by Avi Shlaim
The Israelis encouraged Dr Herbert to make contact with Queen Zain during her visit to London in September 1960. He understood what they were after and promised to try to arrange a private meeting with her when she came to see him in his clinic. But after her visit he told the Israelis that he had nothing of interest to report. As usual, the queen was accompanied by her personal physician, Dr Shawkat Aziz as-Sati, with whom she conversed in Turkish, and Herbert did not find a convenient opportunity for a proper conversation with her. In her entourage he found considerable anxiety about Nasser’s intrigues, but he did not detect any willingness to move closer to Israel as a result. The queen herself was troubled by the rumours of plots to assassinate her. Although the meeting bore no fruit, the Israelis were once again impressed by Herbert’s shrewdness and unqualified willingness to help.39
A month later Hussein visited London; he stayed at Claridges, and Dr Herbert received an invitation to have tea with him there. It was a social call with no particular medical purpose. Hussein was extremely friendly and invited his Jewish doctor to visit him in Jordan. Herbert asked the king whether he received the message he had sent him through his uncle. The king replied that indeed he had and added, ‘I very much appreciate the message and am grateful for it. It was very important for us that during difficult times we had nothing to fear from this side. Over the years a growing confidence has been established which has quietened the border. One day it will be possible through the UN to reach an honourable agreement. Now that contact has been established, we can look forward with increasing confidence to the future.’ Dr Herbert recalled that the king mentioned the United Nations twice as a party in reaching a peace settlement. Although the king did not mention Israel by name, he clearly had it in mind and, what is more, he treated his doctor as the representative of the other side.40 The Israelis were therefore justified in concluding from this private conversation that the king regarded Herbert not just as a doctor and a friend but as a trusted emissary. They went further in thinking that, given the sensitivity of contact with Israel, the king was more likely to put his trust in Dr Herbert than even in any of his closest advisers. In any case, they felt that at long last they had succeeded in establishing a permanent channel of communication with the king.41
Hussein visited London again in December 1961 and saw Dr Herbert five or six times for various medical check-ups. Hussein was said to be as healthy as an ox but tired and rather tense. Dr Sati, the family doctor, accompanied Hussein on all of these visits, so there was no opportunity for confidential conversations.42 Not that the elderly Jordanian physician would have been surprised by the admixture of medicine with covert contacts with the Jews. He himself had been King Abdullah’s doctor as well as his most trusted emissary in the secret diplomacy that he conducted with his neighbours across the Jordan River in the crucial phase of the struggle for Palestine. Unlike some of King Abdullah’s other aides, who had a personal axe to grind, Dr Sati had enjoyed Abdullah’s absolute confidence and was entrusted by him to carry out the most sensitive of missions. It was Dr Sati who was usually sent to Jerusalem to convey the king’s letters or verbal messages to the officials of the Jewish Agency, who knew that the doctor would not try to inject his personal views and preferences in the process of liaising between the two sides and that any money they handed to him would be faithfully delivered to the right destination.43
The patient efforts of the Israelis to make direct contact with Hussein through his Jewish doctor eventually paid off. Following an incident on the border with Jordan, the Israelis asked Dr Herbert to arrange a meeting for them with Queen Zain, who was staying in London at the time, so they could give her a message for her son. Zain replied, ‘Why do you want to meet with me? His Majesty is in London and he is ready to meet an authorized representative sent to him by the prime minister of Israel.’44 Levi Eshkol was the prime minister at that time, having recently replaced David Ben-Gurion. Eshkol was a more reasonable and down-to-earth person than his predecessor, and more moderate in his approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Whereas Ben-Gurion was a proponent of retaliation, Eshkol was a proponent of negotiation, of practical solutions to practical problems, of dialogue and accommodation. Eshkol’s foreign minister was Golda Meir, a participant in the secret contacts with King Abdullah and a not so secret admirer of Abdullah’s grandson. During the 1958 crisis in Jordan, Meir told the British foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, ‘We all pray three times a day for King Hussein’s safety and success.’45 She and Eshkol favoured the continuation of the status quo in Jordan and regarded the survival of the Hashemite monarchy in Amman as essential to Israel’s security.46 For the delicate mission of meeting with Hussein, they chose the best qualified person in the Israeli diplomatic service.
