Destiny Betrayed: JFK, Cuba, & the Garrison Case

by DiEugenio, James

  The phrase, “the dog that didn’t bark” became famous through its usage by Arthur Conan Doyle in his Sherlock Holmes story Silver Blaze. The idea was that a watchdog did not bark while a racehorse was being abducted because the abductor was not a stranger but a person the dog knew and was familiar with. The main thesis of John Newman’s important book Oswald and the CIA is very similar to Doyle’s in Silver Blaze. And this is why it was necessary for Helms and Angleton to guide the Warren Commission very carefully through its Mexico City investigation. The aim was to avoid the question: Why didn’t the dog bark? For as Newman points out, if everything had been working normally—that is if Goodpasture had sent for Oswald’s photo the first day, if the cable about Oswald being at the Russian consulate was sent on October 2 instead of 7, if the audio tape of Oswald speaking broken Russian in the Soviet consulate had been sent to Washington—if all these things had occurred, the sirens would have been sounding throughout the intelligence community as Oswald left Mexico City. After all, you had a former Russian defector communicating with the Russian consulate in broken Russian. And one of the consulate employees, Kostikov, was suspected of being a KGB agent. This should have posed the question: Was Oswald sent back to the USA as a KGB “sleeper” agent? That is, was he to be activated by a Russian contact for a specific assignment? But yet, in spite of all these circumstances that seem so alarming, the alarms did not go off. They remained silent. Why?

  There were three more elements to the plot that guaranteed Oswald would land safely in Dallas and Ruth Paine would aid him into being present on Kennedy’s motorcade route. The first one actually began before Oswald left for Mexico. On or about September 23, Angleton began to bifurcate Oswald’s file. The FBI reports on Oswald’s Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities in New Orleans went into a new operational file, separate from his 201 file.64 Therefore, the bizarre things Oswald was doing in New Orleans—the leafleting on Canal Street and in front of Shaw’s ITM, the fracas with Bringuier, his arrest and jail time and court hearing—these were all kept out of his 201 file. So when the late arriving cable finally did come into CIA HQ from Mexico City about Oswald in the Soviet consulate, this was kept separate from his New Orleans activities. Then two different cables went out on October 10. One was sent to the Bureau, the State Department, and the Navy, describing a man who doesn’t fit Oswald’s description: he is thirty-five years old, has an athletic build, and stands six feet tall.65 This description resembles the wrong Mystery Man photo. At almost the same time, another cable is sent to Mexico City. This one has the right description, but was missing key information: it said that the latest information that HQ had on Oswald was a State Department memorandum from 1962. This was false: the FBI report and other materials about Oswald in New Orleans were in the other file. Ann Egerter, Angleton’s trusted assistant signed off on both phony cables, which means that he did not inform her of this deliberate internal deception—one which he had to have known about—since he was the one man at CIA HQ who had access to all of the Oswald files.66

  But even so, by October 18, the FBI had sent a memo from Mexico City saying that Oswald had met and talked with Kostikov.67 Yet, Oswald was not placed on the FBI’s Security Index list which was passed on to the Secret Service in advance of Kennedy’s visit to Dallas. If he had been on that list, the Secret Service would have made sure he was not on the motorcade route, since he constituted a clear risk to President Kennedy. One reason he was not on the list is because the FBI “FLASH” on Oswald, which had been in effect since his defection in 1959 was removed. This warning required any information or inquiry on the subject to be immediately forwarded to the Espionage Section of Division Five, the Domestic Intelligence unit. Incredibly, the “FLASH” was canceled on October 9, 1963. In other words, after being attached to Oswald’s file for four years, it was removed just hours after the cable from Mexico City arrived in Washington reporting Oswald’s visit to the Soviet compound and meeting with Kostikov. The day before the CIA sent out the misleading memo about Oswald. But in addition to that, on September 16—the day Oswald stood in line to attain a tourist card to Mexico at the New Orleans consulate—the CIA sent a memorandum to the Bureau saying that the Agency was considering taking action against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in foreign countries. That is, they were going to plant “deceptive information which might embarrass” the FPCC.68 In other words, since Oswald had been doing that already in New Orleans with Banister as part of the Phillips-McCord program, his trip to Mexico City may well have been an extension of that street theater. Therefore it was an ongoing charade, and Oswald was just an actor in a continuing discreditation ploy. The implication being, the FBI should steer clear of this continuing CIA operation.

