Web Of Deceit: Britain's Real Foreign Policy

by Mark Curtis

  A British official reported on 25 November that ‘PKI men and women are being executed in very large numbers.’ Some victims ‘are given a knife and invited to kill themselves. Most refuse and are told to turn around and are shot in the back’. One executioner considered it ‘his duty to exterminate what he called “less than animals”’.7

  A British official wrote to the ambassador on 16 December, saying:

  You – like me – may have been somewhat surprised to see estimates by the American embassy that well over 100,000 people have been killed in the troubles since 1 October. I am, however, readier to accept such figures after [receiving] some horrifying details of the purges that have been taking place … The local army commander … has a list of PKI members in five categories. He has been given orders to kill those in the first three categories … A woman of 78 … was taken away one night by a village execution squad … Half a dozen heads were neatly arranged on the parapet of a small bridge.8

  The US Consulate in Medan was reporting that ‘much indiscriminate killing is taking place’:

  Something like a reign of terror against PKI is taking place. This terror is not discriminating very carefully between PKI leaders and ordinary PKI members with no ideological bond to the party.9

  By mid-December the State Department noted approvingly that ‘Indonesian military leaders’ campaign to destroy PKI is moving fairly swiftly and smoothly.’ By 14 February 1966 Ambassador Green could note that ‘the PKI has been destroyed as an effective political force for some time to come’ and that ‘the Communists … have been decimated by wholesale massacre’.10

  The British files show that by February 1966 the British ambassador was estimating 400,000 dead – but even this was described by the Swedish ambassador as a ‘gross underestimate’. By March, one British official wondered ‘how much of it [the PKI] is left, after six months of killing’ and believed that over 200,000 had been killed in Sumatra alone – in a report called ‘The liquidation of the Indonesian Communist Party in Sumatra’. By April, the US Embassy stated that ‘we frankly do not know whether the real figure is closer to 100,000 or 1,000,000 but believe it wiser to err on the side of the lower estimates, especially when questioned by the press’.11

  Summarising the events of 1965 the British Consul in Medan said: ‘Posing as saviours of the nation from a communist terror, [the army] unleashed a ruthless terror of their own, the scars of which will take many years to heal.’ Another British memo referred to ‘an operation carried out on a very large scale and often with appalling savagery’. Another simply referred to the ‘bloodbath’.12

  British and US officials totally supported these massacres, the files show. I could find no reference to any concern about the extent of killing at all – only constant encouragement for the army to continue. As the files above indicate, there is no question that British and US officials knew exactly what they were supporting.

  One British official noted, referring to 10,005 people arrested by the army: ‘I hope they do not throw the 10,005 into the sea …, otherwise it will cause quite a shipping hazard.’13

  It was not only PKI activists who were the targets of this terror. As the British files show, many of the victims were the ‘merest rank and file’ of the PKI who were ‘often no more than bewildered peasants who give the wrong answer on a dark night to bloodthirsty hooligans bent on violence’, with the connivance of the army.14

  Britain connived even more closely with those conducting the slaughter. By 1965, Britain had deployed tens of thousands of troops in Borneo, to defend its former colony of Malaya against Indonesian encroachments following territorial claims by Jakarta – known as the ‘confrontation’. British planners secretly noted that they ‘did not want to distract the Indonesian army by getting them engaged in fighting in Borneo and so discourage them from the attempts which they now seem to be making to deal with the PKI’.15

  The US was worried that Britain might take advantage of the instability in Indonesia to launch an offensive from Singapore ‘to stab the good generals in the back’, as Ambassador Gilchrist described the US fear.16

  So the British ambassador proposed reassuring those Indonesians who were ordering mass slaughter, saying that ‘we should get word to the Generals that we shall not attack them whilst they are chasing the PKI’. The British intelligence officer in Singapore agreed, believing this ‘might ensure that the army is not detracted [sic] from what we consider to be a necessary task’.17

  In October the British passed to the Generals, through a US contact, ‘a carefully phrased oral message about not biting the Generals in the back for the present’.18

  The US files confirm that the message from the US, conveyed on 14 October, read:

  First, we wish to assure you that we have no intention of interfering Indonesian internal affairs directly or indirectly. Second, we have good reason to believe that none of our allies intend to initiate any offensive action against Indonesia [sic].19

  The message was greatly welcomed by the Indonesian army: an aide to the Defence Minister noted that ‘this was just what was needed by way of assurances that we (the army) weren’t going to be hit from all angles as we moved to straighten things out here’.20

  According to former BBC correspondent Roland Challis, the counsellor at the British Embassy, (now Sir) James Murray, was authorised to tell Suharto that in the event of Indonesian troops being transferred from the confrontation area to Java, British forces would not take military advantage. Indeed, in his book, Challis notes a report in an Indonesian newspaper in 1980 stating that Britain even helped an Indonesian colonel transport an infantry brigade on confrontation duty back to Jakarta. ‘Flying the Panamanian flag, she sailed safely down the heavily patrolled Malacca Strait – escorted by two British warships’, Challis notes.21

  The third means of support was propaganda operations, mainly involving the distribution of anti-Sukarno messages and stories through the media. This was organised from Britain’s MI6 intelligence base in Singapore known as Phoenix Park. The head of these operations, Norman Reddaway, told Roland Challis to ‘do anything you can think of to get rid of Sukarno’.22

  On 5 October Reddaway reported to the Foreign Office in London that:

  We should not miss the present opportunity to use the situation to our advantage … I recommend that we should have no hesitation in doing what we can surreptitiously to blacken the PKI in the eyes of the army and the people of Indonesia.

