The next morning I tried the same argument on Carter, but he would not accept it: “I love Andy like a brother and I want to guide him. But he has embarrassed us too many times in the past. He acted in contravention of my order and our policy by meeting with the PLO. Plus he lied to the State Department.”50
Yet, he was clearly torn. The next day he told our senior staff meeting that he should have publicly endorsed Andy’s meeting with the PLO as incoming president of the Security Council, but now Andy was “caught in a quandary” after telling the State Department that the meeting was unofficial. Carter recounted that Andy had also told Israeli ambassador Blum, but the Israelis went public.51 In any case Andy was already on a plane from New York to submit his resignation.
I was left thinking how little personal contact the president had with his UN representative, and how one private meeting between them early on could have helped dial him back to a more acceptable decibel level without silencing his message. But Jimmy Carter did not seek or nurture many close personal relationships. Andy had done a great deal to bring Carter to the Oval Office, but the president barely resisted Vance’s ultimatum. Young’s firing was not the result of the meeting with the PLO itself, but of the way it offended Vance and his department. “I thought we had to communicate with Palestinians somehow or another,” Vance said.52
But neither Vance nor Carter could publicly confirm that the real reason Andy had been fired was that he had not told the full story to the State Department, even while trying to advance U.S. policy by stopping an anti-Israel resolution. Vance had to declare it was “absolutely false” that he acted under pressure from the Jewish community, but this only confirmed the suspicions of those who believed that was exactly what he had done, and they were stoked by some in the press. The tabloid New York Post quoted “one or two Jewish leaders” under a sensational headline: “Jews Demand, Fire Him.”53
Theodore Mann, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, the umbrella organization for more than thirty American Jewish organizations, called the meeting a “deplorable act,” but stopped short of calling for his resignation. Bert Gold, longtime executive director of the American Jewish Committee, perhaps the most prominent national Jewish organization, told the Post that if Andy had arranged the meeting without the administration’s permission, he “should be fired.”54 Among the most severe remarks were those by Rabbi Joseph Sternstein, president of the conservative American Zionist Federation: “The time has come that Ambassador Young should be dismissed from his post.” While even these few calls for Andy’s resignation were not directed at him because he was black, the fact remained that only prominent Jews made them and all were supporters of Israel. This was not lost on the black leadership.
In the scramble to fill the vacuum left by Andy’s resignation, some black leaders competed with increasingly intense declarations of support for the Palestinians, thus widening the gap with Jews who had supported their fight for civil rights. The ubiquitous Reverend Jesse Jackson announced he would be visiting the Middle East at Arafat’s invitation, called Prime Minister Begin a terrorist, and said Israel was “not a democracy but a theocracy.” The Reverend Joseph Lowery, president of the Southern Christian Leadership Council, met with Professor Terzi of the PLO and declared his support for “the human rights of all Palestinians, including the right of self-determination in regard to their own homeland.” Then Lowery went to Blum’s office with an entourage of cameramen, whereupon the Israeli ambassador realized he was a stage prop for the infighting over the leadership of the black community.55
When the black leadership met in New York on August 22 to discuss “black grievances against Jews,” Andy was not even invited. It became a watershed meeting, which issued a statement, tempered somewhat by the wise judgment of the Urban League’s Vernon Jordan, declaring that blacks must express independent views on foreign policy; support the SCLC in opening a dialogue with the PLO as Andy Young had done; and call for a discussion with Jewish leaders to “reassess” the black-Jewish relationship in light of Israel’s close relationship with apartheid South Africa. It also declared that many Jews, despite their earlier support for “the aspirations of black Americans for educational, political, and economic equality with other Americans, abruptly became apologists for the racial status quo” by opposing affirmative action.56
CYRUS VANCE AND RESOLUTION 465
Then disaster turned into political suicide because of the way an Arab-sponsored UN resolution was handled after Andy had been succeeded by his deputy, Ambassador Donald McHenry, a rare black foreign service officer who knew every step of the State Department ladder. With the New York Democratic primary looming for the nation’s largest bloc of Jewish voters, the provocative Arab draft condemned all Israeli settlements, and referred to Jerusalem as “occupied territory.” On similar resolutions the Carter administration had abstained and rounded up enough abstentions or negative votes by the lesser powers to let the proposal die.
