by David Grant
There can be no doubt that Olympias would have wanted Eumenes back in Pella to help face the threat from Cassander once Asia Minor was secured, so her cry for help appears genuine at least. According to Nepos:
Olympias… sent letters and messengers into Asia to Eumenes, to consult him whether she should proceed to re-possess herself of Macedonia… She then entreated Eumenes… not to allow the bitterest enemies of Philip’s house and family to extirpate his very race, but to give his support to the children of Alexander; adding that, if he would do her such a favour, he might raise troops as soon as possible, and bring them to her aid; and, in order that he might do so more easily, she had written to all the governors of the provinces that preserved their allegiance, to obey him, and follow his counsels.90
By now Olympias had already reached out to Polyperchon, or possibly he to her, beset as they were by a mutual enemy. Alexander’s son by Roxane was by now four years old and being referred to as one of the ‘kings’ (symbasileos, co-king) under the title of Alexander IV. Olympias, with Eumenes’ support, was clearly planning to back her grandson over her despised dead husband’s idiot offspring, Arrhidaeus, by Philinna of Larissa. We may question whether Olympias truly harboured grandmaternal feelings for Roxane’s boy, but promoting him was her best route to survival. Strategically, that support made sense for Eumenes too: troops sent by Roxane’s father, Oxyartes (now satrap of Bactria and, or, Paropanisadae), were in the ranks of those assembled at Persepolis and they remained with Eumenes through the battles at Paraetacene and (we may assume) Gabiene.91 So it is unsurprising that Roxane featured prominently in the Pamphlet in a ‘tender’ death scene in which it was made clear that she was the foremost wife at the king’s court; her restraining Alexander from disappearing into the Euphrates may have been crafted to showcase her loyalty to her husband and his men.92
A blood feud was inevitable with Alexander’s mother planning to return to Pella; it would have already taken place if Polyperchon’s administration had any teeth. Nevertheless, after he once again ‘had consulted with his friends’, Polyperchon ‘summoned Olympias, asking her to assume the care of Alexander’s son’; she must have promised the desperate regent she would bring an Epirote army with her; and that is exactly what she did.
Nepos confirmed: ‘Eumenes was moved with this communication’, but not in the immediate direction Olympias might have wanted. Diodorus added that he ‘… at once replied to her advising her to remain in Epirus for the present until the war should come to some decision’; ‘… he therefore assembled troops, and prepared for war against Antigonus’ in Asia.93 Olympias was, however, active in rallying assistance: Diodorus was clear that the support of the Silver Shields held firm in the face of Antigonus’ subversion because: ‘Olympias, the mother of Alexander, had written to them that they should serve Eumenes in every way.’94 She was also active in Greece; she sent instructions to Nicanor, Cassander’s Macedonian phrourarchos of Munychia, demanding he return the strategic district and adjacent harbour at Piraeus to the Athenians.95 On good terms with Phocion, Nicanor (possibly Aristotle’s nephew) had strengthened his numbers and soon controlled the Great Harbour and the adjacent Bay of Phalerum along with the harbour booms; Athens was now landlocked.
Control of the harbours had been an essential part of Cassander’s return with his new ships from his recruiting mission in Asia. But the Athenian Assembly, backed by an army under Polyperchon’s son, Alexander, and Hagnonides who was once exiled by Antipater, now banished Phocion and prepared to oust the Macedonian garrison from Piraeus. This precipitated a chain of events that would result in the executions of both Phocion and Hagnonides, as well as the pro-Cassander Corinthian, Deinarchus, as the hopes of the city ascended to, and descended from, the high point of Polyperchon’s promise of ‘freedom’, and then fell to a decade of ‘tyranny’ under the Cassander-installed Demetrius of Phalerum.96 Cassander, in the style of Eumenes’ counterfeiting in Asia, used forged letters to rid himself of the by now overly successful Nicanor who, it must have appeared to him (possibly with good cause), had been intriguing with Antigonus.97
Although Eumenes had cautioned Olympias to delay her return to Macedonia and warned her against exacting revenge too soon, plans were clearly in place for just that: retribution.98 His advice, ‘not to stir until Alexander’s son should get the throne’, anticipated the execution of Eurydice and King Philip III in the coming months, perhaps to be carried out by the agency of the newly repatriated Holcias and his men.99 But it seems that Olympias did return against Eumenes’ advice, and thus potentially earlier than he had expected.100 She journeyed towards Pella – possibly with Polyperchon already at her side – with the help of her nephew, Aeacides of the Molossian house (Pyrrhus’ father), and in autumn 317 BCE she defeated the army of Queen Eurydice which was attempting to block the path out of the Pindus Mountains that separated Macedonia from the Molossian kingdom to the southwest.101
In the confrontation referred to by Duris as the ‘first war between women’, Eurydice the warrior (in the style of her mother) emblematically paraded herself in full battle armour, uniquely arranged according to Duris, while Olympias marched out as a worshipper of Dionysus to the sound of a tympanum. Eurydice’s men, ‘remembering the benefits that they had received from Alexander, changed their allegiance’.102 The veterans were simply not ready to slay the mother of Alexander, who then rode into Pella and assumed her rightful place. Cassander was absent at the time in southern Greece. Olympias must have thought that her ‘haste and timing’ was justifiable after all; she may well have orchestrated trouble in the south to enable herself to strike.
