An aerial view, photographed November 1, 1950, looking north across the frozen Pungnyuri-gang Inlet (bottom center), where the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, and the two A and B Battery 1o5-mm howitzers of the 57th FA Battalion went into bivouac perimeter on November 27, 195o. The road and the narrow-gauge railroad can be seen on the south (right) side of the inlet. The vehicular road crosses the inlet at a bridge and causeway at the east end of the inlet, and the road then runs west along the north side of the inlet and turns north around a large hill mass (Hill 1324) to the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, position (Hill 1316). At the left center the road can be seen crossing the shallow saddle pass in the 1st Battalion position. Hill 1475 is to the upper right, covered with snow. Near the bottom center is Hill 1250, and in the lower right is Hill 1456. US Army photograph SC 363264.
Mortrude subsequently walked along the platoon line at intervals to see that security was in effect and that his men were not allowing their feet to freeze. He found that the Korean augmentation troops (KATUSA) were in their usual "ostrich" posture. Mortrude pulled some of the men from their holes and ordered them to walk with him until their circulation was restored. When he returned to his platoon CP, he examined his weapon and had difficulty loading and unloading it. There was icing of the bolt, which made operation sluggish or ineffective, interfering with automatic and semiautomatic fire. Icing proved to be a major problem throughout the operation.
The battalion front line was about 2 miles long, with C Company holding the longest company sector from a point east of the road along the ridgeline that ran uphill northwest to southeast toward the summit of Hill 1470, the boundary with B Company. B Company's line turned at a right angle down another spur ridge that ran southwest toward the road. There is some difference of opinion among survivors about just where the right flank of B Company's line ended, but certainly it did not extend to the road by way of Hill 1324. I believe that B Company did not extend its line down the desirable spur ridge leading to Hill 1324 because of a lack of men for such a defense line. Instead it came down a lower spur ridge from the high ground at its left flank some distance north and northwest of Hill 1324. Even so, it did not reach the road. The shore of the reservoir lay about 1%2 miles west of the battalion CP.
The weakest place on the perimeter was at its highest ground, at the boundary of C and B companies, where a spur ridge from a still higher peak eastward provided a good approach downhill to it.'
At Chosin a Marine battalion had about 30 percent greater strength than an Army infantry battalion, thus making the position far more manageable for the Marines than for Faith's Army battalion.
In the three weeks before the 31st RCT hurriedly assembled on the east side of Chosin Reservoir, it had become known throughout X Corps that the Chinese 42nd Army with three divisions, the 124th, 125th, and 126th, had crossed from Manchuria into North Korea and was in the Chosin Reservoir area. This army was an element of the XIII Army Group from Lin Piao's famous Fourth Field Army. Its mission in October and the first half of November, 1950, had been to provide left-flank security for the Chinese XIII Army Group, which had attacked Eighth Army north of the Chongchon River.
As related earlier, the ROK 26th Regiment and the 7th Marine Regiment had encountered the CCF 124th Division in the vicinity of Sudong, on the road from the reservoir to the coast at Hungnam, and in hard fighting had driven it back north to the foot of Funchilin Pass. From there the remnants of the Chinese division had withdrawn to Hagaru-ri.
At the same time the 126th Division had moved eastward toward the Fusen Reservoir, apparently to discover the degree of hydro development there. One of its regiments had had several minor skirmishes with the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, on the east side of the reservoir. The Chinese regiment had withdrawn without offering major battle. There appears to have been no American contact with the 125th Division. Knowledge of Chinese contact presence in the Chosin area itself came when the 1st Marine Division and, later, the 31st RCT climbed to the reservoir. There the Marines had minor contact with a few members of the 125th Division and some un identified Chinese. Knowledge, therefore, was limited to the presence of the three divisions of the Chinese 42nd Army, only two of them now considered to be combat-effective. The Marines believed that there was some evidence that the 42nd Army might have withdrawn from the Chosin area or was in the act of doing so.