But Carter’s inability to avoid wading into the quicksand of Israeli issues was stunning. Things started well when Vance showed the draft of Security Council Resolution 465 to the Friday-morning foreign-policy breakfast. The president, Jordan, Brzezinski, and Brown all agreed that the United States could not support it as worded, and would abstain. That implied negotiating arcane diplomatic phrases lying in a minefield the administration was unable to cross safely. Even now, with President Trump’s public recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the status of Jerusalem remains as politically and diplomatically explosive as it was then.
McHenry reported later that Friday that he had succeeded in having the language on Jerusalem removed, but not the demand to dismantle the settlements. Vance ordered McHenry to delay a vote until he could check with the president. When the secretary called Carter at Camp David on Saturday, he indicated that the language on Jerusalem was gone. Trusting Vance, the president did not ask for a copy of the last draft. But Vance and the president himself were looking for an opportunity to send a strong signal to Menachem Begin about the impact the expansion of settlements was having on talks about autonomy for the Palestinians. Assuming, incorrectly, that McHenry had deleted the Jerusalem language, he directed McHenry to cast an affirmative vote while expressing strong reservations on dismantling existing settlements.
In fact not all the Jerusalem language had been deleted by McHenry’s negotiations. It is remarkable that Vance and Carter, one a world-class lawyer noted for his attention to detail, and the other a president with a penchant for poring over documents, did not insist on seeing the final draft, with its repeated references to Jerusalem, which they knew would contradict an express personal commitment Carter had made to Begin at Camp David not to support any UN resolution dealing with the status of Jerusalem. Carter was furious when Mondale and Ham told him that American Jewish leaders were “extremely upset about the UN vote on the settlements in Jerusalem.” He told them he understood references to Jerusalem had been deleted, and when they showed him the resolution with six references to Jerusalem, he told them, “I can’t believe it.” He called Vance, who was in Chicago, and the secretary told Carter that he also thought references to Jerusalem had been deleted.57
Hours before the vote Vance had been forewarned by Israeli ambassador Evron that the resolution contained multiple references to Jerusalem—six, in fact—and on each occasion that settlements in “occupied territories” were mentioned, the phrase “including Jerusalem” accompanied it. Moreover, the resolution clearly called for Israel to dismantle its existing settlements, which even Sadat did not seek at Camp David. Evron bluntly told Vance he would immediately tell Begin he had been misled by the president’s promise at Camp David.
* * *
It is human nature in remembering events to reorder them in our minds, usually in ways that support our position, and there are as many explanations for the misunderstandings as there were key actors. McHenry cast the affirmative vote in the belief that he had
a green light from Vance, who in turn thought he was carrying out the president’s wishes. Carter said he had instructed Vance to support the resolution only if the offensive language on Jerusalem was deleted. Ham believed that Carter gave Vance some oral parameters so he could bargain over the language, but to Ham it was also symptomatic of a broader problem: “We were always swinging back and forth between Carter wanting to be tough [on Israel], and the political realities.”58
Israel’s ambassadors in Washington and at the UN were furious, with Yehuda Blum in New York fingering McHenry as a diplomat in the “anti-apartheid orbit,” who he felt saw Palestinians as “underdogs” and “colored people” like himself.59 When Carter returned from Camp David Sunday morning, Mondale had the unenviable task of explaining to him what had happened, and letting him know that the campaign staff in New York City was in revolt, with Democratic workers literally walking out of Carter headquarters. Finally scanning the full text, Carter declared that his instructions had not been followed and exploded in anger.60
Realizing the force of the gathering political storm, the president issued a statement at 10:00 p.m., March 3, the Monday after the Saturday vote, blaming it on a miscommunication of his instructions to McHenry.61 When Mondale asked me to come to his office, he told me he was “outraged” about the resolution, which he blamed on an “end-run” by Vance going directly to Carter, when he knew the Jerusalem language was supposed to be deleted but had not been. He was livid and “discouraged,” accurately forecasting it had “revived Kennedy” and would cost Carter the New York primary.62
