by Mark Puls
Hamilton and Jefferson were also at odds. Hamilton emerged as the dominant figure among the Federalists, who favored strong national defense and the encouragement of business. Jefferson became the leader of the anti-Federalists, who favored a strict interpretation of the Constitution and fought the growth of the War and Treasury departments.
As the divide in his cabinet widened, Washington left for a tour of the southern states and for a visit to Mount Vernon in the spring of 1791. Jefferson and James Madison began a tour of New England states and New York to garner anti-Federalist support.
Lucy gave birth to a daughter in July, whom they named Caroline. But no sooner had they added one child then they lost another. Marcus Camillus, their eight-year-old son, died in September 1791, at his school in Princeton. On September 8, Washington wrote in condolence to Henry and Lucy: "Parental feelings are too much alive in the moment of these misfortunes to admit the consolations of religion or philosophy; but I am persuaded reason will call one or both of them to your aid as soon as the keenness of your anguish is abated.“17
No words could console Knox, who responded to Washington that "[i]n this moment, neither philosophy nor reason have their proper office." He wrote a letter to the headmaster of the Princeton school thanking him for sending the remains of his son home. Knox's friend and wartime colleague, Henry Jackson, sent a letter expressing his sense of loss over the death: "That so lovely, promising and amiable a boy should be taken from his parents and friends who love and adore him, while the lives of thousands are spared who are a burden to themselves and society.“18
Lucy and the children had returned to Boston for the summer, and their son, Henry Jackson Knox, had been placed in a boarding school. With the frontier troubles unresolved, Henry stayed in Philadelphia. Life in the capital became dull in Knox's estimation. He wrote to Lucy that she was not missing out on any tempting social events, only two teas had been held that summer. On Sunday, July 15, he wrote her "[m]y evenings cannot possible be any cause of jealousy. They are stupid indeed. I drive out pretty often, come home, read the evening paper, then got to a solitary and painful bed—painful from the reflection that the companion of my soul is at a distance and that I am deprived of the blessed solace of her arms."
In a letter to his daughter Lucy, he confessed that his passion for public accolades had waned. "All my life I have been pursing illusive bubbles which burst on being grasped, and 'tis high time I should quit public life and attend to the solid interests of my family.“19
By early 1793, the world plunged into a global war. Knox was concerned about the country's ability to defend itself, but he was handcuffed in his efforts to prepare the nation's defenses because of budget concerns and the huge federal debt amassed during the Revolution. The War Department not only had to deal with the domestic troubles regarding the Indians but with the prospect of an invasion by a foreign European power. France was in the throes of a revolution. The French king, Louis XVI, who had been so helpful to the American's during its revolution, was guillotined with Marie Antoinette before a jeering mob on January 21, 1793. The new French government declared war on Great Britain, Spain, and the Netherlands on February 1, 1793.
The Girondist regime of the French republic sent an ambassador to America by the name of Edmond Charles "Citizen" Genêt, who arrived in Charleston on April 9, 1793. Genêt was welcomed with great fanfare, as many Americans hailed the French Revolution as an extension of their own struggle for liberty against monarchy. While in Charleston, he commissioned privateers and armed ships to prey upon British merchant ships even before presenting himself for recognition before Washington's administration. Genêt never questioned the Franco-American alliance and the treaty between the two nations that had been signed during the American Revolution with the now-deposed royal French government. Many political leaders in America also viewed the treaty as perfectly valid, despite the change in French governments. The governor of South Carolina applauded Genêt's efforts, and the Frenchman was enthusiastically greeted all along his trip to Philadelphia. Washington, who took the oath of office for a second term on March 4, was apprehensive that Genêt's actions would drag America into a war with Britain and sent a list of questions to his cabinet asking if the French treaty was still valid and whether Genêt should be received.
The issue split the administration along party lines. Secretary of State Jefferson loved France, where he had served as an American minister. He welcomed Genêt as a friend and believed that the United States was bound by treaty to align itself with France. Knox and Hamilton disagreed, and believed America should avoid insulting Britain and risking another war.
