By contrast, the Israeli delegation was flexible—“even indulgent”—although Begin himself remained obstinate. Twice a day he convened his delegation of about a dozen advisers. Not only did he encourage everyone to speak, but he began by asking the opinion of the lowest-ranking staffer and going up the ladder, “so nobody would be a yes man,” as Elyakim Rubinstein recounted. At Camp David, Rubinstein was a junior diplomat fresh out of law school (he would later become an Israeli Supreme Court justice), and he said the structure of Begin’s meetings gave him the chutzpah to speak up, even though these creative discussions did little to bend Begin’s views.44
“THE GREAT TASK REMAINING BEFORE US”
The most meaningful effort to relieve tension was initiated by Carter—a Sunday-morning tour of the most important battlefield of the American Civil War at nearby Gettysburg. What better place to emphasize the costs of war and the rewards of peace to two countries that had repeatedly fought each other since Israel’s founding? The one ground rule Carter set was a complete ban on any discussions of the peace talks. Carter rode in his presidential limousine to the battleground seated between Sadat and Begin, with Aliza Begin and Rosalynn Carter across from them. The Egyptian and Israeli leaders compared their experiences in a British prison.
Leaving nothing to chance, Carter had already been briefed by the noted Civil War historian Shelby Foote, a fellow Southerner, but his narration of the battle was superfluous for the military men on the tour. Dayan had visited the battlefield before, and Sadat, in his military training, had studied the details of Pickett’s charge by the Confederate Army. He explained the Southern leadership’s mistakes that lost the decisive battle for the Confederates.
Begin did not join in the excited military discussions shared by the former generals, but when the tour moved to the site of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, Begin began to speak in a quiet voice. Everyone was shocked and turned reverently silent as he repeated the words by heart.45 If Carter meant to make the trip an object lesson for his two principal guests, he never said so, but it was obvious: the tremendous cost of another Middle East war and the necessity for peace.
When they returned from Gettysburg, Carter, Mondale, Vance, and Brzezinski met with Begin, Dayan, Weizman, and Barak. Carter’s draft sidestepped the specifics of geography and ducked long-term issues of sovereignty for yielding territory, but it was based on the concept of trading land for peace—all the rest, as the rabbis say, is commentary.
Begin understood exactly where Carter wanted to lead him as the president presented the American document, declaring that it “may decide the future of the people of Israel.”46 He told Begin: “There are phrases in it which both you and Sadat will find difficult to accept.… My task will be hopeless if you now reject the language of UN [Resolution] 242. Sadat doesn’t believe Israel wants to sign an agreement; that you really want land. I told him he was wrong.… I would hope you will be flexible and minimize your proposed changes.”47
But the session soon degenerated into a sterile debate. Begin wanted all three to produce their peace plans in public. Carter quickly pressed forward, explaining that his idea was to have neither side make any substantial changes to this private American draft. The two began to argue over UN Resolution 242. Begin angered Carter with a legalistic argument that the language applied only to wars of aggression, and that the Six-Day War, in which Israel defended its very existence, gave it the right to change its frontiers. Carter responded: “What you say convinces me that Sadat was right—what you want is land.” In frustration, Carter adjourned the meeting until later that night in the hope that the Israeli delegation would modify Begin’s position. As Carter left, he confided to Ambassador Lewis: “I don’t think Begin wants peace. He really doesn’t.” Lewis wisely advised the president that Begin certainly did want peace, but the more important question was the price Israel was prepared to pay.48
When they all reconvened that night, it was to parry back and forth until 3:00 a.m. on Monday morning, with Begin arguing every point tenaciously, including definitions of “sovereignty,” “autonomy,” “rights,” and other disputed words. When they finally adjourned, exhausted, Carter walked to his cabin with Dayan and complained that almost half his time with Begin had been spent discussing the Sinai settlements. As Dayan turned in the dark to leave, the one-eyed war hero walked into a tree. He was shaken, with his nose bleeding, and Carter helped him onto the path to his cabin. Carter later told me it was a poignant reminder of Dayan’s heroism in battle.49 Bone-tired, the president took a brief nap and awoke to make revisions to his text.