Yaacov Herzog (1921–72) was a highly sophisticated, cultured and sensitive man with a profound faith in Israel’s destiny. He was the son of the Chief Rabbi of Ireland and the brother of Chaim Herzog, the director of military intelligence and later president of the State of Israel. Yaacov, who was born in Dublin, settled in Palestine in 1939. He graduated in law from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and obtained a doctorate in international relations from the University of Ottawa. Following in his father’s footsteps, he was also ordained as a rabbi and became a considerable Talmudic scholar. As ambassador to Canada he achieved fame by challenging Professor Arnold Toynbee, the eminent historian, to a public debate at McGill University. From 1963 to 1965 he was deputy director general of the Foreign Ministry. Herzog was a practising Jew, very cautious by nature, but with a taste for secret diplomacy and sensitive missions. It was he who established the secret channel to Hussein, and it was he who maintained it almost without a break until 1970. Herzog and Hussein had very little in common except for their admiration for the British way of life, yet they established a relationship based on trust and mutual respect. Apart from all his intellectual talents, Herzog was a meticulous, even fastidious, civil servant who compiled an extraordinarily detailed record of all his contacts and conversations with Hussein and his advisers.47
On 24 September 1963 Herzog went straight from the airport to the secret meeting at Dr Herbert’s elegant house in Langford Place, St John’s Wood. When he entered the room, Hussein rose from his chair and stretched out his hand. Herzog bowed to him, shook his hand, and expressed his appreciation that he had agreed to see him. Dr Herbert stayed with his guests until the end of the meeting after Hussein indicated that he had no objection. Herzog opened the conversation by saying that he was privileged to be the special emissary of the prime minister and foreign minister of the State of Israel and that he brought with him a message of esteem and goodwill. They and indeed the entire people of Israel viewed with sympathy and admiration King Hussein’s statesmanship, leadership, and personal courage. While the public posture of their relationship might be touched by the wounds of history, deep down Israelis were aware of the common destiny that bound the two peoples together in their struggle for survival. They were convinced that cooperation between them enshrined a key for stability and progress for the Middle East as a whole. As Herzog spoke in this grandiloquent manner, Hussein alternated between smiles and signs of nervousness. He offered Herzog a cigarette and insisted on lighting it with his lighter.
Herzog proceeded to give a survey of the situation in the Middle East, touching on many of the different conflicts in the area. Hussein broke in with a broad smile and gave his response. With clear signs of nervousness and weighing his words very carefully, he said that he was pleased that Herzog had come to see him. For years he had been endeavouring to build up his country and it was not an easy task because his people had suffered much; there were diverse elements, and he was constantly under pressure from his enemies. He did not want war, as he realized that war would solve nothing. All he sought was to develop a better life for his people. He understood that his people had to recognize and accept Israel as a fact. He admitted that in the past he had been very extremist, but he wanted the Israelis to understa
nd that his family had suffered tragedy. He hoped that a solution would come about, and he was prepared to work towards this goal.
Hussein agreed with Herzog’s analysis of the Middle East situation. His trouble, he said, was with his friends more than with enemies. The Americans supported Nasser to the highest degree and without reservation. They were now also supporting the Ba’th, an unstable and destructive force that would bring communism into the area. Hussein spoke with some bitterness about the Americans and returned to them at several points in the conversation. America took Jordan for granted. He had therefore decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and he had just completed a successful visit to France. Hussein said that he had nothing personal against Nasser, but that Nasser was incapable of agreeing to a union of equals. He was now careful in his relations with Nasser so as not to provoke him. The Ba’th seemed to be moving on a dangerous course. They were considering a union of Syria and Iraq, and he felt that it was their plan to try to swallow up Jordan.
The more tangible part of the conversation dealt with cooperation in the security, political and economic spheres. Hussein said that he favoured cooperation and asked Herzog to make suggestions. Herzog offered to transmit regularly their assessments of the internal situation in Jordan and of military developments in other Arab countries of the Middle East. He referred in this context to the information they transmitted in 1958 on Mahmud Roussan’s plot and to the contact of their head of military intelligence (his brother, Chaim Herzog) with Emil Jamian. Hussein expressed his deep gratitude for their support and for the information they had transmitted to him in the past. Herzog replied that it was vital to establish a means for regular communication about security.
Herzog proceeded to outline a plan for coordinated political action in the Middle East. He argued that America’s support for Nasser was due in no small part to the absence of a coordinated initiative on the part of his opponents. If clear lines of policy were worked out between Iran, Turkey, Jordan and Israel, a new concept for the Middle East might evolve and an effective counter-balance to Nasser be created. Hussein seemed particularly impressed with this idea and proceeded to reiterate his criticism of American policy. Herzog replied that Israel could be of assistance in an effort to project a positive image of Hussein and Jordan in the US press and in Congress. Hussein remarked that the situation was growing more difficult and that he would appreciate any help that Israel could proffer. The discussion then moved on to economic issues like water, tourism and the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees. Here the discussion helped to clarify the issues in dispute without leading to any concrete conclusions. But in the course of the conversation both sides had ample opportunity to state their basic position. Herzog emphasized Israel’s commitment to the independence and integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Hussein expressed his deepest admiration for Israel’s achievements.
