by Mark Curtis
The worst aspect was arming Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime had been a standard destination for British arms exports, including machine guns, ammunition and, in the 1980s and 1990s, around a dozen Hawk aircraft, together with military training. The Foreign Affairs Committee notes that in the government’s annual reports on arms exports for 1997 and 1998 ‘no indication was given … that any particular special [arms exports] regime was being applied to exports to Zimbabwe’.29
In other words, Mugabe’s appalling human rights record was not relevant to government policy in this period. It only mattered once Mugabe started threatening white farmers with forcible expulsion from their farms.
Britain continued arms exports to Zimbabwe after August 1998, when it intervened in DRC’s civil war. From this point on Zimbabwe deployed British-supplied Hawk aircraft to devastating effect. The Foreign Affairs Committee commented that ‘it is not disputed that the Hawks have been used in the intervention in the DRC’. The context was a brutal one. According to Amnesty International, in December 1999 over 600 civilians were killed in the northwest of the country by indiscriminate bombing by DRC government forces and their allies. Dozens more were killed in targeting towns like Goma, Kisangani and Uvira from May 1999.30
An export licence for military-use signals equipment spares was granted in October 1998 and licences were also granted in November 1998 for components for British Canberra, Hawk, Hunter and Islander aircraft in Zimbabwe. In May 1999 a licence was granted covering components for military vehicles and in June 1999 for military air traffic control radar. Only one licence was refused from the beginning of Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC until February 2000.
The Foreign Affairs Committee notes that the export licences provided in late 1998 and early 1999 ‘may well have been used to supply spares for military equipment used for intervention in the DRC, including aircraft spares’. It also notes that British policy ‘represented an open door for the export of military material to Zimbabwe, primarily aircraft and aircraft weapon spares, but also radars, military computers and military vehicle spares’, potentially for use in the DRC.31
‘We have made it clear that there can be no military solution’ to the conflict in the Congo, Foreign Office minister Tony Lloyd said in December 1998. ‘Britain is working hard for peace’, he told the House of Commons, presumably without laughing, as the government continued to arm Zimbabwe.32
Whitehall also ignored the EU. In June 1999, following the failure of efforts to secure a ceasefire in the DRC, the EU presidency called for ‘rigorous application’ of the EU code of conduct on arms exports by member states. This prompted no noticeable change in London which continued to issue export licences, apparently breaching its own and the EU’s guidelines.
Following press reports in January 2000 of Whitehall disagreements on issuing licences for Hawk spares the government announced a ‘tightened’ policy on arms exports on 9 February 2000. But then it got worse.
On 24 February 2000 seven outstanding licence applications for Hawk spares were granted. This was done in the full knowledge that Hawks had already been used in the DRC and would be used again. Without these spares it had been widely reported that two of the Hawks would be unable to operate. This decision was taken against the recommendation of Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and was a further clear breach of the export guidelines, which claim that the government will not supply equipment that can be used for aggressive purposes.
Only in May 2000 did Britain finally announce an arms embargo, following state-sponsored violence in Zimbabwe. Five of the seven licences for the Hawk spares were revoked, but two had already been processed. So the Zimbabwean air force had already received some spares critical to resume Hawk operations in the grotesque war in the DRC.
Pledge two – We arm human rights abusers
The British government is complicit in massive human rights atrocities through its current arms exports. Whichever way you look at it, the Blair government has blood on its hands.
Robin Cook once described small arms as ‘the basic method of mass killing over the past decade’.33 Indeed, the vast majority of people killed in wars are victims of small arms, about two million over the last decade alone.
Britain has exported small arms to dozens of countries, issuing 1,500 small arms licences in the Labour government’s first year in office alone. These basic methods of mass killing have gone to countries such as Israel, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt and Turkey – all states that are highly repressive or at war with their own people or others.34
Government policy, as noted above, is not to stop exports to human rights abusers, merely to ‘take into account respect for human rights’. Clearly, not much is taken into account in this long list of gruesome governments.
The government’s claim that it will not allow exports to regimes that ‘might use them for internal repression’ is simply a lie; there is no other way of putting it. British military exports go to governments repressing their people all the time. There are many examples, but I will consider two in some detail – Indonesia and China.
Indonesia
The government’s 1998 annual report on human rights contains a photo of Robin Cook shaking hands with President Suharto of Indonesia. It is meant to be an example of where Britain pursues ‘constructive engagement’. This is true in the sense that Britain had engaged constructively with the brutal Suharto regime for thirty-five years, providing it with military, economic and political support to continue repressing people and conduct violence and terror in Aceh, West Papua and East Timor (see chapter 21). The basis of British policy towards Indonesia is support for the central government in Jakarta, which, following the fall of Suharto in 1998, remains guilty of gross atrocities in Indonesian provinces seeking self-determination.
Let us look at known cases of British-supplied arms being used for repression.
In April 1996 Scorpion light tanks supplied by the British firm, Alvis, were used against students in south Sulawesi, killing three and injuring many others protesting against bus fare increases and military brutality. Despite this, a few months later the Conservative government issued further licences for Scorpions.
