At a January 9 meeting chaired by Brzezinski, he said we needed to show some visible export cancellations to demonstrate that our program had teeth. State’s Richard Cooper countered that if the U.S. canceled a Soviet order and another country picked it up, we would simply “look silly.” There were countervailing arguments to everything we examined. Canceling oil-drilling equipment, said Deputy Energy Secretary John Sawhill, would mean the Russians would extract less of their own oil and buy more on the world market, driving up prices even higher. If we banned phosphates, the Soviets would cancel sales of ammonia that we needed for fertilizer. Would the French step in and try to sell their computers in our Russian market? Should we buy corn instead of wheat to stabilize the market and protect Iowa farmers? Bergland argued that if we were going to embargo grain, we should also stop shipping livestock, fertilizer, and soybeans: “If we do any, we should do all.”
And so it went on product after product, splitting hairs. It seemed we were “half-pregnant,” when we should be persuading our allies to show solidarity by not supplanting our exports.22 Treasury Secretary Miller separately complained that Brzezinski was “taking over trade policy, and just wants to cancel contracts with the Soviets without thought.”23
Managing the implications of his grain embargo was particularly testy. The grain-exporting companies demanded full indemnity for their losses, which we had yet to consider in detail. As for the longer term in the markets, I had good reason to urge the president to give us time to consider the economic consequences of the embargo, but he would not hear of it. The ripple effects would go from the farmers to the grain exporters to the grain elevator owners and to the small country banks that had financed different parts of the supply chain. We closed the grain futures exchange while we worked on the details of a program to protect the entire agricultural economy. Bergland succinctly said that we had created a panic and now had a responsibility to fix it.24
He then laid out a complex program to avert a meltdown of the agricultural economy, the essence of which was that the U.S. government would take over the Russian contracts, not release the grain on the market, which would depress prices, and put an equivalent amount into the government reserve. It had taken a full, exhausting weekend to work out this plan, which represented only the start of our labors. At the end of the Sunday-night meeting, I felt we had a chance to avert a domestic catastrophe, at least in the farm belt.
At the Monday-morning cabinet meeting on January 7, Vance reported that an estimated 400,000 Afghan refugees had flooded into Pakistan since the invasion. Mondale, always looking at the political implications, said it was important to deny export licenses for high technology and other products, so “farmers won’t feel they are alone.”
Commerce Secretary Philip Klutznik said he had frozen all applications for strategic exports to the Soviet Union. Carter emphasized the importance of publicizing specific actions, and shifted from international affairs to their effect on domestic politics, announcing he would stick close to the White House in order to be seen doing his job rather than campaigning. Carter correctly forecast that Reagan would be the Republican nominee, and said that he had not yet seen any deterioration of public support on his handling of the hostage drama in Iran. “What I hear is ‘avoid bloodshed and keep us out of war,’” he said. It struck me that a president who was so consciously apolitical in his governance, by trying to do whatever he thought was “right,” could turn on a dime when the campaign season began.25
DON’T CRY FOR US, ARGENTINA
To have real bite, any U.S. grain embargo had to depend upon our friends denying the Soviets the opportunity to fill in the gap by selling their grain. But in the rush to take action, insufficient attention had been paid to one of the world’s greatest grain producers: Argentina, and that left us crying. Arms sales to the military junta had been curbed under the president’s human rights campaign, and as the saying goes, everything that goes around comes around. On January 10, Agriculture’s Hathaway told me in a state of near-shock that the Argentines had nine million tons of grain, and they were considering selling it to the Soviet Union. The embargo had been announced so precipitously that this was the first time Hathaway told me or anyone at the White House. I called Christopher at State, who declared himself “flabbergasted” at the size of their stockpile, which he had been told was only six hundred thousand tons.
I learned that in a meeting of grain-exporting countries, the Agriculture Department’s representative had found out about Argentina’s large stockpile and reported it to state’s Richard Cooper, but the correct number was never passed up to me or others at the top, and we therefore did not think of Argentina as a major exporter. I found this unfathomable; but that is what happens when a bureaucracy must suddenly shift course to a new policy under great time pressure, and does not catch up with all the relevant facts.26
We then met with Whitney MacMillan, the president of Cargill, the world’s largest private grain-trading company. He was totally dismissive of the embargo, asserting that there were plenty of substitutes for the United States as grain suppliers, and Argentina was only one of them; but Argentina was anxious to take advantage of our embargo and smarting from the human rights pressures we imposed. Cargill had no choice but to help Argentina, he said, or “we will lose our franchise.” Moreover, Cargill’s foreign subsidiaries needed to be able to maintain their ties with the Soviet Union, “or we will burn our bridges to the USSR to sell U.S. grain.” He argued that foreign affiliates of American companies should be free to pursue their normal business abroad without interference from Washington. I knew he had his stockholders to consider, but even though I was no great fan of the embargo, I found his attitude repugnant in showing absolutely no interest in the security challenges our country faced from the Soviet invasion.27
Major grain exporters, including Canada, Australia, and Argentina, had agreed to not replace American grain at a meeting in Brussels.28 But a few days later Argentina reneged on its promise. The Soviets sent envoys to negotiate for the grain, and so did the United States, but our negotiators were waved away by Argentina when we pressed them to support the embargo. The problem would have been significantly worse if Argentina had harvested a better crop that year. It reduced its grain sales to other nations and sold most of its reserves to the Soviets at premium prices. But even so, the Russians were able to buy only an additional seven million tons.