Carter continued erupting in successive meetings with all concerned and had the following exchange with McHenry. “The president: ‘Don, you know I never realized all those other references to Jerusalem were in there. If I had, I would have ordered you to abstain.’ McHenry: ‘They weren’t new, Mr. President. They were there all along.’ The president: ‘Nonetheless, I never would have approved it.’ McHenry: ‘Well, sir, I might have argued with you about them, but of course, I would have voted however you said.’”63
Ambassador Evron was asked to meet with Carter in the Oval Office.64 Wearing his cardigan sweater with a yellow legal pad in hand, the president explained he was assured the Jerusalem language had been excluded and exclaimed: “If my Secretary of State doesn’t read the papers that he then talks to me about, what am I supposed to do with him?” In Evron’s presence, he called Vance’s deputy Warren Christopher and told him he was going to disassociate himself from the resolution—and even suggested Evron draft his statement.65
There was confusion then and to this day about who was responsible for the vote, but none whatever about its political implications. As Ham recalled: “The minute that happened, we knew we had a huge mess on our hands, and at that point, we backtracked and we got it both ways.”66
Mondale became like a man possessed and, realizing the political consequences, called Vance from the campaign trail: “We’ve got a firestorm, and it is something that we can’t live with.”67 Vance said he had talked with McHenry before the vote, and he would take responsibility as McHenry’s boss. Mondale replied that it went far beyond blame.68
CARTER AND THE PRIMARIES
The howls of outrage from Israel, AIPAC, and major American Jewish leaders reached their highest octave since Carter launched his Middle East peace negotiations and proposed the arms sale to Saudi Arabia. Carter hastily summoned the Jewish leadership to the White House, told them he instructed Vance to abstain if there was any reference to Jerusalem, and stuck to the story of a communications breakdown. He added that while he did not condone the settlements, and believed they were “illegal and an obstacle to peace … I never asked Begin to dismantle existing settlements but to stop new ones.” The meeting left nerves frayed, but the Jewish community seemed to accept the excuse of a miscommunication and give Carter the benefit of the doubt.69
The next week Vance was called before Congress, and the story fell apart. He testified that the resolution was consistent with administration policy and defended McHenry. That was the coup de grace. Rosalynn was campaigning in New York when she saw the headlines in her hotel room and realized they would simply reignite a controversy that had begun to simmer down. She thought: “Heaven knows Cy Vance doesn’t have a political bone in his body.” She immediately called her husband and pointedly asked: “Doesn’t Cy know we’re in a campaign?” She told him straight out: “It was bad enough in New York already, but I might as well come home now. We’re finished, and I’ve got to go out and smile at people all day.”70
At a White House staff meeting on March 24, Carter complained, “The Jewish community has never given me a break, even when Begin is at the far extreme, and other Israelis agree with me.”71 In the primary we suffered massive Jewish defections. Through the early contests against Kennedy, Carter rolled up large majorities of the Jewish electorate and won the votes of about 70 percent of Jewish Democrats in his successful Illinois primary just two weeks before New York. With a 20-point lead in New York’s opinion polls, Carter had expected to land the knockout blow against Kennedy. But the senator carried New York with 59 percent of the vote, and neighboring Connecticut the same day.
What was unreported until now is that with Kennedy’s full concurrence, his political strategists had been already planning a public withdrawal from the race if he lost in New York. They had drafted a concession and withdrawal statement and reserved a room at a Boston hotel for Kennedy to deliver it on the morning after the primary.72 They had just been overwhelmed in Illinois. With a New York defeat, said Carl Wagner, a top Kennedy campaign aide, “we would have lost Pennsylvania for certain. The rationale for the candidacy didn’t exist.”73
Carter rebounded and won almost all the remaining primaries, but with losses interspersed, mainly in Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia. The final set of primaries on June 3 was also a mixed bag. But Carter had won 51 percent, or 10 million primary votes, to 37 percent, or 7.3 million votes, for Kennedy, and he ran far ahead in delegates, 2,123 to 1,151.
