While recognizing the enormity of the challenges facing the most “artificial” countries, I am inclined to be much more cautious. Perhaps the situation is irremediable in countries with ongoing civil wars, but only one of the Troubled Thirteen, Chad, is listed in this category by the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP).33 Otherwise, though, I would hesitate to put countries on the operating table, for reasons that will be clarified by considering Africa, where widespread surgery of this sort is often advocated.
Africa's ethnolinguistic fragmentation and the fact that 80 percent of its borders follow latitudinal and longitudinal lines imply that African countries tend to rank quite high on artificiality/fragility: twenty-five of the thirty most fragile states, as calculated by the CSP, are on that continent.34 To consider a specific one, focus on Nigeria, which figures in the top half of the CSP's top thirty in terms of fragility.
Nigeria's 150 million people are divided into more than 250 different tribes. Is reemphasizing tribal loyalties likely to offer a way forward? How about a division between the Muslim north and the Christian south? Actually, this was already tried on a smaller scale by Biafra—a tragedy that also reminds us of the blood that gets spilled in the course of most efforts to restructure borders. What about the continent as a whole? Since Africa is located far from and is otherwise poorly connected to other regional markets, and since it is fragmented internally into many small, poorly integrated national markets, what seems to be required is an expansion in the spatial scale of cooperation, to the supranational level, rather than a contraction to the subnational (tribal) level (that is, a reversion to World 0.0). Chapter 13 discusses the way forward for Nigeria in more detail.
More broadly, a focus on restructuring national borders betrays to me a basic World 1.0 bias: the idea that if we could only get people stowed away into the right countries, everything would be all right. This focus is subject to all the problems with World 1.0 discussed in chapter 1, including the basic gaps in coverage in a state-based partitioning of the world that are dramatized by the difficulties of dealing with failing/failed states.
Failing states loom particularly large because, as noted in the previous section, most sources of armed conflict are now internal rather than international, and of course, failed/failing states are their usual hosts. Simply trying to get around the problem by disaggregating until one ends up with homogenous polities doesn't make sense because there is, practically speaking, no end to how finely one can discriminate among people.
To make the same point a different way, ever-increasing fragmentation is not the same as ever-increasing freedom. In fact, going by historical analogies, such fragmentation seems more likely to be associated with an escalating fear of others rather than a sense of freedom or security, and runs counter to the expanding circles of cooperation witnessed over the last five millennia (see chapter 1) as well as the current imperatives of dealing with global externalities, risks, and imbalances while continuing to open up.
Toward a Freer World
In summary, this chapter has gone beyond market failures to explore and explode a number of myths related to the contention that more openness begets political oppression. The more integrated economic order of World 3.0 doesn't seem likely to lead to particular countries or companies lording it over the world, nations having to don a “golden straitjacket” and losing their freedom to act; democracy going the way of the dinosaur; or an expansion of armed conflict. In fact, opening up seems to directly improve certain kinds of political outcomes and should help indirectly by boosting growth, which historically has tended to lead to increases in social justice, democracy, liberalization, and respect for human rights (while periods of stagnation have tended to usher in more authoritarianism).35 So political concerns of the sort reviewed in this chapter are not, generally speaking, reasons to slam the brakes on globalization.
The proposition that openness should increase political freedom is, in a sense, very intuitive. The real question, then, is why there is so much of a tendency to leap to conclusions—or at least to dwell on political anxieties—that are counterintuitive or contradict the kinds of information presented earlier in this chapter. Some of the other patterns on display, particularly the increase in the number of independent countries since 1900, suggest that the deep, underlying distinctions between “us and them” that we encountered in chapter 1 are still at work, fueling calls to keep “them” on the other side of the borders of our sovereign states. But as the previous section highlighted, putting up new borders does impose significant costs. So softening the conflicts that divide us and expanding circles of human concern and affection may be a better path forward. Chapter 15 offers some suggestions about how to accomplish this.
Chapter Eleven
Global Homogenization
Source: www.CartoonStock.com
CHAPTER 10 ADDED political fears about globalization to the economic preoccupations discussed in the preceding chapters—and addressed those fears. This chapter does the same for cultural fears, as exemplified in the cartoon. Critics have decried globalization as a tidal wave of homogenized American consumer culture that tears “authentic” local cultures asunder. And on the surface, they seem to be right. Fly into any large, cosmopolitan city on any planet in our solar system and you encounter restaurants like McDonald's and KFC as well as their local imitators. The American global presence goes well beyond restaurants to include films starring Tom Cruise and Angelina Jolie, music by the likes of Willie Nelson and Lady Gaga, brands like Nike and Apple, and of course, the language spoken in malls around the known universe, English. So even if globalization is no longer about Pax Americana, does it force Pop Americana on everybody?
