Brazilians, Vargas claimed, were rushing to join the fight; indeed, Brazil’s problem was not that it didn’t have enough potential soldiers, but rather that it had too many.
But President Vargas’s comments were not strictly accurate. To begin with, the question of how best to staff the expeditionary force had been the subject of an ongoing internal dispute in Brazil. At the heart of the issue was the structure of the Brazilian army in 1943. The members of each division were predominately drawn from the area in which the division was stationed; most of these divisions were based in large urban areas such as Rio de Janeiro. Early on, Vargas decided that it would be unfair to commit specific divisions to the expeditionary force, as this would place an unacceptable burden of sacrifice on the particular areas from which these divisions were drawn. This was more of a political decision than a humanitarian one; Vargas knew that he might stir up opposition to the war if he overrelied on certain segments of the population. He was also keen, for political reasons, that the force should be drawn from all parts of Brazil so as to illustrate the nationalist, unifying aspects of the Estado Novo.9 And so the expeditionary force was drawn from units from across all of Brazil, its soldiers a mix of men from different regions.
The fact that the force had not worked together before was viewed as an advantage; this would help it shift to the American model of training—which, as the soldiers soon discovered, was very different from the Brazilian model. In other words, members of the expeditionary force would adapt to the new methods much quicker than if they remained embedded in their old command structures and organization.10
However, in addition to these structural challenges, it was also a fact that not every Brazilian was willing to participate in the war effort, as Vargas claimed. Nearly none of the enlisted men had been abroad before. When Brazilian pilots arrived in the United States for training, their American trainers noted that most of those men had never left Brazil before, either. This presented a problem for recruitment; the force was known to be heading overseas, and many Brazilians decided they had no interest in being sent into a war zone so far from home. Draft dodging was quite common in Brazil even before it entered into World War II, but the problem became much worse in 1943 as the army tried to recruit men for the expeditionary force. Of those men that did present themselves when drafted, moreover, over 40 percent were declared medically unfit to serve. This was a problem for troops who had been drafted from other parts of the Brazilian army, as well as for new recruits.11
The question of who would lead the Brazilian force was the subject of much debate and rumor. Dutra suggested that he should personally lead the force, and indeed had publicly expressed this point during his meetings in Washington in August 1943. President Vargas, however, turned down Dutra’s offer. According to British sources, the gossip in Rio was that Vargas preferred to keep his long-serving minister of war under his watchful eye in case the Brazilian army was tempted to, as the British put it, “emulate the performance of their neighbors [Argentina] to the south.”12 Dutra’s only consolation was that the candidate suggested by his longtime political rival, Osvaldo Aranha, was also rejected for the role.13 Yet when Dutra talked to his generals about who else might lead the force, he discovered that only one of his senior officers was willing to accept the challenge. Thus it was that General João Baptista Masarenham de Morais found himself in charge of the Brazilian military excursion to Europe.14
The organization and training of the force was beset by problems from the start. President Vargas’s stipulation that he would send troops to Europe on the condition that the United States would supply them with arms proved to be problematic for the US military, which blocked the agreed supply of arms to the troops in Brazil. The United States blamed its failure to deliver the weapons on a shipping shortage.
The lack of weapons had an immediate and severe effect on the troops’ training. General Masarenham de Morais eventually agreed that his units would receive only basic training in Brazil,15 and they would not be equipped at all until they reached the war zone. Basic training was to be completed by mid-March 1944, at which point the Brazilian authorities would notify the US joint chiefs of staff. The force would then be moved to Europe where it would receive further training and be fully equipped by the United States.16 All of this would take time; in December 1943, the war department in Washington predicted that the Brazilian force would not be ready for deployment overseas until May or July 1944 at the earliest.17
While Washington was less than sanguine about the prospects for the Brazilian troops, Rio was eager to see them deployed as soon—and as widely—as possible. In the first part of 1944, Brazilian officers were sent to the United States for training, and a number of senior officers visited North Africa to see for themselves how the US army operated in combat. They were obviously anxious to enter the fray; both the United States and the British noted that the Brazilian military authorities appeared eager to get involved in the conflict as soon as possible.18 From the Brazilians’ perspective, time was running out, and there was a very real possibility that the war might end before they would be able to make a meaningful contribution to the Allied war effort. Still, it was proving difficult for the Americans to assess just when the FEB would be ready to depart Brazil.19 And when it did, US military planners intended to effectively sideline these untrained and—in American eyes, at least—poorly disciplined troops.
One Brazilian found it almost impossible to contain his criticism of the organization and planning of the expeditionary force: the chief of staff, General Góes Monteiro.20 And Góes Monteiro’s relationship with the minister of war, Dutra, deteriorated as the two men locked horns over these issues. Góes Monteiro wanted a more effective force, one that was better armed. As Góes Monteiro’s public criticisms of the organization of the expeditionary force increased, Dutra started to build up the profile of other generals as possible replacements for the chief of staff. The fact that Góes Monteiro maintained a good relationship with Aranha despite their political differences did not help the general’s case with Dutra, who continued to be the archrival of the minister of foreign affairs. This slow breakdown of the working relationship between Góes Monteiro and Dutra boded ill for the Estado Novo, as the two men had arguably done the most to help create the regime.
