by David Crist
23. North memorandum to John Poindexter and Robert McFarlane, “Next Steps,” December 9, 1986, The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, pp. 280–82.
24. Reagan Diaries, entry for January 17, 1986, p. 384.
25. Charles Allen testimony, Hearings on the Nomination of Robert Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence, volume 2, p. 4.
26. President’s Special Review Board Interview of Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, January 12, 1987; Hearings on the Nomination of Robert Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1991, pp. 319–20.
27. Lang interview.
28. Ibid.
29. Allen interview.
30. Charles Allen, quoted in Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, p. 404; Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, p. 206.
31. Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army, Final Report of Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Sale and Transfer of Missiles, Spare Parts, and Other Related Equipment to Selected Middle East Countries, February 3, 1987, p. 6; Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 311.
32. North to McFarlane, February 27, 1986, Joint Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Appendix A, p. 1179.
33. Odom interview.
34. Walsh Report, Chapter 24, “The Investigation of State Department Officials: Shultz, Hill and Platt,” www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_24.htm, accessed December 12, 2010.
35. Armitage interview; William J. Crowe, The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), pp. 300–301.
36. Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), p. 314.
37. North e-mail to Poindexter, May 6, 1986, cited in Report on the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, p. 231.
38. Rafsanjani’s nephew Ali Hashemi Bahramani mentioned this to George Cave during a later meeting.
39. Notes by Oliver North, cited in Walsh Report, Chapter 1, “United States v. Robert C. McFarlane,” fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh; George Cave memorandum on the McFarlane mission to Tehran, May 30, 1986, National Security Archive Document Reader, pp. 295–96. According to the Bahramani, they looked to the embassy records and could find nothing about McFarlane, but did come across George Cave from his time in Iran a decade earlier. So they decided to meet with them.
40. McFarlane message to Poindexter, May 27, 1986, cited in Report on the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, p. 238.
41. McFarlane message to Poindexter, Joint Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Appendix A, p. 1270, column 1.
42. Cave learned that, only that day, the Iranians had dispatched a delegation to Beirut to meet with their Hezbollah surrogates to discuss hostage release. With no advanced preparatory work, they simply could not react that fast to an issue as sensitive as working with Hezbollah to release their captives at the behest of the Americans.
43. Reagan Diaries, entry for May 28, 1986, p. 415.
44. North raised concern to Poindexter that if the United States did not respond to the release of Jenco, it could jeopardize the safety of the remaining hostages. North memorandum to Poindexter, July 29, 1986, cited in Report on the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, p. 246.
45. The two sides differed on the Iran-Iraq War, particularly overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Bahramani agreed with North that his country wanted to live peaceably with its Iraqi neighbor. But he added that Iran needed some kind of victory. He stressed that the Iraqi president “must go” and inquired about the willingness of the United States to use its influence “to get rid of Saddam Hussein.” North countered that he could make no such commitment, but the United States did not want to see Iran lose, nor did it want to see Iraq defeated to the degree that it might elicit Soviet intervention to prop up its client state.
46. Report on the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, p. 253.
47. Ibid., p. 257.
48. Initially, the press credited Jacobsen’s release to the efforts of the special envoy Archbishop of Canterbury, Terry Waite. See Ihsan A. Hijazi, “Anglican Envoy Renews Effort on Beirut Hostages,” New York Times, November 1, 1986, http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F50711FA38580C728CDDA80994DE484D81.
49. Bernard Weinraub, “Iran Says McFarlane and 4 Others Went to Tehran on a Secret Trip,” New York Times, November 5, 1986.
50. President Reagan remarks on signing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, November 6, 1986, www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/86nov.htm.
51. Caspar Weinberger memorandum for the record, “Meeting on November 10, 1986, with the President, Vice President, Secretary Shultz, DCI Casey, Attorney General Meese, Donald Regan, Admiral Poindexter, and Al Keel, in the Oval Office,” undated, p. 2, cited in The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, pp. 315–17.
52. Walsh Report, p. 263.
53. “Message to Be Passed by Dunbar to Mehdi-Nejat,” December 23, 1986; memorandum for Department of State, “Unscheduled Meeting with Iranian Official in Frankfurt,” undated.
