In Search of the Lost Testament of Alexander the Great

by David Grant

  The exact location of Nora remains unidentified. Yet within that impregnable stone fortress in the Phrygian highlands, or on the confines of Lycaonia and the Cappadocian Plateau, contemplating his fate and the permutations of the outcomes with the odds stacked against him, Eumenes may well have conceived of the content of the Pamphlet.6 The shockwaves from this precision-guided weapon targeted everyone then in power, with a range that reached from India to Epirus. Although its blast was short-lived, the fallout lingered on until it had been safely contained by Ptolemy’s Journal. But its heat signature remained in what we have come to name The Book of the Death and Testament of Alexander the Great.

  If the months of siege at Nora did inspire Eumenes to craft his path of retribution, when amongst his later invocations of the ghost of Alexander, the epistolary subterfuges, the forced campaign marches and the full-scale battles, did his unique kykeon, his propaganda cup, finally appear? Two significant factors hamper attempts at an exact dating: our sources’ methodologies and the corruption of the texts which house the Pamphlet remnants today.

  THEROS, TRYGOS, POLEMOS: SUMMER, HARVEST, WAR

  Diodorus’ Biblotheka remains the fullest coverage of events of the years 319-315 BCE in which the siege and its aftermath fell. What becomes clear from a comparison with the calculated length of Arrian’s Events After Alexander, itself a précis of Hieronymus, is that Diodorus’ compression was at times drastic.7 Arrian needed ten books to cover the years 323 to 318 BCE whereas the same period occupies only Diodorus’ eighteenth book.8 Fragments of Duris suggest the Samian historian covered the same period at the pace of one and a half to two years per book, though he appears to have sped ahead with his narrative after Eumenes’ death.9

  Alongside the severe culling of detail we have the challenge of unravelling the order of events: Diodorus divided his chapters into synthetic campaign years in which little monthly or seasonal direction was provided, save his references to the hardships winter placed on operating; this was a method likely employed by Hieronymus himself, most likely following Thucydides and Xenophon before him.10 And so theros, trygos, polemos, summer, harvest and war, all merged together in a less than coherent sequence. Diodorus additionally tried to synchronise the Roman consular year (January-January by his day) with the Athenian archon year (summer to summer) whilst attempting to adhere to Hieronymus’ overall progression, but he filled gaps he found in his narrative – detail of affairs in Greece, for example, which Hieronymus did not personally witness – by drawing from other historians such as Diyllus.11 In the process, Diodorus occasionally predated his entries against the eponymous archon change to more effectively introduce new subject matter, and as a result he was often six months or more off the pace. But only three of the five archon changes in the years 323-319 BCE were recorded, with no reference provided at all for the years 321/320 BCE and 320/319 BCE.12

  Plutarch was even less concerned about being clinical on the sequence of events, as long as the resulting narrative satisfied his character development and the thematic shape he sought. So we have a conspicuous lack of syncronicity between his and Diodorus’ account in which a lamentable lacuna sits between the synedrion at Triparadeisus, and the battle at Orcynia,13 whilst almost all of the latter half of 320 BCE is ‘passed over in silence’.14

  Many scholars have dedicated lengthy studies to elucidating and solving the problem, noting that even the Triparadeisus settlement may have been wrongly dated; modern interpretations place the gathering of generals anywhere from summer 321 (the ‘high’ chronology, as suggested, imperfectly, by Diodorus’ text) to mid-320 BCE (the ‘low’ chronology, suggested by the Parian Chronicle and Babylonian Chronicle, and which we follow), though hybrid theories place events somewhere in between. If the date of Perdiccas’ death can be anchored down by the latter to May/June 320 BCE, the meeting of generals at Triparadeisus should have logically followed soon after.15 But the Babylonian Chronicle and the Parian Chronicle only provide chronological safe anchorages here and there, and the latter is far from reliable.16 As it has been pointed out, everything can be reinterpreted by the subtle shunting back and forward of a war council, a flotilla launch, or an envoy’s arrival in between.

