Begin arrived in Washington in the tense atmosphere of a PLO terrorist attack that killed an American photographer and 35 Israelis and prompted an Israeli attack on a PLO base in southern Lebanon that Carter felt was “a terrible overreaction” and disproportionate in its devastation. This hardened public attitudes about the risks of concessions to Egypt.63 In the complex history of our relationship with Israel, and as Carter foresaw, there probably has not been a more confrontational meeting with the leader of a friendly country than occurred in the Cabinet Room on March 22, 1978, with the president, vice president, Vance, Brzezinski, and me around the large oval table with Begin, Dayan, and Dinitz. The heart of the bitter dispute lay in Begin’s refusal to agree to yield at least some of Israel’s conquests on all fronts, including the West Bank. He did not claim Israeli sovereignty over “Judaea, Samaria and Gaza,” but an abiding interest, although he was prepared to offer the Palestinians autonomy, to be reviewed after five years. Brzezinski, seeking compromise, said that if Israel withdrew to military emplacements, as I had told Dinitz, “then your plan could be the basis for a solution, and open the way for peace … security yes, political control no.”
Carter wasted no time in getting to the heart of what was bothering him: Israel’s refusal to follow the terms of UN Resolution 242. Carter spelled out that this meant withdrawal to agreed frontiers and a voice for the Palestinians in their political future. Without giving Begin a chance to reply, Carter expressed his “discouragement” at Israel’s refusal to accept these mandates while continuing to establish new Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Then he warned Begin that he would alert congressional leaders to Israel’s unacceptable positions at a meeting only a few hours later.
Carter flatly told Begin that the “obstacle to a peace treaty with Egypt is your insistence on keeping political control over the West Bank and Gaza.”64 Then he icily summed up his understanding of the Israeli position, which came to be called the “six no’s”—a play on the Arabs’ “three no’s” refusing peace with Israel after their 1967 defeat—Israel would not stop building new settlements; would not stop expanding existing ones; would not yield its Sinai settlements; would not withdraw its political authority from the West Bank and Gaza; would not recognize that UN Resolution 242 applied to all the territories; and would not allow the Palestinians to choose between interim self-government or becoming part of Israel or Jordan.65 After some seconds, which seemed like hours of stony silence, an ashen-faced Begin argued that he had been flexible. But despite his attempts to rebut Carter, the president was unrelenting.
Taken aback by the harsh tone, Begin asked Carter to do exactly the opposite—to frame Israel’s position positively and convey Israel’s willingness to be forthcoming. Begin explained: “We won’t agree to halt settlements during the negotiations, as we have the right to settle there, and negotiations could take years.” My notes record that “Begin presents a very rigid, unbending position.” It was clear that Begin and Carter brought out the worst in each other. Sensing this, Dayan interjected and talked more flexibly about withdrawal to military encampments, and said Israel had a new proposal for using 242 as the basis for negotiations with all of Israel’s neighbors. Immediately the president responded: “This is more promising.”66 While I felt that Dayan had salvaged something, from Begin’s standpoint the meeting was “nasty,” with an absolute stalemate, and hardly improved by the White House spokesman’s description of Begin’s intransigence.67
Shortly afterward, in his private study, the president asked my views. Summarizing Begin’s ideology, I told him he would be much more flexible on terms for giving up the Sinai, where he made no historical or biblical claims. I felt the best we could do on the West Bank would be to try to limit the expansion of settlements and develop a plan for Palestinian self-government. I added one other element: As difficult as Begin could be in representing what even the Hebrew Bible described as “a stiff-necked people” (Exodus 32:9), I believed he was totally trustworthy and honest in his beliefs. The president made no comment.68
But I received calls offering support for Carter from Jewish members of Congress, including its only Holocaust survivor, Tom Lantos of California.69 Even my Harvard Law School professor Alan Dershowitz, a staunch supporter of Israel, offered help and warned: “We’re creating the wrong [American] Jewish leadership, who are knee-jerk for whatever the government of Israel does.”70 The night of that tense meeting, I sat down with Begin and Yechiel Kadishai in the small den in Dinitz’s residence and found Begin morose and upset.