In the end the grain embargo and sanctions program had deeper political results than we could have realized at the time: Together with Carter’s direct warning, it helped stay the Soviets’ hand against the popular uprising in Poland the following year, when they were poised to invade. But for now, agricultural leaders blamed the president for penalizing farmers more than the Russians, and consumers blamed Carter for raising crop prices. Yet, an analysis of market data showed that wheat and corn grain prices actually fell during this period, and only began to rise after Reagan lifted the embargo in 1981. Ultimately the strategy was very successful, with the prices of grain remaining stable while American grain sales actually reached record highs.
While the embargo caused the United States to lose its dominant share of the Soviet market, by forcing the Soviet Union to diversify its suppliers it achieved its intended aim of retaliating against the Soviet Union by reducing its meat production and forcing it to pay premium prices for grain. Often they paid nearly 25 percent above international market prices and still were unable to make up even half the seventeen million tons embargoed by the United States. Together with a poor Soviet harvest, that meant less meat on Soviet shelves. Per capita meat consumption fell back to 1965 levels, thwarting an important objective of the Soviet government.29
Most important, the administration decided that to promote a united front against Soviet aggression, it was necessary to maintain the embargo even if the Soviets were eventually able to acquire grain elsewhere. By refusing to reverse his position on the embargo in the face of political backlash, Carter proved he was
willing to commit himself and the country to a strong stand against aggression, and this in itself was a victory. I should have taken off my domestic adviser’s hat in favor of a broader perspective. Carter’s resolve and his tough actions against the Soviets were politically popular—even in Iowa, where he decisively defeated Kennedy.30
MOSCOW GAMES
In his nationwide address, Carter signaled that the United States would “prefer not to withdraw” from the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, but would have to consider it if the Soviets did not end their aggression in Afghanistan. The issue was first revisited at a January 9 meeting with the president by Mondale, who argued that if people “see Russian ships in our harbors, and American athletes in Russia for the Olympics, it sends the wrong signal.”31
This time Carter consulted more widely, contacting foreign government and sports federation leaders. He regarded it as immoral for athletes to participate as guests of the Soviet Union while its troops were engaging in a violent suppression in Afghanistan. Extending an olive branch, the administration agreed to attend the games if the Kremlin would make a firm commitment to start withdrawing troops. No such commitment ever came. He sent a personal letter to Brezhnev offering to attend the games after a one-year postponement if the Soviets left Afghanistan. That also was ignored.
The president again raised the question of the Olympics at a senior staff meeting early in January. He said it would be impossible to participate if the Soviets were still in Afghanistan, and “we can’t pick it up and move it all to one place; therefore, we should break it into pieces and go to Greece for a permanent place, or we will be killing the Olympics permanently.”32 I knew this troubled him because he was a sportsman, loved playing softball, fishing, and canoeing, and was an avid tennis player.
He simply could not let go of the subject at a meeting later that month with me and our senior White House congressional lobbyists. I told him we were getting ahead of ourselves because the Olympic Games did not take place until August. He forcefully replied in no uncertain terms: “The bottom line is that we’re not going if they’re still in there.” He spent a considerable amount of time with the U.S. Olympic Committee working for the boycott even though he also realized it made him few friends in the world of sport. Although the Winter Olympics were already under way at Lake Placid in upstate New York, he decided not to visit because “I’m too controversial.”33
A diplomatic tug-of-war began, involving the Soviet Union, our European allies, the International Olympic Committee, and the U.S. government and people, who were surprisingly supportive of a boycott. And like all boycotts, it raised unexpected questions: Should we also bar American companies like Coca-Cola and Levi-Strauss from advertising at the Olympics, while asking our athletes to stay home? We had no legal power to do so. By February, as the Europeans were hesitating, although leaning our way, Carter felt we needed some alternative competition to satisfy the athletes, who had trained for four years and now would be denied an opportunity open to them only during a short window in any young life. He decided to bring the U.S. Olympic Team to the White House to explain the boycott to them in person, appeal to their patriotism, and offer them an alternative.34
Although we never mentioned it directly, the dreadful example of American participation in the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, giving Adolph Hitler a measure of credibility, was certainly on my mind—and I believe on Carter’s and Mondale’s, too. Congress stood behind the administration with resolutions supporting the boycott by overwhelming bipartisan votes in both houses. So did international leaders, and finally the U.S. Olympic Committee, too, which voted not to participate, although Vance reported “it was a difficult decision.”35
Polls showed that 55 percent of Americans approved of the Olympic boycott, but Carter knew his plan could backfire and make America look pitiful, unless a majority of national teams also stayed home. Convincing them was a tough slog, led by Vance. Most Olympic bodies are independent and resented being told what to do by their governments. Carter and his top assistants gave interviews, speeches, and made personal appeals to point out that attending would be immoral and unsportsmanlike. Although the decision to boycott the Olympics upset many people, Carter viewed it as an essential political blow against the Soviets. The Moscow games were politically important to the Soviet leadership to showcase and celebrate its achievements. The four most influential nations—the United States, China, Germany, and Japan—did not attend. Several Soviet dissidents and intellectuals said the boycott would send a strong political and ideological message to the Soviet people.