The Blair government refused to revoke the licences for this agreement to sell fifty Scorpions and related equipment.
Scorpions were again used in Jakarta in May and November 1998 in incidents killing eighteen protesters.
The Labour government also refused to revoke licences for seven Tactica water cannon agreed in December 1996.
Tactica water cannon supplied by British arms company GKN in the 1960s were used in Bandung in June 1996 against people protesting at the deaths of the students in south Sulawesi. Eyewitnesses said that tear gas was used in the water cannon.35
These water cannon were also used against street protesters in May 1997 to break up an election march, where they were filmed spraying water over the crowd.36
Water cannon were again used in February 1999 against workers in Surabaya, East Java, dispersing discoloured liquid to suppress workers’ rights to free assembly.37
Other British-supplied armoured cars have also been used:
In December 1999 and July 2000, Saladins (Alvis-made armoured cars exported in the 1960s) were used in Ambon in incidents where more civilians were killed.38
There are thus eight known occasions since 1996 that British-supplied armoured vehicles have been used for repression in Indonesia, six of them occurring under the Blair government. Yet dozens of these vehicles have been delivered to Indonesia under Labour. The ‘assurances’ provided by Jakarta to the effect that equipment will not be used for internal repression are clearly laughable. But in the case of the water cannon, the government has admitted that it has not received any assurances anyway.39
The fact is that any arms or military-related equipment going to Indonesia might be used for internal repression in one way or another. As Amnesty International has said: ‘Indonesian armed forces are focused
primarily on combatting internal dissent rather than external threats. Their role is to monitor and suppress violent and peaceful dissent throughout Indonesia’. In March 1997, General Tanjung announced that his forces would shoot on sight any violators of electoral law. He also said that any opposition to the government would be ‘sliced to pieces’. In February 1999 a shoot-to-kill policy to quell civil disturbances was ratified by parliament. All this must be well known to those issuing export licences.40
It must have been especially helpful to the Indonesian authorities to have acquired from Britain a sophisticated surveillance system to monitor protesters as well as traffic and criminal suspects.41
Further support to Jakarta comes from Heckler & Koch, a subsidiary of BAE Systems. It has supplied to Indonesia machine guns produced in Turkey which are used by the Indonesian police and the Kopassus special forces. Defence Secretary George Robertson described the commander of Kopassus, General Prabowo, as ‘an enlightened officer, keen to increase professionalism with the armed forces and to educate them in areas such as human rights’. In fact, Prabowo is known in East Timor as an ‘enthusiastic torturer who killed at least one independence leader’, according to the Independent. He gained his reputation by using torture and murder and organising bands of civilian thugs, the forerunners of the ‘militias’ that have terrorised East Timor. Despite this, Kopassus officers were allowed by the British government to attend a post-graduate course in defence studies at Hull University. Another fifty Indonesian military officers have been trained in the UK under Labour.42
On coming to power, the Blair government had the option of revoking the licences for the sale of Hawk aircraft agreed in 1996. This was the simplest of decisions for a government with even a remote commitment to an improved arms exports policy. Hawk aircraft have been regularly used against the civilian population in East Timor, according to East Timorese leaders and other eyewitnesses. While in opposition, Robin Cook said in 1994 that Hawk aircraft ‘have been observed on bombing runs in East Timor in most years since 1984’.43
But New Labour refused to revoke the licences, allowing the Hawks to be delivered. It said that revoking the licences was not ‘realistic or practical’, and that it legally had to honour its commitment. This was simply not true. Legally, the government could have stopped the sale but, in the words of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, it ‘would be obliged to demonstrate that its policy towards that country had indeed changed in such a way as to require revocation’.44 Since Labour has never had any intention of changing British support for Jakarta, this option was effectively closed.
So, in addition to processing 125 licences outstanding from the Conservatives, Labour has proceeded to issue dozens more. Taxpayers may also be pleased to know that they pay for the RAF to train Indonesian pilots in using the Hawks. By July 1998 five instructors and twenty-four student pilots had been trained.45
As well as being used to intimidate the population in East Timor in the Blair years (see chapter 21), Hawks play other useful roles for Jakarta. In 2000, Hawk aircraft conducted a series of operations over towns in the province of West Papua, similarly designed to frighten local people and intimidate supporters of independence.46 In fact, the British government agreed with the Indonesian authorities that Hawk aircraft could be used in military exercises in the skies over West Papua. The Indonesian military doubled the number of Hawks stationed in the province from three to six, as it intensified its campaign of repression.
