by Gant, Jim
The Key Tasks in Relation to the Tribal Leadership Will Be:
Listen
Understand
Learn
Influence
“Influence without Authority”
I could re-insert a Tribal Engagement Team in Mangwel tomorrow. However, in other areas it would take more time to perform a proper operational preparation of the battlefield (OPB) and build enough rapport to begin. There are many “acceptable” areas available. Acceptable does not mean no risk. This is not a strategy for the risk-averse. However, with the work we’ve done already, my TET would be safer in Mangwel than anywhere in Afghanistan.
Given the time and resources, I would go anywhere in the country and do this. It would take one month to prepare the TET for insertion into the area of operations (AO): I would need two weeks to do an analysis of the area (Area Study) and another two weeks to train my TET on the tactical tasks necessary to conduct the mission. The TET’s goal is to achieve “influence without authority.” The most reliable and lasting influence happens by acting as partners, not distant superiors or strangers.
The TSFs (Arbakai) will be a much more credible force than the local police (ANP) for many reasons. They will also give the villages and tribes what they need most: an accepted, professional force that can offer the tribe protection from the Taliban.
The relationships the TETs build with their tribes will have long-lasting effects, free of influence or interference by local/district/ provincial/national politics. The TET/TSF alliance will be able to govern and secure the tribe’s area until the tribe is confident that the local police and army can help protect them. Even then the tribes will be able to maintain their autonomy.
Afghan tribes do not give up their autonomy to anyone. Many, many tribal militias fought against the presence of the Taliban long before 9/11.
The TET will also need to monitor closely the relationship the tribe has with other tribes in the area, and how they are interacting. Of course, the goal is to incorporate as many other tribes as possible into the TTE strategy and give each tribe a TET. That is the major goal of the expansion phase of the operation.
Why chase the enemy? Make him come to us. And when I say “us” I mean a group of people who have the same goals: the TET and the tribe.
Influence without authority – Sitting Bulll and I enjoyed each other’s company. Our camaraderie set the tone for out team’s relationship with the rest of the tribe. We laughed and spoke of many things that most US forces are taught as being taboo.
Make no mistake, there is a lot more fighting and killing to do. We should do it on our terms, side by side with Afghans with as many advantages as we can have. The TTE strategy will give us that.
This plan requires a small group of men who can comprehend the extensive networks, influences and idiosyncrasies of the mission and the environment. We’re talking about “street smarts”—the instinct to grasp and account for all second, third and fourth order effects of decisions at all levels.
This is warfare at the Ph.D. level. It is constantly changing and requires continual assessment. Only a few dedicated men can execute this plan properly.
It will become a very personal fight. Once we commit to the tribe, the Pashtunwali code comes into effect for the US team as well. In the end it will be the TET’s ability to build a true bond with the tribe that is backed up by warrior ethos: the ability and desire to fight and die alongside them when necessary.
Start Small, Think Big
This strategy can be tested on a pilot basis. It doesn’t have to cost a lot of money. Tactical Tribal Engagement can be tried out on a small-scale (one or two tribes in a given area) to determine how productive it will be for the long term. It will take at least six months to a year to see any tangible results. Once it is demonstrated that this course of action will work, more resources can be put into it for the long-term (three to five years). I think everyone agrees that Afghanistan will not be won overnight. This strategy requires an investment of time, but not major manpower or resources.
Sitting Bulll, Dr. Akhbar and I enjoyed many late-night conversations in the midst of our tribal friends.
We helped the tribe with village projects whenever we could. ODA 316 built this well for Dr. Akhbar.
Even if the TTE strategy does not work on a large scale, wouldn’t ten or twenty successes impact the overall COIN fight in Afghanistan? I believe the answer is yes. As a matter of fact, success in Mangwel is almost a guarantee if I can get there before Malik Noor Afzhal passes away. He is eighty-six years old and time is ticking.
Now, as always, the enemy has a vote as well. As the TETs and TSFs become more of a threat, the more the Taliban will increase the time, resources, capacity and will to destroy or at least disrupt their operation. This will increase the overall threat and in turn the violence directed at both the TET and the tribe.
The Risks of Tactical Tribal Engagement
Each TET tribe will become a target and will take casualties. The US teams themselves will be targeted. There will be fighting. But the fighting will be US soldiers alongside tribesmen against a common enemy. Isn’t that what we want?
There will also be “push-back” from assorted Afghan officials, powerbrokers, warlords, criminals, and some minority races in Afghanistan, as we would be arming and training a majority of Pashtun tribes.
How do we Deal with Competing Tribes?
One of the keys here is to ensure that we tie what we are doing at the tactical level to regional and national representatives. Not coordinating our goals and operations with Afghanistan’s national political/military elements only promotes a confusing and contentious relationship between the various government entities and the tribal system.
