparations began in March. The majority of troops were brought to Novorossisk by rail, the transports escorted from Odessa and well screened by the big ships of the navy, and embarkation commenced on 4 April. The convoy, some 22 transports, sailed on the 5th under the direct protection of the Imperatritsa Maria, 3 cruisers, 3 seaplane carriers, and 15 destroyers and torpedo boats. The landing at Rize began the morning of the 7th. The battle groups centered around the Imperatritsa Maria, and the Imperatritsa Ekaterina remained at sea north of Rize to cover the landing against possible interference. Seaplanes from the three carriers patrolled overhead, and netlayers laid an antisubmarine net around the port. The British observer with the Black Sea Fleet summed up the operation: “It has been very fortunate that all troops and stores were put on shore in one day, although everything was in their favor, good landing places, no opposition and a fine day with an exceptionally calm surface, making it difficult for any submarine to approach without being detected. On the whole, as a first landing, it may be considered creditable.”45
The troops had been landed safely, but the threat of the Turkish counterattack, which began on the 8th, caused Yudenich to request that at least one brigade be landed closer to the front at Hamurkan. Rear Admiral Khomenko, commander of the transport flotilla, refused to deviate from his orders, and Ebergard, flying his flag in the Imperatritsa Maria, was anxious to get the big ships away because of the threat posed by submarines and refused to change his plans. Yudenich insisted, however, and on the night of the 7th, a brigade of approximately 8,200 men was moved along the coast in seven of the Elpidifors, which had remained at Rize after the transports departed.46 The Turkish counterattacks were stopped, and the now reinforced Russians were able to resume their advance, which was covered by the heavy guns of the battleships Rostislav and Panteleimon, assisted by four destroyers. The Turkish army evacuated Trebizond on the evening of 18 April.47
The Russian high command decided that it would be prudent to reinforce Russian forces in Lazistan, especially as a Turkish counterattack was anticipated. They ordered the transport of two more divisions, the 123d and the 127th, by sea. The approximately 34,400 troops with their horses and equipment were assembled at Mariupol in the Sea of Azov and transported in two convoys on 16–19 May and 28 May–4 June. After the convoys had passed through the Kertch Strait from the Sea of Azov into the Black Sea, the commander in chief in the Imperatritsa Maria, with two cruisers, three seaplane carriers, and the usual large number of destroyers and torpedo boats, provided the escort. The troops were landed at Kavata Bay, 5 miles to the east of Trebizond. The Russians built temporary wharves, and on the eve of the arrival of the convoys carefully swept the entrance to the bay and laid a 4-mile-long line of antisubmarine nets. There also were four patrol lines outside of the nets. The newly constructed landing craft and motorized lighters were employed extensively and the landings went well. The Germans and Turks made no direct move to interfere.
The navy temporarily deployed the Second Battleship Squadron (the Ioann Zlatoust, Evstafi, and Panteleimon) with the cruiser Pamiat Merkuria, the seaplane carrier Almaz, and four destroyers to join the naval forces at Batum. They remained there through the summer with orders to blockade the Anatolian coast to the east of Sinope, protect the army’s seaward flank, and provide artillery support or protect valuable transports if necessary. There were other torpedo boats and gunboats at Rize and Trebizond and a pair of small, old, and not very effective submarines at Batum.
The Turks seemed powerless to disrupt these operations, although the Russians had been somewhat lucky, since German submarines were in the area at least part of the time. U.33 sailed from Constantinople the day Trebizond fell and spent several days in the Trebizond area. The submarine reportedly spotted one of the Russian dreadnoughts at least twice but was never in a position to fire and moved off to the northeast coast of the Black Sea on 28 April and sank three sailing craft and a steamer before serious oil leaks forced her commander to break off the patrol and return to Constantinople on 4 May. U.33 required a prolonged period of repair. Souchon pointed out that his UB submarines were not suitable for operations in the distant eastern portion of the Black Sea and asked for another large boat as a temporary replacement until one of the improved UB.II-class could arrive. The Admiralstab agreed and sent U.38, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Max Valentiner, one of the crack, though controversial, German submariners in the Mediterranean. In the interim, the small UB.14 worked off Trebizond between the end of May and first few days of June, but returned to Constantinople without having had any success.
