by Mark Zuehlke
Nothing was simple. Wherever the officers turned, more complications were revealed. When everyone was unexpectedly summoned to the War Office, they were surprised to find Montgomery waiting for them in a room adorned with large wall maps of Sicily. He had flown from North Africa to deliver a detailed briefing. Now the Canadians learned the full scope of the enterprise. They would be under Montgomery’s command and folded into the Eighth Army, which was carrying off the British side of the invasion. Landing simultaneously would be another army, the American Seventh, under General George S. Patton. Delivering two armies in a single day onto Sicilian beaches meant the invasion was the largest in history. There were not enough men in Northern Africa, so the Canadians would be sailing from Britain, while a large contingent of American troops came direct from the United States. “It can be appreciated,” noted 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade commander Brigadier Howard Graham, “that the sailor boys had a tough task on their hands to co-ordinate the movement of convoys from North America, Great Britain, North Africa, and Malta so that all would arrive at their proper places at the proper time.”6
A major headache was that Eighth Army’s supply stores were so strained that nothing would be available from North Africa for the Canadians. They must bring their own supplies, sufficient to last forty-two days. This meant there would be ninety-two ships, excluding escorts, carrying the division. Instead of everyone sailing together, they would move in three convoys, the two main ones designated the Slow Assault Convoy and the other the Fast Assault Convoy. The slow one would assemble in Liverpool and sail on June 25, while the fast convoy would depart harbours in the River Clyde three days later. Aboard the slow convoy would be packed vehicles, equipment, and supplies not required to immediately support the assaulting troops during the first days of the invasion. The fast convoy would carry the assault troops and their weaponry. Movement of these convoys was to be so precise that they would marry up at a “release point” seven miles off Sicily on the night before the invasion. Following a few days behind these two convoys, a third carrying reinforcements, field hospitals, replacement equipment, and supplies would proceed to a staging area in North Africa, from which matériel and men would be transferred to Sicily as needed.7
Montgomery departed, leaving instructions that Salmon and some key staff officers should fly to Cairo in a few days for a meeting with the corps commander under whom the Canadians would serve, Lieutenant General Oliver Leese. The most worrisome aspect of the plans so far presented was that they were not finalized and were subject to minor or major change at a moment’s notice. As had been the case since the decision to invade Sicily was agreed on at the Casablanca Conference, Montgomery, his superiors, and the staff at the various headquarters were still arguing many key aspects fundamental to Husky.
EARLIER THAT YEAR, in January, the combined chiefs of staff had met Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt in French Morocco, at Anfa Camp on the outskirts of Casablanca. Their purpose was to hammer out basic strategy for the year. With North Africa all but won, the pressing issue was how next to employ Commonwealth and American forces against Germany and her European allies. It was a heady time. German and Italian forces were cornered in Tunisia, the last Axis stronghold in North Africa. In Russia, the Germans had been forced onto the defensive in the after-math of Sixth Army’s destruction at Stalingrad. The Japanese tide had been stemmed in New Guinea and on Guadalcanal. Churchill cautiously mused that in the dawn of 1943 they were seeing, “perhaps, the end of the beginning.”8
The Americans, particularly the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General George C. Marshall, preferred an immediate invasion of Western Europe from Britain or, alternatively, landings in southern France. But the three-pronged invasion on November 8, 1942, of Morocco and Algiers and subsequent operations in North Africa—with heavy demands on shipping and supplies—had forced them to recognize that a cross-channel assault would be impossible until 1944. The British countered that Allied landings in southern France would preclude any chance of a cross-channel invasion. There was no way to limit the scope of such an operation. Any landings there would require such a vast commitment of manpower, shipping, and supplies that this would become the invasion of continental Europe, which the Allies were not yet ready to carry out. On the other hand, Churchill warned, the Allies “would be a laughing stock if in the spring and early summer no British or American soldiers were firing at any German or Italian soldiers.”9 So where to shoot?