  The last part of this scheme took place on the day of the assassination. For it was on that day that it was discovered that Kostikov was part of the lethal Department 13.69 In an after action CIA report it is revealed that the FBI called the Agency when Oswald’s name first was mentioned on the radio. That call was then passed on to Angleton’s office.70 And now, Kostikov’s true identity was revealed. His was the KGB unit responsible for assassinations in the Western Hemisphere. After being methodically lulled to sleep, in the Holmes parallel, not barking, this information must have felt like a hard punch to the jaw. Oswald had met with the KGB representative for assassination seven weeks before Kennedy arrived in Dallas. Yet, he was allowed to be in the building behind where the president’s limousine would be driving. And no one in the FBI or Secret Service did anything for nearly two months. The diabolical trap had been sprung. Hoover had no choice. He went into CYA overdrive. He eventually punished 17 agents for not properly surveilling Oswald on his return from Mexico to Dallas. And therefore not placing him on the Security Index.71

  Yet, something very odd happened the day after the assassination. When the FBI agents who had been questioning the detained Oswald heard one of the tapes of the accused in Mexico City, they said the voice on the tape was not Oswald’s. J. Edgar Hoover communicated this fact loud and clear twice. Once in a memorandum, and once in a taped phone call to President Johnson. Within twenty-four hours after Kennedy’s murder, Lyndon Johnson had already heard about Oswald’s alleged visits to the two communist consulates in Mexico City. He was clearly worried about them. In a phone call on the twenty-third he asked Hoover, “Have you established any more about the visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in September?” Hoover replied that this was all very confusing. He said that they had a tape and a photo of a man who was at the Soviet consulate using Oswald’s name. But, “That picture and the tape do not correspond to this man’s voice, nor to his appearance. In other words, it appears that there is a second person who was at the Soviet Embassy down there.”72 On that same day, Hoover wrote a memorandum in which he said that two FBI agents who had been questioning Oswald heard this tape and concluded that the voice on the tape was not Oswald’s.73 This false tape and photo had been transferred from Anne Goodpasture to FBI agent Eldon Rudd on the evening of the twenty-second.74

  After Hoover exposed this material as being phoney, thereby endangering the conspiracy, something remarkable happened. A cover story was set in motion. The cover story was that the tapes had been destroyed prior to the assassination. If the reader recalls, this was what Phillips told Tanenbaum in one of his first interviews with the HSCA. In fact, both Goodpasture and Rudd played roles in the cover up. Goodpasture started it on November 23 by sending a cable to Langley saying that the tape of the call made by Oswald on the 28 was recycled before the tape of his October 1 call was secured.75 This, of course, is false. As we have seen, tapes were kept for at least ten days. On that same day, the twenty-third, Rudd then chimed in by saying that tapes of Oswald in Mexico City had been erased.76 Then Gordon Shanklin, the Special Agent in Charge at Dallas, notified Hoover “the actual tape from which this transcript was made has been destroyed.”77 The cover up then deepened. On November 24, Mexico City advised Langley, “Regret complete recheck show
s tapes for this period already erased.” In other words, the story now was that not one single tape of Oswald in Mexico City survived.78 The CIA then provided FBI agent Clarke Anderson with transcripts of Oswald, claiming the original tapes had been destroyed. Anderson then advised the Bureau that the recordings of Oswald’s voice had been erased prior to the assassination.79 For all intents and purposes, the tapes that had just been listened to on the twenty-third, ceased to exist on November 24.