  Nevertheless, studies of the Liber de Morte Testamentumque Alexandri Magni, which represents the Pamphlet in its modified form, have pinpointed two broad periods that best suit its original publication: 322-321 BCE, or better still, 319-316 BCE.17 The latter period significantly commenced with the siege of Nora, and ended with Eumenes’ death after battle at Gabiene (so the close of 316 BCE or beggining if 315 BCE). Within these dates, broadly occupied by the Second Diadokhoi War, several windows of opportunity, or moments of desperation, manifested themselves, and each could have precipitated the Pamphlet’s release. If we systematically break down its content, we can narrow down the moment at which the strategic rehash of Alexander’s Will was broadcast to the fragmenting Macedonian-governed world.

  ‘THE ARROGANCE OF THE FORTUNATE AND THE DESPAIR OF THE DESTITUTE’18

  Eumenes’ early attempts at a negotiated settlement at Nora failed; it seems he had been asking for more than his hopeless position deserved. Diodorus’ text appears unequivocal on what happened next: Antigonus referred the matter back to Antipater, the royal regent in Pella. Eumenes also ‘… later sent envoys to Antipater to discuss the terms of surrender. Their leader was Hieronymus, who has written the history of the Successors.’19 The reference to ‘later’ is vexing, but whenever Hieronymus undertook the journey as Eumenes’ presbeis, he would have needed his besieger’s blessing and potentially his protection, for Hieronymus may have been on the proscription list of Perdiccans drawn up at Triparadeisus if he was operating with Eumenes when Craterus was killed;20 it is possible that Hieronymus departed Nora for Pella with Antigonus’ own envoy, Aristodemus of Miletus.21

  More confusing still is the implication that Antigonus, in his position as the Macedonian regent’s strategos of Asia, was obliged to seek the regent’s advice on Eumenes’ fate; his mandate had given him plenipotentiary powers to hunt the Perdiccans down and put them to the sword, as the fate of others made quite clear. One possible explanation would be the fame of the siege, perhaps as notorious as Eumenes himself, for: ‘No one else had been so much talked about in the army since the death of Craterus.’22 If discussed from Pella to Persis and with a situation so unique, starving the occupants of Nora to submission, and executing the now powerless Eumenes without at least soliciting Antipater’s blessing, might have broadcast ambition Antigonus was not quite ready to unveil: the philotimia and philarchia that Antipater already suspected.23

  If Eumenes was pressing for his claims to be heard in Pella, he was simply buying time. No doubt he planned to ask Antipater, perhaps already known to be ill, to extend a similar offer of reconciliation to that he proferred to Eumenes before his confrontation with Craterus, terms Eumenes then rejected due to old enmities.24 Although he had nothing to lose from diplomacy, Eumenes cannot have hoped for much: he had urged Perdiccas to repudiate Antipater’s daughter, Nicaea, as a prelude to his invasion of Macedonia, he had widowed another of the regent’s daughters (married to Craterus) and come close to a clash with Antipater himself at Sardis, a conflict saved only by a warning from Cleopatra’s intelligence system. Moreover, he had bettered Antipater to an embarrassing extent in Lydia or Phrygia before taking Celaenae, if the content of the Gothenburg Palimpsest is reliable.25 Any reply from Pella would likely be a death sentence and perhaps Antigonus knew it, explaining why he acquiesced to the embassy – as useful for Eumenes as bringing owls to Athens.26 When considering that Eumenes remained incarcerated at Nora until after Antipater’s death, we may conclude the answer from Pella was to continue the siege, assuming the embassy arrived before the regent expired.

  When briefing Hieronymus for the journey, Eumenes would have tasked him with contacting Olympias who was still based in the Molossian region of Epirus, and possibly with getting word to Cleopatra who was now alone as an
‘unofficial’ hostage of Antigonus in Sardis.27 If Eumenes expected a death sentence from the regent, he also knew he had an ally in Alexander’s mother; Diodorus did report that some Molossians joined the Greek alliance against Antipater in the Lamian War, though their initial support ended in treachery soon after.28 But there does exist a clear epistolary tradition that details Olympias’ denigration of Antipater, and, in turn, it captures his complaints about her obduracy which had already prompted Alexander’s famous quip: ‘She was charging him a high rent for ten months’ accommodation inside her womb.’29

  Plutarch believed Alexander had even warned Antipater about a plot being laid against him, and if not specifically named, Olympias is a strong candidate as its architect, though this appears later embellishment to the tale that was possibly motivated (or supported) by the conspiracy detailed in the Pamphlet. Plutarch went as far as stating: ‘Olympias and Cleopatra had raised a faction, Olympias taking Epirus, and Cleopatra Macedonia.’ When he heard of it, Alexander allegedly commented that his mother had made the better choice, for ‘… the Macedonians would not submit to be reigned over by a woman’. More plausible is Antipater’s deathbed caution: ‘Never permit a woman to be prostates of a kingdom.’30