Each TET tribe will become a target and will take casualties. The US teams themselves will be targeted. There will be fighting. But the fighting will be US soldiers alongside tribesmen against a common enemy. Isn’t that what we want?
From top to ground level, we ideally must be on the “same page” and move forward as one united force.
My last thought on the long-term effect of this strategy is that of the Chinese bamboo tree…
When a Chinese bamboo tree is planted, the grower must water and nurture it. The first year, it does not grow more than one inch above the ground. During the second year, after more watering and fertilizing, the tree does not grow any more than it did during year one. The bamboo tree is still no more than one inch high after four years. Nothing tangible can be seen by any outsider.
But, in the fifth year, the tree can grow more than eighty feet. Of course, the first four years the tree was growing its roots, deep into the ground. It is the roots that enable the tree to create an explosion of growth in year five.
Bottom Line: A TET strategy will have to be given the time and patience to do its work. But as our teams continue to establish themselves, one tribe at a time, their influence will reach a tipping point and become a far-reaching strategic influence.
The Original Six. This is not a good quality photograph—taken in near dark with a marginal camera—but it may be the only picture I have of the original six members of ODA 316. Yes, there were only six of us during our first three months of fighting in Mangwel.
Clockwise from me sitting down in front: SFC Mark Read above my right shoulder, then SFC Chuck Burroughs, SSG Dan McKone, SSG Tony Siriwardene, SSG Scott Gross on Tony’s left, and finally that is Khalid, my outstanding interpreter, sitting below Scott.
I have always loved this picture as it was these six men who started what would become a great fighting unit that found Sitting Bull and a new way to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan.
TRIBAL
ENGAGEMENT
TEAM TIMELINE
The first timeline noted below moves the TET into an area that supports US presence or a TET member who already has strong ties in the area (like Mangwel). I call this a permissive scenario.
The second scenario is one where the tribal members are n
eutral to US support or there is no prior relationship with TET members entering the area. In this case, the timeline would be pushed out from three to nine additional months. This situation would be a semi-permissive scenario.
The permissive and semi-permissive scenario is in relation to the tribe, not the environment itself. Although the tribe may be permissive (receptive) to the TET, the overall environment may be semi-permissive or even non-permissive. The fact may be that a particular tribe may want the TET, yet be surrounded by tribes that may not. Or the Taliban may have support in an area where the tribes support the TET.
By far the most important daily task is building rapport. This is our security. This is what will allow the TET to accomplish “influence without authority.”
Permissive Environment Phases with Timeline:
The Taliban will know immediately when a tribe receives some sort of US team and that the team is living inside the village with a tribe.
Preparation Phase (1-2 months): The TET begins its Operational Preparation of the Battlefield (OPB) development. Information gathering (area study), intelligence collection and analysis, intensive language training, logistics planning, detailed logistics request.
Tactical train-up with TET members.
Infiltration, Rapport and Organization Phase (1 month): The TET assesses and develops relationships in the tribe and begins training the TSF (Arbakai). Infiltration. The TET would move into the closest firebase (FB) to a selected tribal area and begin its tactical Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and continue its training.
Initial Contact. This would vary based on the enemy threat and the history of the area. In Mangwel my team and I could show up completely unannounced and it would work. In other areas the TET may have to request a meeting with the tribal leader or possibly even send a local ANA/ANP unit to the village to request that the head malik come to the firebase to talk.
Determine with the tribal leaders how many TSF (Arbakai) members they want, how many they need and what the TET can realistically support and train.
Assessment and Build-up Phase (6 to 8 months): The TET begins to build a true relationship with the tribe by this time and can make a much better assessment of the ways and means of the tribe. Focus is on the training program for the TSF and security posture of the TET. This period will be the most dangerous for the TET as it will become apparent that the tribe is receiving outside support and becoming a threat to any enemy in the area. The threat to the tribe and the TET will increase in direct proportion to the success of the TET’s integration with the tribe.
Expansion and Sustainment Phase (continuous, open-ended time frame): During this phase the biggest strides will be made by integrating the tribe into the local/district/regional and national government because they will be secure and, most importantly, they will feel respected and honored because the US has shown a clear commitment to them. How to choose the right tribes to partner with? One good way is using “will” and “capacity” as benchmarks for initial screening. Some tribes have both the will and capacity to fight the Taliban. Other tribes have the will but not the capacity. Other tribes have the capacity and not the will.
What about the Tajiks, the Hazaras, and the Uzbeks?
Do we support some of those tribes as well? I believe we should.
There is also the issue of key terrain located in a specific tribal area, and even areas the Taliban may need for various reasons (opium, supply and infiltration routes, etc.). The decision to support which tribe(s) would be an Afghan one. We (the US) also would need to put our own analysts and criteria to it to ensure that the right decisions were being made.
