The situation was radically transformed by the arrival of Scheer and the High Sea Fleet, which Commodore Goodenough commanding the Second Light Cruiser Squadron reported to both Jellicoe and Beatty by wireless from his flagship Southampton at 4:38. Beatty, after closing Goodenough and sighting the High Sea Fleet himself, turned 16 points to starboard (180°) and began to draw the Germans after him and toward Jellicoe. Once again there was faulty signaling. Evan-Thomas failed to see the signal made by flags to turn, and when it was repeated at 4:48 as the Fifth Battle Squadron drew abreast of the Lion, it called for a turn in succession rather than together, and to starboard rather than to port. The result was to open a gap of 3 miles between Evan-Thomas and Beatty and to bring the Fifth Battle Squadron into considerable danger from the Third Squadron of the High Sea Fleet (the König, Grosser Kurfürst, Markgraf, Kronprinz, Kaiser, Prinzregent Luitpold, and Kaiserin) as Scheer had ordered his fleet to turn by divisions toward the British. Evan-Thomas engaged the van of the High Sea Fleet but escaped without serious damage, and “the run to the South” was over.
The situation was now reversed, with Beatty drawing Scheer and Hipper toward Jellicoe in the second phase of the battle, not surprisingly known as “the run to the north.” The British at first continued to be plagued by poor visibility, but after about 5:40, the light tended to favor them and dazzle the German gunners. Visibility, though, was really a complicated factor, changing frequently for different ships, and, as Campbell points out, for the British “it was seldom good and frequently poor.” On the German side, the conditions often might have been difficult, but on the few occasions they could see their targets clearly, “their shooting was as dangerous as ever.”82 The British achieved far better results in “the run to the north” between 4:54 and 6:15. Hipper’s First Scouting Group was badly battered, particularly the Lützow, Derfflinger, and Seydlitz, and lost a good deal of its fighting value. All of the Von der Tanris heavy guns were at least temporarily disabled. German ships, though, were well protected, and German ammunition more stable than that of the British. The ships did not blow up and were exceedingly difficult to sink.
The Germans ran into more trouble. At 4:05 Jellicoe had ordered Rear Admiral Hood with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron—the Invincible, Inflexible, Indomitable, two light cruisers, and four destroyers—to reinforce Beatty. The estimates of Beatty’s position were incorrect, and Hood was too far to the east. The light cruiser Chester on Hood’s starboard beam turned to investigate gun flashes to the southwest and at 5:36 ran into Rear Admiral Boedicker’s Second Scouting Group (light cruisers Frankfurt, Pillau, Elbing, and Wiesbaden), which had been screening Hipper. The Chester had a harrowing time and was hit seventeen times before she could fall back on Hood. Boedicker’s cruisers, in pursuit, met Hood’s battle cruisers, and the Wiesbaden was disabled before they could get away. The appearance of Hood’s battle cruisers convinced Hipper, still hotly engaged with Beatty, that he had encountered the British battle fleet, and he fell back on Scheer, reforming in front of the German battleships. Hipper had been preparing to launch a destroyer attack against Beatty. The attack was diverted to Hood but was not effective, although the British destroyer Shark was disabled and later sank.
