After all had breakfasted, Drake assembled three platoons of five tanks each with one of his command tanks mounting a 105-mm howitzer and having communications with regimental netting. This made a total of 16 tanks at his line of departure, which he marked on his map as 3/4 mile north of Hudong-ni. Drake pulled his jeep second in line behind the command tank. Hodes and the first sergeant of the medical company rode with him. Drake left his 4th Platoon of tanks and the second command tank with Lt. Hensen at Hudong-ni to defend the 31st Infantry Rear CP and the regimental dumps there."
Major Lynch watched the tank column form and then start up the road. Lynch's observation of Drake at Hudong-ni and later in the Marine defense perimeter at Hagaru-ri (where on the night of November 3o Drake's tanks slaughtered CCF attacking down East Hill in an effort to overrun the northeast arc of the Hagaru-ri perimeter) caused him to characterize Drake as an outstanding tank commander.
Born in California in 1923, Drake graduated from West Point in the class of 1944 and was commissioned an infantry-armor officer. He was assigned to the 9th Tank Battalion, 20th Armored Division, and received his field training under Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, who took the division to Europe in World War II. He served with the 9th Tank Battalion of the loth Armored Division in Europe in 1944-45, and in Japan during 1949-50 he commanded A Company, 77th Tank Battalion, up to the outbreak of the Korean War. His tank company was in action following the Inchon Landing from Suwon north to the Han River and the capture of Seoul. Drake was 27 years old at Chosin.
Capt. (later Col.) Robert E. Drake (right) talking with Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, X Corps commander (left), and Maj. Gen. David G. Barr (center), commander, 7th Infantry Division, Hungnam, Korea, December, igso. Photograph courtesy of Colonel Drake.
Brigadier General Henry Irving Hodes, 7th Division assistant commander, who now rode beside Drake, was born in the District of Columbia on March 19, 1899. Like Drake, he was a West Point graduate, class of 1920. Hodes was now 51 years old. He had been commissioned from West Point as an infantry officer but later transferred to cavalry. In World War II he had served in the War Department General Staff from 1942 to 1944 and had then commanded the 112th Infantry Regiment, 28th Division, in Europe. He was known as a taciturn officer. When he rode north with Drake on the morning of November 28, he let Drake exercise complete command of the tank attack, assuming the role of an officer who merely sought transportation to the forward infantry battalions.12
Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, deputy chief of staff, Eighth Army, at Munsan-ni on his return from the first meeting of the armistice conference at Kaesong, Korea, July to, t95t. Hodes was assistant division commander, 7th Division, at Chosin Reservoir, November-December, t95o. US Army photograph SC 372286.
From the line of departure the command tank led off northward with Drake and his passengers next in line. The three tank platoons followed without any infantry. About half a mile north the road seemed headed straight into Hill 1221, which rose about 400 feet above the low ground at Twiggae. There a tributary rising in the high mountain mass of Hill 1456 on the northeast emptied into the reservoir. The road thus far had been level, or nearly so, and ran near the edge of the reservoir. It crossed a small bridge and came to the edge of Twiggae, where it turned sharply northeast, angling up the lower slope of Hill 1221 toward a saddle about a mile away. There it made a hairpin turn and started northwest down the opposite (north) face to another inlet valley, where it met the reservoir.
Near Twiggae the stretch of road leading up to the saddle of Hill 1221, where the enemy had ambushed the medical company the night before, came into full view. At this turn the medical sergeant asked Drake to stop the jeep so that he could point out places where the Chinese had been the night before when they ambushed the medical company. While he was speaking and pointing to various places, a single shot from a sniper hit him in the head. Blood spurted over the map the three had been examining. The sergeant died immediately. Hodes took cover, and Drake ran to his command tank. It was about 10:00 A.M. on November 28.13
When Drake reached his command tank, he divided his force into three platoons. One platoon started up the road along the south slope of Hill 1221, a second attacked the south face of Hill 1221 north and west of the road, and Drake held the third platoon as a reserve at first behind his command tank. After the engagement was joined, however, Drake sent the third platoon east of the road along the right-hand edge of the flat ground at the lower edge of Hill 1473 (Ko-bong) in an effort to give flank support to the tanks on the road.