When Sadat and Carter met in the morning the president, building on a suggestion by Dayan, proposed allowing Israelis to live in just one settlement while acknowledging it as Egyptian territory. But Sadat refused. Carter argued that Sadat permitted Jews to live in Cairo, so why exclude them from Sinai settlements? Sadat replied: “Some things in the Middle East are not logical or reasonable. For Egypt, this is one of them.”50
By the eighth day, Tuesday, September 12, Begin was ready to leave Camp David, with only a short, joint general statement. He pulled out a typed draft blandly declaring that the three had met at Camp David, and Israel and Egypt appreciated the invitation from the United States. Or they could simply list the items of agreement and disagreement. Carter said numerous public opinion polls showed that a majority of Israelis were willing to accept a peace treaty as the price for yielding their Sinai settlements, and the conversation grew heated and unpleasant. Carter warned Begin of all he would be giving up if he left: diplomatic recognition and peace with Israel’s most formidable enemy, unimpeded access to the Suez Canal, an undivided Jerusalem, and a chance to negotiate with Jordan and others for a comprehensive peace—“all this, just to keep a few settlers in the Sinai.”51
Facing the prospect of failure, the language of the principals became incendiary. The next day, Lewis met with Begin and other Israelis after lunch and Begin startled him by saying: “Sam, do you know what the President said to me last night? He told me that Sadat had told him that he would never sign an agreement as long as I was Prime Minister. He was asking Carter to have me removed.”52
Begin furiously called Sadat a hypocrite, reaching a level of personal animosity he had never shown when they were together. Lewis realized that Carter, being too frank, had clearly made a serious error in relaying Sadat’s words to Begin, because Begin could see they could be used in Sadat’s own defense if Camp David failed and the others tried to blame Israel. Begin also complained to Lewis that he asked Brzezinski where he picked up the term “Palestinian aspirations,” and Brzezinski replied it had come from a recent conference convened by Bruno Kreisky, Austria’s Socialist chancellor and a Jew, who had put Sadat together with Israel’s Shimon Peres. This was hardly reassuring, since Peres was Begin’s chief political opponent. In scathing terms, Begin asked what the Socialist International was doing in these negotiations? (The philosophy of this international association of socialist parties, including Peres’s and Kreisky’s, was light-years from Begin’s.) How would he feel if the Republican Party had been drafting position papers for that conference? 53
* * *
It was now obvious that a stalemate had been reached. Carter separately warned Sadat and Begin that time was running out. In what turned out to be a key stratagem, he asked each to designate one man in his delegation to form a working group with him to develop a draft all parties could live with. This proved to be a brilliant tactical move. Fortunately, each side put forward two of their most creative and influential delegates, Osama el-Baz of Egypt and Aharon Barak of Israel. Both had the full confidence of their leaders, and both were brilliant lawyers whose lives were focused on their briefs.
Barak had been a last-minute addition to the Israeli delegation. He had just been elevated to the Israeli Supreme Court, but delayed taking his seat on the bench to join the delegation at Begin’s request. His clothes were rumpled and his hands stained with ink from legal drafting, but h
is appearance belied a creative legal mind—one as imaginative as el-Baz’s was meticulous. He had been named dean of the Hebrew University Law School at the age of thirty-eight, while the scholarly Egyptian—slight, diminutive, almost mouselike in appearance—earned two advanced degrees from Harvard and had a Jewish girlfriend while studying with Kissinger and Roger Fisher, the celebrated specialist in techniques of negotiation (Getting to Yes). For the president of the United States to sit at a negotiating table across from subordinates, even two such accomplished individuals, but far below his status as a head of state, was unprecedented in American diplomatic annals. This breach of protocol was of no importance to Carter; his mind-set was that of a master builder on his greatest project: He tried to solve problems and get things done.54
Without the intimidating presence of Sadat or Begin, the comfort level in Carter’s cabin increased measurably. The three sat around the president’s desk debating key points in search of acceptable compromises and careful phraseology that might make them more politically palatable. On the issue of UN Resolution 242, they decided that the disputed language proscribing the “acquisition of territory by war” should be deleted from the agreement itself, and that the full text then be placed in an appendix, while the formal agreement would note that “the parties agreed to United Nations Resolution 242 in all its parts.” They resolved the arguments over whether to call the territory the “West Bank” (Egypt’s preference) or “Judea and Samaria” (Begin’s) and “Palestinians” versus “Palestinian Arabs” by deciding to use the appropriate phrase in the Egyptian and English texts and the other phrase in the Hebrew text. All told, they negotiated for eleven hours. But they still could not agree on the disposition of settlements or on full diplomatic recognition, and that was left for the next day.
