An aerial view of the right (east) side of Chosin Reservoir, looking northwest over the middle and lower (northern) parts of Chosin Reservoir. It was taken on November i, 1950, from a point over the Paegamni-gang Valley, with Hudong-ni at the lower-left corner. Hill 1221 is the hill mass in the lower-left center. All the terrain on which the 31st RCT and Task Force Faith fought their battles from November 27 to December 1, can be seen in this photograph. The inlet perimeter is the frozen-over shallow water of the Pungnyurigang at the right center. US Army photograph SC 363267.
Throughout the night ... I continued to walk the line of the platoon positions to ensure that one man was awake in each hole and that no one was freezing. Fortunately, the platoon sergeant and his Korean counterpart were able to prepare some "C" ration coffee on a squad burner. This coffee, though only lukewarm when distributed to the troops, was greatly appreciated, more, I think, for the effort than the sustenance. All through the night we heard cries from our friendly wounded within the perimeter who were suffering from the cold. Also, the fighting with infiltrators in other areas of the perimeter had apparently resulted in US stragglers drifting into our more stable area. During one of my platoon rounds I was threatened by a hysterical battalion truck driver who was frenzied by the bizarre appearance of my improvised helmet cover (a pillow case) and my salvaged Chinese greatcoat. After he refused to be reassured by my voice, I was rescued by one of our automatic riflemen who in turn threatened to cut him "in half" if he didn't "leave the lieutenant alone."
Toward dawn ... enemy mortar fire increased in the vicinity of the Platoon CP. First, my acting Korean platoon leader was slightly wounded in the legs and back, and next, our platoon sergeant, SFC Campbell was killed. This left only the platoon medic, Camoesas, with some battalion wounded still awaiting helicopter evacuation, and myself in the CP area.
Sometime in the early morning.,. . Capt. Seever came to my CP and informed me of the increasing infiltration of other portions of the Task Force perimeter and of the possibility of a counterattack to clear the area. However, this mission never materialized for the 3rd Platoon.
Also, during this busy period, I injured my knee while launching a rifle grenade flare from a kneeling position on the icy ground. I don't know if the butt of my carbine slipped across my knee or if I carelessly placed it against my knee before firing. Thereafter it became difficult for me to walk.'
By shortly after midnight the Chinese attack had built up to an intensity not known in previous nights. Major Curtis thought that the enemy was determined to overrun the perimeter at any cost. Only the determined holding of their positions by A and C companies prevented the perimeter from being overrun. Even though there was more need for antiaircraft automaticweapons fire than ever, McClymont had so reduced its volume that his quad-50s were firing only two of their four machine guns and the dual-40s only one of their two guns. Their ammunition had been so reduced by this time that he had to take this conservation measure to keep the invaluable weapons in the fight.
One enemy penetration swept the infantry from in front of one of the quad-5os and beyond, but the crew stayed with their weapons and kept on firing. The penetration was sealed off largely because of the heavy quad-5o fire, and the enemy who had penetrated were killed inside the perimeter.;
After midnight the Chinese attacked the south and southeast sides of the perimeter simultaneously and penetrated the east side in the sector held by the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry. Strangely, however, their attacks did not appear well coordinated, nor did they concentrate on crucial points, though some received stubborn and repeated attacks.
Early in the night there was much blowing of bugles and whistles and launching of flares on the north. To those inside the perimeter this appeared to be a logical approach of any new attacking force: all it had to do was cross the ice at the narrow neck of the inlet and come directly to C Company's position. Heavy snowfall that began after dark made visibility poor.
