Tyrwhitt and the Harwich Force met the first group of twenty submarines at sea on 20 November and escorted them into port. Tyrwhitt had given strict orders that there should be no cheering or demonstration, and the surrender of what had been for so long the largely unseen enemy had a curious air of unreality, with the British at action stations until the last minute. The Royal Naval ensign was hoisted over each submarine and the crews quickly repatriated. The U-boats continued to trickle in over the next eleven days, and by 1 December a total of 114 had been surrendered. This by no means represented all German submarines, and an Allied Control Commission that visited Germany in December discovered no less than 62 still seaworthy, with another 149 under construction. The Allies ordered the Germans to immediately surrender all seaworthy boats, towing those that could not proceed under their own power. All boats on the stocks were to be broken up and no new construction undertaken. Eventually 176 submarines were surrendered to the British. Another seven foundered en route to Harwich, a number of old unseaworthy craft were broken up in Germany, and eight were eventually recovered from neutral ports where they had taken refuge. One U-boat (UC.48) was scuttled by her crew at Ferrol in March 1919 to prevent the Spanish from handing her over. The former German submarines were divided among the victorious Allies and, no doubt, carefully studied.134
The surrender of the U-boats, which were Germany’s most deadly weapon at sea and the greatest threat to the British, had been curiously anticlimactic. The big spectacle was provided by what had become the lesser threat in 1918, the German surface ships. The symbolism, though, was immense. Operation ZZ—the arrival of the German fleet in the Forth—took place on 21 November. Many British and Americans sarcastically referred to it as Der Tag, only instead of giving battle, the Germans came to surrender. The Germans were under the command of Rear Admiral von Reuter. Hipper had informed the state secretary he did not feel up to the job. He watched the big ships leave Schillig Roads with the thought, “My heart is breaking with this; my time as fleet commander has come to an inglorious end.” Shortly afterward he asked to be placed on the inactive list and retired.135
Beatty in the Queen Elizabeth met the Germans at sea with the Grand Fleet and representatives from the other naval commands, reportedly 370 ships. The Americans were represented by the five dreadnoughts of the Sixth Battle Squadron, Admiral Sims in the flagship New York. The French navy was represented by Rear Admiral Grasset in the old armored cruiser Amiral Aube, accompanied by two destroyers. The day, though, really belonged to the Royal Navy. The British fleet formed into two columns of thirteen squadrons, and the light cruiser Cardiff led the German fleet between the two immense columns. The British turned 180° and escorted them to port. Von Reuter arrived in Friedrich der Grosse, one of 9 dreadnoughts, 5 battle cruisers, 7 light cruisers, and 49 destroyers—numbers somewhat less than those specified in the armistice terms. The battleship König and cruiser Dresden were in dock and joined later, and one destroyer had been sunk by a mine in the Bight. The British ships wore their battle ensigns and were at action stations in case the Germans tried something, although the German ships were supposed to have been de-munitioned and without their breech blocks. Nevertheless, after four years of bitter war the British simply did not trust the Germans. The British guns were empty, but the ammunition cages were up and loaded, ready to be rammed home. The directors were trained on the Germans and correct range and deflection kept continuously on the sights. The ships’ companies of the Grand Fleet were fascinated by this close look at the enemy, although to British eyes the German ships looked dirty and unkept. For the commander in chief and many of the British officers there were mixed emotions, for they would have preferred a naval victory like Trafalgar instead of the peaceful surrender in what more than one described as a funeral procession. The Germans reached their assigned anchorage in the middle of the Firth without incident, and the fleet cheered Beatty as the Queen Elizabeth proceeded to her anchorage. After the flagship had been secured, Beatty briefly addressed the ships’ company. He was about to leave the quarterdeck when he stopped, turned, and to the delight of the men said: “Didn’t I tell you they would have to come out?” At approximately 11:00 A.M. Beatty made the general signal: “The German flag will be hauled down at sunset to-day, Thursday, and will not be hoisted again without permission.” That evening Beatty held a service of Thanksgiving.136 The naval war was over.