54. Caspar Weinberger memorandum for the Acting Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, December 22, 1986; Richard Armitage memorandum for Caspar Weinberger, “Status of Discussions with Iran,” December 22, 1986.
55. John Poindexter, “The Prudent Option in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, November 24, 1986. A copy with President Reagan’s comment provided by Admiral Poindexter.
CHAPTER 11 A RING ON THE AMERICAN FINGER
1. Weinberger Diary, entry for November 23, 1986.
2. Reagan Diaries, entry for November 24, 1986, p. 453.
3. Peter Burleigh, interview with author, December 16, 1994.
4. Oakley interview.
5. Richard Murphy, interview with author, December 21, 1994; Report to the Majority Leader by Senator John Glenn and Senator John Warner, U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, 100th Congress, 1st Session, June 17, 1987, p. 15.
6. Sandra Charles, interview with author, March 21, 1995.
7. Christopher Joyner, ed., The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 121.
8. Jordan’s King Hussein was especially angry at the Americans in part because the last high-level briefing he received on Iran had been just days before the news broke of the secret arms deals. Murphy interview; Armitage interview; Crist, “End of Tour” interview.
9. General George Crist letter to Caspar Weinberger, April 3, 1987.
10. The first use of the Badger bomber to attack Iran was in August 1987, when one attacked shipping at Larak Island.
11. CENTCOM History Office, Command History, 1987, pp. ii–61; National Security Policy Implications of United States Operations in the Persian Gulf: Report of the Defense Policy Panel and the Investigations Subcommittee to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987, p. 8.
12. George Crist message to William Crowe, “Persian Gulf” (162000Z), December 1986.
13. CENTCOM, “Lessons Learned: Operation Earnest Will, July 1987–Present,” slides 3L, 3R; Michel Heger and Yves Boyer, “U.S. and Iran Issues in the Gulf,” Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran vs. The United States of America), International Court of Justice, Corrigendum, tab B, pp. 8–17; Middle East Force, Command History, 1986, p. 2-3-3.
14. One other Harpoon was lost from the Iranian missile boat Pekan in November 1980. The head of the navy was a communist sympathizer and gave the coordinates to the Soviets, who then sent a salvage ship to recover the missile.
15. CINCCENT message, “Protection of U.S. Flagged Vessels” (270515Z)
, May 1987, pp. 1–4.
16. General Council of British Shipping, “Iran/Iraq: The Situation in the Gulf: Guidance Notes for Shipping,” February 1988, pp. 30–40.
17. “Iran Promised to Leave Japanese Shipping Alone, Khuranari Says,” Kyodo News, July 4, 1987.
18. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran vs. The United States of America), International Court of Justice, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim: Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1st Naval District Fleet (Intelligence), “Instructions for Radar Stations,” February 9, 1986, Exhibit 114; Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1st Naval District Fleet (Intelligence), “Instructions for the Deployment of Observers on Oil Platforms in the Persian Gulf,” October 1980, Exhibit 115; Archive of Incoming Messages, 1st Naval District, “Command Post to Rostam Oil Platform, 1986–1987,” Exhibits 118–19.
19. Case Concerning Oil Platforms, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, pp. 61–63.
20. General George B. Crist speech, “Cincs’ Wargaming Conference,” 1987, p. 9.
21. Message from CINCCENT to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Protection of U.S. Flagged Vessels” (270515Z), May 1987, p. 2. Another source fixes the number of attacks directed at Kuwait from September 1986 to July 1987 at thirty out of forty-four attacks. See Janet G. Stein, “The Wrong Strategy in the Right Place,” International Security, Winter 1987–1988, p. 148.
22. “War Risk Insurance,” p. 1.
23. Ibid.
24. Anthony Quainton, interview with author, March 21, 1995; Burleigh interview. In the words of Richard Murphy, “Balancing the superpowers…has been an element in Kuwaiti policy over the years.” U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, p. 30.
25. Howell interview.
26. Shawn Tully, “The Biggest Bosses 48. Ali Khalifa al-Sabah Kuwait Petroleum Dealmaker for a Dynasty,” Fortune, August 3, 1987.
27. Charles interview.
28. In addition to the U.S. and Soviet request, Kuwait also asked Great Britain to reflag its tankers. Eventually two Kuwaiti tankers were reflagged and escorted by London.
29. “Chronology,” Earnest Will Activation: Unclassified, p. 2. A detailed recap of Earnest Will compiled for General Crist by the staff of CENTCOM.
30. Memorandum for General George Crist, “U.S. Coast Guard Requirements,” 1987.
31. American Embassy Kuwait cable to Secretary of State, “Kuwaiti Use of U.S. Flag Vessels” (131344Z), January 1987; Frank Carlucci, interview with author, March 20, 1995, Washington, D.C.
32. Secretary of State message (290850Z), January 1987, p. 1.
33. Quainton interview.
34. General George Crist, interview with author, Beaufort, South Carolina, February 5, 1993; also described in Michael Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 123.
35. Weinberger interview.
36. Armitage interview.
37. Oakley interview.
38. On January 29, Shultz clarified the U.S. position in a message to Ali Khalifa, following it up with a phone call five days later. He stressed to the Kuwaitis that the onus for protecting their shipping remained with the Kuwaitis and the Gulf states themselves. Kuwait could register its ships in the United States, like any other country, but only if it met all the coast guard requirements. However, the U.S. military stood ready to provide any assistance needed to protect the country from Iran, and he urged the Kuwaitis to become more involved with the contingency planning at CENTCOM. Joint Chiefs of Staff message to CINCCENT, “Kuwaiti Request for U.S. Flagged Vessels” (290850Z), January 1987; Secretary of State message, “Kuwait Request for U.S. Flag Vessels” (030010Z), February 1987.
39. Secretary of State message, “Kuwaiti Negotiations with U.S. and Soviets for Naval Protection” (050840Z), March 1987.
40. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 396; also Weinberger interview.
41. Sandy Charles memorandum for Caspar Weinberger, “Kuwait Request to the U.S. and Soviets to Protect Shipping,” March 2, 1987.
42. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 397.
43. Secretary of State message, “Protecting Kuwait Shipping” (070909Z), March 1987; Joint Chiefs of Staff message to General Crist, “Protection of Kuwaiti Shipping” (071801Z), March 1987. At the same time Weinberger sent the letter to the Kuwaiti government, he sent a message to the ambassadors in the area informing them of the pending U.S. decision to escort all eleven Kuwaiti tankers. In return, he said, “We expect Kuwait to end its plan to complete agreement with the Soviet Union for protection of civilian vessels in the Gulf.” If Kuwait decided to proceed with the agreement with the Soviets, Weinberger wrote: “We also want to be sure that if for some reason the Kuwaitis decide to proceed with the agreement with the USSR that we ensure that no other Gulf state give the Soviets access to refueling, repair or resupply facilities which would represent a significant advance for their position in the Gulf.” Secretary of Defense message (070911Z), March 1987.
44. Secretary of State message (DTG 050710Z), March 1987, section 2, p. 1.
45. Personal message from General George Crist to Admiral William Crowe (DTG 101020Z), March 1987.
46. Rear Admrial Harold Bernsen, USN (Ret.), interviews with the author, August 10, 1995, and February 22, 2007; Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser, interview with the author, March 10, 2007.
47. Rear Admiral Harold Bernsen message to General George Crist, “Private Jewels” (110547Z), March 1987; message from Admiral Bernsen to General Crist (DTG 110547Z), March 1987.
48. Admiral William Crowe message to Secretary Caspar Weinberger, “Protecting Kuwaiti Shipping” (121330Z), March 1987; Crowe, Line of Fire, p. 178.
49. Swart interview.
50. The only contingency plan similar to this operation was Plan 1012. It focused on defending U.S. supply and lines of communications through the Gulf against a Soviet threat, and had very little bearing on the task at hand. Lieutenant General Robert Neal, USMC, interview with author, May 25, 1995.
