Brazil’s economic and military dependence upon the United States, already great, will be considerably increased. The United States must face the future possibility of diverting large stores of equipment and large contingents of troops to ensure the defense of the western hemisphere. The problem of supplying sufficient ships to transport Brazil’s requirements of fuel, machinery, and manufactured goods also becomes increasingly vital.25
While the United States had long urged Brazil to join the war, the United States thought the decision might have the effect of pushing Rio and Washington into even greater codependence. This prediction would prove extremely accurate in the months ahead.
The report also illustrated that the United States understood the wartime goals of Vargas and Aranha much more clearly than the Brazilians realized. The Americans apprehended that Brazil’s split from Argentina at the conference of foreign ministers in January 1942 would allow Rio to use the war as a springboard to regional supremacy—with the full assistance of the United States, which was still more concerned about potential German attacks on the Americas than about any possible flare-up in intra-American tensions. The report stated:
Brazil, a long rival with Argentina for leadership in South America, will look forward to strengthening its military power as an ally of the United Nations. Strategically located as it is, the country should move forward greatly with United States aid. Increase in air power should be a prime objective to safeguard Axis attack from Africa. As to design on Argentine territory, it is believed that Brazil will be content to leave existing borders alone. Unless an incident develops, no action is to be expected between the two rivals.26
This assessment, too, would prove prescient. Yet while a war between Brazil and Argentina did not strike Washington as a likely consequence of Rio’s declaration of war, there were other risks that could be every bit as serious—and which indeed were much more likely—than a transatlantic German attack.
The United States remained sensitive to the possibility that Brazil’s entry into the war might well suit Axis plans.27 Brazil’s increased demands on the United States for assistance in troops and material would effectively divert forces from other theaters of the conflict, and would therefore help the Axis powers—a gain they would enjoy at little risk to themselves.28
As the United States looked to the medium- and long-term strategic implications of Brazil’s entry into the war, President Vargas concentrated on preparing the country for the trial that lay ahead. As he did so, meeting extensively with the Brazilian military and with Jefferson Caffery, another American arrived in Rio as part of a whirlwind tour of Latin America. Nelson Rockefeller was already a bona fide star in Brazil, but his appearance in person, and so soon after the declaration of war, always created an electric atmosphere in Rio. The only person who appeared slightly miffed by Rockefeller’s arrival was Jefferson Caffery, who maintained that Rockefeller’s visit had no official purpose. In reality, Caffery’s vanity made it difficult for him to accept his eclipse by Rockefeller or the show of love and respect that Cariocas gave the visiting coordinator of inter-American affairs.
Osvaldo Aranha laid out the Brazilian version of the red carpet treatment for Rockefeller. Large crowds greeted the American’s arrival at the Rio airport, and he was paraded at public events such as at the horse racing at the Jockey Club. In private, both Aranha and Vargas hosted lunch or dinner parties in honor of their American guest. Alzira, meanwhile, took an instant shine to the handsome, energetic, and articulate American. Both she and Aranha moved Rockefeller around the room, making sure he was introduced to the right people. Despite the onset of war and the uncertainties that lay ahead for Brazil, an upbeat and positive atmosphere seemed to follow Rockefeller wherever he went. To many Brazilians, he represented everything that was good about the United States, and—much to the annoyance of Caffery—they bestowed prizes and honors on Rockefeller, making him an honorary member of some of the city’s major clubs, such as the Jockey Club.
But Rockefeller had not come to Brazil just to shake hands, smile, and reassure Brazilians about the struggles that lay ahead. He had come to tie up a whole series of economic and cultural deals with the Brazilian government—huge agreements dealing with everything from rubber to banking, agreements that would soon transform Brazil’s wartime economy beyond recognition.
By his very nature, Rockefeller was a doer. While in the country, he was constantly firing off quick notes to his staff on the ground in Rio and back in the United States, trying to understand how to make things work better, and not taking “no” for an answer. “What’s the biggest problem here?” he asked Vargas. “Infrastructure,” the president replied. So Rockefeller promised to help develop new transport systems in the huge interior of the country.
Rockefeller also saw great potential for using his Brazilian adventure as a means for solidifying his powerbase back in Washington, which was still under threat from General Donavan and his “spook agency.” For all his good work and ambitions, however, Rockefeller’s trip almost ended in disaster when the plane carrying him and his team crash-landed in a ditch at the end of the runway at Porto Alegre in southern Brazil.29 Luckily, all were able to walk away from the crash with only cuts and bruises. Rockefeller, no doubt, made a note to build better and longer runways in Brazil.
While in Brazil, furthermore, Rockefeller was gathering information about the newest addition to the Allies. Shortly after his return to the United States, Rockefeller’s office produced a confidential report on Brazil and its potential impact on World War II. The report represented a detailed effort on the part of his office to assess Brazil’s needs and determine the immediate tasks confronting the Vargas regime. It outlined these tasks in terms of the threats facing Vargas both from within his regime and from the Axis powers. Vargas, the office of the coordinator of inter-American affairs declared, needed the following:
The consolidation of a unitary front within the government itself; the completion of steps safeguarding against the threat of Axis invasion in the northeast; and measures to ensure internal security against the potential danger from Axis minority groups and the organized fifth column. Should it be necessary to rid the government of powerful figures hitherto in sympathy with the Axis, the president is in an excellent position to do so by seeking support from the middle and left.30
Vargas, no doubt, would have agreed with the Americans’ assessment of the three-pronged threat he faced, although it’s much less clear whether he would have been so sanguine about the possibility of removing from his government the “powerful figures” to whom the report referred—no doubt meaning Dutra and Góes Monteiro.
