by Tom Mahon
IN THE us THE Russians were principally interested in information on the armed forces and the defence industries – intelligence on chemical weapons being a particular priority.104 The United States army’s Chemical Warfare Service, under the command of General Amos Fries, had responsibility for all aspects of chemical warfare including research and development. The service had extensive experience in the refinement and production of mustard gas, which was regarded as the most effective gas used in the First World War. In addition, towards the end of the war an American officer, Captain Lewis, had developed the highly toxic Lewisite, which like mustard gas was potentially fatal when absorbed either through the skin or inhaled. In the 1920s and 1930s the Russians devoted considerable resources to the production and deployment of these two gases. The US had also developed advanced gas masks borrowing on British and French designs.
‘Jones’ provided ‘Stephen’ with a wide array of information, covering areas such as chemical warfare, official reports from the army, navy and air service and airplane engine testing. In the field of chemical warfare he supplied copies of the journal, Chemical Warfare for the years 1922, 1923 and 1924. This was a journal produced by the Chemical Warfare Service, which Connie Neenan described as of ‘wonderful value’ to the Russians. There was also ‘a complete book of various army gases’, which probably refers to the book, Chemical Warfare written by General Fries as a ‘labor of patriotism’. This was published by McGraw Hill in 1921 and though available in bookshops at the time was a most macabre production, containing detailed information and formulae of the poison gases of the First World War. In addition ‘Jones’ handed over the 1926 annual report of the Chemical Weapons Service and two gas masks, one of which was developed for army officers so as to allow the wearer to use a field telephone or wireless.105
Figure 27. The IRA’s agent in New York, ‘Mr Jones’, reported to Moss Twomey on the success of his espionage activities for ‘Stephen’, the Soviet intelligence officer.
In paragraph 9 ‘Jones’ wrote: ‘My job is getting very hard I was asked to concenterate [sic] and give results. I have, but it means:- wine and women. I am on to the right people now, and can produce material of a high order, but I have to bring good whiskey along, and stay up all night drinking with whores and the people who give me the stuff. “Stephen” is satisfied and offered me a raise in pay. I refused as I don’t want him to think I am doing it for money. I may not last long at this pace. If you hear of me being mixed up in a scandal, you will understand.’
Other items supplied included: a technical drawing of the Browning .50 calibre anti-aircraft machine gun, the 1926 annual reports of the chief officers commanding the artillery and the infantry, ‘important technical notes [from the] Navy Construction Yard’ and information on a naval torpedo.106
Regarding airplane technology and the air service, ‘Jones’ gave the Russians documents on tests of two Packard airplane engines – one the 520 horsepower 1500 engine, the other the 2500 engine. Neenan claimed that: ‘This saved Stephen’s people $250,000 as they intend[ed] to buy one prior to getting [the] test [results].’ There were also Air Service ‘tests, photos and drawings’, ‘Specifications issued by [the] Officer in Charge [of the United States Army] Air Service’ and ‘[flight] manuals [from the Air Service’s flight training school at] Kelly Flying Field [in Texas]’. In addition there were ‘aero technical bulletins’, and ‘technical notes’ and memoranda for the years 1924 through to 1927.107
In 1926 ‘Jones’ engaged in negotiations for items that cost up to $500,000. He hoped that ‘Stephen’ would purchase them through him and so preserve a connection that could be later exploited by the IRA for their own purposes, as well as landing him a hefty ‘commission’. ‘I [‘Jones’] built my connection thru [sic] people who were helping me in the hope that I would buy stuff, the price of which might run up to $500,000. I discovered that our friend [‘Stephen’] was buying the stuff. I asked him to give me the buying of some of it and I would be in a position to give very valuable information. He refused. This puts me in a hole and I may lose good connections. He knows this and it’s his lookout. It will mean hard work to work it up again. There is a big commission going with this.’ It is intriguing to wonder what this highly expensive equipment was. ‘Jones’ refers to it as ‘stuff’ and this was a term used by the IRA for munitions, specifically explosives.108