The most useful advice for me came from Lewis, a fine ambassador and one of the American officials most sensitive to Israel’s concerns, while nevertheless strongly supporting the president’s attempts at peacemaking. Lewis was a Yale-educated career diplomat with a deep understanding of the country where he served. He had earned the trust and confidence of Begin, Dayan, and all the key Israeli government figures, convincing them he was a friend of Israel who also had the president’s confidence. The ambassador gave us a biting critique of the president’s behavior and the administration, and warned ominously that Begin was “convinced we’re trying to do him in.” He advised us that the Israelis would be more responsive “if they’re convinced we’re still their special friends.”
Lewis pointed out that the president had sent no personal notes to Begin to help maintain human contact (he rarely did to any foreign or domestic leader). He recommended that the president spend fifteen minutes alone with Begin and show admiration for him as a person despite their differences: “Pump him up.” Turning from personal diplomacy to matters of policy, he criticized the way the administration’s general reduction of arms sales had meant reneging on promises to Israel, and furthermore that packaging arms destined for Israel with sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt offended Israel because it tied their needs to the Arabs’—both now and possibly in the future. Taking all these moves together, he explained patiently, “supports Begin’s view that Jews are all alone in the world and mustn’t give in; it feeds his view of [Jewish] suffering.” I welcomed his advice but noted on my legal pad: “JC won’t listen and back him up.”71
I got my chance just before Begin’s arrival. On Saturday, April 30, a day of rest for most of the country but a buzz of activity at the White House, I had a lengthy discussion with the president about the many domestic issues in my portfolio, and I was deeply touched by his uncharacteristic thanks and praise: “You are at the top in terms of my estimation of people here. I appreciate your making my job easier.” This gave me an opening to talk about Israel, and I summarized many of Lewis’s concerns. Carter’s response reflected his mind-set: “Begin is solely holding up peace. I have a coldness in my heart toward him after our meetings.”72
This frank display of feelings sometimes got him in trouble when they tumbled out in public—and it was lucky that this one had not, with its biblical allusion to God hardening Pharaoh’s heart against Moses as he sought to lead his people out of Egypt. Carter agreed to be more cordial and met privately with Begin for half an hour the next day, but in his diary entry for that day, it was clear that nothing had changed: “He’s a small man with limited vision, and my guess is he will not take the necessary steps to bring peace to Israel—an opportunity that may never come again. I’m determined to put maximum pressure on him but will have to judge the political situation closely to maximize the possibility for success.”73
After the meeting there was a White House reception for America’s religious and lay Jewish leaders. Carter had originally opposed a reception for Begin, but agreed to a ceremony as part of our effort to mend fences. As he confided to his diary: “I finally agreed to meet with two hundred rabbis to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of Israel. Twelve hundred showed up, and Begin and I made somewhat emotional speeches to them, although brief, and then shook hands with everyone. The result of the whole affair was very positive.”74
His most positive contribution was a surprise public announcement in
Begin’s presence, following a written recommendation from Lipshutz and me (based upon the suggestion of Ellen Goldstein of my staff), that he was forming a commission to establish an American memorial for the victims of the Holocaust, to be chaired, at my urging, by Holocaust survivor and famous author Eli Wiesel (another Carter legacy largely forgotten by the more than fifty million people who had visited the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington by 2017). He focused on Begin’s own family’s murder at the hand of the Nazis; Begin was clearly moved, and so was I.