The answer is no. National cultural barriers may have fallen to some extent in recent decades, but they are still extremely important, and they will continue to remain so. And we're not just talking here about food and entertainment, but also about deep aspects of culture that at best make home a place of comfort and belonging, and at worst harden into parochialism, ethnocentrism, and racism. These darker manifestations are visible even in countries we think of as advanced, tolerant, and stable. For example, in 2009, Switzerland passed a constitutional amendment banning the construction of new minarets. Almost 60 percent of voters approved this measure, giving voice to deep and widespread fears about Muslims that were both religious and cultural in nature.1
World 2.0 thinking tends to equate globalization with cultural homogenization or convergence, but the purpose of this chapter is not to push the opposite point of view—that all we have today are differences and the hardened cultural identities of World 1.0. Rather, it is to suggest that reality is far removed from both extremes, and to redirect attention to World 3.0, in which cultures don't converge but also aren't entirely uninfluenced by each other. In such a context, we have much to gain and little to fear on the cultural front from more cross-border interaction.
The cultural tableau that spreads out before us includes cultural differences or barriers that won't change anytime soon, as well as cultural differences that will fade, albeit to a more limited extent than one might expect, and other differences that will evolve instead of dissolving. The latter are what are responsible for the numerous cultural benefits of globalization.
Of course, there are also some hard cases where increased openness does pose a clear cultural threat, and these have to be taken into account. But the generalized cultural resistance to opening up seems to reflect fear of foreigners rather than reasoned analysis of the cultural costs and benefits. It is tempting to speculate that such fears may once have been adaptively useful but aren't any longer (at least not to the same extent), and thus can be worked on. The chapter concludes by describing some mechanisms for actually doing so.
Resilient Cultures
In chapter 3, we saw that the United States and Canada share a common language and cultural heritage, yet even in this case, there are enough cultural differences—maybe as a reaction to all that is shared—to
sustain strong national identities on both sides.
Looking beyond North America, we can cite numerous casual examples of cultural difference. Citizens of the United States maintain a culture around owning guns that most Europeans can't fathom. The Czechs drink way more beer than people in Saudi Arabia, and even more than the Irish, who come in second.2 Pakistanis google sex more often than any other national population, just slightly more than the Vietnamese and far more than the Irish and Czechs. Eritreans google god the most as well as figuring in the top five nationalities searching for sex.3 India and China are so close geographically that they still haven't resolved their territorial disputes, but couldn't display more distinct food cultures, particularly around which animals and parts of animals should or shouldn't be eaten. Argentines see psychotherapists more often than other nationalities, and Brazilians spend a higher proportion of their income on beauty products than the citizens of any other major economy.4
More systematic research has revealed the surprising resilience of cultural differences. Analysis of data from the World Values Survey, a study covering sixty-five countries and 75 percent of the world's population, has found that although modernization has wrought tremendous cultural change, underlying values do remain intact. As the researchers involved noted, “A history of Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian traditions gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist even after controlling for the effects of economic development.”5 Traditional values can also reemerge even after modernization, globalization, and economic development have seemingly swept them away. The late Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has spoken of a “clash of civilizations” between East and West running along ancient cultural and religious fault lines, while Economist editors John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge have noted the resurgence of religious fundamentalism in their book God Is Back. As we discussed in chapter 1, the late twentieth century also saw a resurgence of regional fractures and separatism in the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere along traditional ethnic, religious, and tribal lines.
Critics of globalization nonetheless point to any number of villains who are supposedly destroying traditional cultures and imposing homogenization. European nationalists fear the bureaucrats in Brussels, who are allegedly pushing aside national cultures in favor of a European identity. Europeans, Islamic nationalists, and others fear hegemonic national cultures, particularly that of the United States. Many anticorporatist believers in World 1.0 fear multinationals like Coca-Cola or McDonald's, arguing that they tend to lure consumers into adopting a single superficial, unhealthy global lifestyle. And perhaps most broadly, postcolonialist theorists fear that Western concepts and mores are exercising a sort of imperialist power, pushing aside indigenous traditions under a guise of universality.
In point of fact, these villainous agents of cultural corruption and decay have proven much feebler than alleged. Europe, as we noted in the last chapter, may have grown more united in recent years, yet unification has also spawned geographically based, separatist countermovements in places like Kosovo and Catalonia. And for all their alleged power, corporate-driven consumerism, cultural imperialism, and homogenization have all proven far from overwhelming. As evidence of this last point, let's briefly consider four large consumer-focused U.S.-based multinationals frequently mentioned as agents of these trends.
Begin with McDonald's, that bogeyman of antiglobalization, and a veritable icon of homogenization, efficiency, and corporate marketing. We often tend to think of McDonald's as a relentlessly consistent purveyor of fast food around the world: a Big Mac is a Big Mac is a Big Mac. But if one has the appetite to visit the company's outlets around the world, it is obvious that it actually offers a dizzying array of local menu items, including the McArabia in Saudi Arabia, the McShawarma in Israel, and the Bulgogi Burger in South Korea (for even more examples, see table 11-1).
