Welles had been instructed to ask about the German attacks on merchant Brazilian shipping during the course of his interview with Aranha, and the filmmaker approached the subject diplomatically:
Another delicate subject, Mr. Aranha. The sinking of Brazilian ships, especially in North American waters. It would seem needless to say that their loss was no more avoidable than the loss of our own merchant ships, and that Brazilian ships are no easier for our navy to protect than American ships. Still, some of us here have feared that certain sections of Brazilian opinion might find in those disasters a source of resentment and perhaps even some loss of confidence in our defensive powers.27
Welles’s comments were exceedingly careful—a fact attested to by the original script for the interview, on which he had scrawled copious notes. Welles had gone through draft after draft to craft the tone and the meaning of the segment in a way that would reflect exactly what he wished to convey to the audience—namely, that the attacks on Brazilian shipping would not alter its position on the war.
Welles’s second radio appearance came on Brazilian President’s Day, April 19, 1942, and was broadcast live from a glittering event during which Rio’s political and social elites were treated to a musical show. Welles acted as the host, along with the very wooden and droll Jefferson Caffery, who could hardly hide his discomfort at being outshone by Welles. After the musical performance there was dancing, and everybody wanted a dance with the star attraction from America. Welles danced with Alzira under the watchful eye of her husband. Charming, cultured, and with manners perfectly tailored to the black-tie event, Welles worked the room as if he were the president and Caffery a mere junior aide.
Just as Brazil had taken to his predecessor, Sumner Welles, so it fell in love with Orson Welles. Later, he would confess that he couldn’t remember a more appreciative audience than the Cariocas. Welles’s part in Brazil’s story may have been only a brief walk-on amid the greater drama of the first attacks on Brazilian shipping, but the warmth that much of Rio and Brazil felt for the crazy Yankee gave him a unique opportunity to play ambassador—a role he had, in reality, craved.
Despite Welles’s failure to finish his film, he played a meaningful role in helping to keep Brazilian relations with the United States on an even keel in the months of February and March 1942, crucial months that saw the first Brazilian casualties of World War II. When Welles could keep himself together long enough, and keep his demons at bay, he was capable of doing the most brilliant things for his country and for Brazil. He was, however, on borrowed time; the booze, the amphetamines (which he took because he thought they made him lose weight), the heat of Rio, and the punishing work schedule were all taking their toll.
Welles didn’t exactly leave Rio a broken man, but when he finally departed, his career in Hollywood was effectively over. Welles’s reputation as a filmmaker would take years to recover, and even when it did, the films he directed and starred in would not win nearly the same acclaim as his earlier works.
Yet while Brazil may not have done wonders for Welles’s career, he had given a great lift to his host nation. The time he spent there as an ambassador, showman, radio presenter, and lover of all things Brazilian endeared him to the country, which needed just such a distraction—indeed, just such a friend—at a time when it was having to adjust to life during the war, with all the losses and fears that such dramatic times brought. Later in the year, months after Welles had left, Osvaldo Aranha wrote warmly to his radio costar, thanking him for his work in Brazil and for the good impression he had left in the country.28
One man had been conspicuously absent from most of the festivities and parties for the Welles entourage: President Vargas. During February and March 1942 he continued to remain in Petrópolis and came to Rio only when the occasion demanded it. The president had much to ponder as he went for his regular morning walk around the town. As German attacks on Brazilian shipping increased, President Vargas was coming under more and more pressure to act against Axis assets in Brazil. Initially, he did so to release some steam from the boiling kettle of anti-Axis feeling in Brazil, which the local police reported to him was getting out of control. On March 12, 1942, Vargas signed a decree authorizing the seizure of 30 percent of the total funds of Axis subjects living in the country. Estimates varied as to how much this amounted to in reality, but a figure of half a billion dollars was the most widely accepted.29
The early days of the Axis naval campaign against Brazilian shipping proved to be very difficult for Vargas, who quickly realized that Dutra and Góes Monteiro’s earlier warnings that Brazil was not ready for war were actually close to the mark. Vargas called for the support of the United States in establishing naval convoys to protect Brazilian merchant seamen and in providing arms that would help Brazil defend its shipping. But this aid had not yet arrived, despite the fact that by March 1942, nearly the entire Brazilian merchant navy was running between the United States and Brazil. Although they were carrying essential war materials to the United States, the ships remained completely vulnerable to the German U-boats prowling the Atlantic.
On March 11, the day after the sinking of the SS Cairu, Caffery wrote to Hull with the news that the secretary of state had feared: no more Brazilian ships would be coming to the United States. “Aranha tells me that the government has ordered all Brazilian boats to take refuge in the nearest ports,” Caffery reported.30 The day before, Vargas had written in his diary that he was determined to suspend all shipping to the United States until he got the guarantees he wanted from Washington.31 In addition to their requests for convoy assistance, the Brazilians now also requested US help arming the Brazilian boats that were in US ports. Brazil itself would take responsibility for arming Brazilian ships in Brazilian ports.32
Brazilians felt the impact of the Axis campaign against their country’s merchant shipping almost immediately. Shortages of some basic materials became routine. Soon, fuel was scarce, and petrol rationing commenced. Fuel shortages only became more pronounced when, on April 18, President Vargas canceled tanker sailings from the eastern coast of the United States to South America. This measure, which was introduced to protect the slow-moving tanker fleet from Axis attacks, was set to last between four to six weeks.33
Newsprint soon became hard to find as well.34 This shortage threatened to stop production of several of Brazil’s major daily newspapers, and caused a great deal of bad feeling toward the two principal suppliers of newsprint, the United States and Great Britain.35 To be sure, the Allies appreciated the importance of keeping Brazilian newspapers in circulation. Not only were the state-controlled papers full of pro-Allied articles, but they also took an increasingly hostile line against the Axis powers.