In December 1943, a tired and increasingly marginalized Góes Monteiro resigned as chief of staff. His career, however, was far from over, and Góes Monteiro would return to the spotlight briefly as minister of war in August 1945. Yet the immediate impact of his resignation was enormous. The alliance Dutra had enjoyed with Góes Monteiro was shattered, and this development appeared to initially strengthen the hand of President Vargas over the armed forces. But Dutra remained an extremely powerful figure and the US perception of the minister of war remained unfavorable, with US officials still highlighting his alleged pro-Nazi bias and his preference for acquiring arms from Germany over the United States. His continued presence in talks and negotiations increased the suspicion of the US army and made it wary of equipping the Brazilian forces.
While the Brazilian military leadership was preoccupied with the formation and training of the FEB, President Vargas was equally focused on the domestic political consequences of World War II for his regime. The Brazilian military was growing stronger, and Vargas was cognizant of the potential threat. In a speech commemorating the sixth anniversary of the establishment of the Estado Novo on November 10, 1944, the president emphasized the themes of national unity and internal stability, which he saw as vital for the Brazilian war effort. His speech at the inauguration of the new military arsenal in Rio de Janeiro was something of a reminder to opponents to not make trouble. Vargas warned:
In these difficult circumstances, when we require above all the internal stability to assure us our merited place among the victorious nations, it would be an error and a crime to agitate the country. For this very reason the government will not hesitate to repress any attempts
at useless disturbance. This is the hour for unity and to maintain it we shall not hesitate to use energetic means.21
At the end of the speech, Vargas offered hope for those Brazilians who longed for democracy, while also challenging those who saw little future for the Estado Novo in the postwar period. “When the war is over,” he assured them, “in an atmosphere of peace and order and with the maximum guarantees of liberty of opinion, we will readjust the political structure of the nation, which will be done by ample consultation with the Brazilian people.”22 What such “readjustments” might entail, Vargas didn’t say—but the mere mention of the potential for political change suggested that Vargas would try to steer his government into line with the changing tides of public opinion in Brazil, rather than attempting to roll right over them.
Later on that same day, Vargas gave a second address, this one at the inauguration of the new ministry of finance in Rio de Janeiro—an office building that, the US embassy reported, was the finest in South America.23 President Vargas devoted much of his second speech to the theme of the spiraling cost of living in Brazil. He announced wage increases for all classes, including the armed forces, and concluded with an appeal for Brazilians from all walks of life to make a contribution to the war effort. Tellingly, he again promised political reform once the war had been won.24
Brazilians’ reaction to Vargas’s two speeches was generally very positive. Even his critics appeared resigned to letting him lead the war effort free from major political disturbance. As the Americans noted, “this reflects a generalized sentiment that internal political disturbance would be disastrous for the country at this time and that, therefore, Vargas should be unmolested until the war is over.”25 Yet by mooting the possibility of political changes in the Estado Novo, Vargas was also attempting to secure his position in the aftermath of the war, when his political foes would surely not grant him such a reprieve.
Vargas was attempting to buy time. He understood that Brazil’s participation in the war would lead to demands for internal political reform and a return to democratic politics. He could argue that this was not the time for such a debate, but he knew he could not avoid it indefinitely. As Brazil committed its young men to the war effort, popular pressure on Vargas grew, and his proclamations about political reform—which essentially amounted to promises for a return to democracy in the postwar era—were a sign that Vargas was willing to meet the Brazilian people halfway.
Yet time was exactly what Vargas did not have. While Vargas attempted to shore up his political position within Brazil with wage increases and promises of reform, and while he was dealing with the training and deployment of the expeditionary force, Brazil’s usefulness to the United States was declining almost by the day. By the end of 1944, the United States no longer needed Brazil’s help with a potential occupation of the Portuguese islands, the Azores. Following complex and, at times, difficult negotiations between the British ambassador in Lisbon and Portuguese leader António de Oliveira Salazar, the Allies reached a deal with Portugal; Salazar granted the British access to the air bases on the Azores. The agreement, which was signed on August 18, allowed the British to use the strategically important islands as a supply depot, as a base for aircraft in the ongoing battle against submarines in the Atlantic, and as a support station for a planned Allied invasion of the European mainland.26
During the final quarter of 1943 the US diplomat George Kennan worked out an arrangement with Salazar for the US military to use the islands, as well. Once the United States secured access to the islands, the air bases became the focus of the major US military buildup in preparation for the Allied invasion of mainland Europe. With the Allies encamped on the Azores, there was no need for Brazil to play any role in the defense of the islands. The Brazilians’ hesitation to get involved in the Azores, and Salazar’s reluctance to sanction any role for Portugal’s old colony in the defense of the islands, had made Brazil even less strategically valuable to the United States.