McDonald's has found that the most successful business strategy in our semiglobalized world is an adaptive approach that combines the standardization of certain core brand elements with localization of others. Thus, despite McDonald's diverse menus, it still requires that French fries have sugar content of exactly 21 percent, no matter where in the world they are produced, and that a pound of cheese yield thirty-two slices, no more, no less. To further complicate matters, standardization is not necessarily unidirectional. For example, McCafé, a coffee-house-style food and drink chain that was developed in Australia in an attempt to compete with the many local coffee shops, was later introduced to the United States, Japan, and other countries. This nuanced mix of localization and standardization is what has helped McDonald's generate 60 million customer visits per day.6
McDonald's is hardly the only Western fast-food chain to have profited by melding standardization with a respect for and affirmation of traditional cultural tastes. In China, Yum! Brands offered the same original recipe chicken in its KFC restaurants, yet supplemented it with locally oriented products such as soup, noodles, bamboo shoots, and the “Dragon Twister,” a sandwich featuring chicken, Peking duck sauce, cucumbers, and scallions. The result of such a hybrid approach? KFC became the largest restaurant chain in mainland China, with more than three thousand outlets there in 2010, compared to 263 in 1998, and returns on investment substantially greater than those posted by KFC's other geographies.7
Turning to beverages, we find that Coca-Cola, the world's most valuable and ubiquitous brand, has likewise adopted a strategy of respecting cultural differences while still offering some standardization. Coke serves local tastes by varying its core cola product (using cane sugar in Mexico as opposed to corn syrup in the United States) and, more importantly, by marketing local brands in different countries. Ever hear of Avra, BURN, Cappy, Fernandes, Kvass, or Real Gold, all of which are owned by Coca-Cola? You might if you lived in Greece, Poland, Croatia, the Netherlands, Russia, or Japan, respectively.8
Table 11-1 Ten local menu items available at McDonald's
Menu Item
Country
Description
McArabia
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, other Middle Eastern countries
Small grilled chicken or beef patties, served in pita with vegetable toppings and garlic mayo
Shogun Burger
Hong Kong
Teriyaki pork patty with lettuce, served on a sesame seed bun
McAloo Tikki Burger
India
Vegetarian burger made with potatoes, peas, and spices
McShawarma
Israel
Shawarma flatwich sandwich, using kosher meat
Bubur Ayam McD
Malaysia
Translates literally as “chicken porridge”
McPalta
Chile
Avocado paste and pork sandwich
Kiwiburger
New Zealand
All-beef patty, egg, tomato, lettuce, cheese, onion, cooked beetroot, sauce, and mustard on toasted bun
McNifica
Panama, Argentina, Costa Rica, and other Latin American countries
Salted beef patty with cheese, lettuce, and tomato
Wiesmac
Poland
Beef patty, onions, lettuce, one slice cheddar cheese, mustard, and horseradish sauce
Bulgogi Burger
South Korea
Pork patty in bulgogi marinade
Source: Wikipedia; Peter Gumbel, “Big Mac's Local Flavor,” Fortune, May 5, 2008.
Or consider a newer multinational that attempted standardization in a supposedly susceptible media industry. In the late 1980s, Bill Roedy, president of MTV Networks International, used to explain MTV's globally standardized strategy by saying, “A-lop-bop-a-doo-bop-a-lop-bam-boom means the same thing in any language!” Fifteen years later, his tune had evolved—as had the company's: “MTV India is very colorful, self-effacing, full of humor, a lot of street culture. China's is about family values, nurturing, a lot of love songs. In Indonesia, with our larges
t Islamic population, there's a call to prayer five times a day on the channel. Brazil is very sexy. Italy is stylish, elegant, with food shows because of the love of food there. Japan's very techie, a lot of wireless product.”9
This proliferation is not unconnected to profits, of course. Globaloney notwithstanding, the role of language and distance effects in what music gets played where have stayed roughly constant since the 1960s—and the degree of home bias has actually increased sharply since the late 1990s!10
Corporate-driven consumerism, cultural imperialism, and homogenization are visible to some extent with the opening up of borders. But even in our four minicases—hard cases, since they involve large, U.S.-based, consumer-oriented multinationals often cited as homogenizers of popular culture—they are not nearly as pronounced as globalization's critics think.
Cultural Gains and Losses
So far we've argued that globalization hasn't automatically swept away traditional cultures. We should also account for the important cultural gains that have accrued from openness, and that could be added to if we pursue additional openness under World 3.0. Scholars such as Tyler Cowen have suggested a number of ways in which cultural exchange has fostered cultural innovation, multiplying the number of cultural choices available.11
Inspiration is one such pathway to cultural innovation: Starbucks, for instance, originated in an attempt to recreate an Italian espresso-bar experience in the United States. Mixture represents another: creole languages are a good example, so much so that creolization has come to denote cultural mixtures or hybrids more broadly (e.g., in cuisines). Transplantation plus adaptation is arguably even more important, given the need to adjust to variations in local culture: Starbucks actually started out by copying Italian espresso bars so faithfully that it featured recorded opera music and bowtied waiters—but quickly figured out those features did not fit its U.S. clientele. And the transnationalization of cultures, such as the one joining the global business elite or global scientific communities, supplies yet another route to innovation—one whose importance is probably escalating because technology has made it easier to connect and mobilize across borders.
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