  Which is simply not true. In addition to Hoover’s memorandum and phone call—based on the testimony of two agents—FBI agent Burt Turner wrote a memo on November 25 stating that the tapes had been previously reviewed in Dallas. CIA officer and Deputy Station Chief Stanley Watson testified to the HSCA that at least one recording existed after the assassination.80 Further, the man who was first in charge of the CIA’s inquiry for the Warren Commission, John Whitten, wrote that while some tapes had been erased, some of “the actual tapes were also reviewed,” and that another copy of the October 1 “intercept on Lee Oswald” had been “discovered after the assassination.”81 This may be why Whitten was removed by Helms from this position and replaced by Angleton. Further, Whitten’s preliminary report on Mexico City stated that Oswald entered and exited Mexico by car. When, in fact, the Commission said Oswald could not drive. This therefore suggested someone was escorting him and he therefore had accomplices in Mexico. This report also admitted the CIA had no photos of Oswald, and the one they produced was not him.

  It was important, actually it was crucial, to cover up this hole in the plot. Not just to sustain the frame-up of Oswald, but also to allow President Johnson to invoke a national security cover up while recruiting the Warren Commission. For it was this threat of nuclear war against Russia that Johnson used on both Chief Justice Earl Warren and Senator Richard Russell to overcome their reluctance to join the Commission he was constructing. When Russell resisted, Johnson told him “we’ve got to take this out of the arena where they’re testifying that Khrushchev and Castro did this and did that and kicking us into a war that can kill forty million Americans in an hour…. Now you put on your uniform in a minute.” Realizing that Hoover was already part of the cover-up, he told Russell, “All you’re going to do is evaluate a Hoover report that he’s already made.”82 When Warren also resisted, Johnson used the same tactics with him. He said he was greatly disturbed by the rumors going around involving Castro and the Russians in Kennedy’s murder. These rumors, if not abated, could catapult the world into nuclear war. Johnson then told Warren he had talked to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. McNamara said a nuclear strike by the USSR would cost the USA as many as sixty million lives. He then said he had the Commission all set up. But there was one thing missing, the imprimatur of the highest judicial officer in the country. He then added, “You’ve worn the uniform; you were in the Army in World War I. This job is more important than anything you ever did in the uniform.”83 According to some reports, Warren left this meeting with tears in his eyes.84

  In his later talk with Russell, LBJ went into a bit more detail about the process. He said that once Warren was in his office, he refused the offer two times. Johnson now decided to play his ace card. He said he pulled out a piece of information given to him by Hoover. It concerned Oswald in Mexico City. Johnson said, “Now, I don’t want Mr. Khrushchev to be told tomorrow and be testifying before a camera that he killed this fellow … and that Castro killed him.” Johnson then confirmed that Warren started to weep.85

  To say this deception about Oswald in Mexico worked well does not begin to do it justice. For at the first meeting of the Warren Commission the former DA of Alameda County California, Earl Warren, came out as meek as a lamb:

  1. He did not want the Commission to employ any of their own investigators.

  2. He did not want the Commission to gather evidence. Instead he wished for them to rely on reports made by other agencies like the FBI and Secret Service.

  3. He did not want their hearings to be public. He did not want to employ the power of subpoena.

  4. Incredibly, he did not even want to call any witnesses. He wanted to rely on interviews done by other agencies.

  5. He then made a very curious comment, “Meetings where witnesses would be brought in would retard rather than help our investigation.”86

  In other words, as Johnson told Russell, they were to ratify the FBI’s inquiry. There was to be no real investigation by anyone. The Mexico City charade, with its threat of atomic holocaust, had secured the cover up of Kennedy’s murder. But although Hoover went along with that cover up, he later realized that he had been snookered by the CIA. Just seven weeks later, while reading a memo about CIA activities in the USA, he scrawled on the margin: “OK, but I hope you are not being taken in. I can’t forget the CIA withholding the French espionage activities in the USA and the false story re Oswald’s trip to Mexico, only to mention two instances of their double-dealing.”87

