Captain McClymont remembers the experience he and two of his sergeants had on Hill 1221:
The short day was beginning to wane as the convoy started up the switchback of a hill I later learned was Hill 1221. I was about halfway along the column, when the convoy slowed. I started forward. As I started to cross an open space between two trucks, someone else also decided to cross that space and elbowed me aside. The man was about three feet ahead of me when there was a thunk and a bullet tore through his head. He slumped to the road, rolled on his side, and died. For a moment I was afraid, afraid because that man had taken my place!
By the time I made it to the head of the column, I realized that the whole convoy was being fired upon from the hill above us, small arms fire was hitting all about us.... I took my two sergeants, [Grantford R.] Brown and [Robert M.] Slater, and several other men I could get together and we started up that snow-covered hill. The climb was steep and for a while, in the darkness, the Chinese didn't seem to be aware of my small group.
Then we came over a crest and the high hill mass loomed up, perhaps a hundred or so feet higher than we were. A sloping field-like area extended to the top of the hill and as we came in sight, several dark figures literally dropped out of sight on top the hill. We began to draw fire from the hilltop. I loaded my Tommy Gun with a fresh clip, yelled at my group to follow me, and began walking up that hill, firing at anything that looked like a target. On my right and my left I could hear similar firing. Two thirds of the way up the hill I looked back and only my two sergeants were with me. The rest of the men had turned back.
The three of us were too far up the hill to turn back. We kept moving and firing. To the left a dark shadow became a man [lying] on his stomach, hastily swinging something towards us. I turned my fire control lever on FULL and sprayed him, but there [were] only about three rounds in that clip. I grabbed another twenty round out of my Chinese apron, dropped the old clip on the snow, slammed home the new clip. My target wasn't moving, though. I kept on walking upwards and there I was on the gently rounded top of the hill. Like perfect little golf holes on a putting green, there were several absolutely round foxholes. A figure jumped out of one, ran for another, didn't make it as we cut him down.
As far as I knew, every one of those foxholes held a Chinese soldierwhat to do? I had a grenade taped to my Chinese apron. I took that in hand, went close to what looked like a larger foxhole, pulled the pin, counted this time one one thousand-two one thousand-then I rolled that grenade towards that round hole like a golfer on the 17th hole in a Master's tournament. That grenade rolled around the lip of that hole and didn't go in. It exploded there and we three hit the dirt [another grenade did the same thing].
I rose to my feet, took my Tommy Gun at the ready position and walked towards that infamous foxhole. Someone popped up from another hole, but one of my sergeants picked him off. As I walked forward, I could see farther and farther into the hole. A shot came from the hole. I could see the muzzle flash, but I didn't hear the bullet go by. I raised my Tommy gun high with the muzzle pointing down into the hole and the trigger guard high and I began spraying that hole. I put a whole clip into that hole and nothing moved then. I turned, reloaded, and walked to the next hole, spraying downward. I was tired, exhausted, mad, a little crazy. My sergeants either joined me or covered me and all of those foxholes were sprayed....
The three of us had captured our part of the hill. From both sides of us, along the crest of that hill, there were dug in Chinese troops and they began to fire at us. We went over the flat part and on down the other side of Hill 1221. Sliding and crashing our way, we went rapidly down the slope. About halfway down we intercepted the road switchbacking down toward
McClymont's description of the top of Hill 1221 is unlike that of any other of the participants. Only his and Bigger's groups seem to have reached the crest; the others crossed the long spur ridge running from the crest down to the saddle and the enemy roadblock at some point short of the crest.