When the lead tanks advancing on the road neared some knocked-out vehicles of the medical company, the precise site of the ambush was revealed-about 400 to 500 yards south of the saddle at the east end of Hill 1221. There enemy bazooka teams and supporting riflemen attacked the two lead tanks, scored hits with American-built 3.5-inch rocket launchers, and knocked them out. One of the tanks blocked the road; the other slid off toward one side. Under covering fire the crew members escaped, some wounded.
Meanwhile, the tanks that tried to cross the low ground east of the road found the ground soft in spots. Chinese soldiers rushed down to the tanks, scrambled up their sides, and tried to lift the heavy engine compartment doors, intending to drop grenades inside. Drake's command tank from the lower part of the road swept the tops of these tanks with machine-gun fire and tried for tree bursts of io5-mm howitzer shells above the Chinese. Other tanks of the platoon directed machine-gun fire across the tops of the forward tanks and quickly swept the Chinese soldiers away. Two of the tanks, however, became mired down for a while, and it was a struggle to free them.
The view toward the northeast from near the middle of the inlet perimeter, showing the area the Chinese overran on the night of November 27-28. The photograph was taken on November 28. Several American dead, in sleeping bags, are in the foreground. The vehicular road runs along the south side of the inlet just out of sight beyond the narrow-gauge railroad, which is visible. The photographer is unknown. Photograph courtesy of Col. Ray 0. Embree.
The tanks on the slope of Hill 1221, west of the road, were having a difficult time. They could not negotiate the slippery, frozen slope. One went out of control over a steep incline, and another threw a track. The third platoon, which had tried to skirt the marshland on the east, or south of the road, finally extricated itself and returned to Hudong-ni earlier than the others.
The view from within the eastern part of the inlet perimeter on the morning of November 28, showing American litter parties gathering American dead in the area overrun by Chinese during the previous night. Two Chinese dead (in white uniforms) can be seen in the foreground. The photographer is unknown. Photograph courtesy of Col. Crosby P. Miller.
General Hodes watched the progress of the tank attack and saw that it would not succeed. Drake and Hodes discussed the situation, knowing the attack was failing. Drake said that if he could get some infantry support he would try again the next day to get to the top of Hill 1221 and dislodge the CCF. Drake also said that he wanted air strikes to help his attack. Hodes promised to do what he could, got into Drake's jeep, and drove back to Hudong-ni. Drake continued his efforts for some time after Hodes left but called off the attack in the afternoon. He reported his personnel casualties as two officers and io enlisted men. He had lost four tanks.
Hodes arrived back at Hudong-ni about noon. He seemed intent on going to Hagaru-ri, the only place where help might be sought. While he was considering the situation at Hudong-ni, he told Lieutenant Hensen of the tank company to make a reconnaissance from there to the area northeast of the road to find a route in that direction to bring the tanks around the Chinese roadblock at Hill 1221 and get them to the inlet.14
Hodes then told Anderson, Witte, and Lynch that he was going to Hagaru-ri to get help.'f He planned to go in a jeep. There was discussion among the 31st RCT officers about whether the road might be closed. Hodes did not seem disturbed by the prospect. But that morning the 31st Rear CP had picked up a message over its SCR 193 radio t
hat Hodes's van had stalled in Funchilin Pass, below Koto-ri, and had been pushed over the cliff to clear the road. Other messages indicated that the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, probably would not arrive and that enemy action had stopped traffic over the pass to Koto-ri. The enemy might likewise have cut the road between Hudong-ni and Hagaru-ri, but there was no information on that point. By this time the 31st Rear CP at Hudong-ni had lost communication with the inlet and forward positions, and none of this news went forward to the infantry and the artillery, only a few miles away. Lynch recalled that the night before, the 27th, Colonel MacLean had discussed with Hodes his concern that he had had no word from Lieutenant Coke's I&R Platoon, which he had sent east on reconnaissance.
