69.Greger, Die Russische Flotte, 62; Lorey, Krieg in den türkischen Gewässern 1:305–11. Pavlovich, The Fleet, 460–64.
70.Landing operations discussed in Pavlovich, The Fleet, 481–86. See also Greger, Die Russische Flotte, 63.
71.Lorey, Krieg in den türkischen Gewässern 1:320–22; Greger, Die Russische Flotte, 64; Pavlovich, The Fleet, 469–70, 470 n. 1.
72.Lorey, Krieg in den türkischen Gewässern 2:328–29.
73.Halpern, Naval War in the Mediterranean, 421–25.
74.A summary of events is in Halpern, Naval War in the Mediterranean, 542–46.
75.Halpern, Naval War in the Mediterranean, 547–55. Details of the fate of the ships gleaned from Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921 and Greger, Die Russische Flotte.
9. THE DANUBE
1.Full details are in Pawlik, Christ, and Winkler, Die k.u.k. Donauflottille, and Greger, Austro-Hungarian Warships. For a short history of the flotilla, see Rauchensteiner, “Austro-Hungarian Warships,” 153–73.
2.Wulff, Donauflottille, 13. Wulff served in the flotilla throughout the war.
3.A succinct and convenient discussion of the reasons for this failure may be found in Rothenberg, Army of Francis Joseph, chap. 12.
4.Details on Russian assistance to Serbia in Pavlovich, The Fleet, 305–8, 346–47. As usual when dealing with Russian sources, there are discrepancies. A British intelligence officer in May 1915 reported the Russian forces at Kladovo as two small river steamers (the Tiraspol and Agrafena) and a 60-foot diesel launch with torpedo tube and machine guns, and a double row of observation mines laid just above Kladovo. They numbered about fifty, including an officer and nine military engineers. He reported nothing about artillery batteries or booms. There were another twenty men at Prahovo, with the passenger steamer Sveti Sergi and a launch. See Report by Captain L. S. Amery, 24 May 1915, PRO, Adm 137/1141, f. 205.
5.Ibid., ff. 198–202. Rear Admiral Troubridge, the head of the British Mission to Serbia, was far less sanguine over the capabilities of the Serbian rail system than Amery.
6.Pavlovich, The Fleet, 305–8, 346–47. See also Fryer, Royal Navy on the Danube, 19.
7.Wulff, Donauflottille, 24; Pawlik, Christ, and Winkler, Die k.u.k. Donauflottille, 52, 122.
8.Cardale to Troubridge, 10 March 1915, PRO, Adm 137/1141, ff. 212–14; Fryer, Royal Navy on the Danube, 21–24; Wulff, Donauflottille, 45.
9.Wulff, Donauflottille, 49, 53–54; Fryer, Royal Navy on the Danube, 35–36, 39–40.
10.Fryer, Royal Navy on the Danube, 61; Fitch, My Mis-Spent Youth, 136–37.
11.A full discussion of Troubridge’s appointment is in Fryer, Royal Navy on the Danube, 54–59.
12.Wulff, Donauflottille, 48–49.
13.There are differences over the exact sequence of events and cause of Belgrade’s loss. See Wulff, Donauflottille, 54–55; Fryer, Royal Navy on the Danube, 90; Fitch, My Mis-Spent Youth, 140–41.
14.Gilbert, Churchill 3:252–53.
15.Lord Hankey, Supreme Command 1:270–75; Gilbert, Churchill 3:272, 274–75.
16.Kemp, Die Royal Navy, 44, 83, 90. Details of the class are in Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921, 99–100. On the service of the Insect-class in Mesopotamia, see chap. 4.
17.Gilbert, Churchill 3:302, 308, 318.
18.Admiral H. B. Jackson, “Notes on the Transport of Military Forces to Serbia,” 25 March 1915, PRO, Adm 137/1141, ff. 151–55; J. F. Parry (hydrographer), Report on the River Danube from Budapest to Braila, 26 March 1915, ibid., ff. 160–63.
19.Admiralty to Troubridge, 3 April 1915, ibid., ff. 166–68.