On November 22 patrols from the ist Marine Division made contact with a new Chinese formation in skirmishes west of Hagaru-ri. The formation was identified as the Chinese 89th Division, but its small contact forces showed no inclination to fight. These events led to an optimistic view in X Corps.
A significant incident occurred on November 26. About 4:00 P.M. two miles southwest of Yudam-ni three Chinese soldiers carrying leaflets came up to a patrol of the 7th Marines and surrendered to it. Five days earlier, November 21, they had deserted from the Chinese both Division, loth Army, Third Field Army. They said that other divisions in the 20th Army were the 58th and the 59th. They had crossed the Yalu River with their division at Manpojin on November 11 and had reached Yudam-ni on November 2021. The loth Army's mission, they said, was to cut the Marines' MSR southeast of Yudam-ni after two American regiments had passed their own position west of the town. Their attack was to be launched only at night. The order of march of the loth Army to preassigned positions after it reached Yudam-ni was the both, the 59th, and the 58th divisions. Already, then, according to their story, three new Chinese divisions were in position south and east of Yudam-ni waiting to cut off the 1st Marine Division. Korean civilians told Marine interrogators of recent Chinese troop movements after dark that tended to corroborate this story.' With soldiers from the 89th Division already identified, this information indicated that four divisions from the CCF 20th Army were now in the reservoir area. This startling information was transmitted to X Corps on the afternoon of the 26th, but there is no evidence that it was given to the army units on the east side of Chosin.
One of the curious things throughout the Chosin Reservoir operations was the lack of communication between the ist Marine Division and the Army's 31st RCT. Their radios did not net on the same channels, and neither could communicate with the other. An exception was the ability of Capt. Edward P. Stamford, the forward air controller (FAC) with Faith's battalion, to communicate with the Air Control Center at Hagaru-ri through relay by Corsair fighter pilots overhead. Through them he could inform the Control Center at Hagaru-ri of the need for Marine fighter planes for close ground support.
On this Sunday, November 26, when X Corps received news that three new Chinese divisions were already below Yudam-ni, General Almond at X Corps also had disturbing news from the Eighth Army front to the west. He passed it on to Maj. Gen. Oliver Smith at the ist Marine Division Headquarters. Large Chinese formations had hit hard the right, or east, flank of Eighth Army during the night of November 25-26, routing the ROK II Corps. Unfortunately, none of this information reached the 31st RCT that day or the next.
In contrast to the assumptions and optimistic complacency that characterized the X Corps command in general, what was the reality?
The few small groups of enemy the 5th Marines had seen on the east side of the reservoir before the arrival there of much of the 31st RCT (- ) were in fact the advance scouting parties of the Chinese Both Division of the CCF 27th Army, IX Army Group, Third Field Army. Eight Chinese divisions of the IX Army Group had crossed into Korea and were hidden at various points around and below the reservoir. Another four divisions were held in reserve at the Yalu River in the vicinity of Linchiang. Aerial reconnaissance had discovered neither the crossing of these divisions nor their movements at night to the reservoir area, where they went into preplanned positions to await the arrival of X Corps troops. The Chinese meant to spring the trap when the Marines had concentrated at Yudam-ni and had begun their push west toward Mupyong-ni. The areas west and south of Yudam-ni and eastward toward Hagaru-ri were the focal points of Chinese concentration. One or more division
s were to move down the east side of the reservoir and attack Hagaru-ri from that side.,
In the People's Liberation Army the Third Field Army was considered second only to Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army in combat efficiency. The 2oth and 27th armies of the IX Army Group were among its most noted for mobility. Most of their equipment was of Japanese origin, but much was American, obtained when the Nationalist divisions of Chiang Kai-shek surrendered to the Communists at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.
General Sung Shih-lun commanded the IX Army Group. Born in 1910, Sung was about 40 years old in 195o when his troops confronted the 1st Marine Division and the 31st RCT at Chosin. He had commanded troops in battle since he was 17 years old. In the Long March from Kiangsi Province to Yenan in 1934-35 he had commanded a regiment. In 1949, after the final defeat of the Nationalist forces in the Chinese Civil War, Sung became garrison commander of the Shanghai-Wusung area. Quick-tempered, he was nevertheless considered a good tactician and a master of guerrilla warfare. His bravery in battle was unquestioned-he had been tested many times. On occasion he had served as commander of the Third Field Army.