  As John Newman notes, the plotters were absolutely desperate to get the names of Oswald and Valery Kostikov together on one call. This is why the October 1 call with the impersonated voices of both Oswald and Duran had to be made. Recall, Duran said that the short, blonde Oswald did not come back after the twenty-seventh. He had lied to her about the fact that he had attained a Soviet visa. He had not. When Duran called the Russian consulate, Kostikov said they would have to wait for word from Washington about his visa in four months. The problem with this in relation to the plot is that neither Duran nor Kostikov mentioned Oswald by name on this call. So there was no direct relationship between the two.88 Consequently, whoever was handling this charade, knew there had to be one more call made to establish direct contact between the two. Therefore, the October 1 call, in which Oswald is mentioned by name twice, was faked. And his name was actually spelled out in letters. The impersonator then said he could not remember the name of the counsel he had spoken with previously. At this point the voice on the other end said, “Kostikov.”89 Everything was now in place for the delayed doomsday scenario. Although the Dallas FBI had information about Oswald calling and meeting Kostikov, they did not know his KGB covert role.90 Therefore, when the FBI called the CIA, and this was revealed on November 22, the natural reaction was for Hoover to blame it all on the subordinate agents. Which, as we have seen, he did. The letters of censure went out about three weeks after the assassination.91 When the Warren Report was published, another round of even harsher disciplinary action was issued by the FBI.92

  After the FBI and CIA decided to lie about the tapes being erased prior to the assassination, there was one last bit of evidence that had to be deep-sixed for the plot to stay secret. CIA station chief Winston Scott had told Slawson and Coleman that he had photographs and an audio recording of Oswald in his safe. And he played a recording for the two. There was a big problem with this. If Scott had such things before the assassination, and they were genuinely of the real Oswald, why did he not forward these materials to the Commission immediately? Perhaps right after the Commission was created on November 29. And why would he sit by quietly while the CIA sent up the wrong picture of Oswald to the Commission, and then read stories about the tapes being erased before the assassination? As long as Scott held those materials in his safe, the threat existed that a future investigation would later find them and compare them to what the CIA sent to Texas on the night of the twenty-second for the Dallas FBI agents to look at and listen to.

  April 28, 1971 was the day after Janet Scott buried her husband Winston Scott.93 When she heard of Scott’s death, Anne Goodpasture told James Angleton about the contents of the former Mexico City station chief’s safe.94 On that day, on a mission approved by Richard Helms, James Angleton flew to Mexico City. He was in such a hurry that he forgot his passport.95 And if the recordings were of the same false Oswald’s voice on tape, it would endanger the cover story about those tapes being destroyed prior to the assassination. After entering the house, Angleton vaguely threatened Janet’s widow benefits
. He then had Scott’s safe emptied. The contents were shipped by plane to Langley, Virginia. The man most responsible for creating first, the Oswald legend, then the design of the doomsday scenario to the plot had now disposed of a last obstruction to his handiwork. In fact, the recordings apparently were of the false Oswald, since in an inventory Scott made of calls he had, the speaker talked in broken Russian and he also made a call on September 28 that Duran said he could not have made, since he never returned to the Cuban consulate after the 27.96

  As Jim Garrison said in 1968, the deliberate mist around Mexico City disguised the last masterstroke of the conspirators. And reading his comments about Mexico City back in January of 1968, its hard not to be impressed by how forward his thinking was on the subject. He writes that he was reading Commission volume 24 well into the wee hours of the morning. He is puzzled by the inability of the CIA to produce a photograph of Oswald entering or exiting the Cuban or Russian consulate. He writes that if the CIA did have such a photo, it would be on the front cover of the Warren Report.97 He also notes that one of the Cuban consulate employees the FBI talked to could not recognize Oswald’s photo leafleting in New Orleans. He therefore doubts if Oswald ever really talked to Sylvia Duran. He thinks it may have been an imposter there. He acknowledges that Duran’s name is in Oswald’s notebook, but he writes that it is printed. He also notes that the bus manifest for Oswald’s trip south is missing. He further notes that although Oswald allegedly signed his tourist card, there are no latent fingerprints on it. The reader will search in vain for any other critic to exhibit anywhere near this level of sophistication or acuteness about Mexico City at this time. After this quantum leap forward, Garrison concludes, “There’s something malodorous in Mexico.”