Jefferson again felt the odd man. In an April cabinet meeting called to discuss the Genêt issue and the validity of the French treaty, Hamilton, followed by Knox, voiced their opposition to Genêt. Jefferson had little patience with either man and wrote derisively of Henry in his journal: "Knox subscribed at once to Hamilton's opinion that we ought to declare the treaty void, acknowledging, at the same time, like a fool as he is, that he knew nothing about it. It was clear it remained valid.“20
Washington sided with Hamilton and Knox. He requested that Genêt be recalled and the French obliged. The president also issued a "Neutrality Proclamation" on April 22 that warned American citizens not to aid any nation in its war effort.
Meetings within the administration grew increasingly contentious as the split between the Federalist and Republicans widened. Jefferson's relationship with Washington and his influence within the administration were irreparably harmed by the Genêt affair. Realizing that he had lost the political rivalry with Hamilton, Jefferson turned in a letter of resignation on July 31 and agreed to serve out the remainder of the year as the secretary of state.
Both France and England were unhappy with the U.S. policy of neutrality. Each nation sent warships to prey on vulnerable American merchant vessels under the pretense of stopping any shipments of supplies destined for their enemy's docks. Shipping lanes on the high seas across the globe suddenly became a lawless haven for piracy. American merchant ships sailing across the Atlantic and through the Mediterranean were especially targeted because the United States did not possess a navy to protect its vessels or exact retribution on those who attacked its ships. On October 8, 1793, the American minister to Portugal, David Humphreys, sent a letter to U.S. authorities with the warning that Barbary pirates from Algiers were also capturing American vessels. Panic spread among captains shipping cargo in the Mediterranean under the Stars and Stripes. Every American vessel bound for Lisbon, Cadiz, or the Straits of Gibraltar was in danger of being attacked and its crew thrown into slavery.
In mid-December, American newspapers reported that ten American ships, including the Hope of New York, had been captured along with 110 sailors who were brought to Algiers, where they were stripped, shackled, and sold into slavery. The Algiers pirates used brutal tactics. Fast-sailing corsair ships preyed on slow, unarmed American business vessels, with pirates throwing long lateen yards across their prey's rails and then hopping aboard, armed with cutlasses and pistols. Any merchant seamen who resisted were killed, and the rest were sent below decks in chains.
A public clamor rose for the War Department to defend Americans on the high seas and for the formation of a navy. Knox had argued the need for a naval force as far back as the Confederation government. By the end of the Revolution, all but two of the Continental Navy's thirteen ships had been captured or destroyed, and the navy was disbanded.
Any project to establish a navy would fall under the authority of the War Department. A separate naval department would not be created until 1798. On January 2, 1794, a closely divided House resolved by a vote of 46 to 44 "[t]hat a Naval force, adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs, ought to be provided.“21 The issue was sent to a committee to estimate the cost of building the naval force.
Although Knox was the son of a shipwright and grew up along the Boston docks,
he knew little about building ships or what kind of vessels would suit America's needs. He walked the numerous shipyards of Philadelphia, talking to master shipwrights, captains, and sailors. At the time, the city was the largest shipbuilding center in the United States. More than 8,000 tons of shipping were constructed there, twice the tonnage of any other port in America. More than a quarter of the nation's $7 million in total exports sailed from its docks.22
Knox was swayed by a proposal given to him the previous year, dated January 6, 1793, from the city's leading shipwright, forty-two-year-old Joshua Humphreys, who observed that: "As our Navy must for a considerable time be inferior in numbers, we are to consider what sized ships will be most formidable and be an overmatch for those of an enemy.“23
Knox faced a variety of complicated decisions in choosing a design for the ships. Congress wanted ships to deal with the Barbary pirates, who used light, quick corsairs. America could not afford the large, expensive battleships used by England and France. Yet Knox believed that sooner or later U.S. Navy vessels needed to be equipped with enough firepower to compete with the warships of Europe.