As they parted, el-Baz startled Carter by telling him Egypt could not agree to grant Israel a veto over which Palestinian refugees could enter the West Bank, which might have opened the way for a return of Yāsir Arafat and the PLO leadership. But Sadat had already agreed to give Israel veto authority. Aghast, Carter asked whether Sadat had reversed himself, and el-Baz admitted he had not discussed that aspect of the refugee question with Sadat. Carter asked him to recheck with his boss so Carter could determine for himself whether Sadat wanted to cause a deadlock. The Egyptians sent word that Sadat had retired and given orders that he was not to be disturbed, although it was still only the middle of the evening and Sadat was a notorious night owl. That night Carter could not sleep. Thinking back to the argument he had witnessed that morning among the Egyptian delegation, he feared for Sadat’s safety.55 Was he at risk from his own delegation? At 4:00 a.m. Carter summoned Brzezinski and his Secret Service agents and ordered them to strengthen security around Sadat’s cabin.
“SADAT IS LEAVING!”
The next morning, Thursday, September 14, Carter was greatly relieved to see Sadat emerge from his cabin. Carter joined him on his regular brisk walk, and returned to his cabin to work on the next American draft. Barak was waiting for him and asked the president to meet with Dayan and Weizman to hammer out an agreement for Israel to leave all the settlements in the Sinai. But Begin had refused to agree, and Carter drafted new language to keep the matter open for negotiation for three months. But Sadat refused: he would only negotiate when, not if, the settlements were disbanded.56 The Israeli delegation seemed united in refusing to remove the settlers.
That night, as Carter made a list of the remaining differences, they seemed insignificant to him compared with the great advantages of peace. The Israeli delegation was also in despair and seriously considering leaving Camp David.57 Worse, neither the Americans nor the Israelis realized how increasingly isolated Sadat was from his own delegation. Later that day Kamel abruptly resigned as foreign minister over Sadat’s concessions; he remained quietly at Camp David to avoid embarrassing Sadat during the summit. Carter then announced a deadline, a tactical maneuver designed to force a settlement. He instructed Vance to tell the U.S. delegation that, agreement or not, he was going to finish on Sunday and blame the Israelis for the failure. Quandt was assigned to draft a speech. But Carter refused to give up, meeting with Dayan and Weizman and then drafting a new Sinai proposal, with Sadat still insisting that every Israeli must be withdrawn.58
* * *
With less than seventy-two hours to his self-imposed deadline, Carter awoke Friday morning realizing they could go no further, and proposed drafting a joint communiqué with Sadat and Begin. He already had confided to Rosalynn that the talks had failed and told Mondale to clear his calendar so he could help contain the political damage. Rosalynn said desperately: “I know you’re teasing me.” He answered, “No, we’ve failed. We’re trying now to think of the best way to present the failure to the public.”59
Suddenly Vance, who was normally a paragon of establishment restraint, burst into the room, his face drained of blood, and announced, “Sadat is leaving! He and his aides are already packed. He asked me to order a helicopter!”60 Carter was horrified; it was “one of the worst moments of my life,” he confided.61 A rupture would tilt the Middle East power balance in unpredictable directions; Moscow would certainly try to fill a vacuum that would be left by Sadat’s failure and America’s inability to help him, even as a great power. Carter went to his bedroom, knelt down, and prayed. He changed from his sports shirt and jeans into a coat and tie and walked to Sadat’s cabin, where the entire Egyptian delegation, along with Vance and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, had gathered on the porch.