Rockefeller’s office excelled at organizing trade links between the United States and Brazil, but the report revealed the agency’s limited understanding of internal Brazilian politics, particularly as they concerned the military. The future of two key men in the armed forces, Dutra and Góes Monteiro, continued to give the United States a great deal of concern; the Americans viewed both men as relics of a past era, and felt they should be replaced as soon as possible. The United States also understood that while both men were making public and private noises to the effect that Brazil must wage an effective war against the Axis, they continued to concentrate their efforts on protecting Brazil’s southern borders from what they envisaged to be the major threat of an Argentine invasion—thereby detracting from the strength of Brazil’s defenses against a possible German attack.
The United States was doing what it could to counterbalance the military’s fixation on Brazil’s southern border. In November 1942, after protracted and complicated negotiations, Brazil and the United States concluded the administrative arrangements for a joint force to defend the northeast of the country. The deal essentially left the defense of Brazilian territory and military bases to the Brazilian armed forces, with coastal defenses being run by a joint US-Brazilian force. Admiral Jonas Ingram was formally put in charge of all asp
ects of security, including the protection of shipping, and for his troubles received the title chief of allied forces in the South Atlantic.31 He was based in Recife, along the northeastern coast of Brazil, in the region where a German attack was most anticipated.
Another US senior officer, General Robert L. Walsh, commanded the US army forces in the South Atlantic and was also based in Recife. The roughly two thousand men under his command were not based in Brazil, however, but rather on the British Ascension Island, halfway across the Atlantic.32 General Walsh himself was in Brazil to establish the air base at Natal, which would become an important staging point for planes flying to Africa and from there to the European theater. Indeed, the base would prove vital to US operations in Africa—which were part of a broader US-British invasion code-named Operation Torch—as well as in the pivotal antisubmarine war in the South Atlantic. With U-boats continuing to attack shipping convoys en route to Great Britain from the Americas, the Allies’ victory would hinge on what would come to be called the Battle of the Atlantic. Short of critical military materials as well as basic necessities like food and fuel, Great Britain would not be able to continue fighting if this lifeline were cut off. For a short period during the war, Natal air base was one of the busiest in the world, with an American plane landing there every two to three minutes for eighteen hours a day, seven days a week.33
These security arrangements boded well for the future of US-Brazilian cooperation, yet they were also a source of ongoing tension in Rio. While Dutra remained far from happy about his relative loss of control over the Brazilian armed forces, he grudgingly understood that Brazil was in no position to defend itself on its own. As the year drew to a close, however, Góes Monteiro was becoming increasingly critical of the Brazilian military, arguing that it was doing little and was far too passive.
In choosing not to replace his two top military officials following the declaration of war, Vargas had taken somewhat of a gamble. Later, Jefferson Caffery would admit that the president had been right to hold on to both men, but during the war itself it was a significant risk to allow two outspoken critics of the war effort to remain in power. Yet while Dutra and Góes Monteiro stayed at their respective posts, at least for the time being, Vargas did clip their wings. The president made it clear to both men that he alone would guide Brazilian policy toward the war. Vargas was riding on a wave of personal popularity following the decision to go to war with the Axis, and with his authority—and Aranha’s—at its peak, he obviously felt comfortable reining in his recalcitrant commanders. Dutra, however, was far from admitting defeat, and while he had put his rivalry with Aranha on hold, it was far from resolved. Dutra was biding his time, ready to put a dagger in Aranha’s back the moment the minister of foreign affairs made a mistake.
It was also becoming clear that the alliance between Dutra and Góes Monteiro was starting to fray at the edges. Góes Monteiro was becoming increasingly angry about Dutra’s ability to effectively transform himself politically to reflect the new realities of wartime Brazil. Yet Góes Monteiro seemed to have resigned himself to those same realities. The US military and political figures who had dealings with Góes Monteiro at this time noted that he appeared to have fully embraced the closer ties with the United States and did not have any major problems with the fact that the US military was playing a far greater role in Brazil. The dissonance between his public expressions and his private sentiment may have taken a toll. Caffery, who had known Góes Monteiro since 1937, noted that the chief of staff’s health was worsening.