On the second night of battle Captain Jordan tried to confuse the Chinese in their use of signals by having his M Company mortars fire differentcolored flares. Captain Bigger used the same tactics in his D Company on the night of November 30. When the enemy blew a whistle, he had his men blow one; when the Chinese shot a flare into the sky, his mortars fired one.4
One of the most persistent points of Chinese attack during the night was the boundary of A and C companies at the road at the western end of the perimeter. The A Company roadblock and Lieutenant May's improvised Headquarters Company group that reinforced them took the brunt of these attacks. May said his force killed a Chinese soldier within 50 feet of their position when 4o enemy made a desperate attempt to break through along the road about 6:0o A.M. on December I. After daylight May discovered that the soldier carried a .So-caliber American machine gun wrapped in burlap. But he had no tripod for the gun and no ammunition, nor could any ammunition be found on others in the party who were killed in front of the position.s
Major Miller in his statement on the fighting during the night of November 30 commented about the terrible destruction the AAA weapons wrought on the Chinese. He wrote: "Two dual 4o-mm guns and two multiple caliber 5o MG self-propelled AA Carriages [M16 quad-Sos] of the i5th AAA located within the perimeter inflicted terrific casualties on the enemy, particularly a multiple mount which had been laid on the road in front of C Company. The Chinese made repeated attempts to knock out these selfpropelled vehicles."6
Major Curtis also commented on one of the Chinese attacks against the A Company roadblock at the western end of the perimeter. He said that "a body of enemy troops charged down the open road in such a manner that our men at first identified them as other friendly troops. This attack, however, was repulsed with great casualties to the enemy. Fighting became very close, and in some instances hand-to-hand in other parts of the perimeter." He added that "occasionally a Chinese soldier would infiltrate inside the perimeter and run about like a madman spraying with his burp-gun until he was killed.... Between 0400 and o6oo every man in the perimeter was in a defensive position operating a weapon. The question was whether the perimeter could hold out until dawn."'
From the very first night of their attacks on the inlet perimeter the Chinese had struck at the northeast corner from the valley of the Pungnyurigang above the bridge. There they had good approaches to the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, holding the eastern side, and L and K companies suffered heavy losses. In the renewed Chinese attacks against this part of the perimeter in the predawn hours of December 1, Pfc. Stanley E. Anderson, of L Company, distinguished himself with a 3.5-inch rocket launcher, succeeding in turning back one of the enemy assaults.' But the CCF kept hitting this part of the perimeter repeatedly throughout the night, seeking a breakthrough.
About 3:00 A.M. on December i the Chinese finally penetrated the northeast corner of the perimeter. Previous penetrations elsewhere had been sealed quickly when Faith sent his preplanned counterattack force to the spot. This last breakthrough at the northeast corner was not closed, however, and it gave the enemy control of a high knob overlooking the perimeter below it to the west. The site was just east of the point where the road crossed the inlet on the bridge and causeway.9
When it became apparent that the Chinese would continue to hold this high ground, Faith called D Company, ordering a counterattack force to recapture the hill. First Lieutenant Robert D. Wilson, company reconnaissance officer, volunteered for the job and got together about 20 men. Just after daybreak he set off from the D Company area for the objective. His force was pitifully armed for the attack, but its condition was no worse than that of anyone else still able to fight in the perimeter. His group had a total of three hand grenades, only small-arms ammunition, and no rifle grenades. Wilson carried a chrome-plated Thompson submachine gun, captured earlier from the Chinese. The men had individual weapons, most of them rifles or carbines.
Wilson moved eastward from the D Company CP, passed through Lieutenant Campbell's machine-gun platoon position jus
t north of (below) the road and slanted northeast toward the causeway and the point of high ground beyond it. Campbell saw him pass through his position just after daybreak. Wilson soon moved from Campbell's sight, dropping below one of the hummocks of ground near the inlet. Since Campbell could not see the attack against the knob, he moved to his northeast gun position at Bigger's request, so that he could report back to him on Wilson's counterattack. From this gun position he could see the enemy-held knob. When Campbell got to the observation point, he could see no movement on the objective. His gun crew there told him that they saw Wilson's attack, which did not get very Their comments and later evidence from survivors indicated that Wilson reached the base of the knob and started up the slope with his men. Enemy fire soon hit him in the arm, knocking him down. He rose and continued on. Another bullet hit him, but he kept advancing. Almost immediately a third bullet struck him in the head and killed him. Then Sfc. Fred Sugua assumed command and climbed on with a small remaining group, but enemy fire killed him within a minute or two. The leaderless men continued the fight and reached part of the knob but were unable to gain control and restore the perimeter. The Chinese continued to hold the crest."