‘Jones’ didn’t specify who his sources were, though he mentioned one particularly valuable ‘connection’ who was not Irish. He also clarified that he had multiple sources and additional potential informants whom he hadn’t ‘tapped’, due to the refusal of the Soviets to adequately fund the IRA.109 Given that much of the intelligence consisted of up-to-date military reports, it is reasonable to assume that at least some of his informants were serving military personnel. Why did they spy for the Russians? American communists could have informed out of a sense of idealism. But it was unlikely that ‘Jones’ had much contact with communists, aside from possible contacts among Irish-American socialists and trade unionists sympathetic to the IRA. Some Irish-Americans would have been open to supplying information to the IRA if they felt it was in support of the ‘struggle’ against Britain, and it is highly unlikely that ‘Jones’ would have explained that the information was being passed on to the Soviets. Money was also a likely motivating force for informants, particularly those with alcohol or other problems. I’ve found no evidence to suggest that the FBI or other US agencies were aware that the IRA was spying for the Soviet Union. In 1940 the FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover, wrote: ‘The Bureau has not been greatly concerned in the past with the activities of the Irish Republican Army except on specific occasions.’ The words ‘specific occasions’ are most likely a reference to IRA contacts with Germany during the First World War, which the federal authorities investigated at the time.110
Towards the end of 1926 ‘Stephen’ brought up the issue of the Soviet ‘war scare’ with ‘Jones’ and proposed that when Britain and the Soviet Union went to war, the IRA would help sink British merchant ships sailing from ports on the east coast. ‘Jones’ reported: ‘They [the Soviets] are going to go to war with our friends [Britain]. Not at once, probably next Fall [sic]. When that time came I would go home so I would have to train a man to take my place [in America], as we will have to work for him during [the] war period. We would have to destroy all our friend’s shipping. He will supply all the necessary material. I would have to organise the men etc.’111 Twomey replied: ‘Regarding destruction of shipping, it is a most delicate matter. Doing so may involve [the] United States in war; not by England in declaring war on [the] USA, but by [the] USA against others.’ He was probably inferring that the US would declare war on the USSR if it found out about the Soviet involvement. Twomey, however, was not dismissing the idea of sabotage: ‘Destruction may be feasible, if it could be done secretly and without capture of our agents. Could you ensure this?’112 However, ‘Jones’ cautioned: ‘Under the excitement of war conditions, we would get almost all our men to do anything, but could not give any guarantee that we could avoid casualties in killed and captures [sic] … I am sure if war broke out, ‘Stephen’ would try to use us in every way possible.’113 By March, ‘Stephen’ reported that ‘there was no immediate danger of war from their [the Soviet] end’.114 In early May 1927, a week before the British raid on the Arcos offices, Twomey noted ominous signs: ‘Word from Glasgow that there is great activity in Nobel’s factory making bomb plates and fuses. Working overtime, aeroplanes being constructed by Beardmores on the Clyde’. ‘Our friend [‘James’] in London has left and his successor is absent at the moment. We have a feeling [that] big international events and probably war on Russia are impending’ and added ‘lately a French newspaper published what purported to be plans for a joint attack by England and Japan on Russia.’ Twomey asked Connie Nennan to update him on ‘possible happenings in such [a] direction’.115 In November at the IRA army convention the delegates passed a motion pledging IRA support
for the Soviets in the event of war.116
Contrary to actual Soviet policy at the time, ‘Stephen’ professed that the Russians should be glad to have the IRA as allies: ‘Owing to the strained relations with England he was of the opinion that they [the Soviets] would make friends with anyone under the circumstances.’117