  The Foreign Office replied:

  We certainly do not exclude any unattributable propaganda or psywar [psychological warfare] activities which would contribute to weakening the PKI permanently. We therefore agree with the [above] recommendation … Suitable propaganda themes might be … Chinese interference in particular arms shipments; PKI subverting Indonesia as agents of foreign communists.

  It continued:

  We want to act quickly while the Indonesians are still off balance but treatment will need to be subtle … Please let us know of any suggestions you may have on these lines where we could be helpful at this end.23

  On 9 October the intelligence officer confirmed that ‘we have made arrangements for distribution of certain unattributable material based on the general guidance’ in the Foreign Office memo. This involved ‘promoting and coordinating publicity’ critical of the Sukarno government to ‘news agencies, newspapers and radio’. ‘The impact has been considerable’, one file notes. British propaganda covered in various newspapers included fabrications of nest-eggs accumulated abroad by Sukarno’s ministers and PKI preparations for a coup by carving up Jakarta into districts to engage in systematic slaughter (forerunners of current modern propaganda on Iraq).24

  The fourth method of support was a ‘hit list’ of targets supplied by the US to the Indonesian army. As the journalist Kathy Kadane has revealed, as many as 5,000 names of provincial, city and other local PKI committee members and leaders of the mass organisations of the PKI, such as the national labour federation, wome
n’s and youth groups, were passed on to the Generals, many of whom were subsequently killed. ‘It really was a big help to the army’ noted Robert Martens, a former official in the US Embassy. ‘They probably killed a lot of people and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that’s not all bad. There’s a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment.’25

  The recently declassified US files do not provide many more details about this hit list, although they do further confirm it. One list of names, for example, was passed to the Indonesians in December 1965 and ‘is apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership at the time’. Also, ‘lists of other officials in the PKI affiliates, Partindo and Baperki, were also provided to GOI [Government of Indonesia] officials at their request’.26

  The final means of support was provision of arms – although this remains the murkiest area to uncover. Past US support to the Indonesian military ‘should have established clearly in minds Army leaders that US stands behind them if they should need help [sic]’, the State Department noted. US strategy was to ‘avoid overt involvement in the power struggle but … indicate, clearly but covertly, to key Army officers our desire to assist where we can.’27

  The first US supplies to the Indonesian army were radios ‘to help in internal security’ and to aid the Generals ‘in their task of overcoming the Communists’, as British ambassador Gilchrist pointed out. ‘I see no reason to object or complain’, he added.28

  The US historian Gabriel Kolko has shown that in early November 1965 the US received a request from the Generals to ‘arm Moslem and nationalist youths … for use against the PKI’. The recently published files confirm this approach from the Indonesians. On 1 November Ambassador Green cabled Washington that:

  As to the provision of small arms I would be leery about telling army we are in position to provide same, although we should act, not close our minds to this possibility … We could explore availability of small arms stocks, preferable of non-US origin, which could be obtained without any overt US government involvement. We might also examine channels through which we could, if necessary, provide covert assistance to army for purchase of weapons.29

  A CIA memo of 9 November stated that the US should avoid being ‘too hesitant about the propriety of extending such assistance provided we can do so covertly, in a manner which will not embarrass them or embarrass our government’. It then noted that mechanisms exist or can be created to deliver ‘any of the types of the materiel requested to date in reasonable quantities’. One line of text is then not declassified before the memo notes: ‘The same can be said of purchasers and transfer agents for such items as small arms, medicine and other items requested.’ The memo goes on to note that ‘we do not propose that the Indonesian army be furnished such equipment at this time’ [sic]. However, ‘if the Army leaders justify their needs in detail … it is likely that at least will help ensure their success and provide the basis for future collaboration with the US’. ‘The means for covert implementation’ of the delivery of arms ‘are within our capabilities’.30

  In response to Indonesia’s request for arms, Kolko has shown that the US promised to provide such covert aid, and dubbed the arms ‘medicines’. They were approved in a meeting in Washington on 4 December. The declassified files state that ‘the Army really needed the medicines’ and that the US was keen to indicate ‘approval in a practical way of the actions of the Indonesian army’. The extent of arms provided is not revealed in the files but the amount ‘the medicines would cost was a mere pittance compared with the advantages that might accrue to the US as a result of “getting in on the ground floor”’, one file reads.31

  The British knew of these arms supplies and it is likely they also approved them. Britain was initially reluctant to see US arms go to the Generals for fear that they might be used by Indonesia in the ‘confrontation’. The British files show that the US State Department had ‘undertaken to consult with us before they do anything to support the Generals’. It is possible that the US reneged on this commitment; however, in earlier discussions about this possibility, a British official at the embassy in Washington noted that ‘I do not think that is very likely’.32

  The threat of independent development

  The struggle between the army and the PKI was ‘a struggle basically for the commanding heights of the Indonesian economy’, British officials noted.33 At stake was using the resources of Indonesia for the primary benefit of its people or for businesses, including Western companies.