U.38 sailed on her first Black Sea cruise on 31 May, and on 3 June landed three agents on the Georgian coast approximately 45 miles north of Batum with orders to attempt to disturb the Russian army’s supply. U.38 did not sight the Russian convoys, but sank four small steamers and a sailing vessel, generally in the area between Tuapse and Sochi, and on 11 June fired two torpedoes, which missed, at a zigzagging dreadnought (probably the Imperatritsa Maria) in the southeastern portion of the Black Sea.
The last amphibious operation of the year took place in June when the long-awaited Turkish counterattack broke through the Russian front lines on the 22d. The Turks advanced approximately 20 kilometers toward the town of Of, located on the coast to the west of Rize. The local corps commander decided to shift three infantry battalions from Trebizond to the threatened sector. The troops embarked at Plantane in the Elpidifors and motorized lighters and moved to Of on the 23d and 24th of June. The Turkish attacks were stopped by 4 July.48
The Goeben and Breslau came out to support these Turkish offensives by attacking Russian shipping and supply lines along the Caucasian and Anatolian coasts, and, if possible, destroying any weaker or isolated warships they could catch. The Goeben shelled Tuapse harbor on the afternoon of 4 July, sinking a small steamer and a motor schooner. At roughly the same time, the Breslau sank a steamer and sailing craft off Sochi and completed the destruction of another steamer that had been torpedoed two days before by U.38 on her second cruise in the Black Sea.49 The Germans had, however, placed their head in the noose, for Sebastopol was much closer to the Bosphorus than the eastern shores of the Black Sea and there was a chance the Russian battle squadrons would be able to cut them off. The Russians tried. The Imperatritsa Maria sailed on the 4th and the Imperatritsa Ekaterina on the 5th of July, and patrolled to the north of the Kirpen Island-Eregli sector. The Germans had anticipated this, and UB.14 was waiting off Sebastopol; but the submarine was spotted and attacked by one of the Imperatritsa Maria’s destroyer screen before she could fire a torpedo. Both the Goeben and Breslau, steaming independently, evaded the Russians by taking a northerly route, close to the Crimean coast, and returning to the Bospho
rus from the direction of Bulgaria. There was fairly widespread criticism of the Russian commander in chief’s handling of his forces and the failure to respond promptly and coordinate the movements of Russian submarines. This may have been instrumental in bringing about the replacement of Ebergard by the young (41) Vice Admiral Kolchak, who had earned an excellent reputation for his handling of the destroyers in the Baltic.50 The new commander in chief was younger than many of the Black Sea captains, and his arrival was greeted with trepidation by some. He was generally expected to bring about a revolution in command and to bring new vigor to operations, with a renewed emphasis on mining off the Bosphorus.51
The Russian amphibious operations on the Lazistan coast in the first half of 1916 are interesting. They were successful. On the other hand, it would be wrong to exaggerate their importance. None of the landings faced serious opposition or strong defenses. There is no comparison between the problems the Russians faced and the fierce resistance the Allies met when they landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Nevertheless, the Russians had gained considerable experience in moving large numbers of men and equipment over the sea and landing them on a hostile coast. Their force of different types of specially adapted transports and landing craft was also growing. On a minor scale the Russians employed a system of guerrilla warfare. Bands composed of Turkish-speaking Greeks and Armenians, generally seeking to escape Turkish military service, were armed and paid by the Russians and then landed by a destroyer on dark nights on the Turkish shore. The Russians spoke to the British observer with the Black Sea Fleet about a force of 300 men, which they hoped to increase to 2,000, and there was talk of a landing by a whole Russian army corps. Reality was less spectacular. There were eight landings by reconnaissance parties in the Samson area from 10 July to 25 August, and the total number of men landed was 160.52
The Russians also executed a raid on the night of 2 November against the Turkish coastal craft, which they had discovered concealed at the mouth of the Terme River, east of Samsun. The destroyers Kapitan Saken, Leitenant Zatzarenni, and Strogi, accompanied by a transport, landed 40 men, together with 140 (mostly Armenian) volunteers, to seize—some accounts report destroy—20 barges and sailing craft.53 The inevitable question was: As Russian superiority at sea increased and their confidence grew, would they be able to attempt another landing closer to the heart of the Turkish Empire, perhaps even at the Bosphorus itself?
