The Eighth Air Force was one of fifteen numbered air forces the United States established during the Second World War. Eleven of them were deployed overseas. The Tenth Air Force, for example, operated in Burma and India. The Fifth flew in the southwestern Pacific. The Eighth was based in East Anglia. It operated from sixty-two airfields that crowded this most eastern bulge of the United Kingdom.
The Eighth began its endeavors on February 29, 1942, when seven U.S. Army Air Force officers arrived in Britain. Their job was simple: create an aerial armada that would pulverize the enemy. That is exactly what they did. But the cost was high. Some twenty-six thousand Americans of the Eighth Air Force did not return home alive.
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At first, progress in building the Eighth was halting. Airplanes and crew were slow in arriving, and some were transferred to Africa to assist Eisenhower in the battle for Tunisia. Then, General Ira Eaker, the commander of the Eighth, discovered that B-17s and B-24s could not safely fly over Germany without protective escort fighters. Yet the fighter available, the P-47 Thunderbolt, did not have sufficient range. So, consistent with U.S. war fighting doctrine, the bombers went on alone into Germany. The results were disastrous. Luftwaffe fighters destroyed many, many U.S. aircraft. Perhaps the most notorious missions targeted Schweinfurt. On August 17, 1943, and October 14 of that same year, Eaker dispatched first 337 planes and then 420 to Schweinfurt and, on the first mission, to nearby Regensburg as well. The latter was the location of an important aircraft manufacturing plant. Schweinfurt was where most ball bearings in Germany were made. On both days the Luftwaffe hammered the attacking force. Each time their guns destroyed more than sixty B-17s. As one B-17 Flying Fortress carried a crew of ten, the Schweinfurt raids cost the Eighth Air Force no fewer than twelve hundred men.
Another difficulty was the weather. Fog, rain, and high winds either kept the planes on the ground or made precision bombing impossible. The Americans thought their top-secret Norden bombsight would ensure accuracy. It did not. Bombardiers trained in the sunny, peaceful skies of the American Southwest found their jobs much more difficult once in German airspace, especially when antiaircraft guns and Luftwaffe fighter planes were trying to kill them. As Eighth Air Force intelligence officers discovered, the B-17s and B-24s more than occasionally missed their targets.
Yet the Eighth persevered. Its numbers grew, and by late 1944, it could put a thousand bombers into the air. Moreover, when early in that year a new fighter arrived, prospects for success dramatically increased. The new plane was the P-51 Mustang. It was fast, maneuverable, and most important, it could fly to Berlin and back. Hermann Göring, the head of the Luftwaffe, is reported to have said that once he saw Mustangs over the German capital he knew the war was lost.
With the P-51s—and the Thunderbolts—the Eighth Air Force was in a position to destroy the German air force. What the Eighth needed to do was to draw Luftwaffe fighters into battle. This was accomplished primarily in two ways. The first was to mount large-scale raids against factories producing German aircraft. Known as “Big Week,” these raids took place in February 1944. The second was to attack Berlin. Early in March, the Eighth struck the German capital. In both cases, the Luftwaffe responded. But the German air force incurred huge losses, and by late spring, the Luftwaffe, short of experienced pilots, was a spent force.
So when Allied soldiers landed on the beaches of Normandy, the German air force was nowhere to be seen.
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To command the great invasion, code named Overlord, Churchill had hoped to designate General Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the imperial general staff, the British army’s most senior position. By 1944, however, it was clear than an American would have to hold the job, because Americans would constitute a large majority of the troops involved. So the choice was Franklin Roosevelt’s. Initially, he planned to appoint George Marshall. At the last minute, the president decided that he needed Marshall right where he was: in Washington directing the United States Army. With General Marshall’s full concurrence, Roosevelt gave the most important field command any American would hold in World War II to Eisenhower.
