In my opinion, any retrograde movement must be at least as well planned as the conventional attack. There must, in fact, be much greater emphasis on details of command, control, and coordination. If, for example, we had been assigned successive objectives as control measures, the critical pass of the road through ground which we had seized with our spontaneous assault would not have been left uncovered. Also, there apparently was little effort on the part of the 7th Div or X Corps to coordinate or support the breakout, once they abandoned the relief effort of 28 [and 29] Nov. It was the very area from which this Division Task Force [31st Tank Company and 31st Infantry Rear CP] withdrew that became the "graveyard" of the truck column and its personnel.19
Captain Edward P. Stamford, USMC, had excellent credentials as an observer and good knowledge of combat practices. His report to the commandant of the Marine Corps, prepared in February, 1951, two months after the action, includes the following remarks:
Most of the Army Officers and many of the NCO's seemed to be very well trained and apparently good leaders. The weakness lay in that the 7th Inf Div lost many of its senior NCO's through transfers to units in Korea prior to its departure from Japan. The other weakness appeared to be in the training of the individual soldiers.
In my opinion the reason for the collapse of the command was due to the loss of most of the leaders in the platoons and companies in 1/32 and the timidity or lack of aggressiveness on the part of the rear guard unit (1/57) [3/31 and HQ Co. 3/31 were the designated rear guard] to move up and replace the casualties suffered in the attempt to take the road block and hill "X" [Hill 1221]. The drifting off of the troops after reaching the ridge of Hill "X" demonstrated the lack of organization and leadership when most needed 20
The views of one enlisted man during the breakout may be of interest, and are perhaps typical of many. Sergeant Chester L. Bair, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, was present during the action. He rode on one of the trucks in the breakout effort on December I. He escaped when the column came to its end near Hudong-ni:
In the breakout I was acting on my own as a Section Chief and a mechanic. ... My truck was moved around somewhat in the column, but I was mostly in the middle or near the front.... Few people would give or take commands. There was a lot of havoc, wounded, dead, low ammunition sup plies, inoperative equipment, and finally the chain of command broken, or nearly non-existent. Along with the CCF, it was extremely cold, and many men did not wish to respond to orders, many of which were wounded, once, twice, and some even more....
I, too, did not make that Last Ditch Effort with a column of 20 trucks. I knew it did not stand a chance, but I thought it would make a diversion, thereby making it possible for some of us cutting out in small groups, or alone, [to stand] a better chance of escape. When many men look back they like to think of themselves as heroes or etc, but the truth of the matter when the chips are down, most try to save their hides....
You must understand at the time this incident took place I was tq years old. I was not interested in history or anything else. All I can remember is the cold, inferior clothing, worn out equipment, the noise, the wounded, and the dead. While some officers and NCO's tried to keep order and keep a chain of command as the situation worsened ... [incomplete]. At the blown out bridge, a half-track [full-track dual-4o] was pulling other vehicles across the river, while I was working on trucks, flat tires, and trying to drain gas tanks of disabled vehicles, because we needed the fuel. We took parts from the disabled vehicles, and tried to keep all the vehicles we could operative. I saw Lt. May several times, he was trying all he could to keep the vehicles operative and positioned them whereby they could be moved out at command, even though he appeared to be wounded [he was not].21
Major Jones is the only officer who has expressed to me his opinion that the outcome could have been no different:
In my estimation the operation East of Chosin was an example of too little to accomplish the mission assigned, rather than deficiency in quality of individuals. Time had not permitted, or planning provided, for a cohesive, organized, supplied and supported RCT, prior to the decision to attack to the north. The units were separated and could do very little to support each other. When the Chinese attacked on the night of 27-28 Nov 5o the operation was doomed to failure. The overwhelming strength of the enemy, the dispersion of the US forces, the lack of communication, the dearth of instructions from higher headquarters, the confusion and ultimately the lack of a chain of command above the RCT level, the absence of intelligence, and the lack of logistical and combat support to the RCT dictated the final outcome. And, of course, the weather played a prominent part. In my estimation, even a complete RCT, in place on the eastern side of the reservoir, would have been unable to extricate itself from that situation, and regain the relative safety of Hagaru-ri. Except for the outstanding close air support, there were no supporting fires to assist the column of wounded-laden trucks and troops breaking out from the inlet perimeter. I don't believe that any force of that size could have made a greater effort or have done better, as a group, than the ad hoc 31st RCT did from the breakout attempt on. It was just a case of not enough combat force to overcome the enemy that attacked us."