The Turco-German naval forces had been powerless to do more than annoy the Russian operations in Lazistan. Souchon made another effort with the Breslau later in July when the cruiser was ordered to lay mines off Novorossisk and then operate against shipping on the Caucasus coast. The Breslau sailed on 21 July with 65 mines, but her departure from the Bosphorus was reported to the Russian commander in chief. The Russians had excellent sources of intelligence, and the Germans and Turks may have unwittingly helped them through injudicious use of wireless. The Russians were the ones who had salvaged the codes from the Magdeburg in the Baltic, and it is evident they also exploited this advantage in the Black Sea. The French liaison officer with the Russian commander in chief confirmed this later in 1916 when he noted that the Russians were cognizant of Turkish and Bulgarian codes and that thanks to constant use of wireless by the enemy, the Black Sea Fleet was well informed (au courant) of everything that was going on.54
Kolchak sailed in the Imperatritsa Maria with the cruiser Kagul and five destroyers to intercept the Breslau. UB.7 had been stationed off Sebastopol for this eventuality, but was prevented from making an attack when she was spotted and bombed by seaplanes, thereby demonstrating again the difficulties German submarines had in the Black Sea. They repeatedly sighted Russian warships, but were unable to deliver their attacks. At 1:05 P.M. (1:30 according to Russian sources), approximately 100 miles north of Sinope, the Breslau met the destroyer Schastlivy, part of the screen preceding the Imperatritsa Maria. The Breslau altered course to the south at full speed and then altered again to a southwesterly course to avoid being cut off. Korvettenkapitän von Knorr had to jettison nine mines in order to give his aft 15-cm a free field of fire and allow ammunition to be brought up. The Schastlivy opened fire shortly before 2:00, but was driven off by the Breslau’s 15-cm. In the meantime the other Russian warships arrived, and by 2:15, despite the Breslau’s efforts to shake her off (which included making smoke), the Imperatritsa Maria opened fire at a range of 22,000 meters. The Breslau’s use of smoke caused the dreadnought to cease fire after two salvoes, but when the cruiser altered course to avoid drawing too close to the coast, she was able to resume fire. Von Knorr was making 25 knots but could not seem to shake the Imperatritsa Maria, whose shooting was good, and a number of the Breslau’s men were wounded by splinters from a near miss. Von Knorr repeatedly used smoke, and eventually the Breslau slowly drew ahead and out of range. The Germans were worried the Russian destroyers might attempt a torpedo attack in the dark and jettisoned another eight mines. The destroyers, however, lost contact with the Breslau, whose escape was aided by a rain squall. The cruiser reached the safety of the Bosphorus early the next morning. The mission had ended in failure.55
RUSSIAN NAVAL SUPERIORITY
The focus of the Black Sea Fleet’s attention shifted back to the west in the second half of 1916. This was largely due to the events surrounding Romania’s entry into the war as well as to Admiral Kolchak’s interest in increased mining, particularly at the Bosphorus. Starting on 31 July, when the submarine Krab laid 60 mines in the entrance to the Bosphorus, Russian destroyers during the next few nights laid more than 800 mines in a semicircle to the north of the Strait. On the night of 11 August a pair of destroyers laid a minefield to the east of the Bosphorus entrance in shallow water north of Adajiklar, and on the night of the 20th, another field to the west of the Strait northwest of Hissar Kaiasi.
On 27 August, after hard bargaining, Romania finally entered the war on the side of the Triple Entente. Shortly before the declaration of war, the Russian fleet reappeared in force off the Bulgarian coast on the 25th. The Imperatritsa Ekaterina and 7 destroyers were out to cover an air raid launched by the 3 seaplane carriers (the Almaz, Imperator Alexander I, and Imperator Nikolai I) directed at the German submarines reported at Varna. Only 7 of the 19–20 seaplanes with the Russian force were able to take off in the rough sea and strong winds. The Russians, in turn, were subjected to attacks by German seaplanes, and the destroyer Pospeshny was damaged.