The major and probably most important effect of the intervention by Hood’s Third Battle Cruiser Squadron was to screen the approach of Jellicoe from the Germans. It also had the effect of moving the lead German squadron, the Third Squadron of Rear Admiral Behncke, more toward the east. There were some Germans who thought this decisive, for if Behncke had carried on to the north he might have surprised Jellicoe while the latter was deploying, and might have even “crossed the T” of the British.83
Jellicoe and his three battle squadrons (two divisions each) were rapidly approaching the scene. The Grand Fleet was in its cruising formation of divisions in line abreast, that is, six parallel columns, each column composed of four dreadnoughts in line ahead. There were approximately 5 miles between the far right and left columns. Jellicoe could not effectively fight in this formation, for he would only be able to use a fraction of his heavy guns because of ships masking one another. The Grand Fleet would have to deploy for battle, on either its port or starboard column, depending on the estimated direction from which the enemy would appear. The deployment of the 24 dreadnoughts into a single line ahead was no easy matter and would require a full 15 to 20 minutes. The problem for Jellicoe was that from 4:45 to 6:00 he had received no reports from Beatty on the location of the enemy. Beatty has been greatly criticized for this. Moreover, thanks to errors in dead reckoning and estimating position in the reports Jellicoe did receive, Beatty was actually much farther to the west—on Jellicoe’s starboard bow rather than ahead—and the Germans about to appear much sooner than he had anticipated. By 6:00 Jellicoe could see the Lion, and at 6:15 he ordered a deployment on the port division, that is, to the east. This had the disadvantage of deploying the British battle fleet farther from the advancing Germans but placed Jellicoe in the tactically advantageous position of “crossing the T” of the advancing Germans. This meant he could employ the great majority of his heavy guns whereas the Germans could only employ a fraction of their own. There have been voluminous discussions of this decision, and the great majority of opinion—but certainly not all—has concluded Jellicoe made the correct decision.84
Beatty, once in contact, steamed across the British fleet to take his prescribed position at the head of the line. This had the unfortunate effect of hampering British gunnery as well as obscuring vision with the battle cruisers’ smoke. It also caused Jellicoe to reduce speed to let him get clear, thereby delaying the deployment. Evan-Thomas realized he did not have enough speed to follow with the Fifth Battle Squadron and therefore took position at the rear of the British line. In doing so the Warspite’s helm jammed, and she made two complete circles in the face of the advancing Germans. She came under the concentrated fire of the German dreadnoughts and was hit thirteen times by heavy shells, but suffered no vital damage. The Warspite regained control for a time, but the helm later jammed again, and Evan-Thomas subsequently ordered her to return to port.
While the Warspite was having her narrow escape, Rear Admiral Robert Arbuthnot led the old armored cruisers Defence and Warrior of the First Cruiser Squadron across Beatty’s bows to engage the light cruisers of the Second Scouting Group. Arbuthnot, a stern disciplinarian and physical-fitness fanatic, had been one of the characters of the Royal Navy, and there were some who were not really surprised at his brave action and subsequent fate. The two obsolete armored cruisers suddenly came in close contact with the advancing German battle cruisers and dreadnoughts and were smothered by the fire from large-caliber guns. Arbuthnot’s flagship Defence blew up and sank with all hands at 6:20. The diversion caused by the Warspite’s mishap probably permitted the badly damaged Warrior to limp away. She was later taken in tow by the Engadine, but sank the following morning.
At approximately 6:20 Hood’s Third Battle Cruiser Squadron opened fire on Hipper’s advancing battle cruisers. Hood turned to a parallel course and the British ships made excellent shooting. Hood’s flagship Invincible was particularly effective. The Lützow was hit repeatedly and suffered the damage that eventually proved lethal. Nevertheless the fatal flaw in British battle cruisers revealed itself for a third time that day. At 6:32 a heavy shell hit the Invincible’s “Q” turret and blew the turret roof off. The flash that followed shot down to the magazines, and the ship blew up, splitting in two parts. The bow and stern remained visible above the water for a long time, and a photograph of them is one of the most frequently reproduced images of the battle. There were only six survivors; 1,026 officers and men, including Hood, were lost. Hood was a particularly able and respected officer, and his role in the battle had been effective. Had he lived, he probably would have attained the highest rank.
The Grand Fleet’s deployment was not completed until about 6:40, but the Marlborough, flagship of the rear division, opened fire at 6:17. Fi
ring did not become general until 6:30, and visibility was not good, with targets appearing and disappearing in the haze. Campbell estimates that of Jellicoe’s 24 dreadnoughts only 12 (perhaps only 10) fired on German battleships at this time, and the four dreadnoughts of Vice Admiral Jerram’s First Division at the head of the British line did not fire a single shot.85 Still, Hipper’s battle cruisers and the dreadnoughts of the Third Squadron, particularly the König, which took 8 hits, were undergoing a heavy pounding, and the doomed Wiesbaden lay helpless between the lines, a target for many of the British ships. The irony is that there were so many ships firing at her that spotting was inaccurate and she did not suffer any fatal damage.
