The need for specialized training became even more evident after the failure of Operation JUBILEE. Operation TORCH came very shortly afterwards, but some lessons had already been learnt, notably the need for much improved beach organization. One major innovation was the use of Headquarters Ships, on which both the naval and army commanders would be located until conditions were such that the latter could transfer their HQs ashore. These majored heavily on communications and more than proved their worth. Happily, the resistance encountered in TORCH was modest, as many other problems were encountered, the resolutions to which were vital to the subsequent success of the landings in HUSKY.
In addition to his tri-service staff Mountbatten recruited a number of civilian experts and especially scientists. These included Professors J. D. Bernal and Solly Zuckerman and the extraordinary Geoffrey Pyke. Many of their ideas were excellent, but some, such as Pyke’s proposal for floating airfields of frozen seawater and sawdust, came to nought and established for COHQ something of a reputation for expensive eccentricity. Another recruit, Harold Wernher, an industrialist but also a Territorial Army officer, was brought in to solve the problem of preparing the ports of Southern England for use in the forthcoming Operation OVERLORD and to advise on other supply and transport issues.
There is no doubt that COHQ made a considerable contribution to solving the problems associated with the invasion of north-west Europe, not least because Mountbatten was a vocal supporter of the attractions of Normandy over the Pas-de-Calais. The concept of MULBERRY harbours, for example, had been conceived by Captain John Hughes-Hallett RN, who was at COHQ at the time: he had been involved with the planning of JUBILEE and had served as the Naval Force Commander after the initial postponement, so he knew better than most that taking a defended port from the sea would be out of the question. However, in April 1943, Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan was appointed Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), and his organization, named COSSAC after his own title, was charged with all the planning for Operation OVERLORD. Moreover, although COSSAC continued to work closely with COHQ , it took over responsibility for raiding the Atlantic coast of Europe. At the same time, the control of all landing craft and their crews passed from COHQ to the Admiralty
By the late summer of 1943 it was clear that COHQ needed to be reorganized to meet the changing circumstances, and as one of his many tasks between arriving back from Quebec and leaving for India, Mountbatten was asked to submit proposals on its future, which he sent to the Chiefs of Staff on 20 September. He put forward two proposals. Alternative A was the retention of an independent organization, smaller in size but otherwise similar to the existing one, under the command of one man, who would be responsible to Churchill in his capacity as Minister of Defence but report to him through the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It left open the question as to whether or not that person should belong to the Committee. Alternative B proposed the establishment of a Directorate of Combined Operations in each of the three service ministries, with a Combined Operations Staff formed within the Chiefs of Staff organization and working under the three Directors of Combined Operations in a similar manner to the Joint Planning Staff. Control of the CTCs, the Combined Operations Experimental Establishment (COXE) in Westward Ho!, which in 1942 had replaced the Combined Operations Development Centre, itself the successor to the ISTDC, and the Special Service Group, would have to devolve upon one of the service ministries. This was inherently somewhat unsatisfactory, and Mountbatten also thought that there was still a need for a common approach on planning and training. Therefore he came down in favour of Alternative A.
First to respond was the Admiralty, by way of a memo to the Chiefs of Staff from Vice Admiral Sir Edward Syfret, the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff. The Admiralty had never much liked the whole concept of COHQ and thus, unsurprisingly, opted for Alternative B, which it saw as restoring to it functions which it should never have lost in the first place. Brooke and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, disagreed, Brooke insisting that the training, research and development functions of COHQ would be better directed under a single head. The RAF was regarded as the most impartial of the three services, and Brooke proposed that an Air Officer should investigate the issue and report back to the Chiefs of Staff.
The officer appointed to carry out this task was Air Marshal N. H. Bottomley, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, who produced his report on 13 October. His overriding recommendation was not dissimilar to Mountbatten’s, that COHQ should be maintained as a central organization for the study and development of the techniques of combined operations. He proposed that it should continue to have an Executive consisting of the CCO and four officers – the Chief of Staff and a senior officer from each of the three services. However, rather than just being responsible for their own staffs, whilst the officers heading up the inter-service planning, signals, training and intelligence departments reported directly to the CCO, the members of the Executive should each head up one of four functional groups, which between them would cover all the activities of COHQ and include staff from all three services. The CCO should remain of the rank of or equivalent to Vice Admiral, with the members of his executive one rank lower.
Bottomley did, however, recommend cuts to the current establishment. He proposed that the minor departments of COHQ – Security, Public Relations, Records, Chaplains and Medical Officers – should be either disbanded or significantly reduced, with resulting economies in the Secretariat, that the Planning Staff should become a committee acting in an advisory role to the Chiefs of Staff Committee’s own Joint Planners on combined operations matters and that the Intelligence Staff should be reduced to a small section to liaise with each of the services. Only training and communications would be largely untouched. As far as the CCO himself was concerned, Bottomley believed that his reporting line to the Minister of Defence was a matter on which the Chiefs of Staff should advise, but considered that it would be convenient and appropriate for him to do so through the Chiefs of Staff Committee rather than directly.