Churchill and his chief of imperial general staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, knew the precise spot. The British arrived in Casablanca with a strategy to win agreement to an invasion of Sicily by patiently wearing down American resistance “like the dripping of water on a stone.” Yet Churchill knew that any Mediterranean invasion point he put forward would be initially resisted by the Americans, who saw in every British strategical suggestion a veiled attempt to regain or expand their empire. This “atmosphere of veiled antipathy and mistrust” had clouded every conference since the war’s outbreak.10
Casablanca proved no exception. This time, however, Churchill and Brooke were able to build a compelling case for invading Sicily. Benito Mussolini’s Italy was on the verge of collapse, and Sicily would provide a perfect springboard onto the peninsula. An invasion there would force Italian surrender. With Italy broken, the British held, the Germans would not move to defend it. The Allies could gain a solid footing on the European mainland at little cost in blood—penetrating Hitler’s Fortress Europe through its soft underbelly, as Churchill was fond of putting it. The British went on to predict that Turkey would join the Allied side and the Germans be forced to divert divisions that would otherwise have been deployed to Russia in order to shore up defences in southern Europe.11
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa, thought that invading Sicily made sense only if the motivation was to remove the island and her seaports as a threat to Allied shipping in the Mediterranean. The other Americans concurred, refusing to discuss further what might follow Sicily’s capture out of a fear that British ambitions in the Mediterranean could indefinitely forestall a cross-channel invasion for lack of men and ships. Striking a conciliatory posture, Churchill and Brooke chose not to press the point. They could afford to leave in abeyance the idea of continuing on to mainland Italy. Instead, they forecast that Sicily’s loss might suffice to bring about an Italian surrender and avoided speculating further as to whether the Germans would occupy and tenaciously defend the country.12
Neither delegation left Casablanca triumphant. But the British had succeeded on a number of levels that gave cause for satisfaction. Sicily would be invaded, and Italy might well follow. Another coup that left Brooke almost giddy with pleasure was that the Americans had been neatly outfoxed, leaving operational control of the invasion in British hands. In a communiqué issued on January 23, Eisenhower was declared the “supreme commander.” This technically gave him overall authority for Husky’s planning and conduct, but the document went on to appoint General Harold Alexander his deputy commander-in-chief, charging him personally with “the detailed planning and preparation and for the execution of the actual operation when launched.” Further, Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham would be the naval commander and Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, the air commander. All three men were British.13
“Eisenhower,” Brooke declared, “had neither the tactical [nor] strategical experience required for such a task.” Making him senior “could not help flattering and pleasing the Americans in so far as we were placing our senior and most experienced commander to function under their commander who had no war experience.” Eisenhower was effectively pushed “up into the stratosphere and rarefied atmosphere of a Supreme Commander, where he would be free to devote his time to the political and interallied problems.”14 Eisenhower was little fooled by this ruse, but there was nothing he could do about it. “I ceased to concern myself directly wit
h the details of the Sicilian operations,” he wrote.15 Churchill emphasized in follow-up correspondence with Roosevelt “that the British should at least be equal partners with our Allies. The proportions of the armies available [for] July were: British, eight divisions; United States, six. Air: the United States, 55 per cent; British, 45 per cent. Naval, 80 per cent British . . . It did not seem too much in these circumstances that we should have at least an equal share of the High Command.” Rather unctuously he would later claim “this was willingly conceded by our loyal comrades. We were moreover given the direct conduct of the fighting.”16
THE MAN RESPONSIBLE for planning the invasion, however, was unable to turn his mind to the task. General Harold Alexander was already commander-in-chief for Tunisia, where battles still raged that required his daily attention. All he could do was hastily examine the tentative plan submitted to the Casablanca Conference by the Joint Planning Staff in London and agree it provided the framework for the Sicily invasion.17
Unable to release any senior officers to invasion planning, Alexander borrowed Major General Charles H. Gairdner from British headquarters in India. Gairdner opened Operation Husky’s headquarters on February 12 in Bouzarea, a small town outside of Algiers. Gairdner temporarily had full responsibility for the invasion force, designated as 15th Army Group but cloaked in such secrecy that it was referred to only as Force 141. The two armies that composed it were also masked, with Eighth Army being alternately referred to as Force 545 or Eastern Task Force and Seventh Army as Force 343 or Western Task Force.
Although British officers constituted the brunt of Gairdner’s staff, several Americans assumed key postings. Major General Clarence R. Huebner became his deputy and senior American representative, while Brigadier General Arthur S. Nevins served as Brigadier, General Staff (Plans). The senior naval and air force officers that gave Force 141 its interservice character were, however, all British.
At the same time that Force 141 opened shop, Force 545 took over office space in Cairo and Force 343 situated itself in Rabat, Morocco. These last two headquarters were inter-service in structure but not inter-Allied, as one concerned itself with Eighth Army and the other, Seventh Army. Since forces would also have to be sent from Britain and the United States, smaller offices were established in London and Washington to oversee planning at those ends. In London, the headquarters was at Norfolk House and was staffed by officers from 3rd British Division until they were replaced by 1st Canadian Infantry Division staff at the end of April.