  British and US planners supported the slaughter to promote interests deemed more important than peoples’ lives. London wanted to see a change in regime in Jakarta to bring an end to the ‘confrontation’ with Malaya. But commercial interests were just as important. Southeast Asia was ‘a major producer of some essential commodities’ such as rubber, copra and chromium ore; ‘the defence of the sources of these products and their denial to a possible enemy are major interests to the Western powers’, the Foreign Office noted. This was a fancy way of saying that the resources would continue to be exploited by Western business. Indonesia was also strategically located at a nexus of important trading routes.34

  British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart wrote in the middle of the slaughter:

  It is only the economic chaos of Indonesia which prevents that country from offering great potential opportunities to British exporters. If there is going to be a deal in Indonesia, as I hope one day there may be, I think we ought to take an active part and try to secure a slice of the cake ourselves.35

  Similarly, one Foreign Office memo noted that Indonesia was in a ‘state of economic chaos but is potentially rich … American exporters, like their British counterparts, presumably see in Indonesia a potentially rich market once the economy has been brought under control.’36

  For the US, Under Secretary of State George Ball had noted that Indonesia ‘may be more important to us than South V-N [Vietnam]’, against which the US was at the same time massively stepping up its assault. ‘At stake’ in Indonesia, one US memo read, ‘are 100 million people, vast potential resources and a strategically important chain of islands’.37

  US priorities were similar in Vietnam and Indonesia: to prevent the consolidation of an independent nationalist regime that threatened Western interests and that could be a successful development model for others.

  President Sukarno clearly had the wrong economic priorities. In 1964, British-owned commercial interests had been placed under Indonesian management and control. However, under the Suharto regime, the British Foreign Secretary told one Indonesian army general that ‘we are … glad that your government has decided to hand back the control of British estates to their original owners’.

  The US ambassador in Malaysia cabled Washington a year before the October 1965 events in Indonesia saying that ‘our difficulties with Indonesia stem basically from deliberate, positive GOI [Government of Indonesia] strategy of seeking to push Britain and the US out of Southeast Asia’. George Ball noted in March 1965 that ‘our relations with Indonesia are on the verge of falling apart’. ‘Not only has the management of the American rubber plants been taken over, but there are dangers of an imminent seizure of the American oil companies’.38

  According to a US report for President Johnson:

  The [Indonesian] government occupies a dominant position in basic industry, public utilities, internal transportation and communication … It is probable that private ownership will disappear and may be succeeded by some form of production-profit-sharing contract arrangements to be applied to all foreign investment.

  Overall, ‘the avowed Indonesian objective is “to stand on their own feet” in developing their economy, free from foreign, especially Western, influence.’39

  This was a serious danger that needed to be removed. As noted elsewhere, Third World countries are to develop under overall Western control, not by or for themselves, a truism about US and Bri
tish foreign policy revealed time and again in the declassified files.

  It is customary in the propaganda system to excuse past horrible British and US policies by referring to the cold war. In Indonesia, the main threat was indigenous nationalism. The British feared ‘the resurgence of Communist and radical nationalism’.40 One US memo says of future PKI policy: ‘It is likely that PKI foreign policy decisions, like those of Sukarno, would stress Indonesian national interests above those of Peking, Moscow or international communism in general.’

  The real danger was that Indonesia would be too successful, a constant US fear well documented by Kolko and Noam Chomsky in policy towards numerous other countries. A Special National Intelligence Estimate of 1 September 1965 referred to the PKI’s moving ‘to energize and unite the Indonesian nation’ and stated that ‘if these efforts succeeded, Indonesia would provide a powerful example for the underdeveloped world and hence a credit to communism and a setback for Western prestige’.41 One critical area was the landlessness of the poor peasants – the source of the grinding poverty of most Indonesians – and land reform more generally, the key political issue in rural areas and the smaller cities. The PKI was recognised by British and US officials as the champion of the landless and poor in Indonesia.

  Britain was keen to establish good relations with Suharto, that were to remain for thirty years. A year after the beginning of the slaughter, the Foreign Office noted that ‘it was very necessary to demonstrate to the Indonesians that we regarded our relations with them as rapidly returning to normal’. Britain was keen to establish ‘normal trade’ and provide aid, and to express its ‘goodwill and confidence’ in the new regime. British officials spoke to the new Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, of the ‘new relationship which we hope will develop between our two countries’. A Foreign Office brief for the Cabinet said that Britain ‘shall do all we can to restore good relations with Indonesia and help her resume her rightful place in the world community’.42