Eisenhower’s title was Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force. His deputy was a British airman, Sir Arthur Tedder. Tedder had worked with Ike (the nickname used by everyone save the more formal George Marshall) and shared the American commander’s commitment to a staff of British and American officers functioning as a single, integrated unit. The senior naval commander for Overlord also was British, as was the top air force officer.
Eisenhower had wanted Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander for command of the invading ground forces. An Englishman, he had seen success in Egypt, Tunisia, and Italy. “Alex” was well liked and very good at his job. But Churchill insisted that he remain in the Mediterranean. So the assignment was given to Montgomery. In fact, “Monty” was an obvious choice, though not one Eisenhower relished.
The newly installed Supreme Commander arrived in England on January 15, 1944. By then much planning for the invasion already had taken place. A British officer, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, had put in place key parameters of the plan. It was Morgan, for example, who selected Normandy. He also initiated construction of the artificial harbors as well as the oil pipeline that ran under the channel from the coast of Cornwall to the Contentin Peninsula. One of Eisenhower’s biographers, Michael Korda, has called Morgan’s plan “inventive, audacious . . . and well-prepared.” Later, Montgomery would attempt to take credit for Overlord. But Korda reminds us that it was Frederick Morgan who did much of the planning.
When assigned his task, Morgan had been told Overlord would comprise three infantry divisions plus paratroopers. To his credit, Montgomery realized more troops would be needed and that the beachhead needed to be much wider (eventually it would span nearly fifty-five miles), an assessment with which Eisenhower agreed. However, more troops meant more landing craft, more equipment, and importantly, more time. So the date for the invasion was pushed forward. It was to take place on June 5.
By then, indeed even at the beginning of 1944, Germany’s generals expected the Allies to invade Western Europe. Their problem was that they didn’t know where the landings would occur. Norway was a possibility. So was Holland. The location they themselves would have chosen was in France, at the Pas de Calais. This is where the channel-crossing would be the shortest, and it offered a direct route into Germany. Normandy and Brittany also were possible locations, as was Spain.
To add to the Germans’ dilemma, the Nazi commanders did not know exactly when the Allies would strike. It might be in the spring or, possibly, the summer. The fall would be less likely given the weather. But still, September and October could not be ruled out.
To mislead the Germans the Allies engaged in an elaborate program of deception. Through the use primarily of radio signals that the Allies knew the Germans would intercept, the British and the Americans created phony invasion forces, one in Scotland and one in southeastern England. The latter was “commanded” by Patton, who on occasion would appear in public in Kent and Sussex in order to lend credence to the fictitious army. Such a force so close to the Pas de Calais and led by one of America’s most dynamic generals helped persuade German officers that the invasion would take place across the Straits of Dover. Hitler, himself, thought Norway was a strong possibility.
This effort in deception by the Allies was highly successful. It threw the Germans off balance and kept troops away from Normandy. Indeed, of the two German armies stationed in France, the strongest purposely was deployed in the area around Calais.
To prepare for the invasion, the Germans constructed an extensive network of coastal fortifications. Known then and now as “the Atlantic Wall,” it consisted of guns, beach obstacles, and mines. Of the latter there were many. In order to repel the invaders, the German army planted 6.5 million mines along the French, Belgian, and Dutch coasts.
Further, reasoning that the Alli
es would require deep water ports to keep their troops supplied, the Germans designated eleven seaports as festungsbereiche. These were heavily armed fortress areas. Self-sufficient, they were not dependent on reinforcements and were intended to be impregnable. Deny the Allies ports for their supply ships and the invasion would be contained.
All told, the Atlantic Wall presented a formidable obstacle to Eisenhower and Montgomery. Yet it had one major drawback. It wasn’t finished. Moreover, the Germans faced two further problems, both self-imposed. The first was that many of their troops in France were not first-rate. The second pertained to their command arrangements. These were cumbersome, and they hindered rather than aided efforts to defeat the Allies.