20.Major Gossett (War Office) to Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble (with copies of the reports), 11 June 1915, ibid., ff. 180–97.
21.Troubridge to Admiralty, 14 May 1915, ibid., ff. 171–79.
22.Captain L. S. Amery, “Notes on a Visit to Galatz and Braila . . .,” 20 April 1915, ibid., ff. 181–84; Amery, “Notes on the Iron Gates and Cataract Section of the Danube,” 21 May 1915, ibid., ff. 194–97; Amery, “Notes on the Prahovo Line &c,” 24 May 1915, ibid., ff. 198–202.
23.Troubridge to Admiralty, 10 July 1915, PRO, Adm 137/1141, f. 299; Troubridge Diary, 8 July 1915, Imperial War Museum, London, Troubridge MSS.
24.See the full discussion in Fryer, Royal Navy on the Danube, chap. 8. Fryer’s speculation the British monitors might not have been able to pass through the Iron Gates is unfounded; three did in 1919. See Kemp, Die Royal Navy, 92–93.
25.Troubridge Diary, 11 October 1915, Troubridge MSS.
26.Information on Serbian vessels is scanty, but by September they apparently had the armored motor boats Dalmatia (1–37-mm revolver cannon, 1-mitrailleuse); Pobeda (1–37-mm revolver cannon), the latter under command of a Russian lieutenant; and Sveti George; tug Timok; and motorboats Galeb and Yadar. A Russian boat, Sloboda, is also mentioned. Translation of report by Major Milan Nikolitch, Engineering Adviser on Staff of Defence of Belgrade to (Serbian) Headquarters, 20 September 1915, PRO, Adm 137/1141, ff. 362–64.
27.Cardale to Troubridge, 10 March 1915, Troubridge to Admiralty, 8, 26 April 1915, PRO, Adm 137/1141. See also Fitch, My Mis-Spent Youth, 138–40, 144–46.
28.The incident is discussed at length in Fryer, Royal Navy on the Danube, 100–102; see also Wulff, Donauflottille, 55–57; Pawlik, Christ, and Winkler, Die k.u.k. Donauflottille, 103–4; Csikos, “Der Schienmonitor der k.u.k. Donauflottille.”
29.Troubridge to Admiralty, 10 July, 21 August 1915, and remarks by Admiral Gamble, 6 September, and Admiral H. B. Jackson, 7 September 1915, PRO, Adm 137/1141, ff. 299–301, 305, 313–15.
30.Details of the plan of campaign from General von Falkenhayn, German General Staff, 179–87.
31.Hermann Schmidtke, Völkerringen um die Donau, 50, 57–58. The author served with the German motorboats on the Danube. See also Wulff, Donauflottille, 71.
32.The action of the monitors is summarized in Wulff, Donauflottille, 63–71. On the action of the Allied naval missions, the best account is Fryer, Royal Navy on the Danube, chap. 13. Unfortunately, Fryer’s very useful attempt to reconcile conflicting Allied and Austrian reports is hampered by his having relied on the earlier (1918) work of Wulff, written during the war, rather than the fuller and more balanced work of 1934.
33.Troubridge to Admiralty, 9 January 1916, PRO, Adm 137/1141, ff. 409–10.
34.The most complete accounts of the land operations are Glaise-Horstenau, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 3:187–342; and Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, vol. 9, chap. 3.
35.Described in detail in Fryer, Royal Navy on the Danube, chaps. 14–15; see also Fitch, My Mis-Spent Youth, chap. 15.
36.Wulff, Donauflottille, 73–74, 77–78; Schmidtke, Völkerringen um die Donau, 51, 53–54; Pavlovich, The Fleet, 347–48.
37.Parry, Report on the River Danube, PRO, Adm 137/1141, ff. 161–62; DDSG (Donau-Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft), Von Wien zum Schwarzen Meer (Vienna, n.d.), 104–5.
38.Fregattenkapitän Gabor von Döbrentei, “Die Donauhandelsflotte im Kriege,” in Wulff, Donauflottille, 204–7. The Russians took the Vaskapu to southern Russia where the Austrians eventually recovered her in 1918.