The Chinese did not pull back from the perimeter everywhere at daybreak as they had on previous days. Many of them stayed in the low ground within the perimeter. Others withdrew only a few hundred yards, within small-arms range. From these positions they delivered small-arms grazing and some machine-gun fire. Also, enemy mortar fire picked up and continued with increasing accuracy. This daytime fire caused more casualties.12
The Chinese made some desperate efforts at a final breakthrough after daylight. An assault force of 40 to 50 soldiers tried again to rush the 75-mm recoilless rifle posted on the road at the boundary of A and C companies. As before, the attack came up the road from the west, this time along the ditch on the south side of the road. Corporal Armentrout used a heavy machine gun, damaged during the night by an enemy mortar round, to hold off the enemy for a few minutes. Then the gun jammed. He sent his assistant gunner back for the only other heavy machine gun available. It arrived in time, and Armentrout killed about zo enemy soldiers with it, repulsing the attack.13
The increasing difficulty of taking care of the wounded is illustrated in Major Miller's statement that "during the night the Bn Aid Station had received a direct mortar round hit which wounded all the Aid Station medical personnel including Capt. Navarre, the battalion surgeon. Medical supplies were completely exhausted by dawn."14
Daylight revealed low clouds and fog. The prospect for receiving desperately needed air support during the day was not good. Curtis described the situation after daybreak:
An attempt to describe accurately the scene inside the perimeter of Task Force Faith on the morning of i December 1950 runs the risk of appearing macabre. Very probably, however, even Hollywood will not be able to duplicate it in stark tragedy and horror.... By dawn on i December members of the Task Force had been under attack for 8o hours in sub-zero weather. None had slept much. None had washed or shaved; none had eaten more than a bare minimum. Due to the season of the year, darkness covered about 16 hours of each 24 hour period-and during the hours of darkness the enemy exploited his terror weapons such as bugles, whistles, flares, burp-guns, and infiltration tactics. The ground was frozen so solidly as to hamper digging, so riflemen and weapons crews occupied very shallow trenches.
The dead, concentrated in central collecting points, had to be used as a source for all supplies including clothing, weapons, and ammunition. Everyone seemed to be wounded in one fashion or another and to varying degrees of severity. Frozen feet and hands were common. The wounded who were unable to move about froze to death. Trucks and jeeps and trailers were ransacked for ammunition and any kind of fabric that would serve for bandages or clothing.
But the factors that discouraged and disheartened most were these: Everyone could see that the weather was growing worse, which meant the loss of air support and aerial resupply; that relief from Hagaru-ri in any force less than regimental size could never reach us; that another night of determined attacks would surely overrun the position. )5
As the dead accumulated, there was at first some effort to dig graves and bury them just below the bridge and causeway in the low ground along the inlet. But the frozen ground made this difficult, and other pressing matters and the near-exhausted state of the troops led them to abandon it. Most of the bodies were carried to a sheltered place under a low embankment along the inlet not far from the causeway. There, frozen stiff, they were laid in rows and stacked about four high. Only the recent dead were in the aid station at the end.16
Dawn on the morning of December i came to the inlet with low-hanging clouds completely covering the perimeter. Snow flurries added to the dismal scene. All this was most discouraging to the men. They would desperately need air support during the day. If the weather remained this way, they would get none.
Those who could find a ration tried to eat the frozen food. Major Robbins told of breakfasting on a can of beans, frozen as usual. He started a small fire, but it soon went out for lack of fuel. No one was willing to expose himself in the open to scavenge for something to burn. So the group ate their frozen beans mixed with ice crystals.
Caring for the wounded was a top priority after daylight. But it was hard to do anything for them since medical supplies were exhausted. There was neither morphine nor bandages, so reasonably clean cloths and towels were used for bandaging. A Korean shack served as the principal aid station. Two stoves from the Headquarters Company kitchen had been saved. They provided hot soup and coffee for the wounded.'