On 15 October the Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the Bottomley Report, agreeing that the post of CCO should be filled by an officer of Flag, General or Air rank and that, on his appointment, he should be invited to prepare a detailed establishment on the principles set out in the report. This, however, was not to happen for some time, as Churchill was experiencing considerable difficulty in finding Mountbatten’s successor.
The Prime Minister’s immediate preference was for another senior naval officer, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, A. V. Alexander, was asked for his recommendations. Alexander’s first suggestion was Rear Admiral Rhoderick McGrigor. In many ways McGrigor would have been a good choice. During 1943 he had commanded the amphibious force which captured Pantelleria, and he had subsequently led Force B, which had formed part of the Eastern Naval Task Force for HUSKY. In his capacity as Flag Officer Sicily he had been involved in the planning of all the Commando operations following the initial invasion. Moreover, although he had had a distinguished career at sea, he was also an experienced staff officer, his postings including a spell in the Training and Staff Duties Division at the Admiralty, and he was considered to have done well as Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Weapons) in 1941/42.
In the event that Churchill required a Vice Admiral, Alexander’s choice was Arthur Power. He, too, had excellent experience both at sea and on the staff and, as Flag Officer Malta, had been closely involved in the planning of both HUSKY and AVALANCHE. Alexander told Churchill that he would prefer Power to go to a senior appointment in the Eastern Fleet, and it does not appear that he was taken into consideration. McGrigor was not rejected, but was put aside for the moment until the Prime Minister had interviewed his preferred candidate.
Throughout his life Churchill had something of a penchant for ‘heroes’, and both Keyes and Mountbatten fell into this category, the latter for his exploits as a destroyer captain. Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vi
an was another. He had come to the notice of both the Prime Minister and the public as captain of the destroyer HMS Cossack, which entered a fjord in then neutral Norway to liberate British merchant seamen captured by the Graf Spee who were being taken back to Germany on the Altmark. He had subsequently led a destroyer flotilla in a daring torpedo attack on the Bismarck and, in March 1942, whilst escorting a convoy from Alexandria to Malta with a covering force of four light cruisers, had seen off a much more powerful Italian fleet in the Second Battle of Sirte.1 For the last of these exploits he had been knighted, an exceptional honour for one of his rank. His credentials as potential CCO were less compelling than those of McGrigor, resting on his appointment as commander of Force V for HUSKY and his subsequent role in command of the escort carrier force for AVALANCHE
Vian was a sea officer par excellence; indeed, apart from a short period in the early 1930s, he had never held a shore appointment, and he did not want one now. He was, nevertheless, called back to the UK by Churchill. Briefed by the Admiralty, however, which made it clear that this would not be a careerenhancing move, he had little hesitation in turning down the offer and returned thankfully to sea. McGrigor was then summoned to London, to be given the same briefing and to make the same decision.2 Mountbatten later claimed that both men had also been warned off by Rear Admiral Charles Daniel, then the Flag Officer Combined Operations at COHQ.
One other possible candidate was put forward by Brigadier Leslie Hollis, the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This was Air Vice Marshal James Robb, who had actually served in COHQ during 1942 as Deputy Chief of Combined Operations, in which role Mountbatten had thought highly of him. He would have been a good choice, notwithstanding the fact that the involvement of the RAF in combined operations was very much subordinate to that of the two other services. There is no evidence, however, that he was subsequently considered.
It was now mid-October, and Churchill urgently needed to make the appointment. His thoughts turned to Bob, whom he had invited to lunch at Chequers shortly after his return from Salerno. Bob was another hero, in Churchill’s mind at least, and he had, moreover, as much practical experience of combined operations as anyone, including over nineteen months leading the Special Service Brigade. He consulted the Chiefs of Staff and, although there is no record of the discussions, there is every likelihood that the price of their agreement was the downgrading of the role of CCO, who would sit no more at the top table, and a significant reduction in the size of the organization. Bob was summoned to see Churchill and offered the job. According to Bernard Fergusson, a friend of Bob’s from Staff College and later his subordinate at COHQ , Bob replied that he did not think that he was the right person:
‘So you shun responsibility, do you?’ said the Prime Minister. Laycock replied with some indignation that he had never done so in his life.
‘Well, you’re C.C.O.!’ said Churchill; and he was.3
The appointment was approved by the King, who had recently received Bob in audience, and he was appointed CCO on 22 October 1943, on which day he was promoted to major general. He was thirty-six years, six months and four days old, the youngest age at which anyone in the British or Indian Armies or the Royal Marines was appointed to general officer rank during the War. Not much more than three years earlier he had been a captain.
This was an extraordinary turn of events and an accolade by any standard. Less than two months beforehand, Bob had submitted his resignation to Mountbatten; now he found himself his successor. Even more recently he had accepted a position as Sturges’ deputy; now he was being placed in overall control of the Special Service Group. In 1940/41 he had reported to Haydon; now he was his superior.