The United States still had some use for Brazil on this front, however. At the end of 1943, the United States asked Brazil to influence Salazar to cease supplying wolfram to Germany. Wolfram was a vital component in the German armaments industry, and Portugal was a major source of the metal for the Germans. In a letter to the foreign minister on September 20, 1943, the Americans explained the importance of restricting exports of wolfram to Germany:
The importance of wolfram, a ferroalloy used in the manufacture of steel, lies in its value, as a supply item to the United Nations and as a strategic material to the Axis. According to reliable figures, German wolfram requirements for 1943 have been reduced to 5,800 tons under stringent conservation methods. This includes the German need of wolfram in the manufacture of tungsten carbide cores. To meet even the greatly reduced consumption, Germany must rely upon her purchases in the Iberian Peninsula. . . . If German acquisitions in Portugal can be kept to a minimum there is little doubt that German reserves may be completely exhausted at the end of the year and that German production of armor-piercing ammunition will be very seriously impeded.27
Because the metal was so vital to the Nazi war effort, it was equally vital that the Allies prevent more of it from reaching Germany. Salazar, however, was refusing to comply with Allied demands to cut the sale of wolfram to Germany. In his negotiations with Ronald Campbell in Lisbon, Salazar had adopted the line that if he refused to sell the wolfram to the Germans, they might come and take it anyway.
The United States hoped that, given Brazil’s long history with Portugal, Rio might succeed where Washington failed. The Americans asked Aranha if he was willing to have the Brazilian ambassador in Lisbon raise the matter with Salazar.28 Aranha quickly agreed, and for much of the early part of 1944, Brazil pressured Salazar to stop sales of wolfram to Germany.29 As one Brazilian suggested, “Our soldiers could be killed in action by guns and shells made and manufactured using Portuguese wolfram.” Salazar paid little attention to the Brazilian protests, however, and continued to sell wolfram to Germany right up until the eve of D-Day.30 Yet the perception that Brazil was doing something to help the Allied cause proved to be more important than its failure to impact Salazar’s decision making.31
Aranha’s efforts to get Salazar on board with the Allied cause notwithstanding, the Americans were finding it increasingly difficult to deal with the minister of foreign affairs. Caffery noted that since Brazil had entered the war, Aranha had become “harder and harder to deal with over economic matters.”32 Aranha spent long days working in the Itamaraty Palace, ignoring its beautifully maintained gardens and swimming pool as he attempted to steer Brazil through the war while also extracting as much from the Allies as he could. At night, Aranha often hosted formal dinners for foreign diplomats and leaders. His energy levels were impressive—but perhaps due to the hectic pace of his work, he was missing important strategic trends both inside and outside of Brazil.
At the end of 1943, Aranha remained fully committed to his cherished policy of full partnership with the United States. His political antennae told him that he was still the Brazilian leader with whom the United States most preferred doing business, which surely helped to fortify his commitment to the Americans. And as far as Aranha was concerned, there were only two points of dispute between his nation and the United States. The first was the fact that the United States had tried to stop Brazil from selling rubber to Chile the previous year, which had ruffled feathers in Rio.33 Aranha had accused the United States of treating Brazil like a colony instead of an equal partner. The moment had passed, but to some extent Aranha had once more overplayed his hand with the Americans. In retrospect, the United States’s intervention in the proposed sale should have served as a wake-up call to the minister of foreign affairs, and an indication of the true nature of the relationship between Brazil and the United States. It did not. Aranha continued to hope for a full partnership with the United States once Brazil committed its armed forces to the battle in Europ
e.
The second bone of contention between Brazil and the United States had to do with something called “the proclaimed list”—essentially a blacklist that aimed to prevent foreign nationals from trading with the Axis powers by cutting off their economic ties with the United States if they did so. The proclaimed list was first introduced in July 1941 as part of the program of economic warfare against individuals and companies that were based outside of the combatant nations, but that were deemed to be pro-Axis.34 US diplomats and intelligence agencies were tasked with compiling the proclaimed list, and the implications of being named on the list were huge: people and corporations on it were prohibited from doing business with firms or individuals in the United States. Brazil, with its large German, Italian, and Japanese immigrant populations, was hit hard by the proclaimed list. And given the dearth of reliable intelligence, a number of Brazilian individuals and companies that were operating legitimately nevertheless found themselves on the list.
Aranha never liked the idea of the proclaimed list, and said on more than one occasion that he stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States on every issue except this one. Indeed, Aranha saw the proclaimed list as a means for the United States to replace Brazilian-owned companies with British or American ones.35 He frequently made this argument to Caffery, pointing out that most of the 265 Brazilian companies originally placed on the blacklist were either Brazilian-owned or had operated in the country for an extended period of time, so could not possibly be construed as being pro-Axis.36 But Caffery proved unreceptive to Aranha’s argument, as did the rest of the US government. The US economic warfare teams could point to evidence for their suspicions. And though this evidence was often incomplete or had been gathered from locals who had past business dealings with the companies they ratted out to the United States, and who were thus often deeply biased, the United States held firm to the blacklist.
Brazil : The Fortunes of War (9780465080700) Page 27