From the New York primary onward, I believe Carter was left with the view that New York Jews had not only defeated him in the primary but were also a factor in his loss in November.74 He was also hurt by bitter opposition over the UN vote from New York City’s egocentric Jewish mayor, Ed Koch, even after Carter had literally saved his city from bankruptcy. In the 1976 election Jews had been one of the most reliably Democratic groups, giving Carter some 70 percent of their votes. But in 1980 only 45 percent of Jewish voters cast their ballots for him, giving Carter an even lower level of support than McGovern in his landslide loss to Nixon.
Ham attributed the collapse of Jewish support to more than just a botched resolution: “A lot of it was cultural, and Southern Baptist, and there was a huge cultural kind of gap and suspicion of Carter.” Another factor Ham identified was that in making a deal in the Middle East, Carter “had to push both sides, and the Jewish community didn’t like the fact that he had pushed Israel.” And Begin finally contributed to that dislike, and although he spoke graciously about Carter from time to time, he continued making statements to try to rally the Jewish community to him in the peace process.75 Truly, no good deed goes unpunished.
Carter called Kennedy after the last round of primaries to try to work out a harmonious convention, but Kennedy demanded and Carter rejected a televised national debate between the two. They met at the White House, but it led nowhere. Carter remembers a difficult session with Kennedy, who, rather than withdraw or even attempt to compromise, vowed to press his candidacy at the convention.76
“THE DREAM WILL NEVER DIE”
A far more serious threat occurred at the convention, when Kennedy began by appealing to Carter’s large majority of delegates to vote their conscience. He won an ally in Senate Majority Leader Byrd, who feared a Reagan landside would sweep out Democratic senators and give the Republicans a majority, which is exactly what happened. I believe Byrd also vainly hoped that in the event of
an impasse the convention would turn to him as its savior. It fell to the Rules Committee to decide whether to unbind delegates and hold what is known as an open convention. But under the chairmanship of Senator Daniel Inouye, a Japanese American war hero from Hawaii who lost one arm in battle, Kennedy’s seasoned party operatives lost, and the delegates remained bound by their primary votes. Afterward Inouye went to the suite of Carter’s young staff, headed by Tom Donilon (later National Security Adviser to President Obama), complimented them on their victory, and reflected on the bitterness of the fight with a remarkable statement: “I’ve experienced that kind of scent and that sweat and that smell only one other time in my life, and that was in battle in World War II.” That captured the tone of the convention.77
Kennedy’s next step was to challenge Carter by taking popular liberal positions in a series of platform fights, in the hope that lightning would strike and that the delegates would turn to him.78 I was in charge of developing the Democratic platform, as I had been in 1976, but this time it was a far more trying task to reach a balance—reaffirming Carter’s policies as president, while extending a hand to the Kennedy forces by including as many of their provisions as possible. It failed because they wanted it to fail. They attacked key parts of the president’s anti-inflationary budget policies and his position on national health insurance, introducing 60 or 70 minority reports and demanding floor time for separate debates on more than 20 for a public brawl that would have filled prime-time television and delayed the major speakers past midnight.
My two White House deputies, Bert Carp and David Rubenstein, and I met several times with Kennedy’s staff, led by his chief policy adviser, Peter Edelman. On June 14, shortly after the last set of primaries, we discovered that compromise was impossible. They demanded an immediate $12 billion economic stimulus and the establishment of a Reindustrialization Corporation, with federal funding and the ability to issue stock and lend money to help industry modernize and improve public infrastructure.79 These demands were totally divorced from the economic realities of the day, and at the Drafting Committee, the differences between the two factions burst into angry arguments on both sides.80 Acrimonious meetings continued for several days, and I had frequent meetings with the president and his staff on the emerging platform dispute.81
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