The German generals had still another problem. They did not agree on the strategy to be employed once the Allies arrived. Field Marshal Rommel, reinstated by Hitler, and in tactical control of most German troops in France, wanted to meet the Allies head-on at the beaches. He wanted command of all armored forces, which he would fling at the invaders as they were stepping ashore. Other generals wanted to hold the tanks back from the coast, away from naval gunfire. Their approach was first to determine where the principal attack was taking place (there might be a diversionary landing) and then order the tanks into battle. Rommel’s reply was that armor thus employed would be subject to Allied aircraft as it moved into position.
Both points of view had merit. The solution was a compromise. Some tanks were placed under Rommel’s immediate command. Others were held in reserve, allocated to another general. Still other forces were under Adolf Hitler’s personal control. The arrangement was far from satisfactory, especially given that in the absence of the Luftwaffe, German success depended on rapid deployment of armor.
Eisenhower too faced difficulties in the structure of command established for the invasion. One of the difficulties involved control of strategic airpower. The Supreme Commander wanted to employ the heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command in a tactical role. He wanted them to pound railroads, bridges, and roads in and around Normandy so that German troops on the coast could not be reinforced. The air commanders objected. Sir Arthur Harris and his American counterpart, Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, thought their aircraft would be best utilized attacking German industry. In particular, Spaatz wanted to destroy the enemy’s petroleum assets. Neither man had much use for Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the RAF officer formally in charge of Overlord’s air campaign. They ignored whatever he had to say and went about their business, which, to them, was strategic air warfare. Eisenhower, however, was adamant. He insisted they divert their planes to Normandy and environs. When they continued to resist, Ike threatened to resign. Harris and Spaatz then gave way. The result was that for several months American and British heavy bombers dropped thousands of bombs on targets in Normandy. But in order not to give the Germans a clue as to where the Allies were to land, the bombers struck more often in the area around the Pas de Calais.
With but one exception, the Overlord air campaign was highly successful. British and American aircraft kept many of the enemy away from the battle. Those that did arrive were delayed and battered. Of critical importance were the Allied fighter-bombers. These were smallish, single-engine aircraft, exceptionally rugged and armed with both bombs and rocket-propelled explosives. Two such aircraft, the British Typhoon and the American Thunderbolt, harassed the enemy every day.
The one exception took place on the day the Allies invaded. American heavy bombers were directed to pulverize the beach areas just before the troops landed. But, fearful of hitting the Americans moving toward the shore, they overcompensated. Their bombs struck well beyond the beaches. Few German soldiers were killed, although the number of cows in Normandy was severely reduced.
Those planes had “bombed long.” A more distressing incident involving “bombing short” occurred in Normandy several weeks later. To support the breakout of American troops from the confines of the ground gained in the first weeks of the invasion, the Eighth again was instructed to strike enemy positions immediately in front of the soldiers. Unfortunately, their aim was off. The bombs struck the Americans instead. Many of them were killed and wounded. Among the dead was Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair. He had been the commander of the huge stateside organization responsible for training and equipping the entire U.S. Army. In Normandy to observe the troops he had trained, McNair was the highest ranking American officer in Europe killed during the Second World War.
Eisenhower faced another difficulty, one over which he as Supreme Commander had no control. This was the weather. Placing thousands of troops on the beaches of Normandy required relatively calm seas to prevent the small landing craft from capsizing. Fair weather also was required for operating aircraft that would fly in support of the invasion. On June 4, the weather was dreadful. Hard rain, high winds, and choppy seas posed too great a risk to Overlord. The forecast was similar for June 5, the date scheduled for launching the attack.
Eisenhower postponed the invasion by one day. Given the prediction for the 5th, this was not a difficult decision. The next one was.
Because of requirements regarding tides and moonlight, few days in June were suitable for the invasion. June 6 was one of them, but the next date was not until June 17. By June 4 the troops had been moved to their embarkation points and much of southern England was sealed off. Further delay would jeopardize the secrecy that so far had been maintained.
What would the weather be on June 6?