MAPS
1. THE NORTH SEA
2. THE BRITISH ISLES
3. THE MEDITERRANEAN
4. THE ADRIATIC
5. THE AEGEAN
6. THE PACIFIC
7. THE INDIAN OCEAN
8. THE NORTH ATLANTIC
9. THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
10. EGYPT AND THE SUEZ CANAL
11. AEGEAN COAST OF ASIA MINOR AND APPROACHES TO THE DARDANELLES
12. MESOPOTAMIA
13. NORTH RUSSIA
14. SABBIONCELLO PENINSULA, CURZOLA, AND THE DALMATIAN COAST
15. THE BALTIC
16. GULF OF RIGA
17. THE BLACK SEA
18. THE BOSPHORUS AND VICINITY
19. LAZISTAN COAST
20. THE MIDDLE DANUBE
21. THE LOWER DANUBE
22. THE ENGLISH CHANNEL AND DOVER STRAIT
23. PATROL AREAS ESTABLISHED BY THE MALTA CONFERENCE (MARCH 1916)
24. THE OTRANTO BARRAGES (OCTOBER 1918)
25. EAST COAST OF NORTHERN AMERICA
26. THE NORTHERN BARRAGE
NOTES
1. THE NAVAL BALANCE IN 1914
1.An excellent introduction to the subject remains “The New Navalism,” in William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1951); see also Kennedy, British Naval Mastery.
2.This period is well covered in Marder, Anatomy of British Sea Power and Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy.
3.The most complete recent study is Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism.
4.Historians generally complain there is no adequate biography of Tirpitz. He and his projects can be studied through Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday’s Deterrent; Volker Berghahn, Der Tirpitz-Plan (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1971) and his more convenient shorter work in English, Approach of War; Weir, Building the Kaiser’s Navy; and Herwig, “Luxury Fleet,” chap. 3.
5.Summary of the Tirpitz program based on Berghahn, Approach of War, 32–42; and Steinberg, Yesterday’s Deterrent, 208–23.
6.Cited by Berghahn, Approach of War, 29. This interpretation is particularly associated with Eckart Kehr, Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik, 1894–1901 (Berlin: E. Ebering, 1930).
7.Membership figures cited in Wilhelm Deist, Flottenpolitik und Flottenpropaganda: Das Nachrichtenbureau des Reichsmarineamtes, 1897–1914 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1976), 157.
8.Cited by Berghahn, Approach of War, 40.
9.Berghahn, Approach of War, 38; Herwig, “Luxury Fleet,” 42–43.
10.For surveys of the diplomatic history, see Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale (London: Macmillan, 1968); Zara Steiner, Great Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1977); George L. Monger, The End of Isolation (London: Thomas Nelson, 1963); and on the Anglo-French staff talks, Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy.
11.On Fisher as first sea lord, see especially Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. 1; Ruddock F. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
12.On Scott, see Padfield, Aim Straight and Guns at Sea; and Admiral Sir Percy Scott, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy (London: John Murray, 1919).
13.On development of the dreadnought type and battle cruiser, see Parkes, British Battleships, chaps. 80–81, 83–84; Burt, British Battleships, 19–33, 39–45.
14.On this point, see Sumida, Defence of Naval Supremacy, 27–28, 37–41, 51–61.
15.This point is stressed by Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., “The Origins of the Dreadnought Revolution: A Historiographical Essay,” International His
tory Review 13, no. 2 (May 1991): 264.
16.Sumida, Defence of Naval Supremacy, 160–61, 330–34. See also Sumida, “British Capital Ship Design and Fire Control in the Dreadnought Era: Sir John Fisher, Arthur Hungerford Pollen, and the Battle Cruiser,” Journal of Modern History 51 (June 1979): 205–30; and Sumida, The Pollen Papers. On the importance of the Dreadnought and gunnery developments as part of a system for increasing the combat capability of fleets, see Karl Lautenschläger, “The Dreadnought Revolution,” 121–36.