In the discussion about the danger in setting out alone for Hagaru-ri in a jeep, someone had a persuasive thought. It was suggested that it would be better for Hodes to go in a tank since it would provide better protection for the trip and had radio facilities as well. This changed Hodes's mind, and he said that he would go in one of the tanks. He left Hudong-ni just after noon and soon arrived at Hagaru-ri, only S miles south, without incident. Hodes never returned to Hudong-m.11
In the afternoon Lieutenant Hensen began reconnoitering for a route around the Chinese roadblock. He took two tanks and started up a trail that ran northeast from behind the schoolhouse along the sloping ground of the hillside. The trail was only wide enough for one tank at a time. On this trail enemy fire hit the lead tank on its right track and stopped it. Lieutenant Hensen sighted the enemy gunner who had fired the round and had his tank gunner fire on him with a round of white phosphorus. This shot destroyed the enemy position. A member of Hensen's tank crew, Sgt. Jimmy P. Howle, tells what happened next:
We all got out of the tank. Lt. Hensen wanted some volunteers to go on to the top of this saddle to try and reconnoiter a new route to your [Capt. Drake's] position. When we reached the top of this saddle, we could see you at a distance. We became engaged in a fire-fight with some Chinese. They wanted to surrender. Lt. Hensen said that we would take them prisoner. They were in a group, and as we walked toward them they spread apart, and a man with a machine gun opened fire on us. I saw where the bullets striking Lt. Hensen in the front.... The bullets were pushing in his stomach and I could see his jacket pushing out in the back. I and Kim ran for cover of the trees nearby. We used up all our ammunition while trying to get back to our disabled tank and the other guys. I reported what had happened, and had it radioed to the CP. I then went inside the tank and replenished my ammunition, also some hand grenades. I asked if there were any volunteers to go with me and retrieve Lt. Hensen's body. No one would go. I started out alone. I didn't go far when I observed two Chinese down the hill to my right. I opened fire on them, neutralized them. When I looked to my left I saw the Chinese that had wanted [to] surrender just standing above me. I opened fire upon him. I think I emptied the clip into him. Then I saw many Chinese in the trees. I think that is when I realized just how crazy I was. That is when my nerves went berserk. I ran as fast as
A panoramic view, looking over the eastern end of the inlet perimeter, photographed on November 28, 1950, by an unknown photographer. The valley of the Pungnyuri-gang lies at the left along the base of the mountains. CCF sniper fire came from the ridge at the far right. Photograph courtesy of Col. Ray 0. Embree.
calming effect on me, but not enough. Later on the same Medic gave me some more. I think enough to put me to sleep. "
I could back to the safety of the tanks. 1st Sgt Keck and your [Drake's] executive officer (I don't recall his name) had just arrived. They were forming a group to go and retrieve Lt. Hensen. I wanted to lead them to where Lt. Hensen was. Your exec. ordered me to the CP, telling me that I was in no condition to go anywhere. I told 1st Sgt Keck about the Chinese that I had emptied the clip into. He informed me later that he had shot him about three more rounds to make sure that he was dead. The exec told the jeep driver to take me to the CP and to return. Upon reaching the CP I talked to a major about what was going on up there. Then I went into the kitchen, and was offered a cup of coffee. I was shaking so bad that I could not hold it. I sat down on a box and was handed it again, placing it between my knees. It was no use, I was shaking too badly. Then the Medic (I don't remember his name) gave me a shot of morphine. It had some
The group on the trail did not recover Lt. Hensen's body, but returned to the schoolhouse. Drake knew Hensen was a very aggressive young officer and was not surprised when his sergeant told him of his attempt. Drake searched the mountain country to the northeast with binoculars, eventually spotting Hensen's body propped against a tree in a sitting position, his rifle in his lap. Drake assumed that the Chinese had set a trap, hoping that Americans searching for Hensen would walk into it. He did not
Before he left for Hagaru-ri, Hodes, realizing that the Chinese in the high mountains on the northeast had perfect observation of the 31st Rear CP at Hudong-ni and after dark might make an effort to overrun it, decided that it should have a perimeter defense. He told Major Witte, the regimental S-2, to lay out a perimeter, and he then walked over it with him. Witte had no regular infantry for the perimeter, so he used an engineer platoon and regimental service troops. Hodes asked Witte whether there was any reason why he should not leave Lt. Col. Berry K. Anderson, the regimental S-3, in charge at Hudong-ni. Neither Hodes nor Witte knew Anderson well, but Witte replied that he knew of no reason to deny Anderson his seniority.