After regaining the Hagaru-ri road south of the saddle, McClymont, joined by other troops, led the group south until they were challenged in Chinese, whereupon all of them jumped over the embankment in the direction of the reservoir just as a machine gun opened fire on them. They decided they had better get out on the ice. They took their direction from the North Star and with it at their back walked into the Marine perimeter at Hagaru-ri.22
The movements of Captain Kitz and his composite K Company in the late afternoon of December I are ill defined. When they abandoned their mission as rear guard east and northeast of the bridge, some of them may have gone directly south over Hill 1221 to the vicinity of Twiggae and then on south over the ice toward Hagaru-ri. But Kitz and some of K Company went up the road to the truck column. He spoke of his men at this time as being hard to handle. Two or three days later at Hagaru-ri he wrote a statement that gives some information about his and his company's role at Chosin. He wrote: "The men were damn hard to handle. You couldn't get them to move ... you couldn't control them.... The men just wouldn't function as soldiers should. They didn't go up to the high ground. They were tired and wanted to huddle together and thought there was more protection in numbers and very few of them would listen to reason. They just looked at you when you tried to get them to move."23
Eventually Kitz and several other officers got groups together and attacked the hill, knocking out several enemy positions, and reached what he called the top. He thought that they had taken the hill. It was nearly dark by this time. He sent two messengers back to the truck column with orders to start moving, and then he and his men began moving "across country" with Chinese at their heels. Actually Kitz had not taken the hill as he thought. Perhaps he had cut a way through some of the enemy forces or found a way through them or some enemy pulled aside to let him through. But he had not cleared the hill. He said that he looked back to see whether the trucks were moving around the bend of the hairpin curve, but they were not. Some wounded had dismounted from the trucks when he started, he said, and had joined him. Kitz had about 210 men with him when he struck out for Hagaru-ri, arriving there about midnight.24
Captain Swenty was among those who were still with the trucks as darkness came on. He saw that the column remained immobilized. He went back down the column, talking with some of the men about what they knew of the situation, especially about Hill 1221. One group in the ditch said that two groups of men, each of about platoon strength, had attacked the hill an hour earlier but had not returned. Swenty went back along the trucks and ran into Captain Bauer, whom he found badly wounded. Swenty said: "There was little to do for him as he had bled badly and the hole in him was pretty big. His talk was incoherent but I could make out he was asking for a first aid man. I could see he was in great pain and I proceeded to look at his wound. All I could do was to pull him to safety. I looked for an aid man. I found a couple that were hit but all their equipment was used up. I could not even find any dressings."25
Swenty decided to try to go up the hill to see if he could make contact with any American soldiers there. He talked to some men in the ditches, asking them to go with him. They refused to move. He then started by himself, but soon others were following him. Near the top, enemy in a foxhole on their left fired on them. Two of the soldiers deployed around the foxhole and knocked it out. Swenty and his group searched for more enemy but found only eight positions where the Chinese had already been killed or the holes were empty. The group then went cautiously down the south side of the hill, where they could hear voices of men who had crossed the hill earlier. They were a mixed lot of stragglers from virtually every unit in Task Force Faith. In talking with the men along the road, Swenty had learned from them that Captain Turner, of B Company, and Captain Seever, of C Company, had been killed and that Majors Miller and Curtis had been wounded.
When Swenty heard the truck motors start up, he thought that the convoy was ready to come across Hill 1221 and head for Hagaru-ri. On the south side of Hill 1221 he gathered u
p the wounded who could walk and started south. Half a mile down the road he was suddenly challenged. Startled, he asked, "What?" The challenge was repeated. An ROK soldier quickly responded in Korean or Chinese, Swenty did not know which. Word passed back down the line that the men were to cross the road and get to the railroad. They crossed the trestle at the Paegamni-gang under fire but without casualties. Continuing south along the railroad, they reached the sawmill at Sasu, where they stopped to make a check. Swenty counted about 6o men who had joined his group after it started, so that now there were about loo men with him. They moved onto the road and made it to Hagaru-ri. One man hit over the heart would not accept help, saying that he could make it to Hagaru-ri. About 40 of the group had been wounded. Swenty himself was uninjured except for frostbite on feet and hands.26
By 6:oo P.M. the enemy had been more or less cleared from their positions on Hill 1221, except in the strong fire-block and roadblock area at the hairpin turn at the saddle through which the road passed. Faith and Jones agreed that it must be attacked from the south, or rear. They agreed to gather up individually all the men they could find on Hill 1221 and its south side, meet on the road south of the saddle, and then jointly attack it from the rear. Lieutenant May was still at the bridge finishing the work there.