Unlike ‘James’ in London, ‘Stephen’ seemed to have been genuinely very concerned about the possibility of a break with the IRA. In February 1927 Twomey wrote to ‘Jones’ that: ‘we may have to break off, even temporarily, to let them see they cannot dupe us or treat us as they wish’ and when ‘Jones’ told ‘Stephen’ that the connection was to be broken, the latter was ‘mad’. He summoned ‘Jones’ to a meeting where they talked about this for three hours. ‘Stephen’ was ‘wildly excited over the matter, and will do anything to keep us on his hands’. Jones had already slacked off on his work for ‘Stephen’, reporting: ‘I notified my connections that I would not see them for a few weeks. I also had told Stephen during argument that I had not tapped certain sources, which would give results, because I felt they had no intention of being straight with us. He said that he believed this. Of course there is a certain amount of truth and bull in it, as I did not work hard on the job for some time past, but I gave satisfactory results just the same. It will take ten weeks to get an answer from his HQ and he thinks I am treating him bad in not supplying him with stuff in the meantime. From his attitude I think everything will be alright, as he is more or less helpless without us, all you have to do is use the strong hand. The chief cause of the trouble is his HQ have no idea who supplies the material. He [is] getting all the credit. As far as I can gather, he never reports in detail how or where he gets the stuff etc.’ ‘Stephen’ offered to pay the expenses for an IRA delegation to go to Moscow to try and get the Soviets to resume funding, provided that ‘Jones’ would either continue working for him or hand over control of a particularly valuable informant. ‘Jones’ refused. ‘Stephen’ claimed to be making this offer on his own bat, without sanction from Moscow, and he told ‘Jones’ ‘not to report the matter to his HQ’. The two ‘parted very good friends’.118
‘Jones’ was not a person overburdened with modesty and believed he was the main intelligence source for the Soviets in America: ‘They almost depend on us solely to do their work here.’119 This was unlikely, however, given the presence of RU networks among American communists. He added: ‘I have been very successful in my work. When the last man [Soviet agent] was leaving, he was lavish in his praise of my work. They [sic] told me that when I got time for a vacation that they would send me to their capital and that they would teach me their language etc. This of course is all bull, which I pretended to swallow. I am of [the] opinion it is with a view to getting me to work for them independently. Later on this morning, I told him I was expecting a cable ordering me to cease working [for the Russians]. He was very much upset [and] he asked me what I would do. I only laughed thinking he would ask me to work direct[ly for him] and compromise himself, [but] he is too wise.’120 ‘Jones’ continued to put pressure on ‘Stephen’, who was said to be in a ‘state of despair’.121 He felt that the IRA had been exploited by the Soviets, and in an interesting choice of words wrote: ‘Believe me these people [the Russians] are getting away with murder, but they will not do so [for] much longer as I am going to resign next month.’122
‘Jones’ was ‘determined to get back to civilian employment’.123 In March Twomey wrote to Neenan: ‘Prevent ‘Jones’ [from] resigning … he may need cash which you can give him. He is too hasty and almost unreasonable.’124 But ‘Jones’ was adamant: ‘I will not work whole time again. Not even for one day.’125 By early May ‘Jones’ had ‘definitely given up’. Twomey felt let ‘down badly’ and wrote him a final letter asking him to reconsider: ‘You appreciate I am sure the delicate nature of this work, how very few suitable persons there are to do it. A person who may be capable may not be close or reliable enough. We can have nobody who does not fulfil the last conditions.’126
Twomey wrote to Neenan recommending that he should take Jones’ position and get someone else to perform the administrative and organisational duties of An Timthire: ‘The work is so delicate and needs such secrecy it may be advisable [that] you take it on yourself and get someone else as An Timthire.’ In the meantime, to maintain the relationship ‘Jones’ introduced Neenan to ‘Stephen’.127
Since the agreement with the Soviets dated from 1925 it was to be expected that a number of Irish republicans in America would have known about it, though not in detail. Neenan contradicted himself somewhat when he said that: no one ‘is aware of his [Jones’] work, but all believe he is working for [the] Army [IRA]’, and then he suggested that the IRA take advantage of Jones’ resignation to discretely get the word out that the agreement had been terminated: ‘We could tell those who know that [the] connection with ‘Stephen’ [has been] broken off.’128 Twomey added that Neenan should officially retain the title An Timthire so as not to arouse suspicion.129
Twomey advised Neenan: ‘You should be free to devote a good deal of your time to “Stephen”. This work may cease at any time, and if it does you will be able to resume [your duties as] An Timthire … Pretend to “Stephen” you must travel on his work, charge expenses to him and in this way keep in touch with [the] distant camps [IRA-Clan na Gael clubs] of ours.’ 130
Who was ‘Mr Jones’?