39.On the planning around Romania’s entry into the war, see Larcher, La Grande Guerre, 134–42.
40.For accounts by the Austrian and German commanders, see Arz, Zur Geschichte des Grossen Krieges, 102–20; Falkenhayn, Der Feldzug der 9. Armee.
41.Falkenhayn, German General Staff, 316–21; Falls, The Great War, 227–28; Stone, The Eastern Front, 264–65.
42.Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921, 421–22; Alexandrescu, “Kämpfe der rumänischen Kriegsmarine.”
43.The former commander of the Romanian Danube Flotilla gives his version of events in Negresco, Comment on fit la Guerre sur le Danube, 30–34.
44.Wulff, Donauflottille, 82–86; Alexandrescu, “Kämpfe der rumänischen Kriegsmarine,” 395, 397.
45.The most detailed accounts are in Reichsk
riegsministeriums, Der Weltkrieg, vol. 11, chap. 4; and Glaise-Horstenau, Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 5:223–358, 449–628; a standard monograph is Kabisch, Der Rumänienkrieg.
46.A short account of Russian participation in the Romanian campaign is in Stone, The Eastern Front, chap. 12.
47.Phillimore to Admiralty, 30 October, 7 November 1916, PRO, Adm 137/1389, ff. 463–64, 473–74. Phillimore naturally reflects the Russian point of view. Romanian activities are explained in exhaustive detail in Negresco, Comment on fit la Guerre sur le Danube, chaps. 3–7.
48.The Austrian mining detachment used light boats to launch mines in the Danube current to drift down to the Romanian lines, and on 20 October claimed to have sunk a patrol boat. This was probably the river torpedo boat Maracineanu, which the Romanians acknowledge as having been mined and sunk with all hands. Wulff, Donauflottille, 96–97; Alexandrescu, “Kämpfe der rumänischen Kriegsmarine,” 399.
49.Phillimore to Admiralty, 30 October, 7 November 1916, PRO, Adm 137/1389, ff. 463–64, 476.
50.Ingénieur principal du Génie Maritime Mercier and Lieutenant de Vaisseau de Breda, “Rapport complementaire au sujet d’une mission à l’armée du Danube,” 29 September-4 October 1916, SHM, Carton Ed-115.
51.Regele, Kampf um die Donau 1916, 76–80. Regele used Romanian literature published in the interwar period.
52.Wulff, Donauflottille, 88–92; Regele, Kampf um die Donau 1916, 81–82; Glaise-Horstenau, Österreich Ungarns Letzter Krieg, vol. 5, pt. 2, pp. 328–33; there is more emphasis on the importance of German air attacks in Reichskriegsministerium, Der Weltkrieg 11:208–12.
53.A very detailed study of the operation is in Regele, Kampf um die Donau, 1916, chap. 4. Mackensen’s reactions are in Wolfgang Foerster, Mackensen: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1938), 290–92.
54.Wulff, Donauflottille, 93–95. A Romanian source describes a Romanian garrison of 238 sailors, infantry, and artillery defending Cinghinarele against about 5,000 attackers. Averescu, “Kämpfe der rumänischen Kriegsmarine,” 398.
55.Capitaine de frégate de Belloy to Minister of Marine, 18 October, 2 November 1916, Capitaine de vaisseau Zarine and de Belloy, “Considerations sur la position stratégique du Danube Octobre 1916,” n.d. (c. 17 October 1916), “Note sur la Mission Navale Française (Groupe des secteurs fluviaux),” n.d. (2 November 1916), SHM, Carton Ed-115. The memorandum is also reproduced in Negresco, Comment on fit la Guerre sur le Danube, annex I, 365–72.
56.Wulff, Donauflottille, 100–103; Schmidtke, Völkerringen um die Donau, 82–90. An exhaustive study is in Regele, Kampf um die Donau, chap. 5.
57.Schmidtke, Völkerringen um die Donau, 68, 90, 110–13. They were later commanded by the famous Kapitänleutnant von Mücke, who had escaped with part of the Emden’s crew in the schooner Ayesha. See above, chapter 4.