But this did not stop intense criticism of Brzezinski among the Jewish leadership, which sufficiently concerned him to send me an extraordinary memo with a summary of his views from 1970 forward on the Middle East, emphasizing his pro-Israeli statements. As much as I disagreed with his tactical decisions in pressing Israel, I replied with a handwritten note that I was “livid at the occasional inference from unnamed members of the organized Jewish community that you are anti-Israel” and promised to help defend him against such calumny. Even New York’s strongly pro-Israel senator Daniel Moynihan told me he was “disturbed [that] Jews are responding to demagoguery.”75
Carter’s own family also unwittingly undermined his efforts. His sister Ruth Carter Stapleton had played a prominent part in Carter’s becoming a born-again Christian, and had just accepted a speaking engagement at a crusade by the organization Jews for Jesus, whose primary purpose was proselytizing Jews, especially young people. When I heard about this from Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, who handled interreligious affairs for the American Jewish Committee, I sent Ham a very blunt memo: “This is a group which is despised in the Jewish community, and an appearance by the president’s sister will only aggravate the deep feelings in the Jewish community against the administration.”76 I urged him to intervene and explain that her appearance would certainly not help her brother or his administration. He did so, and her appearance was canceled.77
A JEWISH CASUALTY OF A SAUDI ARMS SALE
One of the administration’s boldest attempts to buy goodwill, if not peace on both sides, was a multibillion-dollar deal to spread American jet fighters around the Middle East, simultaneously enhancing Middle East security and American interests, or so it was argued. It had been arranged by the Ford administration to ensure that the United States would be regarded as a reliable arms supplier capable of replacing the Soviet Union. Sales to Israel were also part of the package that would maintain Israel’s qualitative edge. But this did not mollify its supporters in Congress. Israel had legitimate fears that it would start a shift in the strategic balance toward the Arabs. The deal had to be approved by Congress, and this injected fierce opposition by Israel and its American supporters directly into American politics. Overriding Carter’s policy of limiting arms sales, the administration wanted to demonstrate to the Saudis and Egyptians that the United States was determined to strengthen ties with them, even in the face of domestic opposition.78
The deal provoked one of the most contentious presidential battles with the American Jewish leadership, before or since (perhaps matched by Ronald Reagan’s sale of AWACS planes to the Saudis). For the first time—but not the last—AIPAC and the leaders of the American Jewish community went head-to-head against an American president over a congressional vote. They argued that once the jets came into the hands of the Arabs, they would be turned against Israel. Suspicion by AIPAC’s executive director, Morris Amitay, turned into sheer ill will over what he considered Brzezinski’s high-handed manner. When the administration had first blocked the sale of Israeli-made Kfir jet fighters to Ecuador, Amitay told me he raised the issue after a White House lunch with Brzezinski as they walked into the Rose Garden, and he bluntly replied, ‘Next subject,’ quote unquote.” From then on it was political trench warfare that left permanent scars on both sides.79
To provide Israel with greater assurance, and with the backing of Brzezinski and Carter, in an April 20, 1978, meeting with the deputy chief of mission at the Israeli Embassy, Hanon Bar-On, I explored the possibility of crafting a mutual defense treaty to protect Israel from its Arab enemies.80 Careful to say that I was only putting forward my own informal thoughts, I told Bar-On that I had heard some “major figures” discuss building a U.S. airbase in the Israeli Sinai and using Israel’s ports for our navy as part of a mutual defense agreement. I suggested that the airbase could not only help stabilize relations between our two countries, but also would provide effective protection to the oil resources in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, I said, Israeli ports for the U.S. Navy could provide reasonable alternatives to our access to Greek and Turkish ports under the NATO treaty.
Bar-On summarized this in a top-secret cable to Dayan that day, but Israel never seriously took up the suggestion.81 It was a major tenet of Israel’s national security posture—as it remains to this day—that the nation can defend itself, although in a crunch it will always ask the United States for help. I believe the reason they demurred was that they felt a U.S. military presence would deter Israel from acting independently—for example against Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities, against Hezbollah in Lebanon, or more recently in Gaza. By their calculation the loss of flexibility would be greater than any gain from a formal defense treaty binding the United States.