The United States offered what resources it could spare and US naval officers offered advice on the routing of Brazilian shipping, but these were mere stopgap measures, and fell short of the assistance Vargas requested.36 Meanwhile, the political situation within Brazil was growing dire. Just as Aranha suspected, the Brazilian army was full of “told you sos” about the shortages. Dutra demanded to know how the army was meant to repel any southerly Argentine attack without fuel. When Vargas reminded his minister of war that Argentina was equally short of fuel, Dutra argued that he suspected Washington would go soft on Argentina and supply it with petrol in order to try to entice it into breaking relations with the Axis powers.
In late April 1942, a worried President Vargas came down from his retreat in Petrópolis to meet with an American naval delegation in Rio.37 Following a long discussion, President Vargas made the unprecedented decision to open all ports and airfields to the American navy and its air forces. After resisting the idea of allowing an American military presence in Brazil for so long, Vargas was finally forced to bow to this American demand in order to salvage the worsening situation in the Atlantic. Once the United States had established a military presence along the Brazilian coast, he hoped, it would drive off the wolf p
acks of U-boats that were hunting Brazilian shipping, and reopen the trade link between North and South America.
The man most responsible for this American coup was Vice Admiral Jonas H. Ingram. Vargas was so impressed with the US officer that he ordered Brazilian naval forces to follow Ingram’s orders, whatever they may be.38 Vargas and Ingram only grew closer during the course of the war, to the point that the US admiral would unofficially advise the Brazilian president on naval issues. Ingram eventually assumed all responsibility for the training and equipping of Brazilian naval forces and worked closely with Vargas in the battle for the South Atlantic.39 In April 1942, however, Ingram’s major contribution was to organize greater protection for Brazilian shipping against German U-boats operating out of French ports.
By the end of April 1942 it appeared that Brazil—while officially remaining a neutral country—would not retain this status for much longer. It was widely expected that the German attacks against Brazilian shipping would intensify over the summer of 1942, and would eventually draw Brazil into the war despite its best efforts to stay out of it. The Brazilian army, however, was plotting to stop this from happening.
10 A Question of Succession
In the afternoon of May 1, 1942, President Vargas’s limousine followed its usual path from Petrópolis down toward Rio de Janeiro and the Vasco da Gama stadium. The soccer stadium was crammed full of Cariocas who were anxious to hear their president’s speech on the state of the war and the economic situation in Brazil. British and American officials were also present, equally keen to take note of Vargas’s remarks. Germany was effectively at war with Brazil—at least, as far as public opinion in the country was concerned—and there was no telling what new policy announcement Vargas might make, or what his speech might dictate about Brazil’s involvement in the ongoing world war.
Suddenly, as Vargas’s car drove along Praia do Flamengo, a wide boulevard snaking past the mouth of Guanabara Bay, the driver lost control of the car.1 The back of the vehicle spun violently, hitting and dislodging a large concrete post along the side of the road.2 The back of the car was badly damaged by the post and President Vargas was injured. His jaw fractured and his hip broken, Vargas lay in pain in the backseat of the wrecked vehicle as he awaited help.
Back at the stadium, news of the accident was greeted with confusion. The audience and VIPs were initially informed that the accident was not serious, and that the president was still planning to go ahead with his speech. It soon became clear, however, that Vargas was on his way to the hospital, and he would not be able to continue with the engagement.
While Vargas’s injuries were not regarded as life-threatening, they removed him from political life for three months. He would not appear in public again until the second half of August 1942. During his lengthy convalescence, the president’s health became the source of much speculation and deep concern among the Allied diplomatic community in Rio. And as the autumn wore on, it was widely acknowledged that his recovery was not progressing as smoothly as had first been hoped. In June, the British ambassador, Noel Charles, sent a bulletin to his superiors in the foreign office in London, offering an update on the president’s health:
President is in bed with weights on his leg to stretch it. Leg was badly set at first and will necessitate his remaining in bed another six weeks or so. Jaw injury is healing, original contraption in mouth having been changed for something more comfortable. President transacts business though he does not see ministers frequently or give audiences. At one moment rumor had it that his mouth had become septic but United States ambassador and myself could obtain no reliable confirmation of any kind sufficient to justify my telephoning you.3
Luckily, Vargas’s condition was not quite as severe as the British feared. Still, they were correct about one thing: there was indeed a veil of secrecy surrounding the president’s injuries and his recovery.