Scheer was in a desperate situation and escaped from it by the maneuver known as the Gefechtskehrtwendung, which can be translated as the “battle-about-turn.” At 6:33 Scheer made the signal “Turn together 16 points to starboard and form single line ahead in the opposite direction.” The German Third Destroyer Flotilla delivered a torpedo attack—which was not pressed home—and made a smoke screen to cover the maneuver. The move, aided by mist and a wind from the southwest that blew smoke toward the British line, was successful and competed by 6:45. The Germans disappeared to the southwest. At 6:57 the Marlborough was hit by a torpedo, probably fired by the Wiesbaden, but although listing was able to steam at 16 knots for the remainder of daylight.
Jellicoe did not at first realize that the Germans had turned away, and those Grand Fleet captains who might have observed the maneuver did not, with that distressing lack of initiative that plagued the British in the battle, report it to him. When he discovered the Germans were gone, he did not pursue closely, but instead, steaming at 17 knots, 4 knots below maximum speed, ordered the fleet with its divisions in echelon on to a course that would cut across the line of retreat to the German bases, and then altered to a more southerly course when he assumed he had steamed far enough to the east to achieve this purpose. Jellicoe’s failure to pursue the Germans closely is another of the more controversial aspects of the Battle of Jutland that was and remains hotly debated. He was, of course, aware of his immense responsibility and the frequently quoted remark that he was the one man who could lose the war in an afternoon. Jellicoe’s actions reflect the policy embodied in the Grand Fleet Battle Orders, in which there was no signal for a “general chase,” and Jellicoe did what he had always said he was going to do. By not, however, ordering his divisional commanders to pursue independently, he may well have lost a great opportunity.86
Scheer gave Jellicoe another chance when he blundered back into the arms of the British. At 6:55 he signaled for another 180° turn. He tended to be vague about his reasons for doing so, implying it was too early to assume night cruising order, that the British could still have compelled him to fight before dark or cut off his retreat, that he wanted to surprise and shock his opponents, and that he wanted to render assistance to the Wiesbaden. None of this is terribly convincing. Professor Marder suggests, although he admits it cannot be proven, that Scheer was attempting to slip astern and to the north of the British fleet in order to escape home via the Skaggerak. He misjudged Jellicoe’s position.87 Perhaps Scheer betrayed the truth to Holtzendorff in an unguarded moment after the battle. According to one of his staff officers, the admiral in a mellow frame of mind after dinner admitted, “My idea? I had no idea. . . . The thing just happened—as the virgin said when she got a baby.”88
At about 7:10 the two rearmost British divisions sighted and opened fire on the Germans, and by 7:15 the firing extended all along the British line at ranges varying between 11,000 and 14,000 yards. Once again the Germans ships in the van, notably the battle cruisers of the First Scouting Group and the Königs of the Fifth Division, Third Squadron, received heavy punishment during the few minutes the British were able to see them. The Germans, for their part, could see little of the British ships save gun flashes. Scheer was in a desperate position, and at 7:13 signaled the battle cruisers to make what in effect was a suicidal charge. His signal Schlachtkreuzer ran an den Feind, voll einsetzen has been translated as “Battle cruisers at the enemy, give them everything.” The battle cruisers at that moment were actually commanded by Captain Hartog of the Derfflinger, for Hipper and his staff had been compelled to abandon the badly damaged Lützow shortly before 7:00 and were trapped for two hours in the destroyer G.39 before they could transfer to the Moltke. Hipper later described how he could never forget those hours in the little ship amidst the tremendous shell splashes of the battle while he tried to keep up with the big ships.89 At 7:14 Scheer ordered the battle cruisers to engage the British van, thereby altering the orders for the “death ride” to a turn to the south. At 7:15 Scheer ordered his destroyer flotillas to attack and make smoke, and at about 7:17 or 7:18 signaled another “about-turn to starboard.” The ships of the Third Squadron were close together and under heavy fire, and the maneuver was carried out under difficult conditions.