Much of Sung's IX Army Group entered Korea from Manchuria between November 15 and 20. Counted in his strength were former Nationalist divisions which brought their American weapons with them, with the Thompson submachine gun prominent. When Sung entered Korea, the 42nd Army left the Chosin area and moved toward Tokchon to join its parent organization, the XIII Army Group of the Fourth Field Army, which was then massing against the US Eighth Army. Sung then took over responsibility for the Chosin Reservoir area. He had a double mission: provide eastflank protection to the larger XIII Army Group in the west that was to attack Eighth Army and, more important, destroy the ist Marine Division and any other troops then assembling in the Chosin area.;
Nearly all these Chinese soldiers came from the Chinese province of Shantung and were farmers or sons of farmers. Shantung lies on the west side of the Yellow Sea on the Chinese coast, opposite the southern tip of Korea and Kyushu. The climate there is relatively mild, like that of Illinois in the United States, and these soldiers were not inured to the harsh winters of northern Korea, as were many of the XIII Army Group soldiers, who were natives of Manchuria.
In the fighting at Chosin Reservoir the combat effectiveness of the 27th Army was easily the best. It attacked the ist Marine Division at Yudam-ni on the west side of the reservoir and the 31st RCT on the east side of the reservoir in the initial surprise attacks on the night of November 27. The 20th Army was next in combat effectiveness. It cut the American MSR at numerous places south of Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri and fought most of the battles along that road south to the coast. The 26th Army was the least effective, most of its participation being near Koto-ri.
General Liu Fei had once commanded the 20th Army, but did not lead it in Korea. The 20th Army began leaving Shantung Province by rail on November 6, 195o and closed into Chian, Manchuria, by November to. It crossed the pontoon bridge over the Yalu River, moved the 6 miles northeast to Manpojin, and there entrained for the next leg of the journey. The trains moved only at night, remaining hidden in tunnels during the daytime. The railroad ran 40 miles southeast of Manpojin at Kanggje, an important road- junction center, and from there another 28 miles southwest to Mupyong-ni. There the 20th Army left the rail lines and marched along the narrow, twisting dirt road that led eastward 5 miles to Yudam-ni, on the western side of Chosin Reservoir. It closed there between November 13 and 15, five days after crossing the Yalu, and relieved the 42nd Army of responsibility for the Chosin area. Except for a few small groups, the loth Army remained effectively concealed until November 27.
MAP 5. Chinese Communist forces movement to Chosin Reservoir, November 15-20, 1950.
The 26th Army left Tenghsien, Shantung Province, by train beginning on November i, and by November 5 it had closed on Linchiang, Manchuria. Sung held it there in IX Army Group reserve until about the end of November. When it became apparent that the 20th and 27th armies were not going to defeat the X Corps troops and destroy them in the reservoir area, he belatedly started the 26th Army south. Two divisions arrived in the Chosin area in time to join efforts to cut off the ist Marine Division and 7th Division troops before they reached the Hungnam Perimeter at the coast.4
The 27th Army was directly involved with the 31st RCT in the battles on the east side of Chosin Reservoir. This army was capable of long, sustained marches and had distinguished itself in China in attacks against fortified places. It had behind it a long string of battles in the Chinese Civil War, including the battle for Shanghai.
On October 25, i95o, the Both Division and the rest of the 27th Army began a rail movement to Linchiang on the Yalu River. It arrived there on November i. The 79th and 8oth divisions immediately crossed the river and headed for the Chosin Reservoir. The 27th Army was to make the frontal attack on the X Corps troops. In its plan of attack on the ist Marine Division at the reservoir the 27th Army was to divide its forces in a pincer movement that would close at Hagaru-ri. Its 79th Division was to move down the west side of the reservoir and attack Yudam-ni. The Both Division was to move down the east side of the reservoir and simultaneously attack Hagaru-ri from that side.