Although Major Lynch, General Hodes's G-3 aide at Hudong-ni and at Hagaru-ri, did not participate in any of the actions of the 31st RCT, he knew the situation at Hudong-ni and Hagaru-ri, and he saw the remnants of Task Force Faith come into the Marine perimeter. Thereafter he was involved in the aborted effort to send a relief force to the aid of the task force. He commented: "No doubt all leaders, as well as those in my status and the men caught in this tragedy, carried away a haunting conscience, if they escaped. What was right? What was wrong? At some point in time all played Pilate in washing their hands. The Marine leaders are no exception. They had the only capability in that area and they were informed by an army major [Lynch himself] to use army tanks. Nothing came of this. By this time it was their responsibility, though
No doubt most of those who survived the ordeal east of Chosin tried later to forget as much of it as possible and did not torture their consciences about where they might have failed in one way or another and in what way they might have performed better or differently and contributed to a successful breakout. But there were some among the officer corps who have had the experience on their minds, and in at least one or two cases on their consciences, for the past thirty-five years. Colonel Wesley J. Curtis, USA, Ret., then major and the ist Battalion S-3, is a case in point. In correspondence with Colonel Curtis, I speculated that he was probably the last officer not riding in a vehicle, though wounded, who left the task-force vehicular column at its final stop near Hudong-ni. He replied that he could not be positive that this was the case but believed it to be so. Then he wrote the following series of questions, directed to himself, and his answers:
1. Question: You were aware that Faith and Miller were seriously wounded, were you not then-by law, custom, and tradition-in command?
Answer: Yes.
2. Question: Were you aware of it at the time?
Answer: Yes.
3. Question: Was it right then, for you to "cut-out"-to abandon the command?
Answer: No.
4. Question: What should you have done?
Answer: I should have remained with the truck column - regardless of the consequences.
5. Question: Has this bothered you-your conscience?
Answer: Yes-for the past 35 years.
6. Question: If you had it to do over again-would you do the same thing?
Answer: Probably, yes.
You recognize the self-indictment in the foregoing. It is made in the interest of honest history.
Now for the statement in defense of the decision I made at the time.
i. The Victorian concept (that has its roots in the days of chivalry) that a soldier's role is not to question why-but only to do or die-will not stand up to the scrutiny of a prudent and thoughtful man. A soldier's role is to fight-and live to fight another
day-under conditions that favor success.
2. It is a well-established principle of tactics that success is exploitedfailure is not reinforced. Also, a delaying or covering force avoids close engagement. It is obvious that tactics-as taught at Fort Benning-do not address the exact situation that existed in the Twiggae-Hudong-ni area at 2200 hours i Dec 1950. TF Faith had been defeated in detail. There was not an intact machine gun section, automatic rifle fire team, a skeleton rifle squad in the force. The "force" (and I use the word advisedly) was strung out along a narrow road. There was no resistance left in the column-no firing -motors in the trucks were not running-drivers were not in the cabs of the trucks. The only sound heard was the moaning of the wounded and dying. I claim that Patton in a Tiger tank-a MacArthur on a white horse could not have reversed the situation.24
Was it not ironic that Task Force Faith came to its final stop just short of the site of Drake's 31st Tank Company bivouac and the 31st Infantry Rear CP? Thirty hours earlier there had been 16 operable tanks and 325 soldiers in a perimeter within a stone's throw of where the convoy died-they had been there since the evening of November 27. Then, on November 3o an order came for them to withdraw to Hagaru-ri. The 7th Infantry Division Command Report, Chosin Reservoir, for the period says, At iioo hours 3o November this group was ordered to move to Hagaru-ri." 2S
Who ordered the withdrawal to Hagaru-ri? How was the order transmitted to Hudong-ni? And why was the order issued? A search of the ist Marine Division G-3 Journal, November 30, 1950, fails to disclose an entry concerning an order of any kind to the gist Rear CP and the 31st Tank Company at Hudong-ni. Yet that command would be the one authorized to issue it. The Marine G-3 Journal file does, however, record Message No. 37 at 1900 (7:00 P.m.) saying, "Serv Bn: Adv elms RCT 31 arriving Hagar- ri."26 Testimony of officers in the movement says that they arrived about 5:30 P.M. We know from Captain Drake and Major Lynch that the tank company arrived at Hagaru-ri before dark and that Drake had placed his tanks in the Marine perimeter there before light failed. The service elements mentioned in the Marine G-3 Journal file may have arrived later than the tanks. The movement of these forces from Hudong-ni has been described earlier.