Overlord’s chief meteorological officer was J. M. Stagg, a group captain in the Royal Air Force. On June 4, he reported to Eisenhower and the senior commanders that data indicated that on the 6th the weather would moderate. Conditions would not be good, but they would be less severe. The invasion could be carried out. Everyone in the room understood it would be dicey and that there would be no guarantee of success.
At stake was more than the lives of the troops involved. Were the invasion to fail, the consequences would be enormous. There would be no Second Front. Nor would there be a second chance to invade Normandy, at least not for a year or two. Hitler then would be able to concentrate on the east. The outcome of the Second World War, however it played out, would not favor the United States and Britain. A failed Overlord would be seen as a defining moment, a catastrophe that constituted an unparalleled setback to the cause of freedom. And the responsibility would be Eisenhower’s.
Should he again postpone the invasion, or despite the weather, should he order the invasion to proceed? The Supreme Commander did not flinch. He gave the order putting Overlord in motion. The Allies, said Eisenhower, were to land in France on June 6, 1944. Writing in 1983, Montgomery’s biographer Nigel Hamilton noted, “It was Eisenhower’s moment of trial—and he responded with what can only be called greatness.”
Transporting 132,700 soldiers across the English Channel to a Normandy occupied by two German armies was not a simple task. Assembled for the trip were some 5,000 vessels, including 138 warships. The latter included battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and the all-important minesweepers that provided safe passage through mine-infested waters. One of the battleships was the USS Nevada, which had been damaged but not destroyed at Pearl Harbor.
The plan of attack called for five landing sites. Each had a code name. From west to east, these were Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword. Utah and Omaha belonged to the Americans. Juno was assigned to the Canadians. Gold and Sword were British. Further, three airborne divisions, one British and two American, were to make night jumps on both flanks of the invading force.
American paratroopers numbered approximately thirteen thousand. They were superbly trained, perhaps the best soldiers in the entire United States Army. Carried to Normandy by 822 C-47 aircraft, they were to secure the causeways leading away from Utah Beach and delay, if not prevent, German reinforcements from dislodging the American 4th Division that had come ashore.
The paratroopers, and
their comrades who arrived by glider, achieved these goals but at great cost. More than a few C-47s were shot down killing all aboard. The Germans had flooded the environs of Utah, so many paratroopers drowned. Practically none of them landed where they were supposed to. Confusion was great, but somehow the airborne soldiers rallied, and started to kill Germans. When, in August, the Battle for Normandy was over, the two American airborne divisions were in need of rest. One of them, the 82nd—one of America’s most famous military units—had endured a 46 percent casualty rate. Their dead numbered 1,142.
The U.S. Navy’s big guns opened fire at 5:30 A.M. At Utah the tide carried the troops somewhat south, but the 4th Division was able to secure the beach with relatively light losses. Indeed, the Americans had lost more soldiers in a disastrous training exercise at Slapton Sands on the southeastern coast of England than they did at Utah Beach. Among the soldiers in the first wave was Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt Jr. The son of the former president, he did well that day, earning the Congressional Medal of Honor. In July, while still on duty, he died of a heart attack. The general was buried in Normandy, in an American military cemetery. Nearby is the grave of his younger brother, Quentin, an aviator killed in the First World War.
At Omaha U.S. infantry and combat engineers landed at six-thirty in the morning. They were met with murderous enemy fire. Those that survived, as well as those that died, passed into legend. Omaha Beach today is one of America’s most sacred spots. Loss of life on June 6, 1944, was great, and early on, consideration was given to withdrawing the troops. Part of the difficulty was the terrain. Heights close to the beach provided excellent fields of fire for the defenders. Another was that, unbeknownst to the Americans, a first-rate German division was stationed at Omaha. Still another problem was the absence of U.S. tanks. Most of those allocated to Omaha floundered in the rough water while attempting to reach shore. During the morning, American soldiers, many dazed and wounded, huddled beneath the coastal bluffs. To them and to their commanders, the situation looked grim.
America at War: Concise Histories of U.S. Military Conflicts From Lexingtonto Afghanistan Page 22