* * *
One immediate casualty of our quarrels with the American Jewish leadership over the Saudi sale was Ham’s valued political liaison, Mark Siegel. He had been sent around the country to promote it, and was still a good soldier. The State Department drafted a standard speech emphasizing that the F-15s for Saudi Arabia were only defensive weapons and posed no threat to Israel. Acting on direct orders from Vance, Siegel delivered the speech to the United Jewish Appeal at the Washington Hilton—and was booed. A member of the audience challenged him by holding up a McDonnell-Douglas brochure in which the manufacturer touted the F-15 as “the best offensive attack aircraft in the world.” Siegel went to Ham and indicated he wanted to leave, but Ham suggested he remain and just quietly drop his role as Jewish liaison. He did not reject this outright: “I wasn’t Joan of Arc. I wasn’t a fanatic, and I also had a family.” Siegel then asked a good friend, Al Hunt of the Wall Street Journal, what he should do. Hunt told him that once a resignation is offered, it can’t be withdrawn. Siegel decided to leave, which only served to strengthen the Jewish leadership’s belief that the sale disadvantaged Israel. No one spoke to him during the few days he was packing up his things.
One of the most prized qualities of anyone in a senior White House position is loyalty, no matter whether you agree with the decisions that come out of the Oval Office. Mark knew he had broken an implicit pledge of loyalty. He drafted a long letter of resignation, whereupon Carter asked to see him in the Oval Office, the only time he had been alone there with the president. Carter said he thought of him as a friend, respected his decision, but wanted to know more. Siegel expressed his respect for Carter’s efforts to bring peace to Israel but bluntly criticized Brzezinski. He told Carter that at a formal luncheon in the State Department dining room for Jewish leaders, Brzezinski snapped at the head of the Jewish Federation of Los Angeles: “You people better learn that you don’t dictate foreign policy.” Only after Siegel left the White House did he go public with his complaints. Humiliated, he left the White House, and while walking along Pennsylvania Avenue ran into a reporter, Carl Luebsdorf of the Dallas Morning News, who jokingly said Brzezinski had indicated, “You’re not going to meddle in foreign policy anymore.” Now thoroughly rattled, Siegel blurted out that he definitely would not be involved: He was resigning because he had been told “just flat-out lies about the offensive capabilities of these aircraft.”82 The White House then leaked to the press that he had not resigned but been fired, which of course angered him. Welcome to the world of Washington and the brutal domestic politics of Middle East policy making.
Siegel’s resignation raises the issue of whether it is appropriate for a senior adviser to a president to resign over a policy difference. My view is t
hat you have to be prepared that many decisions will not go your way. While the opportunity always exists to walk out and make a grand statement, this is not the right course, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. It is important to stay to fight the next battle. It is a rare privilege to be at the shoulder of a president of the United States and try to influence decisions that can have real impact on the way Americans live in our country, and on the world. It is also important to make your case with force and logic, and I always tried to do so (with the exception of the Bert Lance case, and its heavy personal implications). But as the old baseball adage goes: “You win some, you lose some, and some are rained out.” By remaining loyal, even where decisions of great personal importance went against me, I was able to help sway others. I always reminded myself that it was not me but Jimmy Carter who was elected president by the people of the United States.
MONDALE’S MISSION, BAGELS AND ALL
Tensions with Israel and the Jewish community were so high and the negotiations so unpromising that Mondale was sent on a mission to Jerusalem and Cairo from June 30 to July 3, 1978. He had strong pro-Israel credentials and deep relationships with American Jewish leaders, some of whom he brought with him. It was an unusual government mission. For one thing, it was the first trip by any vice president to Israel, and also the first to serve traditional Jewish food on board—lox, bagels, and blintzes for breakfast, courtesy of the White House chef. Only in America could you find a New York City delicatessen on Air Force Two.
I was aboard and was struck by an important difference between Mondale and Carter. On my many trips with the president, he would hold brief conversations with officials accompanying him aboard Air Force One and then retire to his cabin to work. Carter then summoned his aides, myself included, to discuss the issues that we expected to arise on the trip.
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