58.Capitaine de vaisseau de Belloy to Minister of Marine, 22 March 1917, Lieutenant de vaisseau de Breda, “Travaux de la Mission Navale Française sur le Danube (Mois de Mai-Juin-Juillet 1917),” 3 August 1917, SHM, Carton Ed-115.
59.An interesting and detailed report was furnished to the Admiralty by the British liaison officer with the Russian Black Sea Fleet Engineer Commander Le Page to Rear Admiral Stanley, 13 November 1917, PRO, Adm 137/940 (pt. 1). Russian operations are summarized in Pavlovich, The Fleet, 470–73.
60.Berthelot’s journal has recently been published. See Glenn E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot and Romania: Mémoires et Correspondance, 1916–1919 (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1987).
61.Pawlik, Christ, and Winkler, Die k.u.k. Donauflottille, 105–6.
62.Pawlik, Christ, and Winkler, Die k.u.k. Donauflottille, 107–10; Wulff, Donauflottille, 153–69.
63.Louis Cordier, Victoire éclair en Orient (3d ed., Aurillac: U.S.H.A., 1969), 244, 245 n. 3; Ducasse, Balkans 14–18, 230–35.
64.Wulff, Donauflottille, 168–88, 226–32; Schmidtke, Völkerringen um die Donau, 152–57.
10. FROM DREADNOUGHTS TO SUBMARINES: 1915–1916
1.Groos and Gladisch, Krieg in der Nordsee 4:41–42.
2.Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, 87–88.
3.See chapter 2. The dreadnought Vanguard was also destroyed by an internal explosion at Scapa Flow in November 1917.
4.Pohl to Bachmann, 7 April 1915, cited in Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 4:58–59. Translation by NID in Naval Historical Library, London.
5.Trotha to Tirpitz, 31 March 1915, ibid., 45–46.
6.Lans to Tirpitz (and enclosure), 13 September 1914, reproduced in Tirpitz, Deutsche Ohnemachtspolitik, 85–89; see also Gemzell, Organization, Conflict and Innovation, 146–47.
7.Wegener, “Reflections on Our Maritime Situation,” 1 February 1915, reproduced in Wegener, Naval Strategy, 133–44. On Wegener, see Herwig’s introduction, ibid., xv-xxx. For Tirpitz’s reaction and the original memorandum, see Tirpitz, Deutsche Ohnemachtspolitik, 208–13.
8.Wegener, “Can We Improve Our Situation?” 12 July 1915, Naval Strategy, 184.
9.Ibid., 195–97.
10.Ibid., 162–63. On German war aims and the United States, see especially Herwig, Politics of Frustration, 133–38.
11.See Herwig’s introduction to Wegener, Naval Strategy, xxx ff.
12.Herwig, “Luxury Fleet,” 161.
13.Tirpitz to von Pohl, 16 September 1914, cited in Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 2:89–90.
14.Memorandum by Tirpitz, 26 January 1915, reproduced in Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 3:248–49.
15.Tirpitz to Trotha, 10 March 1915, quoted in Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 4:42. Translation by NID.
16.Herwig, “Luxury Fleet,” 158–61.
17.See Groos and Gladisch, Krieg in der Nordsee, vols. 1–5; Tirpitz, Deutsche Ohnemachtspolitik; and von Pohl, Aus Aufzeichnungen und Briefen. For the Müller diaries see Görlitz, The Kaiser and His Court, and on the “Tirpitz-line” in the official history, see Bird, German Naval History, 27–30.
18.Spindler, “Submarine in Naval Warfare,” 837.
19.Gemzell, Organization, Conflict and Innovation, 440 n. 6; Captain A. Gayer, “German Submarine Operations,” 622.
20.Michelsen, La Guerre sous-marine, 15; Gayer, “German Submarine Operations,” 625.
21.Gemzell, Organization, Conflict and Innovation, 142; Stegemann, Die Deutsche Marinepolitik, 22–23.