17.On Churchill as first lord, see Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 2, Young Statesman, 1901–1914 (London: Heinemann, 1967); Gilbert, Challenge of War; Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. 1, chaps. 10–11; and Churchill, The World Crisis.
18.On the 1912 redeployment, see Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, chap. 2.
19.On the naval race and diplomacy of the period, see Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, chap. 20; Herwig, “Luxury Fleet,” chaps. 4–5.
20.March, British Destroyers, 165.
21.The figures have been culled from various authorities (who naturally differ): Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921; Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow 1:439–42; H. M. Le Fleming, Warships of World War I (London: Ian Allan, n.d.); Taylor, German Warships.
22.There were also thirty to thirty-three modern oil-burning destroyers at Harwich. The exact number of destroyers that would have accompanied the High Sea Fleet is difficult to establish. On British destroyers, see March, British Destroyers, 162.
23.Figures given vary widely. The ones cited here are gathered from Corbett and Newbolt, History of the Great War 1:12 n. 2, 438–40; Goldrick, The King’s Ships, 48–50; Weyer, Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten, 424.
24.On these subjects, see Cowie, Mines, Minelayers and Minelaying, chaps. 4–5; Campbell, Jutland: An Analysis, 369–72, 385–88.
25.For full discussions of these points, see Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. 1, chaps. 12 and 13; Roskill, Strategy of Sea Power, 108–10; Goldrick, The King’s Ships, chaps. 2–3; Philbin, Hipper, 22–26; Herwig, “Luxury Fleet,” chap. 7; and Herwig, German Naval Officer Corps.
26.These questions are covered at length in Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, passim.
27.On the naval law of 1900, see Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, 329–36. On the pre-1914 French navy, Walser, France’s Search for a Battle Fleet; Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, chap. 3; and Le Masson, “La politique navale française,” Propos maritimes, 181–239.
28.French figures drawn from Thomazi, L’Adriatique, 213–16; and Halpern, Naval War in the Mediterranean, 3–5.
29.On the Italian navy, see Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, chap. 7; Halpern, Naval War in the Mediterranean, 5–7; Ropp, Development of a Modern Navy, 181–84, 198–201; and the detailed study published by the Ufficio Storico, Gabriele and Friz, La politica navale italiana. The Ufficio Storico is also responsible for a magnificent series of studies, “Le navi d’Italia,” on different types of Italian warships.
30.On the Austro-Hungarian navy, see Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, chap. 6; Sokol, Austro-Hungarian Navy; Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht; and Lawrence Sondhaus, The Habsburg Empire and the Sea: Austrian Naval Policy, 1797–1866 (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1989).
31.On the Triple Alliance Naval Convention, see Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, chaps. 8–9; and the very detailed study published by the Ufficio Storico, Gabriele, Le convenzioni navali della triplice.
32.On the Balkan naval race, see Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, chap. 11.
33.A recent survey of the Russo-Japanese War is J. N. Westwood, Russia Against Japan, 1904–05: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War (London: Macmillan, 1986). Discussions of the Russian navy on the eve of the war are in Saul, Sailors in Revolt, chap. 1; Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, 295–313; and Greger, Die Russische Flotte, 9–14. An important source for data on ships is Watts, The Imperial Russian Navy.
34.The most convenient source for summaries of the smaller naval powers is now Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921. On Spanish warships, see Alfredo Aguilera, Buques de Guerra Españoles, 1885–1971 (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1980).
35.There is a good summary on the Japanese navy in Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921; and much detail in Hansgeorg Jentschura, Dieter Jung, and Peter Mickel, Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869–1945 (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1977).
36.Representative surveys include Knox, United States Navy, chaps. 29–34; William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958); idem, The United States Navy; and James R. Reckner, Teddy Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988).