  Antigonus notionally controlled the flow of information into Nora but it would have benefited him to reveal to Eumenes the gravity of his position. The proscribed Perdiccan confederates under Docimus, Attalus and Polemon were in a siege that was to last sixteen months in Phrygia and which would end with their deaths or defections.31 The necrology may have included Laomedon, the displaced satrap of Coele-Syria, care of Ptolemy’s annexation. Alcetas, faced with an impossible situation, finally committed suicide at Termussus in Pisidia and his body was posthumously mutilated, whilst Holcias and his 3,000 renegades had been rounded up more locally and their fate was in the balance.32 Moreover, Eumenes had himself been served a painful reminder of his non-Macedonian origins at Orcynia, with significant defections from his ranks before, during, and after the battle; enlisting and retaining Macedonians was becoming the labour of Sysiphus for the Cardian Greek.

  Antipater still dominated Pella and the dynastic stakes through a clutch of eligible daughters: the second-time widowed Phila, with an infant son by Craterus who had amicably passed on his Persian wife Amastris to Dionysius of Heraclea, remarried Antigonus’ son, Demetrius, and Nicaea, following the rejection by Perdiccas, was sought by Lysimachus (probably before Antipater died).33 Ptolemy had married a third wife, Eurydice, sometime in 321/320 BCE. The defeated pro-Perdiccan Somatophylax, Aristonus, had agreed to retire to Macedonia under Antipater’s watchful eye, and Polyperchon had crossed to Europe with Craterus and supported Antipater in the Lamian War. Its successful conclusion saw the regent maintaining his stranglehold over Greece through the oligarchies he had installed over the previous fifteen years.34 Additionally, White Cleitus, the former Perdiccan fleet commander, had been confirmed as satrap of Lydia at Triparadeisus in return for naval assistance given to the regent.35

  Now, months into the siege, Eumenes cannot have truly fancied his chances of survival any more than a thalamios on a sinking trireme.36 Supplies were dwindling and despite his ingenious mechanical device for exercising his horses, the military mounts must have looked more like meals even though Eumenes ‘seasoned’ what remained with ‘charm and friendliness’.37 ‘Whatsoever friends asked to be dismissed because they could not endure the asperities of the place and the constraint in diet, all these he sent away, after bestowing upon them tokens of affection and kindness.’ And underlining the plight of those who remained was the knowledge that Antigonus now commanded the most powerful force in Asia under a single Macedonian general: 60,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and thirty war elephants, with ‘pay without end’ if more were required.38

  Cornelius Nepos, however, provided unique additional detail that might allow us to reconsider the true nature of Eumenes’ plight: he claimed that: ‘During that siege, as often as he desired, he either set on fire or demolished the works and defences of Antigonus.’ Nepos further implied that Eumenes could have broken out, but he was awaiting spring and meanwhile ‘pretended to be desirous of surrendering’, and treating for terms.39 If Eumenes was indeed playing a delaying tactic, it was to exploit any one of several outcomes: a new offer from Antigonus, the appearance of Perdiccan renegades still operating in the region, the death of Antipater, or as Nepos suggested, better breakout weather, for the mountain passes may well have been snowbound. The friends Eumenes dismissed may have been able to slip away individually and get word to supporters, and an escape in the planning explains the need to keep horses in shape. Antipater died first, and with him any death sentence appears to have expired, as Antigonus’ next move suggests.