The method of performance (MOP) and the method of evaluation (MOE) criteria actually will not be that difficult to determine for the TET. However, as the RAND study points out, “Effective analysis capability is a critical component of any capability. Counterinsurgency operations require the development of an analytical methodology to measure the insurgency’s impact on the local population—especially the impact of the security condition. Several factors can make it difficult to measure the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations: Progress cannot be measured by the advance of militaries across a map as in conventional warfare; focusing only on guerrilla fighters misses the broader support network; a complicated array of political, economic, social, and military factors can fuel the insurgency; and there are rarely ideal predefined qualitative or quantitative target metrics.” (Jones 2008, 122)
Every Day the Tribal Engagement Team Will Focus on Security and Quality of Life Issues
A major concern is initial security. This must be built from the inside out. Our influence comes not just from providing security or enabling the tribe to provide it themselves. It is the fact that we are there. We are living with the tribe, sharing their dangers and hardships. This does not require a massive footprint. A very small team can accomplish miracles. I have seen it and I have done it.
After a relationship has been built with the tribes, we will be able to gather relevant and actionable intelligence on the Taliban, HIG, Haqqani and al-Qaeda networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The tribe and the Tribal Security Force and specially trained tribesmen who live among the population are in a position to gather information and intelligence. Make no mistake about it, these tribesmen have the ability to collect the type of intelligence we need to be successful.
The TETs need the latitude to dress, speak and act in the ways that will maximize their acceptance by the tribes. This may mean wearing local garb, growing beards, and interacting with the tribe on a personal level. They must be able to “go native.” Go to the tribe’s elementary school daily. Learn Pashto from them. Learn about being a Muslim. Learn about Islam. Learn about the tribe. Ideally, TETs must not only live with the tribe, but steadily integrate themselves into tribal life and customs (as much as the tribe allows). My experience in Mangwel would not be believed by most who did not see it firsthand.
Targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda will be a secondary, but at times needed, task.
The Tribal Security Force (Arbakai) Would Have Three Primary Elements:
A security force responsible for the physical safety of the village/tribe members.
An intelligence collection element (kishakee).
An offensive action and reconnaissance element. This element could integrate itself with ANA or CF elements with the help of the TETs.
The initial priority would be to quickly mobilize the TSFs. They can become an effective force in a short period of time, possibly in ninety days.
Paying the TSF will automatically improve the financial situation of the village and create a stronger bond with the tribesmen who live there.
Task Organization
The following is a “shopping list” of what I, or any TET leader, would need on Day One:
3/6/12 US personnel based on environment
2 interpreters
2 SAT phones
2 SATCOM radio (piggyback freq)
2 PRC-119s
2 ATVs
2 Pick-up trucks
3 Generators
2 Computers with a biometrics kit
Initial infill logistics package for the tribe:
100 AK-47s
30,000 to 50,000 rounds of ammunition
Assorted medical supplies
A “Gift of Honor” for the tribal chief
One must have a true love and respect for the Afghan people (the tribes) and be willing to give a better part of his life for this strategy to work. Not everyone will be able to do this nor should they. But for those warriors who are qualified and feel the calling, it will be the adventure of a lifetime.
Someday you too could fly an American flag outside your firebase, as we did at ours here in Asadabad.
9
CLOSING THOUGHTS
“Many so-called failed states are really failed tribes.”
-David Ronfeldt, “Tribes—The First and Forever Form”
We have to study and understan
d the tribes. Become their true friends and let them see us in all of our strengths and faults as well.
Work with Tribalism, Not Against It
“In the absence of state institutions, how can a typical civil society’s service requirements be provided or administered in an efficient manner? One way is to use traditional groups such as tribes who have experience in performing local governance roles and functions.” (Taylor 2005, 9)
In the words of Haji Mohammed Zalmay, one of the better district governors in Konar Province, “The key to success is getting tribes to come to shuras and keeping them united.”
Remember, in most cases the Taliban is not present in areas where the tribes do not want them to be.
Whether the US “wins” or “loses” in Afghanistan, the tribes will still be there. As David Ronfeldt says in “Tribes—The First and Forever Form,” “The tribe will never lose its significance or its attractiveness; it is not going away in the centuries ahead.” Therefore, we must learn to understand the tribe’s significance now.
There will be no large-scale “awakening” of the tribes in Afghanistan, as there was in al-Anbar Province in Iraq. It will be a much lower and more difficult process.
Nine Differences between Iraq and Afghanistan
In an excellent paper by Carter Malkasian and Jerry Meyerle entitled, “How is Afghanistan different from al-Anbar?” the authors list nine differences and four implications of those differences: