by David Crist
38. “Majlis Speaker Says U.S. Spy Networks Uncovered,” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Tehran, April 21, 1989, FBIS, April 21, 1989, pp. 44–45.
39. “Information Minister Names CIA Spies,” IRNA, April 26, 1989, FBIS, April 27, 1989, pp. 43–44; “Daily on Need to Eliminate Motives for Treason,” IRNA, April 27, 1989, FBIS, April 27, 1989, p. 51.
40. Released in 1991, Cooper later wrote that his confession had been coerced through beatings and months of solitary confinement.
41. “Tehran TV Details Cover Operations of Spies,” Tehran Television Service, May 4, 1989, FBIS, May 8, 1989, p. 57.
42. “Mohtashemi Speaks at Rally,” IRNA, November 4, 1989, FBIS, NES-89-213, November 6, 1989.
43. In March the Iranian Flag of Freedom radio station reported his execution, along with fifty-nine other military officers. To his wife’s relief, the report turned out to be false, and the family was allowed another visit a month later. See “60 Navy, Air Force Officers Said Executed,” Flag of Freedom Radio, March 24, 1989, FBIS, March 27, 1989, p. 50.
44. Rear Admiral Frank Collins letter to James Woolsey, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, April 28, 1994.
45. “Information Ministry on CIA Agents Execution,” Tehran Television Service, November 5, 1989, FBIS, NES-89-213, November 6, 1989.
46. “The CIA’s Darkest Secrets,” US News & World Report, July 4, 1994, pp. 34–44.
47. Weiner interview.
CHAPTER 20 GOODWILL BEGETS GOODWILL
1. Gordon and Trainor, The General’s War, p. 10.
2. Hossein Mousavian, interview with author, October 7, 2011.
3. George H. W. Bush, Presidential Daily Diary, entries for February 4 and February 5, 1990, Bush Presidential Records, Bush Presidential Library, College Station, Texas, White House Office of Appointments and Scheduling, Box 29; George Lardner, “Bush Took Bogus Call on Hostages,” Washington Post, March 9, 1990.
4. Baer, See No Evil, p. 115.
5. John Greenwald, Sam Allis, and David S. Jackson, “Terrorism Nightmare on Flight 422,” Time, April 25, 1988.
6. John Kelly, interviewed by Thomas Stern, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, December 12, 1994.
7. Mousavian interview.
8. Giandomenico Picco, Man Without a Gun: One Diplomat’s Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War (New York: Times Books, 1999), p. 112.
9. The CIA also believed that Iran could not unilaterally order the release of the hostages but had to haggle with Hezbollah. CIA memorandum for Robert Oakley, “Iran and the U.S. Hostages in Lebanon,” August 1, 1988.
10. Twetten interview; Allen interview; Benjamin Gilman et al. letter to the President, November 15, 1989; Assistant Secretary of State Janet Mullins letter to Congressman Benjamin Gilman, January 22, 1990, Bush Presidential Records, Bush Library, White House Office of Records Management. The former CENTCOM commander General George Crist also suspected Iran’s involvement with the Pan Am bombing.
11. Statement by Representative Henry Gonzalez, Congressional Record, U.S. House, March 9, 1991, pp. 4699–703; J. Stapleton Roy memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, U.S. Department of State, “Iraqi Options Paper,” May 16, 1990, in Congressional Record, U.S. House, March 9, 1991, p. 4703.
12. CINCCENT message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Termination of Operation Earnest Will” (172200Z), August 1990.
13. D.C. Discussion Paper, “Options for Iran,” Bush Presidential Records, Bush Library, NSC, Robert Gates Files, Folder Notes, August 1990.
14. Diplomatic note from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Competent U.S. Authority, translated by U.S. Interests Section, Swiss Embassy Tehran, February 23, 1991; Michael Carns memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), “Démarche to Iran,” March 4, 1991.
15. Kelly interview with Stern.
16. Picco, Man without a Gun, p. 157.
17. Iran claimed that Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins was killed in retaliation for the Israeli kidnapping of a Lebanese scholar. “I deeply regret the reported killing of the U.S. hostage but Israel should be blamed for the tragedy,” said Majlis Foreign Affairs Commission official Sa’id Reja’i Khorsani, “Majlis Official Regrets Higgins Execution,” Tehran Times in English, August 5, 1989, FBIS, August 10, 1989.
18. The killings of Iranian dissidents led many in the White House to conclude that the Iranians had merely exchanged hostage taking for assassinations. Bruce Riedel, interview with author, December 22, 2011.
19. George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage, 1999), pp. 383–84, 399, 432–33.
20. Picco, Man Without a Gun, p. 6.
21. Interview with former Iranian official; Mousavian interview.
22. Richard Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), p. 38.
23. “The New Presidency: Excerpts from an Interview with Clinton after the Air Strikes,” New York Times, January 14, 1993. Under pressure from the media and his own advisers, President Clinton backtracked the next day on what many believed had been an offer to Saddam Hussein for better relations.
24. Pollack, Persian Puzzle, pp. 259–60.
25. Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), p. 39.
26. Ibid.
27. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), p. 105.
28. Indyk, Innocent Abroad, p. 43.
29. His words had been coordinated through the U.S. government and originally planned to be given by Anthony Lake, who canceled at the last minute because of a conflict. Remarks by Martin Indyk, “Challenges to U.S. Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities,” Soref Symposium, May 18–19, 1993, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, pp. 1–8.
30. Ibid., p. 3.
31. Ibid., p. 6.
32. Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” Foreign Affairs 73:2 (March–April 1994).
33. Remarks by Paul Wolfowitz, “Challenges to U.S. Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities,” Soref Symposium, May 18–19, 1993, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 18.
34. General Shalikashvili, confirmation testimony, preparation book, volume 2, enclosure, “Potential Q&A,” 1993; Elaine Sciolino, “CIA Says Iran Making Progress on Atom Arms,” New York Times, November 30, 1992. Shalikashvili added that Iraq could also produce a nuclear weapon by the end of the decade if UN sanctions were lifted.
35. Greg Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2010, www.cfr.org/publication/16811/irans_nuclear_program.html, accessed October 8, 2010.
36. Hooshang Amirahmadi, interview with author, June 25, 2010.
37. Pollack, Persian Puzzle, p. 266.
38. Osama Hamdan, interview with author, February 16, 2010, Beirut, Lebanon.
39. Hamdan told the author this over dinner in a restaurant in Hezbollah-controlled south Beirut.
40. Hamdan interview.
41. Michael Eisenstadt, “Déjà Vu All Over Again? An Assessment of Iran’s Military Buildup,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, McNair Paper 29: Iran’s Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, April 1994, p. 12.
CHAPTER 21 WAR OR PEACE
1. 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Command Chronology, entry for July 1, December 31, 1995, Enclosure 1, pp. 2-6-2-7; Patrick Clawson, comments to author, January 14, 2010.
2. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Is Wary as Iran Adds Troops in Gulf,” New York Times, March 1, 1995.
3. Shalikashvili memorandum to Binford Peay, “Expanded Deliberate Planning Against Iran,” October 5, 1995.
4. “Rafsanjani Answers Question on Regional Issues,” Iranian News Agency in English, May 30, 1995.
5. Tim Weiner, “U.S. Plan to Change Iran Leaders Is an Open Secret
Before It Begins,” New York Times, January 25, 1996; Elaine Sciolino, “The Schooling of Gingrich, the Foreign Policy Novice,” New York Times, July 18, 1995.
6. Pollack, Persian Puzzle, p. 274.
7. Kenneth Pollack, interview with author, March 2010. Pollack believes that hard-liners opposed to Rafsanjani seized on this issue as a way of scrapping any possible rapprochement between the United States and Iran.
8. Interview with Dr. Mohammad Javad Zarif, IRIB Television, Second Program Network in Persian, “Official Comments on U.S. Propaganda Campaign,” FBIS, January 4, 1996; Algiers Accords, January 19, 1981.
9. “Khamene’i Assails U.S., Zionist Terrorist Moves,” IRIB Television, First Program Network in Persian, FBIS, March 6, 1996.
10. All eight likely cooperated with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War; however, it’s highly unlikely they ever worked for American intelligence. “Five Sentenced to Death for Spying for U.S., Iraq,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, FBIS, January 6, 1996; “Three People Arrested on Charges of Spying for the U.S.,” AFP, FBIS, June 11, 1996.
11. Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), p. 112.
12. Indictment, United States vs. Ahmed Al-Mughassil et al., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, June 2001.
13. While many intelligence officers suspected that the supreme leader authorized the attack on Khobar Towers, to date, there has been no conclusive evidence that he did. While it is hard to imagine such an important action not having his blessing, the Quds Force is given wide latitude to undertake its operations. Riedel interview.
14. Both the DIA and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations had warned of possible terrorism in the region and had conducted a study that pointed out the vulnerabilities of Khobar Towers, especially the small perimeter that permitted civilian vehicles to get close to the barracks on the north side. Had they known about the plot uncovered by the Saudis, it might have galvanized officials to take action and averted the disaster that followed. Allen interview; Downing Report, August 30, 1996, Finding 18, p. 38; Lieutenant Colonel Robert Creamer and Lieutenant Colonel James Seat, “Khobar Towers: The Aftermath and Implications for Commanders,” Air War College, Air University, April 1998, pp. 5–21.
15. United States vs. Ahmed Al-Mughassil, Criminal No. 01-228-A.
16. Perry Jamieson, Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force History and Museums Program, 2008), p. 13.
17. Unfortunately, no one activated the basewide Giant voice with its audible alarm designed to alert everyone to danger. Downing Report, Finding 20, p. 46.
18. Staff Sergeant Eric Ziegler, cited in Jamieson, Khobar Towers, pp. 46–47.
19. Louis Freeh letter to Prince Bandar bin Sultan, July 11, 1996.
20. According to Richard Clarke, Bandar and others in the Saudi leadership welcomed a conflict with Iran, but were worried that Washington would start a war and not overthrow the Iranian regime based upon their experience in Desert Storm. Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 117. On January 15, 2004, Paul Wolfowitz asked whether al-Qaeda had been behind Khobar Towers. The Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism responded to the deputy secretary “that no credible intelligence strand indicates Al-Qaeda involvement in Khobar Towers bombing. Intelligence has conclusively established Saudi Hezbollah and Lebanon Hezbollah’s responsibility, with direction and oversight provided by the Iranian government.”
21. Mousavian interview.
22. Jay Hines, interview with author, June 17, 2002.
23. There had always been some tension between the United States and Iran due to the latter’s calculating its twelve-mile territorial waters differently than accepted conventions, giving Iran control over a few miles farther out into the Gulf. The U.S. Navy delighted in challenging these claims by steaming a frigate into the disputed water just to assert the right of “freedom of navigation.” Frequently, Iran responded by dispatching some small boats to pester the American warship. CINCCENT message to Joint Staff, “Freedom of Navigation Program” (260959Z), April 1994.
24. Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni message for Vice Admiral Dennis Blair, “Maritime Incident between USS Paul F. Foster and Iranian Patrol Craft” (021912Z), May 1997.
25. Kenneth Pollack, “What If Iran Was Behind al-Khobar? Planning for a U.S. Response,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 243, April 16, 1997.
26. General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), interview with author, August 26, 2010.
27. Clarke, Against All Enemies, pp. 119–20.
28. Riedel interview.
29. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 124.
30. Con Coughlin, Khomeini’s Ghost: The Iranian Revolution and the Rise of Militant Islam (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), p. 279.
31. Cited in Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 82.
32. “Transcript of Interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami,” January 7, 1998, www.cnn.com/world/9801/07/iran/interview.html, accessed October 31, 2010.
33. Coughlin, Khomeini’s Ghost, p. 282; Zinni interview.
34. Richard Murphy and Zalmay Khalilzad, “Iran after Khatami’s Elections: Whither U.S. Containment Policy?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 256, June 20, 1997.
35. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph McMillan memorandum, “Iran: Domestic and Foreign Policy,” February 3, 2001.