While the Olympic boycott was a blow to sports-mad America and especially its athletes, it was an even harsher one to the prestige of the Soviet leadership. Remarkably, 61 nations chose not to attend the Moscow games, which turned out largely to be an eastern bloc event.36 A substitute track-and-field event that we encouraged, the Liberty Bell Classic, took place at the University of Pennsylvania on July 16, with 30 countries and 400 athletes participating. Several other events were held internationally and were often referred to as the Olympic Boycott Games. In response the Soviet Union and several of its allies boycotted the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles and hosted their own “Friendship Games.” As for the Olympic movement, it outlasted the Soviet Union itself.
THE MILITARY DRAFT
To further strengthen his stance, Carter also reinstated registration for the military draft. This was another spur-of-the moment decision and was sharply contested inside the administration as essentially unnecessary. I had a fierce debate with the president about adding this measure to the lengthening list of responses to Afghanistan. I argued strenuously that it reversed his campaign promise against registration, that a National Security Council study showed it was unnecessary, that it might look as if we were moving toward a war footing, and that questions remained about whether women should be registered. Carter replied that Defense Secretary Brown said the registration would save six months in raising a conscript army if the nation had to mobilize in response to further Soviet provocations. “It is the only additional military step available,” he argued.37 There was clearly a burr under his saddle.
I did not realize how upset he was at the time, and it is probably better that I did not. He later wrote bitterly of my and Mondale’s opposition to draft registration as “practically a rebellion.” We argued that he was overreacting and that reinstating registration would be politically damaging to his reelection. He complained of having to “fight off the draft dodgers in my group,” also singling us out for what he considered our timidity about his cabinet reshuffle, his withdrawal from the Iowa primary debate with Kennedy, and the grain embargo.38
The fact of the matter was that Jimmy Carter felt he was on a high: His bold actions had reinvigorated him and his style of governance. Just a few days before, he had expressed a certain relief to us that SALT II was off the table for the time being, saying: “[Now] I don’t have to kiss every senator’s ass.” On the contrary, “I need to escalate the rhetoric and bust the hell out of them [the Soviets].… We’ve been timid because of SALT; the country wants us to be rough.”39 Later in January, grain markets began to stabilize, and Soviet troops soon discovered that Afghanistan was no cakewalk.
When Carter met with the Democratic congressional leaders on the morning of his State of the Union address, the political landscape had changed beyond recognition. Tip O’Neill forecast—correctly—that the president would be greeted warmly by Congress and compared the moment with the period of 1946–47 when the postwar order was being built and America became the guarantor of the world’s security. The Speaker dramatically told the president: “America is waiting for direction and wants to know where we stand and what’s the stopping point. We are all greatly disturbed, and some people don’t think we could beat Mexico or Canada.” The president responded: “The Speaker’s statement is different than it would have been a year ago, and shows how the country has changed.” Carter might have said how much he had changed as
well.40
THE CARTER DOCTRINE
It was time for the annual State of the Union address, on January 23, 1980—the final one of his presidency, as it turned out. Carter had told us while drafting his speech that he wanted to make the speech “a historic document”—so much so that he thought of distributing advance texts to Congress. Fortunately Mondale warned him against circulating advance copies lest the rustling of pages distract from his message. Moreover, the inevitable leaks to the press would dilute the impact of his dramatic announcement. Carter said he did not want to alienate the Soviets, but he said he knew “the world is frightened and I need to send a clear message to them. Alliances are important, but I am willing to stand alone, if needed. I need a strong speech and [to] preach a sermon, so we let the Persian Gulf countries know we’ll be there if the Soviets invade, and let the devil take the hindmost.” He closed our meeting by asking me for a few pages on the domestic issues, but dramatically added: “The key to the speech is here is the line we’re drawing [his emphasis], and if they challenge us, then we’ll respond.” No one could have had reason to doubt his resolve.41
The State of the Union address in the vast chamber of the House of Representatives was the perfect forum for a new Jimmy Carter. Because of the twin crises of Iran and Afghanistan, the air hung so heavily with concern and anticipation it could have been cut with a knife. The president did not disappoint. He began by tying together the two events—“one of international terrorism and one of military aggression.” The bulk of the address focused on Afghanistan. He reviewed the containment and détente policies of the previous three decades that had led toward mutual restraint by the two superpowers, but then declared that now the “Soviet Union has taken a radical and aggressive new step.”
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