Shortly after 9:00 A.M., in heavy clouds, a lone Marine fighter-bomber appeared over the inlet. The pilot came from the carrier USS Leyte, and must have made many previous trips to the inlet. However he managed it, his performance was of utmost value to the task force. The pilot established radio communication with Captain Stamford and told him that if weather permitted he would guide a flight of Corsairs to the perimeter about noon. Stamford gave this information to Faith and then told the pilot to relay to the ist Marine Air Wing dispatcher at Hagaru-ri Faith's request for heavy air support during the day and to notify General Barr, the 7th Divi sion commander, of Faith's intention to try for a breakout. Faith's decision that early was probably influenced by the pilot's remark to Stamford that the weather report received that morning on the Leyte was that sunshine and broken clouds would most likely prevail about noon.2
In the meantime, Majors Curtis and Miller had been conferring with Faith, and they urged him to try for a breakout during the day, for they did not think the task force could hold the perimeter another night. Faith seemed to agree. He called a conference for 10:00 A.M. with his battalion commanders and other staff officers at his CP. There is no record of all the men present, but some who attended recalled that the group included Major Miller, Major Storms, Major Tolly, Captain McClymont, Lieutenant May, Captain Stamford, Major Curtis, and Major Jones. Captain Bigger most likely was also present.
When his officers had assembled at his CP, Faith told them that he had decided on his own initiative to order a breakout from the perimeter during the day in an effort to join the Marines at Hagaru-ri. He said that there was a chance the weather might improve by noon and that aircraft might arrive to help them in the breakout. They were to make preparations for the breakout in case the support aircraft arrived. He said that no help could be expected from the Marines on the ground. He also said that he had had no communication with higher headquarters. The task force would be on its own, except for the close air support it expected to receive. Major Tolly reported that the artillery had only a few rounds of 105-mm howitzer ammunition left. Captain Cody reported the same situation for the 31st Heavy Mortar Company. Captain McClymont said that he had very little ammunition for the antiaircraft automatic weapons.
Faith then issued his verbal orders:
i. The 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, would lead off, opening the way
through the enemy position known to be just west and south of the perimeter along the road and clear the road and roadsides for passage of the truck column.
2. The 57th Field Artillery Battalion and the 31st Heavy Mortar Company would expend their remaining ammunition just before the breakout in support of it and then destroy their pieces and mortar tubes. The personnel would fight as riflemen in the center of the vehicular column.
3. The 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, would follow the vehicular column and protect its rear.
4. Jeeps and their trailers would be destroyed, except certain radio and machine-gun jeeps.
S. All 21/2-ton trucks would be unloaded of whatever cargo they might have, and the wounded would be loaded in them. All inoperable trucks would be destroyed.
6. All operable antiaircraft weapons carriers would be in the column.
7. All supplies and clothing and unused equipment were to be burned or otherwise destroyed.;
Faith told Stamford to ask for at least io aircraft to be over the breakout column at all times to cover the withdrawal.
Major Miller asked Faith for an M19 full-track dual-4o to lead the point of the breakout. He wanted it not only for its formidable firepower but also because with its full track it would be the best equipment in the convoy to push obstacles off the road and extricate any vehicles that got stuck. Faith approved the request.
Faith said that the breakout would start on his order after the aircraft arrived. He gave specific orders to a few officers in the meeting. He told McClymont to place one Miq at the point, as Major Miller had requested, to place another at the rear of the column, and to intersperse the Mt6 quad-5os in the column. Lieutenant May said that Faith told him to "prepare cargo vehicles, plus machine gun vehicles, and to move only the wounded. These vehicles were to be put in a column out on the road.... I was instructed to remain in the rear of our column and to see all vehicles fall into the column."4 McClymont commented that Faith's order to him was the only time he received instructions of any kind from anyone while he was in the perimeter. There is some confusion about who had the responsibility for destroying vehicles that were not to be in the convoy. In any event, many of the vehicles were not burned or destroyed.f
East of Chosin Page 21