Faith and Jones set about their job and soon met on the Hagaru-ri road south of the hairpin turn, just above the point where Drake's knocked-out tanks blocked the road 400 to Soo yards south of the saddle. About this meeting and their subsequent action Jones wrote:
MAP II. Step-by-step sequence of Task Force Faith's breakout attempt.
Having only passed through the area of Hill 1221 once previously, and then after dark, I was not as familiar with the terrain as the others in the group. However, upon reading my memo of 4 Dec So and looking at the map accompanying it, to refresh my memory, I recall that I went due south up Hill 1221 slightly left (east) of its highest point, gathering up men along the way and attempting to clear the hill by fire. When I arrived at the top of the hill all enemy had been cleared from it. I then turned and proceeded southeast toward the main road. According to the sketch on the 1950 map, I came out at the second roadblock, or a few yards south of it. I turned left (NE), as I recall, to proceed up the road toward the hairpin turn to meet LTC Faith. I met him very shortly and we formed up our men on each side of the road just north of the second roadblock and made the attack.27
... By the time dark fell most of the officers and NCO's had become casualties along with many of the enlisted men. Units were intermingled and ceased to exist as organizations. Leadership provided by the officers and NCO's in the line units had ceased to exist. Many of the wounded were climbing the ridge and Hill 1221 west of the CCF roadblock and continuing southward individually and in small groups. When LTC Faith and I formed the two groups with which we attacked the Road Block from the south, those groups were formed by us standing on the road and getting people to stop and join us for the attack. Since it was dark and because the units were nonexistent (as organizations) we had no way of identifying the people who stopped or those who continued on down the road toward the Marine lines. There were many who did not stop even though we pleaded, ordered or tried to influence them of the importance of knocking out the road block. If LTC Faith or I had decided to shoot anyone in order to get their attention -it wouldn't have worked-those people were too far along from injuries, freezing cold, shock, fear and confusion to care. It was a matter of degreethose soldiers whom we were able to gather together and to whom we could explain our plan were also scared, shocked, injured and cold, but they still retained discipline, and the realization that an effort had to be made to reduce the road block so the convoy of wounded could proceed toward the Marine Lines. Most of them I believe were members of the 32nd Inf and knew us and thus stopped because they recognized a remnant of the chain of command still existed, whereas the others neither knew or cared. This might seem like a condemnation of the people of this task force, but it is not. At this stage of affairs, with no organization, no crew served weapons, no communications, no NCO and officer leaders to look to, the fighting units came apart, and left individuals who were in the main looking for aid, medical care and safety. When LTC Faith was hit, the Task Force ceased to exist.28
In this effort on the road south of the enemy fire block and roadblock after dark, Jones collected about 200 men, and Faith had about ioo men. Faith then organized both groups on either side of the road for the attack. Jones with his group was on the right (east) side of the road; Faith was on the left (west) side. This put Faith on the Hill 1221 upslope side of the road.
Both groups started toward the roadblock, traveling in the brush and scrub-tree growth along the sides of the road. The ground on the left rose steeply from the road; on the right the slope was gentler and easier traveling for most of the distance. Both groups fired small arms and threw grenades as they advanced, but apparently there was no attempt to coordinate their advance, nor was there any communication between them. Perhaps in the circumstances there could have been neither. Jones's group, which rapidly shrank in numbers, reached the roadblock area first. It seemed to them that they had knocked out the roadblock since there was no enemy reaction when they reached it. They did not stop to remove the physical block of logs. Jones continued on around the hairpin curve and descended on the other side to the head of the stalled column. He did not know where Faith and his group were.29
About the time Jones and Faith were organizing their attack on the enemy fire block from the south, Captain Jordan, commander of M Company, 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, was preparing to attack it from above. Jordan had arrived at the stalled truck column late, after most of the vehicles had crossed the bridge bypass. He was behind the column, near the end of the troops on the road. He and his men crossed the open valley, where he noticed many casualties. He said of that time: "Enemy fire was taking a heavy toll of the wounded in the trucks and the men who were gathered along the road bank as it hugs the nose of Hill 1221 just before the hairpin turn.... It was obvious the force was getting nowhere but more casualties." If many had thought that the crest and enemy firing positions on the hill had been eliminated earlier, it was now clear that the positions had been reoccupied or the earlier impression had not been factual. Jordan found many Chinese still on the hill. He did not hesitate; he prepared to attack the hill.