22.For full details and exhaustive discussion, see the volume produced by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Bell, Blockade of Germany. Shorter works are Guichard, Histoire du Blocus Naval; Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power; and Siney, Allied Blockade of Germany. The German outlook is in Vincent, Politics of Hunger, esp. chap. 2.
23.Fayle, Seaborne Trade 1:285.
24.Gibson and Prendergast, German Submarine War, 15.
25.Hurd, The Merchant Navy 1:270–71.
26.Gemzell, Organization, Conflict and Innovation, 142–44; Stegemann, Die Deutsche Marinepolitik, 23–26; Herwig, “Luxury Fleet,” 163–64; Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, 222–24; Müller, The Kaiser and His Court, 62–63.
27.Text in Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, 225–27.
28.From the monthly analysis of U-boat gains, losses, and total strength given in Tarrant, U-Boat Offensive, 15–18; Gayer, “German Submarine Operations,” 626. Not surprisingly, different authorities cite different figures, but the general import is the same: the number of submarines available was small.
29.Rössler, The U-Boat, 38–40, 44–47, 50.
30.Tarrant, U-Boat Offensive, 163; Grant, U-Boat Intelligence, 182.
31.Rössler, The U-Boat, 47–49.
32.Tirpitz, My Memoirs 2:139–47. See also Michelsen, La Guerre sous-marine, 24–25; Lundeberg, “German Naval Critique,” 107–9.
33.May, World War and American Isolation, 123–28; Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, 229–31; Tarrant, U-Boat Offensive, 14.
34.Fryatt merits an entire chapter in Hurd, The Merchant Navy, vol. 2, chap. 15, 307–36.
35.Hezl
et, The Submarine and Sea Power, 30–31, 44–48; Tarrant, U-Boat Offensive, 17–19; on the unsuccessful Folkestone-Cape Gris-Nez barrage, see Bacon, The Dover Patrol 2:391–93.
36.Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 2:290–92; 4:24–28; Michelsen, La Guerre sous-marine, 66.
37.Groos, Krieg in der Nordsee 4:121–22; Tarrant, U-Boat Offensive, 16, 19–20; Gayer, “German Submarine Operations,” 627–28.
38.Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations 2:274, 385–86; Fayle, Seaborne Trade 2:12, 27, 30; Scheer, Germany’s High Sea Fleet, 231–32.
39.Hurd, The Merchant Navy 2:308–12; May, World War and American Isolation, 146–47; Fayle, Seaborne Trade 2:93.
40.Gayer, “German Submarine Operations,” 631–32; Michelsen, La Guerre sous-marine, 29.
41.This is substantially the conclusion of the most balanced of the recent surveys, Bailey and Ryan, The Lusitania Disaster, esp. 331.
42.May, World War and American Isolation, 148–59, 205–10; the diplomatic negotiations are recounted in detail by Bell, Blockade of the Central Powers, 423 ff. On the conflict within the German government, see Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter 3:128–50; Görlitz, The Kaiser and His Court, 77 ff.; and summaries in Tarrant, U-Boat Offensive, 20–22; and Herwig, “Luxury Fleet,” 164–65.
43.Figures culled from Spindler, Handelskrieg mit U-Booten 5:362–63; and Tarrant, U-Boat Offensive, 21, 163. On further U-boat construction, see Rössler, The U-Boat, 49–50, 53.
44.Ritchie, Q-Ships, 25, 39–41, 167–68; Grant, U-Boats Destroyed, 25–27. Much useful and fascinating information on Q-ships can be obtained from the old classics: Chatterton, Q-Ships and Their Story and Campbell, My Mystery Ships.
45.Ritchie, Q-Ships, 58–66.
46.Ibid., 55.
47.Görlitz, The Kaiser and His Court, 104–5; the memorandum is reproduced in Tirpitz, Deutschlands Ohnemachtspolitik, 419–20.
48.May, World War and American Isolation, 218–27; Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter 3:147–50; Bell, Blockade of Germany, 441–46. There are numerous documents relating to the Arabic affair in Tirpitz, Deutschlands Ohnemachtspolitik, 382 ff.
A Naval History of World War I Page 83