Jellicoe countered the German destroyer attack with his own destroyers and Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron and, most important of all, turned away with the battle fleet. This once again was in accordance with his stated intentions and the Grand Fleet Battle Orders. The turnaway permitted Scheer to escape for the second time that day. The Germans had been badly pounded, for in this phase of the battle, from 7:00 to 7:45, the British had scored 37 hits with large-caliber guns, including 14 on the Derfflinger and 5 each on the Grosser Kurfürst and the doomed Lützow. The Germans had managed only two hits on the Colossus.
There was still an estimated hour and a half of daylight remaining, and the turnaway at this moment when the British were beginning to pay back the Germans for the losses earlier in the day horrified many. It is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the battle, the crux of the division between Jellicoe and Beatty supporters after the war. Jellicoe’s justification was that by turning away, the German torpedoes reached the British line running at a much slower speed and were easier to avoid. A turn toward the torpedo attack meant encountering torpedoes when they were running at their maximum speed. None of the German torpedoes hit. There was also the danger that the British, had they turned toward the torpedoes, might have encountered successive torpedo attacks from another quarter, and these would have been difficult if not impossible to avoid. Jellicoe after the loss of the Audacious in 1914 was conscious of the vulnerability of British capital ships to underwater damage. The counterargument to this was that however valid the reasons for turning away, Jellicoe forfeited the chance of a decisive victory in order to avoid losses. Would not some British loss have been justified if it meant sinking a substantial portion of the High Sea Fleet? The argument will no doubt continue as long as historians write about the battle of Jutland.90
There was no further contact between the main battle fleets, although just before darkness Beatty clashed with the First Scouting Group and part of the High Sea Fleet. The British scored 8 large-caliber hits, 5 on the battered Seydlitz, compared to one German 11-inch shell that hit the Princess Royal. The British might have been able to achieve more had Beatty been closely supported by at least some of the battle squadrons—Jerram’s Second Battle Squadron had been closest—yet another controversy over lost opportunity.91
Jellicoe was still positioned between Scheer and the German bases, and he hoped to resume the battle at daylight. He was and always had been determined to avoid a night engagement. As he wrote shortly after the battle, “Nothing would make me fight a night action with heavy ships in these days of T.B.D.’s [destroyers] and long range torpedoes. I might well lose the fleet. It would be far too fluky an affair.”92 The problem was not merely torpedoes, however. The Grand Fleet was not trained in night fighting, and German equipment and technique were clearly superior. German searchlights were larger and had iris shutters so the light could be kept ready and burning behind the shutters. The Germans had made their searchlights an integral part of their gunnery control system with searchlights following the lookout’s binoculars. Admiral Hezlet wri
tes: “There is little doubt that had the two battle fleets engaged at night at Jutland the Germans would have invariably hit with their first salvo before the British had fired a shot. At point-blank ranges at which the ships would have sighted each other the effect would have been devastating.”93
Jellicoe set course to cover the so-called Ems route between the minefields and the Frisian Islands by which he assumed Scheer would attempt to return to his base. Scheer elected to return via the Horns Reeft and Amrun Channel close to the Jutland and Schleswig coast, which Jellicoe had left uncovered. The Second German Destroyer Flotilla returned via the Skaw, which, had there been a resumption of the battle, would have deprived Scheer of 10 of his best destroyers and 57 remaining torpedoes. The two fleets actually steered converging courses, but Scheer was able to pass astern of the British. There were a series of short, sharp night encounters—Marder describes seven phases—between the British flotillas and the High Sea Fleet as it passed astern in which, for the most part, the superiority of German night-fighting techniques was demonstrated. The British lost: the armored cruiser Black Prince; the flotilla leader Tipperary; and the destroyers Sparrowhawk (rammed by the cruiser Contest and destroyer Broke and subsequently scuttled), Fortune, Turbulent, and Ardent. The British destroyer Spitfire collided with the German dreadnought Nassau and suffered the blast of two 11-inch guns fired at maximum depression, which wrecked her bridge. Miraculously, she survived to reach the Tyne.
A Naval History of World War I Page 56