51. Peter W. DeForth, “U.S. Naval Presence in the Persian Gulf: The Middle East Force since World War II,” Naval War College Review, Summer 1975, p. 30.
52. Grieve interview.
53. U.S. Embassy Kuwait cable, “Recent Incidents Surrounding Kuwaiti Shias Trial,” May 3, 1987.
54. The Silkworm is a relatively unsophisticated Chinese-made missile. It has a range of approximately ninety kilometers and carries a thousand-pound warhead. Launched along a programmed azimuth, it skims just above the water for a predetermined amount of time, at which point it turns on its radar and homes in on the first target it acquires. If the target moves or its position is off by more than three kilometers, there is no guarantee that the missile will hit the intended target. CIA, “Characteristics and Capabilities of the Silkworm,” April 16, 1987; “Threat Activity: Iran.”
55. Richard Norton-Taylor and William Raynor, “Jailed ‘Go-Between’ on UK-Iran Arms Deals Is Freed to Keep MI6 Secrets Out of Court,” Guardian, February 6, 1999; Marie Colvin, “Secrets of the Silkworm Spy,” Sunday Times, June 15, 1997, p. 15.
56. Weinberger interview.
57. CIA, “Iran Persian Gulf: Increased Threat to Shipping,” February 27, 1987, and “Iran: Growing Threat to Persian Gulf Shipping,” May 30, 1987.
58. CINCCENT, “Operation Private Jewels Commander’s Estimate,” March 1987; Bernsen interview; General Robert Herres message to Admiral William Crowe, “Private Jewels” (141845Z), March 1987.
CHAPTER 12 THE WAKE-UP CALL
1. Michael Vlahos, “The Stark Report,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1988, p. 36.
2. Jeffrey L. Levinson and Randy L. Edwards, Missile Inbound: The Attack on the Stark in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 12.
3. Crist interview; Bernsen interview.
4. Bernsen interview.
5. CINCCENT message, “Attack on USS Stark Chronology” (DTG 221500Z), May 1987, p. 2.
6. Ibid.
7. Rear Admiral Grant Sharp, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on the USS Stark (FFG 31) on 17 May 1987, Department of Defense, 1987 [hereafter referred to as Sharp Report], “Findings of Fact,” Item 1.
8. Sharp Report, “Findings of Fact,” Item 3.
9. The rules of engagement were based on two documents: CMEF Operations Order 400-85 from October 1, 1985, and Commander, Middle East Force, message of August 21, 1986.
10. Sharp Report, “Findings of Fact.”
11. As the official investigation later stated: “The commanding officer failed fundamentally to appreciate the significance of the intelligence information provided to him regarding the recent trend in Iraqi ship attacks south of the 27˚30´ north parallel, into the central Gulf.” Sharp Report, “Opinions,” Item 27.
12. Brindel believed they were in weapons “warning yellow,” which allowed for much greater freedom for the Stark’s weapons to be fired. This, however, did not translate down to his officers and the CIC believed they were still in the restrictive condition “white” and placed the systems in a mode that prohibited any quick response.
13. Sharp Report, “Findings of Fact,” Items 24, 25.
14. The broadcast was made over the narrow-band secure voice radio telephone circuit, or NBSV.
15. Greg McCannel, Lieutenant Commander, USN (Ret.), interview with author, March 22, 1995.
16. Sharp Report, “Findings of Fact,” Item 51.
17. Ibid., “Opinions,” Item 14.
18. Following the attack, the AWACS tried to vector in two Saudi F-15s to the Iraqi jet, but the Saudi pilots refused without orders from their commanders.
19. Interview with Ambassador Samuel Zachem, Oral History Collection, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., undated.
20. COMIDEASTFOR message, “Attack on USS Stark” (DTG 180208Z), May 1987, p. 1; Chief of Naval Operations message, “Personal For” (DTG 230140Z), May 1987, p. 1.
21. Levinson and Edwards, Missile Inbound, p. 33.
22. Interview with CWO3 Howard L. Geiger, USN, by Paul Stillwell, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, January 29, 1988.