Vargas’s two eyes ran the government in his absence. Aranha and Alzira worked together to keep the country running smoothly, though they were increasingly subject to attacks from the military, which naturally viewed Vargas’s ill fortune as an opportunity to shift the orientation of the government away from its increasingly overt support of the Allied cause. And with the president indisposed, these military attacks were exposing a critical weakness in the Vargas regime. Rio was awash with rumors and political intrigue, but one point was abundantly clear to all: Vargas had left no plan in place for succession.
When asked the question of who could potentially succeed the president, Aranha joked, “it will all depend on who has sufficient petrol to enable him to arrive first at the Catete Palace.”4 Indeed, if Vargas died of his injuries—an eventuality for which the British, at least, seemed to be preparing—then the leadership of the country would essentially be up for grabs. The Americans and the British feared that a revolution of sorts would be the most likely outcome should Vargas perish. And, as Charles pointed out to the foreign office back in London, if that happened, the Axis powers would no doubt seize the occasion to make a case for their preferred candidate.5
The timing of Vargas’s accident could not have been worse for the Allies, let alone for his own supporters. He was not a young man, and his road to recovery was far from straightforward. The few people who saw him over the winter months of June and July noticed how much weight he had put on. The injury to his jaw made him reluctant to see visitors, and his broken hip all but ended his golf career. And in the absence of its authoritarian leader, Brazil seemed to be going to pieces.
The perception in Rio throughout this time was that the government was rudderless at a moment when Brazil most needed strong leadership. The country appeared to be being dragged into the war against the will of its own army. The accident also served to deepen internal divisions within the Estado Novo. In the past, most of these internecine disputes had been kept away from the public through careful management of the press, but with Vargas indisposed the regime’s ability to hide the cracks in its façade diminished, and the number of leaks by senior members of the regime increased dramatically.6 To make matters worse, the Axis attacks against Brazilian shipping did not abate during this period but rather intensified as Hitler ordered his U-boats into all-out action against Brazil, which he no longer viewed as a neutral power. In May, June, and July eight Brazilian ships were sunk off the northern coast of South America, killing some twenty-six Brazilian merchant seamen.7 The German attacks were only worsening, despite the fact that Vice Admiral Ingram had effectively taken control of the effort to protect shipping between Brazil and the eastern coast of the United States.
By increasing pressure on the Brazilians, Hitler aimed to shift popular opinion in the country away from the Allied cause—but the attacks had a different, if still insidious, effect. While Brazilians appeared to swing in the opposite direction following attacks, Hitler’s message was not lost on Dutra and much of the senior officer staff corps of the military, which continued to resist the idea of joining the Allied war effort, much to the displeasure of the United States. During his traditional July 4 speech to the American society at the Gavea golf club, Jefferson Caffery went out of his way to praise Vargas and Aranha for their “wholehearted cooperation and enlightened leadership,” but pointedly made no mention of the Brazilian military despite the fact that the navy was effectively taking orders directly from the United States, per Vargas’s command.8
The Germans did not resort to military pressure alone. Daily broadcasts from Berlin sought to drive a wedge between Germans living in Brazil and their adopted government. The Germans had broadcast a list of grievances ranging from the financial to the alleged mistreatment of German spies held in Brazil. Each broadcast finished with an overt threat to Brazil. The broadcast on June 29, 1942, concluded: “Unless the Brazilian government takes steps without delay to end these grievances, the Reich government will take counter measures.”9
The broadcasts also attacked Aranha, and in this they f
ormed part of a concerted German attempt to turn Brazilian opinion against the pro-American foreign minister. Berlin believed Aranha was the single source of the anti-German policy in Brazil, and the Germans later dubbed these broadcasts their “Dear Osvaldo” messages. But in this, unlike in their war against Brazilian shipping, Germany attempted to maintain a veneer of plausible deniability. In private, Aranha said to Caffery, “I spoke to the German ambassador about the radio broadcasts. He assured me that all the nasty stuff, which is being put out by German radio, comes from Argentina.”
Bedridden after his accident, President Vargas struggled to deal with these mounting challenges. Besides the German attacks, he had to manage Brazil’s deepening relationship with the United States, which continued to needle the military and which perpetually threatened to turn his commanders against him. To make matters even more difficult, Vargas was also facing one of the most divisive internal battles of his regime.
The internal dispute had originated with a pro-American July 4 parade organized by students in Rio. The rally was titled “The Anti-Totalitarian Student Rally” and was the first demonstration of its type since the establishment of the authoritarian Estado Novo in 1937.10 Osvaldo Aranha warmly supported the march, as did the president’s son-in-law, Alzira’s husband Ernâni do Amaral Peixoto, the governor of the state of Rio. But the chief of police Filinto Müller opposed the idea of the march, and refused to give authorization for it. Prior to the parade, undersecretary to the minister of justice, Leitão de Cunha, placed Müller under a forty-eight-hour house arrest for opposing the rally. The march went forward as planned, and although it took place in the pouring rain, it was well-attended and received widespread coverage in the local media.11 The students sang in support of President Vargas, President Roosevelt, Osvaldo Aranha, and Leitão de Cunha.12
Brazil : The Fortunes of War (9780465080700) Page 19