36. Indyk, Innocent Abroad, pp. 215–17.
37. Ibid., p. 219.
38. Pollack interview; Zinni interview.
39. Ambassador Hadi Nejad Hosseinian letter to the Secretary General, United Nations, S/1999/1274, enclosure, December 22, 1999; Secretary of State message to U.S. Mission, United Nations, “Response to Alleged Violations of Iranian Territorial Waters,” undated.
40. Speech by President William Clinton, June 21, 1998, www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrsEhjm1DS0, accessed October 30, 2010.
41. President William Clinton, “Remarks at the Seventh Millennium Evening at the White House,” April 12, 1999, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William Jefferson Clinton, part I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000), p. 545.
42. Pollack, Persian Puzzle, p. 323.
43. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, “Remarks before the American-Iranian Council,” March 17, 2000, Washington, D.C. The speech went exceedingly well except for one line by the secretary: “Despite the trend towards democracy, control over the military, judiciary, courts and police remains in unelected hands.” Ken Pollack, a respected CIA analyst now working on the NSC staff, listened to the “unelected hands” line and cringed. He had lobbied hard to no avail to have it removed, believing that it would be seen in Tehran as questioning the legitimacy of the supreme leader.
44. “Iran: Khamenei on Albright’s ‘Deceitful’ Remarks,” Iranian News Agency, FBIS, March 25, 2000.
45. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Edward Walker memorandum, “Iran Policy,” February 16, 2001.
CHAPTER 22 AN ATROCITY
1. October 11, 2000, presidential debate, www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-2000-debate-transcript, accessed July 1, 2010.
2. CINCCENT briefing, “Assessment of Military Options to Iranian Sponsored Terrorism,” January 2001.
3. Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, USMC (Ret.), interview with author, June 18, 2010.
4. On November 25, 2000, both Richard Clarke and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger wrote Clinton that the FBI and CIA believed that al-Qaeda had been behind the attacks. General Shelton remained uncertain about who had perpetrated the attack. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2004), pp. 194–95. The DIA had several unsubstantiated intelligence reports from human sources that po
inted to Lebanese Hezbollah as having trained and provided the explosives to the perpetrators.
5. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 201.
6. During the same briefing, Newbold described the military plans against al-Qaeda. Polo Step was also the name used by CENTCOM to protect Iraqi military plans. See General Tommy Franks autobiography American Soldier (New York: ReganBooks, 2004), p. 384.
7. Cited in Craig Whitlock, “Probe of USS Cole Bombing Unravels,” Washington Post, May 4, 2008, p. A1.
8. Larry Wilkerson, interview with author, June 24, 2010; Haass, War of Necessity, p. 176.
9. Lieutenant Colonel Kim Olson, USAF memorandum, “Iran 101,” February 1, 2001.
10. Pollack interview; Newbold interview.
11. Donald Rumsfeld memorandum to Condi Rice, “Iraq,” July 27, 2001.
12. Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown (New York: Sentinel, 2011), pp. 420–21.
13. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 10–12.
14. David Rose, “Heads in the Sand,” Vanity Fair, May 12, 2009.
15. “An Open Letter to President Clinton,” Project for the New American Century, January 26, 1998, www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm, accessed July 2006; Robert Kagan, “A Way to Oust Saddam,” Weekly Standard, September 28, 1998; Richard Perle, “Rethinking the Middle East,” speech before the American Enterprise Institute, October 14, 1998, www.aei.org/speech/16436, accessed August 3, 2010.
16. Frank Miller, interview with author, July 1, 2010. Five others who worked in senior positions within the Bush administration, who did not want to go on record, shared a similar view as Miller’s.
17. During an interview with NBC’s Matt Lauer promoting his book Decision Points, Bush echoed a frequent dismissive refrain about the judgment of history: “I’m gonna be dead, Matt, when they finally figure it out.” President George Bush interview with Matt Lauer, NBC, November 8, 2010.
18. Interview with senior NSC official. Also see Peter Rodman, Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush (New York: Knopf, 2009), pp. 249–50.