It appears that the CCF 8oth Division conducted most if not all of the operations against the 31st RCT east of Chosin. It is not certain that the entire division was engaged in these actions, nor is it certain that other enemy formations were not engaged there.f
The movements and locations of the 81st and 9oth divisions of the 27th Army during the Chosin battles remain something of a mystery. They were somewhere in the vicinity of the reservoir, apparently at first being held in reserve. There are no recorded battle contacts with them until after the X Corps troops at Chosin had withdrawn into the Hungnam Perimeter. It is possible, however, that elements of these divisions took part in the battles on East Hill at Hagaru-ri in early December and were not identified. The 79th and 8oth divisions were the most effective of all Chinese units engaged.6
On the afternoon of November 27, after the 5th Marines had started their attack west from Yudam-ni, a large Marine patrol met a company-size Chinese force and fought a skirmish with it north of Yudam-ni. Papers taken from one of the enemy dead identified the group as part of the CCF 79th Division., Thus during the 27th this crack division was moving into place just north of Yudam-ni. The US Army troops on the east side of the reservoir seem never to have identified the Both Division as being in their vicinity. Further, the 31st RCT never identified this enemy division during the battles there. It took some Chinese prisoners but apparently had neither the time nor the facilities for extensive interrogation of them. Surviving records of the 31st RCT or personal recollections of participants do not identify the enemy units encountered there-only that they were Chinese.
When the and Battalion, 5th Marines, headed west on the dirt road toward Mupyong-ni on the morning of November 27, it did not get far. Chinese hidden in the hills manned previously dug positions on the high ground flanking the road and with the use of numerous physical roadblocks all but halted the battalion in its tracks. By the end of the day the 5th Marines had advanced only two miles. They went into a defensive position astride the road and on surrounding hills late in the afternoon, not knowing what the night would bring. The 31st RCT had not yet concentrated on the east side of the reservoir and was unable to start its attack that day. It expected to do so the next morning.
Unlucky in many things, the ist Battalion, 32nd Infantry, had good fortune during the evening of November 27 in the return of Maj. Robert E. Jones, its adjutant. He had left the battalion bivouac at "Happy Valley" on the morning of November 23 with an advance party to establish an assembly area for the battalion in the 7th Division area in the Pungsan or Pukchong areas for future operations near the Yalu River. Jones had reached the 17th Infantry area near the Yalu before he learned that the battalion's mission had been changed and that he had to hurry back.
Early in the morning of Nov
ember 27, Jones left the 7th Division's rear CP at Pukchong in a 21/2-ton truck loaded with a two weeks' accumulation of mail and some early Christmas packages, heading for Chosin. He reached Hudong-ni and in a brief stop there found General Hodes and Colonel MacLean conversing in the schoolhouse. Jones asked for the location of the ist Battalion and then continued on his way, stopping briefly at the 31st Heavy Mortar position.'
About 8:30 P.m., soon after Jones's arrival at the CP, a liaison officer from Colonel MacLean's forward CP brought an operations order directing the battalion to attack at dawn toward Kalchon-ni. At 9:30 P.m., Faith gave his company commanders orders concerning the battalion advance the next morning.'
Jones was an "old-timer" in the battalion and the regiment. He had been with both since the early days of the 32nd Regiment's reorganization and had come to it from the 11th Airborne Division when the latter returned to the United States from Japan in 1949. Most of the time he had commanded C Company in the battalion.
Capt. (later Col.) Robert E. Jones in Japan, ig5o. Photograph courtesy of Colonel Jones.
A native of Poyner, Texas, Jones graduated from New Mexico State College in May, 1939, and received an ROTC commission as second lieutenant of infantry. He entered active duty in the army on August 21, 1940. He began airborne training at Fort Benning in 1942, graduating from its Parachute School in May. A little more than a year later he was in the European Theater as a member of the 502nd Parachute Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division. He jumped with his division in September, 1944, at Arnhem, Holland, in that ill-fated operation. Injured, he was evacuated to the United States.
East of Chosin Page 6