‘Mr Jones’ is one of the most colourful and intriguing characters of these encrypted documents, a maverick with a blend of toughness, bluster and intelligence. Piecing together clues from the documents, we can get evidence as to his probable identity.
Firstly, ‘Mr Jones’ signed his name either ‘Jones’ or ‘JB’. What did the ‘B’ stand for? In May 1927 Twomey wrote a letter to an IRA officer travelling to America: ‘I am anxious to hear from An Timthire if Mr Byrne has given up wholetime [sic] work?’131 As this was at the time when ‘Jones’ resigned and given that there would have been very few full-time IRA officers in America, it is reasonable to assume that ‘Mr Byrne’ was the name by which ‘Mr Jones’ was known in public. Then what was Byrne’s first name? Twomey wrote to Neenan, telling him that a courier would call looking for ‘you or Dan Byrne’ and that he was to be given explosives or samples of tear gas.132 Given the sensitivity of this matter, it’s clear that ‘Dan Byrne’ was working closely with Neenan. In addition, throughout Neenan’s despatches in cipher there’s only one other IRA man whom he names as being in his confidence and that was ‘Dan’. For example, when Neenan sent $5,000 to the IRA in Ireland he remarked that the method for transferring the money was so secret that he hadn’t told the Clan but ‘Dan and myself [apart from the couriers] … were the only persons who knew the means by which the money was sent.’133As the name ‘Dan’ is frequently written in cipher it’s reasonable to assume that this is really Byrne’s and hence Jones’ first name. ‘Dan’ was also probably from Cork – as was Connie Neenan and Moss Twomey. This is suggested in Neenan’s letter to Twomey when he recommended that the newly appointed An Timthire ‘must not be from Cork. Note this. I feel others thought Cork were running [the] whole outfit.’134
I’m unaware of any senior IRA officer of the time in either America or Ireland called Dan Byrne, never mind one who would have been entrusted with such an important mission. It’s therefore likely that the last name ‘Byrne’ was a false name, particularly if ‘Jones’ was in America illegally or on the run from the gardaí in Ireland. Interestingly, Connie Neenan himself said he travelled to Boston in 1930 under an assumed name.135
Connie Neenan had an older brother, Dan, in America, but by the time Neenan arrived in 1926 he was already seriously ill and was soon to pass away.136 A dying Dan Neenan, who was not a prominent IRA figure (even if he had been an IRA volunteer) doesn’t fit the description of ‘Jones’.
There were a number of senior IRA officers in America at the time, such as Con Lehane from Cork who had led the IRA’s attacks from Donegal i
nto Northern Ireland in 1922. But there’s only one whose first name is ‘Dan’ – Dan ‘Sandow’ Donovan.
Sandow was one of the toughest IRA gunmen, not just in Cork, but in Ireland – a hard man.137 During the Anglo-Irish War he fought in Cork city alongside Connie Neenan. In 1920 he personally shot police divisional commissioner Smyth at the County Club in Cork.138 Smyth was the most senior police officer killed in the conflict. In the lead-up to the Civil War in 1922 Sandow masterminded the capture at sea of the British arms ship the Upnor. The IRA operatives seized so much arms and ammunition that they’re reported to have needed 200 lorries to cart it all away.139 A small incident that occurred during the Anglo-Irish War serves as a colourful illustration of Sandow’s personality and ingenuity. At that time in Cork, much to the annoyance of the IRA, there was a priest who regularly spoke out against the organisation during sermons at mass. This presented it with the dilemma: how to stop him but without harming him – as it was inconceivable to shoot or rough up a priest. Therefore Sandow walked up to the priest in the street, drew his gun and pointed it at him: ‘I was ordered to do it Father, but I can’t. But there are others who are not as particular as I am.’ It’s reported that the priest kept quiet after that.140