  Having dealt with Alcetas, who had been attempting to install himself in Pisidia – perhaps more legitimately than historians have assumed – Antigonus was now on his way to his customary winter quartering at Celaenae when Aristodemus arrived with news of the regent’s death; this points to late 319 BCE. Antigonus had reached Cretopolis (‘city of the Cretans’, most likely strategically located in Pisidia) and was reportedly ‘delighted’ at the turn of events, whereupon he prepared to make an offer to Eumenes, apparently prompted by the knowledge that Polyperchon had been appointed in Antipater’s place.40

  Hieronymus had either recently returned from Macedonia, perhaps in the company of Aristodemus once more, or he had already returned to Nora when he was summoned to hear Antigonus’ terms.41 Before agreeing to Eumenes’ freedom, Antigonus unsuccessfully invited Hieronymus to join him with the promise of ‘great gifts’. This raises several questions: was this offer independent of Eumenes’ fate, or was Hieronymus being enrolled in order to turn his patron to Antigonus’ cause? And had Hieronymus operated under the one-eyed general before in an otherwise undocumented career? We may never know, but Diodorus provided a typically stoic philosophical summation that was unlikely to have been wholly of his own design: ‘For in the inconstancy and irregularity of events history furnishes a corrective for both the arrogance of the fortunate and the despair of the destitute.’42

  With Antipater dead, Antigonus must have considered himself the foremost of all the surviving Macedonian generals, both in Europe and in Asia; and Polyperchon, as events were to prove, was maleable, and Antigonus must have known it. Furthermore, Cassander, always suspicious of Antigonus’ plans, had been subordinated in the process to a role he would not accept: Polyperchon’s second-in-command, one last evocation of the ‘chiliarch’ role.43

  At the conclusion of negotiations, Antigonus invited Eumenes to ‘share in his own undertakings’, offering him a pardon, ‘a greater satrapy besides’ and ‘gifts many times the value of what he had’ before;44 these are somewhat reminiscent of the terms Antipater had offered earlier.45 Nepos claimed Eumenes only signed the (purportedly amended) oath of release at the approach of spring, thus early 318 BCE. The release date is sound as the likely distance from Nora to Celaenae (from summons to final agreement, a journey possibly twice made by Hieronymus) and the demands of winter travelling in the mountainous region, speak of a deal being brokered many weeks before.

  Antigonus was now in his early sixties. The assimilation of an extended Asia Minor, and even the whole Asian empire, must have seemed possible to him. As Diodorus put it:

  Antigonus made up his mind to maintain a firm grip upon the government of Asia and to yield the rule of that continent to no one… Indeed he had in mind to go through Asia, remove the existing satraps, and reorganise the positions of command in favour of his friends.46

  There was, however, much to marshal in Asia Minor in the first step of assimilation, and in-between Antigonus and Macedonia already stood an apparently accommodating Lysimachus in Thrace.47 But there was one missing ingredient that would provide the approbation his muscle-flexing needed: official support of the Argead house. The royal line now potentially had Olympias as its figurehead, and Antigonus knew full well that she would return
to the centre of Pellan policy with Polyperchon holding the regency for two incapable kings. Antigonus also knew that without approval of the ‘kings’ his men-at-arms did not constitute a royal army at all, for with the death of Antipater his own state mandate had lapsed. That meant royal treasuries were closed to him too, unless he went renegade. Eumenes must have positioned himself as the missing regal link in either scenario; had he maintained his support for Antigonus and not (allegedly) doctored the oath, the face of the Asian empire would have assumed a totally different complexion, as Plutarch pondered when comparing the fate of Eumenes with Quintus Sertorius.48

  A 19th century view of Castle Lampron by Victor Langlois which appeared in Voyage dans la Cilicie. La route de Tarse en Cappadoce, Revue archéologique XXVI, 1856/7. Locally known as Namrun (earlier Nemrod), it sits amid the valleys that run from the Taurus Mountains’ watershed to the sea and must be a contender for the unknown location of Nora, though other suitable and more remote peaks do exist. Sitting broadly where Plutarch described, Namrun guarded the pass leading to Cilicia, which may explain why it was already grain-stocked when Eumenes arrived. The ruins visible are of a Byzantine-period spur castle though signs of far earlier occupation exist, including a rock-hewn dry ‘moat’. Its circumference broadly matches descriptions, as do water features and its impregnability.49 Sheer cliffs leave one approachable path where Antigonus could have arranged his ditch and palisade. Greek inscriptions have been found carved into the rock.

  APO MECHANES THEOS: LIKE GOD FROM THE MACHINE

  Polyperchon the son of Simmias of the Macedonian Tymphaean aristocracy was a notable and high profile campaign veteran, yet he has been labelled ‘a jackal among lions’ for his performance and manoeuvrings in the Successor Wars.50 And he does fit somewhat uneasily into the general scheme of things, if the portrait we see in Diodorus is anywhere near accurate.