Jordan represented well the quality of many of the experienced officers of World War II who were present in the task force. One should remember that he had suffered grenade wounds during the first night battle at the inlet but had continued to command his company, which had held its original position until the breakout. Now he was still going to do a disciplined officer's duty. In his group Lt. Robert Schmitt, leader of the Heavy Machine Gun Platoon, had one arm in a sling from a wound received at the perimeter and a weapon in the other hand. Lieutenant Gray, leader of the 81-mm Mortar Platoon, also wounded earlier at the inlet, got out of a truck and joined Jordan's group. Said Jordan:
Along with Lt. Schmitt, Lt. Gray (both already wounded) we, through various means, assembled about 25 to 30 men from the ditch along the road and attacked up the N. slope of the nose of 1221. We took it and arrived at the top with io men and no ammunition. Lt. Schmitt was killed in this action and Lt. Gray wounded a second time. With the ro men we moved down the nose toward the RB. We assaulted the RB by yelling, shouting and making as much noise as possible. We received a few rounds of S A fire and then we were on the RB which consisted of many logs piled across the roadway. We started to remove the logs and sent a man back to the column to get them started.
It was at about this point that we heard a voice demand who was making all the noise. I responded and it was Col. Faith. He made a comment and along with the small party with him moved along toward the truck column. Just a few minutes later we heard an explosion like a grenade. There was loud talking so I asked what was going on. One of the party stated that Col. Faith had been hit and didn't know if he was dead o
r not. This took place just yards from the RB.
There were enough people there to care for Col. Faith so we continued to clear the RB.30
Jordan was the only officer who attacked Chinese emplacements on Hill 1221 during the afternoon and evening, knocked them out (incurring heavy casualties in his own group), and then led a charge directly against the enemy strongpoint at the hairpin turn-without ammunition and with only a handful of men. His was quite a different story from that of the men who went up the hill, across the finger ridge to the south side, and then on to Hagaru-ri. Jordan's capture of the enemy's roadblock at the south edge of the hairpin curve, together with Major Jones's attack up the road against the enemy fire block just minutes earlier, set up the situation for the truck convoy of wounded to continue at last over Hill 1221 toward Hagaru-ri.
First Lieutenant Gray, wounded in one hand and in both legs two days before at the inlet perimeter and barely able to walk at Hill 1221, survived Chosin. Both he and Jordan received the Distinguished Service Cross for their actions at Chosin. So too did Jones.31
There had been no coordination between Jones's and Jordan's separate attacks, or even knowledge in the two groups of the other's progress and action. That they came almost at the same time and with success was coincidental. Jordan's comments on Faith's arrival with a few men at the saddle sometime after Jones had passed it, and the manner of his injury at the moment of success at Hill 1221, are the most precise known to me. Faith was wounded by an enemy-thrown grenade just a few yards north of the log roadblock and a short distance-perhaps about ioo feet-up the slope of Hill 1221 from the road's hairpin turn. Jordan wrote: "Yes it was dark when we arrived at the RB. There was snow on the ground making it possible to make out moving objects at close range. Col. Faith was not on the road when he called to me. He was probably So to 75 yards off the road on the north side [probably northwest because of the hairpin turn at this point]. In this area there were scattered small trees, either birch or poplar in type. When I approached Faith he appeared to have a GI blanket wrapped around himself."32 Apparently a lone Chinese soldier hidden in a hole in the brush threw the grenade at Faith or his group. Heavy grenade fragments struck Faith above the heart.
East of Chosin Page 28