Within military and political circles in Brazil, the major issue remained the supply of arms from the United States. President Vargas worked away in his small office in the Guanabara Palace, trying to make sure that the United States made good on its promises to supply weapons to Brazil. The US arsenal was already overstretched, and when the Allies launched Operation Torch in North Africa on November 8, 1942, it further limited the quantity of weapons the United States was able to send to Brazil. Yet the offensive also had a positive effect in Brazil. It quickly became clear that Operation Torch would be an enormous success, and this news was widely welcomed in Brazil, where it helped to undercut the military’s deeply held admiration for Germany’s fighting prowess. On hearing of the landings in Africa, Osvaldo Aranha said, “With God’s help and with the tenacity and fighting spirit of the defenders of freedom, we will soon emerge into a better world.”34 The Brazilian press, meanwhile, marked the landings with headlines that highlighted the Allies’ military successes and the failings of the Germans. Jornal do Brasil commented: “The sensational event marks the beginning of the decline of the Nazi military machine. The Axis will be destroyed, Fascism will be swept away from the face of the earth, and peace will be dictated in Berlin by the representatives of England, the United States, China, Russia, Brazil, etc.”35
The Allied victories in North Africa also convinced many Brazilians that the days of the Axis were numbered—and left them wondering how the world would look once it collapsed. Brazil’s middle and upper classes understood that the African campaign would lead inexorably to the liberation of Europe, along with all of the art, culture, and civilization that Brazilians identified with that continent. There was, however, some anxiety as to what would happen at the end of the war. The two most likely outcomes of the conflict were a negotiated German defeat or a total Allied victory, yet there was no way of knowing what would replace the existing structures in Europe. Quietly, many educated, propertied, and conservative Brazilians started to wonder whether, if democracy spread in the aftermath of World War II, the Estado Novo would be compatible with the postwar order.36
While comfortable Brazilians experienced pangs of anxiety about the changes that lay ahead, working-class Brazilians were generally positive about the prospect of a US victory in the war. On the other hand, many Brazilians were becoming increasingly suspicious and afraid of the power of the United States.37 Many Brazilians were concerned that the same US strength that was assisting them during the war might be used to oppress them in a US-dominated postwar world.
By the end of 1942, the likelihood of an Axis attack on northeastern Brazil had decreased due to both Admiral Ingram’s organization of the joint US-Brazilian defenses in that region and also the Allies’ successes in North Africa. The air base in Natal remained a vital bridge for the United States as its commitments in the European theater increased. Naturally, Vargas welcomed developments in North Africa and was happy about the enhancement of Brazil’s national security, but he needed to make the shipment of weapons to Brazil something of a priority for the United States. He also understood that the economic and political gains that Brazil stood to make in the war would require the country to make a clear military investment in the conflict.
Brazil, Vargas knew, was in danger of becoming a bit player in the war unless it could find new ways to help the war effort. Both Vargas and Aranha were aware that the postwar era would be governed by a simple equation of “what you put in = what you get out” of the war. Both men wanted to use the war to help transform Brazil, yet they now found themselves in the position of having arrived late to the party. If Vargas and Aranha were to realize their dreams for Brazil, they would need to raise the stakes and make a more dramatic contribution to the Allies than they had thus far. With Vargas and Aranha’s authority at its peak, the time was ripe for just such a change.
12 Lights Out Over Rio
On September 6, 1942, while President Vargas was working alone in his small, dimly lit study in the Guanabara Palace, lights began winking out along the boulevards of some of the most beautiful beaches in the world. That night, the beaches of Leme, Copacabana, and Leblon, as well as the adjacent streets in the federal district of Rio, were experiencing their first total blackout.
Witnessing the event from the bar at the Copacabana Palace Hotel, Jefferson Caffery pronounced the blackout “very successful.”1 As the shadows grew longer and the sky turned first a deep p
urple, then black, the only visible light emanated from the stars in the clear night sky that hung over the ocean panorama. The unusual darkness over the city skyline was matched by a strange silence, interrupted by the gentle sounds of the waves breaking onto the soft sandy shore. In the distance, occasional shouts were heard echoing down the avenues that ran from the heart of the city to its beaches as tired, grumpy policemen reminded blackout breakers of the fines that awaited them if they didn’t immediately comply with the order. Along Rio’s coastline, which moments before had been brightly lit, it was as if all of the city’s inhabitants had suddenly gone to sleep, or had hidden themselves behind closed doors and drawn curtains.
Wartime in Rio resembled nothing the city had known before. Hotels all along the Rio coastline hosted “blackout parties,” which provided a popular amusement for their wealthy foreign guests and local customers. There was even a blackout cocktail, which was supposed to be jet black but more often than not resembled an unappealing, sooty gray. Revelers must have cared more about forgetting the war than about the color of their drinks, however, as they downed the cocktails in large quantities. Jazz quintets played mid-tempo, slightly off-key dance music to add to the atmosphere at these parties, although guests seemed to be unwilling to be seen enjoying it. Rio was finding it hard to dance to the new tune of war.
Everybody in the city was trying desperately hard to take the war seriously, but it took some time for the local authorities to get the city onto any kind of a war footing. Cariocas had long thought of the war as being far away, in Europe and Africa, but—as Caffery was fond of reminding people—parts of Brazil were within range of German bombers operating out of West Africa. And the entire Brazilian coast, Rio included, was in range of German submarines. Rumors circulated in the city that Axis submarines were lurking just over the horizon, and, at night, they came close enough to check out the nightlife in Rio through raised periscopes.
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