Even accounting for air travel, these headquarters were badly scattered, so bringing everyone together was impossible. But each was tidily linked by cable. On paper the command chain seemed clear, but each headquarters tended to operate quasi-independently while emanating volumes of cables full of discussion, suggestions, and analyses of options. The mixture of physical separation and near-instantaneous communication, as Britain’s official historian later wrote, fostered an atmosphere favouring “debate instead of hastening decisions.”18
Because Eighth Army remained engaged in Tunisia, one of its corps commanders, Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey, took the helm in Cairo. This left General Bernard Montgomery and his chief of staff, Major General Francis “Freddie” de Guingand, free to concentrate on the continuing campaign.19 Although Seventh Army’s General George S. Patton initially took charge of Force 343, he quickly left planning details to his staff in order to take personal control over his army’s II Corps on March 6. This formation was so badly disorganized it was deemed not battle worthy. As II Corps was supposed to provide Seventh Army’s fighting teeth, whipping it into shape was his first priority. Patton was soon running around on a beach screaming at a squad of men from II Corps’ 1st Division during a botched practice landing, “And just where in hell are your goddamned bayonets?”20
While all the senior commanders assigned to the invasion initially paid scant attention to its planning, Gairdner was clearly in over his head. In the early war years, Gairdner had commanded two armoured divisions before being assigned to India. He had no combat experience and little background in operational planning. Polite and well intentioned, he lacked the fortitude required to exert authority over a high command headquarters where personalities and egos were generally strong. Deputy chief of staff Huebner was the opposite—outspoken, rude, and ultimately unfit for senior staff duty. Alexander would declare Huebner “a square peg in a round hole” and fire him in July. The officers serving under these two men were also inexperienced in planning and executing combined operations.21
Hesitantly, with Joint Planning Staff’s tentative plan in hand, Force 141 set to work. Despite the urgency of the invasion deadline—only 137 days remained until the “favourable July moon” date set by the combined chiefs of staff in their January 23 communiqué—the planners sluggishly studied the proposal. There was no sense that time was short—the British held that a division could be fully prepared and launched into battle by amphibious landing in sixty-eight days. Yet this estimate failed to take into account that Operation Husky entailed preparing two complete armies whose divisions had to be assembled, readied for battle, and delivered to the beaches from various parts of the world.22
The Joint Planning Staff had presented three options: an assault on either of two Sicilian port cities—Palermo or Catania—or possibly both simultaneously. Current Allied amphibious warfare doctrine maintained that a major port must fall into their hands shortly after the first beach landings to facilitate putting ashore follow-on supplies and reinforcements. The beaches could only serve as temporary landing facilities. Sicily had three port cities: Palermo on the northwestern flank, Messina at its northeastern tip, and Catania centred on the eastern coast. Messina had been eliminated at the outset. This port stood in the Straits of Messina, a turbulent passage churned by a six-knot current. At its narrowest, the strait was two miles wide, its opposite shore being the toe of mainland Italy’s boot. Messina was believed to be heavily defended, sailing a large naval force into the strait seemed extremely risky, and the city lay beyond the range of Allied air forces operating out of bases in Tunisia—still to be captured—and Malta.
Lying as it did within range of Allied air cover, Catania presented a better prospect. But its port was smaller, judged capable of maintaining only four divisions in the first month of an invasion and six thereafter. Not enough, the planners decided, for subduing the enemy guarding Sicily. Palermo could meet an invasion force’s needs, but a sole assault there left Catania and Messina in Axis hands for reinforcing their garrison on the island. Also, the majority of enemy airfields in Sicily were in the eastern and southeastern regions. If these were not seized quickly, German and Italian air forces would be able to strike the invasion force relentlessly because of the short turnaround times they would enjoy. Any Allied invasion of Sicily must have as its ultimate goal the closing of the Straits of Messina, preferably trapping a great number of enemy forces on the island that could then be eliminated at leisure. To advance only from Palermo towards Messina—while Catania and the eastern airfields remained unscathed—would ensure a tough, costly slog.
Force 141 planners decided the only solution was to launch simultaneous operations. Force 545 (British) would land on the island’s southeastern tip at four points: Avola, Pachino, Pozzallo, and Gela. Three infantry divisions supported by two tank battalions would strike from the sea, and four parachute battalions would drop on prime airfields. Meanwhile, Force 343 (American) would simultaneously land one infantry division backed by a tank battalion at Sciacca and Marinella in Sicily’s southwestern corner to capture airfields that would by the second day be capable of use by Allied air forces to cover a second phase of landings immediately east of Palermo. Two infantry divisions and two tank battalions would carry out this assignment. D plus 3 would see the British landing an infantry division supported by a brigade group on beaches close to Catania, to secure the port, and an airborne division on the Catania plain, to seize a clutch of airports there.
&
nbsp; At the end of February, Alexander dropped in briefly on Gairdner for another quick consideration of what he termed “the London plan,” since it was almost entirely the work of the British Joint Planning Staff. After taking issue with a few minor points, Alexander pondered whether, to simplify matters, the multipronged invasion idea should be abandoned and both task forces concentrated for a mass landing in the southeastern corner. Intelligence estimates showed the island was defended by two German and eight Italian mobile divisions, supported by five Italian coastal divisions. Gairdner’s staff had calculated that ten Allied divisions would be required to defeat them, and even then the two opponents would be roughly equally matched. The port facilities in the southeastern corner, he insisted, were insufficient to support such a large force. Both Palermo and Catania must be won at the outset.23