Humphreys proposed an intermediate ship, a super-size frigate that would weigh more than 1,000 tons with a deck length of 175 feet and a keel as deep as 150 feet. He reasoned that because America could not compete with the massive scale of large European battleships, its navy should use better technology to produce a more compact yet sturdy, efficient fighter that would be both quick and powerful, with enough guns and speed to subdue corsairs and frigates and elude large battleships, also called ships of the line.
Battleships generally carried seventy-four guns on two decks with cannons that could discharge twenty-four- or thirty-two-pound shells. Frigates typically were smaller ships sent out as the eyes of the fleet to scout the waters ahead. They were ideal for poking into harbors and up rivers, and usually possessed a single deck of no more than thirty-eight guns, modest eighteen-pounders. Most frigates would be outgunned against a battleship.
The design was highly controversial, however. Other ship designers charged that Humphreys's idea would not work, that the frigate was much too large and that the hull would crack under the enormous strain of bearing 1,000 tons of wood, copper, and iron scantlings. They believed that the massive frame and exaggerated keel would cause structural weakness that would force the hull to distort under the weight of the heavy guns and extra deck. Some pointed to a common drawback inherent in the design of frigates: The guns sat high above the water to increase the distance of the firing range. This elevated the ship's center of gravity, making it unstable. Adding bigger and more numerous guns to a frigate would increase that instability, and several of Knox's advisors maintained that Humphreys's design should be made lighter and reduced in size to avoid disaster.
Although Knox harbored reservations about Humphrey's design, he was inclined to favor innovative technology. Humphreys believed that his frigates could be strong enough if built from live oak and red cedar, materials that were difficult to obtain in Europe but available in the southern U.S. states.
Aside from establishing a navy, Knox believed that America needed to build a line of coastal defenses to prevent enemy warships from venturing into its harbors unopposed. On February 28, 1794, he submitted to Congress a detailed plan for federal installations along the eastern seaboard in sixteen port towns, including Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, and Savannah. He estimated the cost of building the forts at $76,000 and pegged the expense of 200 cannons for the project at $97,000, for a sum total of $173,000. Another $90,000 would be needed to pay the soldiers to garrison the posts.
To many in Congress, his plans seemed overly ambitious. The bill to fund the navy was finding heavy opposition in the House, where James Madison argued that the country could not afford a navy until it paid off its war debts. He suggested that the United States hire the Portuguese navy to fight its battles. Many anti-Federalist Republicans claimed that the navy would be a tool for Federalists like Knox who could use it to expand the federal government. A navy would also be a source of influence and patronage.
Jefferson had long argued that "a Navy will be [a] ruinously expensive, aristocratic institution, subversive of Democratic ideals, whose glory-hungry officers will drag the country into unwarranted adventures overseas.“24
Nevertheless, heeding the clamor to protect American shipping, the U.S. House finally gave its approval in a 50 to 39 vote on March 10, 1794 for "An act to provide a naval armament.“25 The Senate quickly approved, and Washington signed the measure into law on March 27. The appropriation that launched the United States Navy was a mere $688,888.
On April 15, Knox sent Washington his recommendation in favor of the Humphreys design, writing that the ships would "combine such qualities of strength, durability, swiftness of sailing and force, as to render them equal, if not superior, to any frigate belonging to any of the European powers.“26 Washington gave his approbation to begin work.