37.Information on the U.S. Navy may be found in Silverstone, U.S. Warships; Reilly and Scheina, American Battleships; Friedman, U.S. Battleships; and Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921, 105–33.
2. NORTHERN WATERS: THE FIRST SIX MONTHS
1.King-Hall, North Sea Diary, 43.
2.Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow 1:370–73.
3.Ibid. 356–68, 388–93; on the continental commitment and historic C.I.D. meeting see also Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, 188–93.
4.Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 1:54–57; for exhaustive studies of German plans see Lambi, German Power Politics, 400–401.
5.Lambi, German Power Politics, 404–5.
6.Kennedy, “German Naval Operations Plans,” 184–88; Lambi, German Power Politics, 422–23; Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 1:54.
7.Cited by Herwig, “The Failure of German Sea Power, 1914–1945: Mahan, Tirpitz and Raeder Reconsidered,” International History Review 10, no. 1 (February 1988): 81.
8.Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 12–13. On Jellicoe himself and the circumstances of his assumption of command, see Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow 1:433–34; ibid. 2:10–11; Patterson, Jellicoe, 56–58; and Goldrick, The King’s Ships, 21–27.
9.Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 13–15.
10.On the initial deployments, see Goldrick, The King’s Ships, 26–30; Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations 1:11–14, 31, 37–38.
11.Thomazi, Guerre navale dans le nord, 33–38. On the prewar agreements, see ibid., 30–31; and in more detail (including map), Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, 320–25.
12.For a brief synopsis of the auxiliary patrol, see Dittmar and Colledge, British Warships, 141–48; on French trawlers, see Thomazi, Guerre navale dans le nord, 65, 79.
13.Details on German deployment are in Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 1:40–41, Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, 13–16, 20–21, 26–27; and Goldrick, The King’s Ships, 46–51.
14.Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 29–31; Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 1:45; Jellicoe to Battenberg, 18 August 1914, in Patterson, The Jellicoe Papers 1:52.
15.Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, 11, 25; German text in Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 1:54.
16.Goldrick, The King’s Ships, 64–69; Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 1:65–72; Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations 1:38–39.
17.On Norwegian policy, see Riste, The Neutral Ally, 33–37; on British operations, see Goldrick, The King’s Ships, 59–60, 70–71; and Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations 1:38, 77–78.
18.Details of the transport are in Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, vol. 1, chap. 4; Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, 63–64; and Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 1:78–82.
19.Goldrick, The King’s Ships, 69–73; Keyes, Naval Memoirs 1:69; Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 1:72–78, 251; Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 16–17.
20.Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 29, 77, 92; Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow 2:67–69.
21.On the use of submarines with the fleet, see Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow 4:36–37, 85; Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power, 74–75; and Everitt, The K Boats.
22.The best recent account is Goldrick, The
King’s Ships, chap. 5. For further detail, see Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow 2:50–54; Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations 1:100–120; Keyes, Naval Memoirs, vol. 1, chap. 4; Halpern, The Keyes Papers 1:11–22; Patterson, Tyrwhitt, chap. 2.
23.For the German side, see Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee, vol. 1, chap. 5.
24.Chatfield, The Navy and Defence, 124–25; see also Beatty’s dispatch reproduced in Chalmers, Life and Letters of Beatty, 148–49.
25.King-Hall, North Sea Diary, 59.
26.Patterson, Tyrwhitt, 62; Keyes to Goodenough, 5 September 1914, in Halpern, The Keyes Papers 1:19.
27.Görlitz, The Kaiser and His Court, 25, 228; Tirpitz, My Memoirs 2:92; Philbin, Hipper, 85–86; Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, 55–56; Goldrick, The King’s Ships, 114–16.
28.Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations 1:163, 165, 172–77; Goldrick, The King’s Ships, 120–22, 123–35; the account of Sturdee’s remarks on the Broad Fourteens is in Keyes to Richmond, 4 June 1936, Halpern, The Keyes Papers 2:353.
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