The Romanian decision to enter the war turned out to be disastrous. The Romanians launched an early offensive into Transylvania to enforce their historic claims, but their armies were defeated and Romania overrun by the forces of the Central Powers led by Field Marshal August von Mackensen. After a few months fighting, they retained only a small portion of their territory, leaving the Russians with new obligations. A special naval detachment was created, including three gunboats, to work with the Romanians in the defense of the lower Danube (see chapter 9). Other Russian warships, notably the old battleship Rostislav and a number of torpedo boats, worked along the seaward flank of the front in the Dobrudja region, or attacked what scant shipping—usually small coastal sailing vessels—as could be found along the Bulgarian coast. The Russian navy also ran convoys bringing men and matériel from the Ukrainian coast to Constanza.
On the night of 8–9 September, three Russian destroyers tried to block the use of Varna by German submarines by laying a minefield northeast of the harbor entrance. The mission ended badly when the Bespokoiny was heavily damaged by a Romanian mine on the return to Constanza. The submarine Krab laid another field south of Varna on the 15th. The Russians also came under frequent German air attack. The battleship Rostislav was slightly damaged in Constanza harbor on 2 September, and the minesweeper T.238 was damaged in another raid on the 10th that also sank two lighters.
Constanza, the major Romanian port, was doomed by the advance of the Central Powers on land, and the Rostislav, which had been busy supporting the Romanian army with her big guns, ended by
covering the evacuation of the port on 22 October. The Romanian evacuation was so rapid, however, that the storage tanks filled with large amounts of petroleum remained intact. The Russian high command ordered the navy to destroy them with gunfire from the sea, but this proved more difficult to accomplish than had been anticipated. On 1 November the cruiser Pamiat Merkuria had to break off her first attempt after a false submarine alarm. The attack by two destroyers on the 2d had little effect, and it was only on the 4th that the Pamiat Merkuria, under air attack and fired on by coastal batteries, was able to destroy 15 of the 37 petroleum tanks. The Russians found themselves subjected to heavy air attack in these waters and shifted to approaching their targets during the night and opening fire at dawn. They also increased their minelaying off the Bulgarian and now-hostile Romanian coasts, so that when the extensive minefields off the Turkish coast on the approaches to the Bosphorus are taken into account, the southwestern portion of the Black Sea was on its way to becoming as unhealthy a place for ships as the Baltic. The Russians to a certain extent recognized this when in the latter part of October they began to use the Elpidifors converted into minelayers for operations off the Bosphorus, rather than the destroyers that had largely been employed since the beginning of the war. The shallow draught Elpidifors stood less danger of running onto Russian mines, which more than compensated for their lack of speed.56
The mining offensives and Russian submarines continued to cause loss to the Turks and diminish the number of precious colliers. The Irmingard, raised and repaired after having been sunk at Zonguldak by Russian bombs, struck a mine and was beached on 2 October between Alacali and Kara Burnu. Two weeks later the submarine Narval completed her destruction and sank another collier on 16 October. The Turks also lost the armed collier Rodosto (3,662 tons) on 12 October. The ship was captured after a gun duel east of Kirpen with the submarine Tyulen and brought into Sebastopol. The Turkish navy lost ships trying to clear the mines, notably the torpedo boat converted to a minesweeper Kütahya and the gunboat Malatya, damaged beyond repair. Russian mines also sank one of the torpedo boats of the tiny Bulgarian navy off Varna, another torpedo boat was damaged, and one of the Turk’s precious German-built destroyers, the Gairet-i-Watanije, was also wrecked on an uncharted rock off Varna at the end of October. The Germans and Turks could claim few successes for the mines they laid in different parts of the Black Sea, either with the Breslau or by the UC-type submarines. The coal crisis grew toward the end of the year, and Turkey became increasingly dependent on insufficient shipments from Germany. Souchon was forced to curtail the activities of the Goeben and Breslau, whose movements along with those of the German submarines were also hampered by the extensive minefields. In what amounted to a vicious circle, the Turkish shortage of coal forced them to curtail the efforts at minesweeping, which in turn added to the coal shortage.57
A Naval History of World War I Page 43