The question I now wish to consider is the order for the 31st Tank Company and the 31st Rear to move to Hagaru-ri on November 30. Why should such an order be issued when it was a fact, known to all the higher command, that Task Force Faith, on its only possible exit road from the inlet perimeter in any breakout attempt, would have to pass Hudong-ni? The presence there of the tank company and the 325 miscellaneous troops could be of tremendous, very possibly of indispensable, help to the task force in a breakout. This factor is magnified when one learns that the next night the end of the task force came on the level stretch of road just north of Hudong-ni. If the tanks and the other forces had been left at Hudong-ni, the part of the motor column that reached that vicinity with its hundreds of wounded might have been rescued. Withdrawing these forces from Hudong-ni had the effect of signing the death warrant for Task Force Faith and its wounded. What commander in his right mind could order such a move in the circumstances without deliberately running the risk of sacrificing the task force, and how could he be willing to take that risk?
We do not have documentary evidence that discloses who ordered the withdrawal from Hudong-ni and why it was ordered, but there is other evidence that allows one to arrive at reasonable conclusions on the subject. Under X Corps Operations Instruction No. 1q only Major General Smith, other than the X Corps commander himself, could give an order of this kind after 8:0o A.M. on November 30. We know that the X Corps commander did not issue the order. It is also known that there was no communication between Hagaru-ri and Hudong-ni at this time except over tank radios of the 31st Tank Company. Major General David Barr, of the 7th Division, was in Hagaru-ri during the morning and most of the afternoon of November 30. His assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, was also there and had been there since November 28. It is not known whether the order to Lt. Col. Berry K. Anderson, senior officer of the 7th Division Rear at Hudong-ni, was issued before, during, or after General Barr's visit with Lieutenant Colonel Faith that morning. It seems almost certain that Generals Barr and Hodes must have discussed the question of whether to recall the forces at Hudong-ni to Hagaru-ri. One may surmise that they -or General Barr alone-reached the conclusion that it should be done. General Barr would then have had to persuade Marine General Smith to issue such an order over his name.
But no such order is recorded in the ist Marine Division G-3 Journal. This may be explained, however, if General Smith verbally approved such an order to General Barr, if the order was never committed to writing or a copy sent to the Marine G-3 duty officer, and if General Hodes transmitted the order by the one tank radio at Hagaru-ri that was netted to Drake's tanks at Hudong-ni. Both Drake and Lynch state that the tank radios were the means of transmitting and receiving the order, that no other means was available. Further, Major Lynch recalls a conversation he had with Hodes on November 30 just outside the 1st Marine Division G-3 van in Hagaru-ri: "I asked him [Hodes] about the units east of Chosin. I do not remember whether he said that these had been or would be ordered out. Gen. Hodes had apparently given orders to Anderson via the tank radio located on the NE of the perimeter near the rry [railroad] crossing earlier in the day. I did not see Anderson's headquarters and supply people arrive, but I drove General Hodes to the perimeter and watched the 31st Tank Company arrive. It was put in the defense perimeter immediately."27 The fact that Hodes went to the Marine perimeter at the road and railroad crossing at the northeast point of the perimeter to meet Drake's tanks indicates that he knew they had been ordered out. He himself may have transmitted the order. In another place Lynch says, "He [Hodes] confirmed that he had ordered the tanks out and that they should arrive shortly."28
Hodes must be considered the conveyer of the order and not the initiator. We do not know who initiated it, who urged that the order be sent -whether it was Hodes, Barr, or Smith. It had to be one of the three. But we do know that the order had to be authorized by General Smith. It would seem that all three generals agreed on issuing the order, but it is likely that General Smith acceded to the 7th Division commander's desire in the matter. Yet, as commander of all the troops at Chosin, Smith cannot escape his degree of responsibility.
Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey, USA, Ret., then lieutenant colonel and X Corps deputy chief of staff and confidant of General Almond, has stated to me that General Barr initiated the order and that General Almond was upset when he learned of the withdrawal. According to McCaffrey, Almond asked Barr why he had had the order issued, and Barr answered in effect that he thought he should get the units out while it was still possible to do 50.29
The withdrawal of Drake's 31st Tank Company and the 31st Rear CP from Hudong-ni on the evening of November 30 looms so large in the ultimate fate of Task Force Faith that it is important to understand the critical terrain features of the vicinity. The area west and southwest of the Hudong-ni schoolhouse CP and the tank bivouac and supply area was marsh and paddy land extending all the way to the reservoir, a little less than a mile distant. The village of Sasu-ri lay south of Hudong-ni, half a mile away, on an islandlike area between divided channels of the Paegamni-gang. Sasu, the sawmill village, was on the narrow-gauge railroad at the edge of the reservoir. The tanks, as well as several machine guns, at Hudong-ni had an open field of fire in all directions except to the north and northeast, where the slope of Ko-bong gave some cover to the enemy.
Hill 1239 was the high point of a long spur ridge, west of a higher saddle, that extended westward from the higher Ko-bong mass. The spur ridge ran southwesterly down to the Hagaru-ri road a few hundred feet northwest of the tank and 31st Rear CP area. It was at the tip of this spur ridge, just above (east) of the road, that the CCF established the fire block commanding the road and railroad below and the flat paddy ground and the terrain toward the reservoir. The heavy automatic and small-
arms fire from this position, together with rocket and mortar fire from the lower ground near the entrance to the Hudong-ni bivouac area, stopped Task Force Faith's motor column for the last time. There the convoy died. To withdraw the tank company and the 31st Rear at Hudong-ni while Task Force Faith was still north of them at the inlet was to abandon the men to the greatest hazard. Whatever risk for the tank company in keeping it at Hudong-ni was conjectural and needed to be taken for the greater good.
I believe that any commander who knew that Task Force Faith was to try to break out from the inlet perimeter on the morrow should not have approved the order for the tanks and troops at Hudong-ni to withdraw the day before the attempt. Any superior officer who learned of it after the order was issued and before it was executed should have rescinded it at once. The withdrawal of the forces at Hudong-ni on the afternoon of November 30 was a disastrous command decision. In the end it doomed Task Force Faith.
The Chinese had their own application of Murphy's Law. Nowhere did the Chinese make greater errors than at Hagaru-ri. Their plan was to capture it on the first night of their general surprise attack, the night of November 27. But they did not attack Hagaru-ri that night, even though they had divisions north, west, and south of it. They let the key to their anticipated destruction of the ist Marine Division slip from their grasp at the outset, and they never could regain the same favorable opportunity they had so negligently lost. Why? The answer lies partly in the story of the 31st RCT east of Chosin.
Any thorough and critical analysis of the Chosin Campaign, in which the ist Marine Division played the dominant role, must consider the effect of the action east of Chosin on the ultimately successful defense of Hagaruri and the concentration there of all Marine and other troops who survived the battles of November 27 through December 4, 1950. The successful fighting withdrawal to the coast was organized at Hagaru-ri, and it began from there on December 6.
East of Chosin Page 37