British complicity in Indonesia’s brutal war in West Papua has gone largely unreported. Since 1969 at least 100,000 West Papuans have been killed or disappeared as a result of Indonesia’s military occupation. Conditions worsened in 2001 when Indonesian forces attacked civilians in areas where rebels of the Free Papua Movement are active, engaging in indiscriminate and excessive force against pro-independence demonstrators.47
Britain has extensive business interests in West Papua, with Rio Tinto, the world’s largest mining company, set to own 40 per cent of the Freeport copper and gold mine, the world’s largest, and BP set to initiate a large gas project in the territory. In June 2001, British ambassador Richard Gozney made a statement supporting Indonesian military operations in West Papua, apparently since they would ensure protection for a nearby BP site that he was visiting.48
Britain expresses strong support for Indonesia’s campaigns to suppress self-determination, just as it effectively backed Indonesia’s invasion and subjugation of East Timor for a quarter of a century. According to the Jakarta Post, Defence Minister Geoff Hoon said on a visit to Singapore that the Indonesian government should ‘respond appropriately to separatist movements’. The press reported that when Tony Blair visited Indonesian President Wahid in February 2000, he also pledged British support for Indonesia’s ‘territorial integrity’.49
Achieving ‘territorial integrity’ also comes at a grave price for people in Aceh province. The Indonesian military’s war against self-determination there has escalated dramatically since the fall of Suharto. In 2001, over 1,500 people were killed as Indonesia stepped up repression and brutality, conducting an all-out offensive to crush ‘separatists’. It was reported in July 2002 that Hawks had been used in Aceh. Indonesian reports said that ten Hawks were used to ‘restore order’, in the words of Indonesian air force commander Colonel Djubnedi. Tens of thousands of troops are now stationed in Aceh, guilty of all manner of violations well-documented by human rights groups.50
The standard British government response to Indonesian brutality is to say: ‘We call on all sides to show restraint’, in the words of Foreign Office minister Derek Fatchett.51 London is thus unable to identify the aggressor and unwilling to take action against it, just as with Israel, Russia, Turkey and others.
Sales of an array of military equipment to Indonesia continue, including components for combat helicopters and aircraft, naval equipment, machine gun spares and military imaging equipment. Only a small number of applications for equipment such as armoured cars and sniper rifles are being refused. Total British arms exports to Indonesia have gone down over recent years due to Indonesia’s economic crisis, rather than any change in British policy.
Just as Tony Blair dismissed the appeal by Bishop Belo cited at the beginning of this chapter, so he also ignored the appeal of Indonesia’s most prominent prisoner of conscience, Muchtar Pakpahan, a trade union leader imprisoned for organising pro-democracy protests. One month after Blair’s election, Pakpahan said from a guarded hospital room in Jakarta: ‘I hope that he [Blair] will stop selling weapons to Indonesia, weapons which are used for human rights violations.’52
China
The case of China provides further insight into the government’s policy of exporting military equipment at all costs.
The EU imposed an arms embargo on China in 1989, shortly after the Tiananmen Square massacre. It called for ‘interruption [by EU states] … of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with China’, but the precise meaning of this was left to individual member states to interpret. Within months of the ban the Conservative government allowed GEC-Marconi to export radar equipment for Chinese fighter aircraft – on the grounds that this was ‘non-lethal’ equipment rather than arms. Britain thus helped to undermine the message of disapproval intended by the embargo. Continuing sales (some in violation of Britain’s own interpretation of the ban) and growing military links between Britain and China have continued into the Labour years, exposing the token nature of the British ‘embargo’.
Britain interprets the embargo as covering lethal weapons but not ‘non-lethal’ military equipment. In reality, this distinction is often meaningless. ‘Non-lethal’ traffic control systems were exported to China and used during the Tiananmen Square massacre to photograph protesters and help police capture dissenters. Licences for the same traffic control technology have since been granted, which is now in use in Lhasa, Tibet, occupied by China.
Military equipment supplied to China amounted to £32 mill
ion in 2001 and includes military aerospace components, surveillance equipment, laser sighting and targeting equipment, components for combat aircraft, military electronics, communications and navigations equipment, military explosives and test equipment for small arms ammunition. These significant pieces of equipment may help China launch an assault on Taiwan as well as contribute to internal repression. Some countries have banned virtually all military items to China, but Britain naturally does not stoop this low. The US embargo is much tighter, covering all military goods with only some exceptions.
But British policy goes even further, directly wooing the Chinese military, despite the fact that the EU embargo calls for ‘interruption … in military cooperation’ as well as arms exports. The man who commanded the Tiananmen Square massacre, General Chi Haotian, who became China’s Defence Minister, was a guest of the government in January 2000, visiting John Prescott and Geoff Hoon. China has been invited to arms exhibitions in Britain, and in May 2000 a seventy-strong Chinese military delegation visited the MoD in London and several British military installations, where they were shown the Eurofighter.53
As with Indonesia, the government says it pursues ‘constructive engagement’ with China on human rights, claiming this is the only way to produce results. The actual results are clear: in recent years the Chinese authorities have clamped down even more on dissenters and threats to ‘stability’, and human rights violations have increased, as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the US State Department have all reported. Beijing is currently using the ‘war against terrorism’ as a cover for more repressive internal policies, arresting, for example, 10,000 people in its ‘strike hard’ anti-crime campaign. In 1999, Amnesty International had already told a parliamentary inquiry that ‘the current situation in China is perhaps worse than at any time since the post-Tiananmen clampdown’. The Free Tibet Campaign also criticises the British government, saying that the ‘human rights dialogue’ is failing to halt a worsening of the situation in Tibet.54