Bob’s position vis-à-vis Haydon was potentially difficult. Haydon was eight years older and had been an acting or temporary major general since joining COHQ in March 1942. He had acted as Bob’s mentor for some years and, apart from a temporary chill in their relationship when Haydon lost patience with Bob over his stance on the formation of the Special Service Group, they had always worked well together. He had, perhaps, hoped to be appointed CCO himself and was probably the most qualified person to take the job on, but he had never caught Churchill’s eye. Nevertheless, he was typically generous in his letter of congratulations:
My mind is in a bit of a whirl and I daresay yours is too but I want to say one thing right away and that is that I am ready to do anything I can to help you in any capacity for as long or short a time as you want …
You will, I think, be wise to get your ultimate staff fixed and settled in as soon as you conveniently can but in the meantime there may have to be an interim period and it is that of which I am thinking.
It is a thrill and a tremendous compliment to you and also to the Special Service Brigade. It is an enormous relief to know that they will have you, who knows them so well, as C.C.O. watching over their interests.4
It must have been clear to both Bob and the Chiefs of Staff that the apex of COHQ’s structure could not stay as it was. It suited the latter well to have a very junior general officer in charge, and it became evident very quickly that his deputies would have to be a rank below him. The three in position, Haydon,5 Daniel and Air Vice Marshal R. Graham, were all to leave by the end of the year.
The public relations machine at COHQ , which had been honed to perfection under Mountbatten, had a field day with the news, issuing a press release which extolled Bob’s youth and his deeds not only in Sicily and Italy, but also at Bardia, on Crete and during the Rommel Raid. This was followed on 23 October by a talk on the BBC by Hilary Saunders, the Recorder at COHQ , which was repeated twice on the following day. A great deal of interest was aroused within the press, both British and foreign, and Henriques was asked to produce a more substantial biography, largely for the benefit of the latter. He, too, gave a talk on the BBC, after David Niven had been approached to do so but was then turned down on account of the size of his proposed fee!
There was a great demand for photographs of both Bob and Angie, with the New York Times, Life Magazine and the Canadian Press sending photographers along to their flat in Cranmer Court, Sloane Avenue. One of the photographers was the famous Yousuf Karsh of Ottawa, who produced some attractive portraits. These subsequently formed part of an exhibition which toured Canada, and a set was sent to Tilly and Joe, who were still living in that country with Angie’s father.
After five days of photos Bob told David Astor, the Public Relations Officer at COHQ , that he wanted no more. He now had to get down to serious work. He had been left a letter from Mountbatten to his ‘Successor’, whose identity the then CCO did not know at the time of writing; he had had a ‘shrewd idea’6 who it would be, almost certainly Vian, but had been ordered categorically by the Prime Minister not to disclose the name. In the letter Mountbatten urged the recipient to make the best use in the immediate future of Wildman-Lushington, who would be joining him at SEAC as Assistant Chief of Staff as soon as a relief could be found. Mountbatten had agreed with the AGRM that the new CCO could have any Royal Marine officer he wanted. Secondly, he requested that COHQ should act in future as a Rear HQ for SEAC.
An immediate requirement was to make two appointments which were a consequence of Bob’s promotion. As Sturges’ deputy, Bob proposed Durnford-Slater. Not only was he one of the longest-standing Commando officers, but he was also widely respected throughout the Special Service Brigade and had worked closely with one of the RM Commandos in the Mediterranean. Durnford-Slater returned from Italy immediately, to be told by Sturges not only that would he have responsibility for the welfare of the Army Commandos, but also that he would be in charge of planning the role of the two Commando brigades to be used in Operation OVERLORD. To replace Durnford-Slater at 2 Special Service Brigade in Italy, Bob advised Sturges to appoint Tom Churchill, who travelled immediately from Sicily to Molfetta in Italy to assume control of 3 Commando, 40 RM Commando and the SRS.
Shortly after his appointment Bob received the first draft of t
he Directive under which he would operate. This was placed on the agenda for the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 10 November, which Bob was asked to attend. He gave notice beforehand of three issues he would like to discuss. The first was whether he would be invited in future to meetings at which his advice was expected to be required, or whether he should study the Agenda and attend as and when he thought fit. The second was clarification of the extent to which he was bound by the Bottomley report on COHQ. The third was a request that he should attend all meetings between the Chiefs of Staff and the Directors of Plans and Intelligence, so that he could be thoroughly conversant with future strategy and the war situation.
The answer to the first was that Bob should attend when required to do so. However, almost certainly on the insistence of Churchill, it was confirmed that Bob would continue to have direct access to the Minister of Defence on matters within his jurisdiction. As far as the Bottomley Report was concerned, the recommendations would have to be implemented significantly as they stood. There was no direction on the request to attend meetings with the Directors of Plans and Intelligence, but the close liaison established between their departments and COHQ may have made this unnecessary.
The revised directive was not issued until 28 November, by which time Bob was thousands of miles away. He had been invited to attend the SEXTANT conference, which was to be held in Cairo from 22 to 26 November. This would bring together Churchill, President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to agree a common policy on the aims and prosecution of the war against Japan. Stalin did not attend, as the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan, but Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed to meet him in Teheran immediately afterwards.
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