In the afternoon of the 28th, therefore, Anderson became the acting commander of the 31st Rear CP, pending any change that Colonel MacLean might make. But MacLean was never again in communication with Anderson or the 31st Rear CP. During the 28th, Service Battery of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, which had spent the night about a mile south of Hudong-ni, moved up to the 31st Rear CP and joined the group. There were now 150 miscellaneous 31st regimental headquarters and service troops at Hudongni. Counting Drake's tank company of about 176 men, the total number of troops there was approximately 325.
The Chinese did not attack Hudong-ni while the 31st Rear CP and the tank company were there, possibly deterred by the presence of the tanks. But they did infiltrate snipers to within small-arms range and placed longrange machine-gun fire on the area, causing some casualties.18
During Drake's tank action on the 28th at Hill 1221, he had in view the entire mountain mass of Hill 1473, 1'/z or 2 miles eastward. There on the high ridgeline he could see long lines of horse-mounted Chinese moving steadily southward. Drake estimated that he saw several hundred who had already bypassed the 31st RCT forward and inlet positions and now also Hudong-ni. Whether they were parts of the CCF Both Division that had attacked the 31st RCT or were from another major enemy formation is not known.19 It is reasonably certain, however, that they were on their way to East Hill, which dominated the east side of Hagaru-ri, and possibly other positions farther south along the X Corps MSR, which was under attack all the way to Sudong. Very likely many of them participated in the Chinese attack on Hagaru-ri that night.
During the tank action at Hill 1221 on November 28, Drake had no communication of any kind either with the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, and the 57th Field Artillery at the inlet, only 2 miles northeast, or with Faith's ist Battalion, 32nd Infantry, 4 miles farther north. Nor did anyone at the inlet perimeter hear any sound of the tank battle. The infantry and artillerymen, only a mile or two away, had no knowledge of the armor effort being made to reach them.
At the Inlet
When the Chinese overran the 81-mm mortars and A Battery's Io5-mm howitzers, they neither destroyed nor removed them. When they withdrew at daybreak, therefore, these weapons were still in place, and the artillerymen and the infantry reclaimed them during the morning. After the last Chinese had been driven from the battalion CP and the communications huts in Lieutenant Traywick's dawn counterattack, the 3rd Battalion reoccupied its original CP. During the day with the help of air strikes the infantry troops occupied their original ridgeline positions on the eas
t side of the perimeter. Stragglers from the rifle companies continued to filter into the perimeter throughout the day from their places of refuge during the latter part of the night. M Company improved its position for an expected continuation of the fight after dark. This was difficult work because the ground was frozen.20
The artillery changed its position during the day so that it did not coincide with the emplacements of the two batteries the first night. First Lieutenant Paul C. Smithey, B Battery, said that he talked to one of his ROK soldiers, who in turn talked with several Chinese prisoners. They told him that the next night (November 28-29), after the Chinese launched their first attack, they planned to follow it up by moving on B Battery, where they had been stopped the first night.21
One unfortunate thing had become clear in the artillery positions during the night of November 27-28 and the day of the 28th: Captain Theodore C. Goss, commander of B Battery, was not performing up to the standard of a battery commander. He acted more like a case of "combat fatigue," and was not in the fight.22 In contrast to Goss, Capt. Harold L. Hodge, A Battery commander, has been praised by all his officers and men who left any record of their views. Lieutenant Thomas J. Patton, of A Battery, said of Hodge that his "leadership proved to be of an outstanding quality, giving courage and inspiration to the men of the battery. His coolness under heavy fire was almost unbelievable." Patton said that on the second day Hodge told him that "the Battle of Bastogne was a picnic compared to this." Hodge had been decorated for bravery at Bastogne, according to Patton.
East of Chosin Page 12