The last part of the meeting was devoted to the technicalities of establishing and maintaining regular communication. Herzog submitted that this was absolutely vital and asked Hussein to appoint two high-level representatives, one for security and military questions, and the other for political and economic questions. Hussein promised to give the matter some thought after his return home and stressed the importance of keeping their contact secret. When Herzog reached the door, he turned towards Hussein and bowed. Hussein acknowledged with a warm smile and with a wave of the hand. To Dr Herbert, who escorted him out of the residence, Hussein said that he was highly pleased with the meeting.48
On the following day Hussein paid another visit to Dr Herbert and handed him a secret code for contacting him in Amman without any risk of the message being seen or intercepted by any unauthorized persons. Hussein said that he was very pleased with the meeting and that he had been highly impressed by the presentation that had been made to him. Yaacov Herzog needed no reminding about the importance of secrecy because he was by nature an exceedingly careful, discreet and secretive man. Even in his private diary he resorted to codes, but in his official reports he took this habit to ludicrous lengths. He registered in his hotel under the pseudonym ‘Dr Davis’ and referred to the other participants in the drama by elaborate code names that are not very difficult to decipher from the context. Thus Dr Herbert was ‘the lawyer’; Queen Zain was ‘the cousin’; Jordan was ‘Menashe’ – a reference to one of the twelve biblical tribes of Israel; and Hussein, for some strange reason, was ‘Charles’. At the end of his thirteen-page report on the first meeting, Herzog penned the following impression:
Charles is short and stocky, effusing simultaneously warmth and nervous energy. I was struck by the apparent contradictions in his posture – maturity with leadership, levity with dignity, escapism with responsibility. The almost crushing burden of perilous leadership seemed to have caught his youth unaware. As I watched him at close quarters I recalled the description of Bernard Shaw attributed to Chesterton: ‘I see in him two personalities and at times they come so close to each other that I had to hold my breath.’ As I took my leave I said from the depth of my heart that I felt that the meeting was providential and I prayed that the Almighty would guide the unfolding contact and cooperation towards fruition. Charles seemed moved and nodded assent.49
The most extraordinary thing about this meeting between the Arab ruler and the Jewish emissary is that it took place at all. One factor that helps to explain it is Hussein’s perception that the Americans were wavering in their commitment to the survival of his regime as a result of their desire to accommodate Nasser. Fear that the Americans might abandon him, made Hussein more willing to open a strategic dialogue with Israel in September 1963.50 Meir Amit, the head of military intelligence from 1961 to 1963 and director of the Mossad from 1963 to 1968, stressed the American dimension in Israel’s relationship with Jordan. America was important to both Israel and Jordan. Hussein had a feeling that Israel’s influence in America was decisive and that affected his attitude towards Israel. Another factor that helped Israel get closer to Hussein was that there were fewer problems and fewer conflicts in Israel’s relations with Jordan than in its relations with the other neighbouring Arab states. Amit was not sure whether the word ‘liberal’ was appropriate for Hussein, but he was always more open to contacts with Israel than other Arab rulers. Amit used to say that the sea was stormy and if Israel wanted to continue to swim, it had to swim under the waves. Following this precept turned the Mossad into the secret foreign ministry of the State of Israel and led to the establishment of secret links with a number of Arab states. All these links were grounded in common interests. In the case of Jordan, however, Israel was able to get right up to the top of the pyramid.51
The basic premise of Hussein’s policy was that Israel was there to stay. The issue for him was how to reach accommodation and how to cooperate in the post-peace period. For him the existence of Israel was never in question and neighbourly relations with her were desirable, if not inevitable. He never harboured any illusions of fighting Israel for the sake of eliminating it. There was thus an obvious tension between his public commitment to Arab unity and to the liberation of Palestine on the one hand, and his private commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict over Palestine on the other. This tension did not trouble Hussein, according to one of his close advisers. Hussein knew that Arab leaders always had two languages on Palestine: one was solely for the benefit of the public, while the other reflected their pragmatism and directed their policy. He had no difficulty making use of the same dual discourse.52
10
The Palestinian Challenge
Hussein’s first face-to-face encounter with an Israeli official was followed by a successful effort to re-establish himself as an Arab and an accepted leader among the Arabs. For the British ambassador this was the most significant feature of 1964: ‘After all these years in the Arab wilderness, the prophetic lineage tainted by too close links with the West, of suspect zeal in the struggle against Zion, the Old Harrovian tie like a halt
er round his neck, he has made a remarkable comeback.’1 This comeback was made possible by Hussein’s rapproachment with Nasser. The much vaunted and much feared UAR was consigned to the scrap heap as old rivalries and old jealousies reasserted themselves between Nasser and the Ba’th parties of Syria and Iraq.2 A major realignment was taking place in the Arab world that brought Hussein and Nasser much closer together. Hussein gained unprecedented popularity in Jordan and was able to sleep more soundly in his bed at night. But in the longer term there was bound to be a political price to pay for this association. Some politicians, notably Wasfi Tall, cautioned against what they saw as the appeasement of Nasser, but their warning was disregarded by the increasingly self-confident king.