Knox established the first U.S. Navy yards. Each frigate would be built in a separate city. He initially leased shipyards and then transformed them into federal installations. Throughout the spring and summer, Knox held meetings at the War Department on Chestnut and Fifth in Philadelphia. He laid out detailed instructions for master builders, ship captains, and shipyard agents and going over plans and budgets with Humphreys that included every piece of wood, copper, or iron used in constructing the frigates. Teams of men were sent to the islands off Georgia to cut the live oak necessary for construction to begin. It has been estimated that each of the six frigates required as many as 460 live oak trees.27
The controversial decision Knox made in choosing to build super frigates rather than more conventional warships demonstrated his far-reaching vision of the nation's future. In planning the frigate project, he considered not only the immediate need of dealing with the Barbary Pirates, as many in Congress myopically had, but he also looked to the long-term future of the navy and indeed the country. Just as Humphreys had promised, the oversize frigates, with their wider and longer hulls, extra guns, and reinforced live-oak frames, put the United States Navy on the cutting edge of the science of building and designing warships. This was the beginning of a long tradition of world-class innovation and leadership that would continue for centuries.
The six frigates that Knox helped plan—the Constitution, United States, President, Congress, Chesapeake, and Constellation—went on to perform legendary service. In the War of 1812, Constitution captured three British frigates, Guerriere, Java, and Cyane, along with the sloop Levant as well as many smaller vessels. She was nicknamed "Old Ironsides" after broadsides from Guerriere bounced off her twenty-two-inch-thick, live-oak-framed hull. Casualties aboard the original six frigates were much less than on comparable enemy ships.
Chesapeake also became part of sea lore. She was commanded by Captain James Lawrence in the War of 1812. After suffering a mortal wound during a battle with the British cruiser Shannon, Lawrence cried out with his last few breaths the immortal words: "Don't give up the ship."
Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who each had opposed a navy, would come to be thankful that Knox had championed the cause of a naval armament. Jefferson wrote to John Adams in 1822 that the six frigates "[c]ertainly raised our rank and character among nations.“28
Despite the launch of the navy, Knox became more and more dissatisfied with his role in the administration. Yet he felt he could not yet step down with much of the business of his department unfinished, including building a new corps of artillery, the frigates projects, and erecting the nation's fortifications. He also worked to oversee General Anthony Wayne's expedition against the Indians in the Ohio Territory to quell hostilities against settlers. "I cannot leave my situation in this critical state of affairs," he wrote his friend Henry Jackson, who managed his estate, in a letter of May 10, 1794.29
He felt his influence with Washington waning as Hamilton's rose. Knox became embroiled in a
struggle with the Treasury secretary over the power to buy supplies for War Department, a powerful source of political patronage. Hamilton thought that the Treasury Department should handle all contracts concerning the federal government. Unlike Hamilton, Knox harbored no political aspirations and did not need political patrons, but nevertheless felt that the secretary of the Treasury was trying to enlarge the influence of his department. This was the same charge that Jefferson had leveled against Hamilton so often in letters to Washington.
Knox's personal finances and interests needed urgent attention. Taxes were due on the Waldo patent, and work on his home in Thomaston, Maine, needed direction or contractors would have to suspend the project, and therefore increase its cost. He decided to ask Washington for a six-week leave of absence to return to Massachusetts and his Maine land to put his life in order. Washington agreed. But just as Knox began to pack for the trip home, the fledgling federal government again faced a critical test that demanded the use of the military. In 1791, Hamilton successfully spearheaded a federal excise tax on distilled spirits, which were used as a kind of currency in the far frontier regions of the country. The funds generated by the tax were the second most lucrative source of revenue for the federal government and helped pay for the War Department's expeditions against the Indians.
On the western side of the Alleghany Mountains in the Pennsylvania frontier, the Scotch-Irish pioneers found that because of the expense of transporting wheat and corn over the mountains, the only way to turn a profit on their grain was to convert it into whiskey. Several distillers claimed that the tax was an excessively heavy burden and tried to elude or intimidate federal revenue officers, which led to several instances of minor violence. "Revenuers" were tarred, feathered, beaten, and whipped. On August 1, 1794, however, the situation erupted into an open rebellion. Law officers tried to round up sixty tax evaders to bring them to trial in Philadelphia. A riot ensued as 6,000 settlers from around the region banded together at Braddock's field, muskets in hand, threatening any federal officer who ventured into Washington and Alleghany counties.