What followed was one of the most emotional and historic scenes in the highly charged politics and diplomacy of the modern Middle East. Gheit remembered Carter appealing to Sadat “in the most personal way, telling him it would imperil his presidency and his ability to work with Egypt.”62 Carter warned Sadat that breaking off the negotiations would not only inflict severe damage to relations between their two countries, but between the two men as individuals, because Sadat would be violating his word of honor. Sadat remained adamant, so Carter went further. He told Sadat that he had already earned the enmity of Arab rejectionists simply by going to Jerusalem and that acknowledging defeat at Camp David would leave him in “the worst of all worlds,” by publicly repudiating his own commitments, damaging his reputation as the world’s foremost peacemaker, admitting his visit to Jerusalem had been fruitless, while his enemies would say he had made a foolish mistake. “Give me time to sort it out for you,” Carter pleaded.63
Sadat explained that he had decided to pull out after Dayan told him the Israelis would not sign any agreement requiring their complete withdrawal from Sinai, which would leave the Egyptians vulnerable not only militarily but diplomatically, because their concessions could be used against them in future negotiations. Carter, thinking quickly, offered to sign a statement declaring that an Israeli rejection of any part of the agreement would nullify all of it. Sadat relented at this promise of a formal pledge and said, “I will stick with you to the end.” Some in the Egyptian delegation criticized al Raiss for placing too much trust in Carter,64 others confirmed that Sadat justified overriding their objections by invoking Carter’s eminence and power. Nabil Elaraby, legal adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recalled to me: “He would say, ‘I have the promise of the president of the United States.’ He kept saying that he thought the president of the United States was all-powerful and whatever he says, it will be done.”65
No such trust existed among the Israelis. About the same time Carter was confronting Sadat, Weizman burst into a meeting between Vance and Barak. Sadat, he reported excitedly, had pleaded with him not to allow the Sinai settlements to become a deal breaker. Unaware of the confrontation between Carter and Sadat, Weizman reported that he had pulled Sadat back from the brink.66 Carter had to be summoned, and Weizman told him Sadat had agreed to postpone the question of the settlements for future negotiations. Carter was shocked, since this was not what Sadat had told him. Weizman also predicted that the Knesset would vote
to remove the settlements, while Dayan had told Carter the opposite. Carter was exasperated with Begin and showed it.67 When he next met Sadat, he was assured that Weizman’s account was wrong.
This demonstrated how, in the heat of negotiations, two people can come away with their own completely different understanding of the same set of facts. Such misunderstandings would also recur on the equally vexed issue of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, with devastating long-run consequences.
After a rancorous day, the warm feeling that had infused the first Sabbath dinner had evaporated during a week of exasperating negotiations. None of the Americans, not even the Carters, were invited to the second Friday-night dinner. This time Carter dined with Sadat, then they watched the heavyweight championship fight between Muhammad Ali and Leon Spinks, and put in a call to Ali at about one in the morning to congratulate him. Ali said he was going to hold his championship for another six months and retire. Carter invited Ali’s ten-year-old daughter to visit Amy at the White House. They had dodged another bullet, although by no means the last one.68
Mondale stepped in to play a crucial role. Until that Friday the vice president had been at the White House minding the store with me, but being kept informed by his national security adviser, Denis Clift, at Camp David. Deeply worried that the president would be forever diminished by failure, Mondale was helicoptered from the White House and immediately contacted both leaders. To Sadat he argued forcefully against Egypt’s proposal to display an Arab flag on the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. He also saw Begin privately and pleaded with him to give up all of the Sinai because the desert buffer between the two countries lacked the religious and political significance of the biblical Judaea or Samaria. He promised Begin to do his utmost to obtain American funds to help relocate Israel’s military bases from the Sinai to Israel’s Negev Desert. He also offered to set up American surveillance posts in the Mitla Pass, the traditional invasion route across the Sinai from the Suez Canal to Israel and the scene of fierce fighting in previous wars.69 The early-warning posts remain there to this day.
President Carter Page 63