Olympias immediately set about issuing orders to garrison commanders, directing generals and conducting personal vendettas.103 Eurydice’s fate was forced suicide; Olympias provided her a sword, a noosed-rope and hemlock: three deaths to choose from. Shunning these tools she is said to have hung herself with her own girdle, though she took the rope in another account. The half-witted King Philip III, presumably unable to decide on his fate, was put to the Thracian dagger after wearing the crown for six years and four months; that statement by Diodorus places his death in October 317 BCE, or possibly later according to the Babylonian Chronicle.
Alexander’s mother and her former Cardian secretary were clearly working together on a bigger emerging picture, even if they did not concur on its timing; his experience at court and on campaign, and her role as head of the Argead house, formed a team with unique abilities, perhaps with Cleopatra facilitating their communication from Sardis; the new lower city lay astride the coast road (though not the Royal Road) to Ephesus some three days’ travel away.104 Thanks to the royal missives supposedly sent by Polyperchon, Eumenes had become the kings’ commander-in-chief in Asia Minor, a role Nepos suggested Perdiccas had granted him before, though this time it was either self-appointed, or manipulated with the help of Olympias’ hand. At this point, again thanks to Olympias’ groundwork, the prospect of other satraps joining him was real. It was Antigonus who now appeared the ‘rebel of the monarchy’.105
The unwitting Polyperchon was embroiled in the intrigues and cunning of all those vying for control of the kings, the throne and Asian empire: Cassander, Antigonus and Olympias with Eumenes. His chess was simply one-dimensional in the face of more complex gambits, but with an Antigonus-backed Cassander making headway in Greece, and a Eumenes-supporting Olympias now resident in Pella, what could Polyperchon possibly reverse?106 Eumenes must have anticipated just that.
WORKING THE RESOURCES: CLEITUS’ SILVER AND ARRHIDAEUS’ RESCUE MISSION
It appears that two satraps in Asia Minor were activated by Olympias’ call to arms, and their activity appears coordinated with a likely initial goal of facilitating Eumenes’ eventual return to Macedonia. Had he not been hounded east out of Phoenicia after wintering in Cilicia, Eumenes may have headed north through Asia Minor and linked up with these newly defiant allies. The first was Arrhidaeus in Hellespontine Phrygia, probably the brothe
r of Amphimachus who now governed Mesopotamia and who soon would link up with Eumenes when he made his way east. Arrhidaeus moved to garrison strategic cities of Cyzicus as a ‘defensive measure’; he further dispatched a rescue force to free Eumenes from Nora.107 These actions are more consistent with the trust Perdiccas placed in him when instructing him to oversee construction, and delivery, of Alexander’s funeral bier at Babylon.
Basing their conclusions on Photius’ severe compression of Arrian Events After Alexander, commentators generally accept that the bier’s Syrian destination was a ‘redirection’ of its intended course, and so Arrhidaeus defied Perdiccas from the outset, as ‘desertion’ is mentioned. But this need not be so, and Hieronymus’ rendering of the episode may well have made Arrhidaeus pay handsomely for his failure to assist Eumenes earlier, or to justify the Perdiccan loss of the corpse, or Arrhidaeus’ help in its handing over to Ptolemy under a higher loyalty (Alexander’s last wishes). For we have grounds to believe Perdiccas was himself based in Syria, so the cortege was being delivered to him as instructed, though no doubt Ptolemy’s spies had advance knowledge of its route.108
Besides, if Alexander had requested burial in Egypt in his Will, its final destination was legitimate, the redirection aside; significantly no demands for the return of the body emerged. Arrhidaeus’ elevation (alongside Peithon) to epimeletes at Triparadeisus suggests he was both held in high esteem and he had not alienated either side of the previously feuding armies.109 He was demonstrably no lover of Antigonus, which is perhaps why Antipater confirmed him in Hellespontine Phrygia, so that any ‘rogue’ crossing of the Hellespont could be monitored by him.
Presumably, with his territory bordering the narrow seaway that separated the former Persian Empire from Europe, Arrhidaeus was the first governor in Asia to receive messages and instructions from Pella or Epirus. An attempt to break Eumenes out of Nora would have been a hugely ambitious undertaking as a sole initiative, but it is conceivable as part of a bigger emerging plan. It was too late, that is if the relief force ever reached the fortress, for its fate is unattested. But its timing confirms that Olympias was corresponding with satraps to solicit support when Eumenes was still incarcerated; Hieronymus’ mission to Pella may well have been part of that. Intimate with the defences, the siege guard strength and the locations of Antigonus’ army billeting, Hieronymus could have provided the detail that would have made a breakout possible; Nepos made it clear the perimeter was far from watertight.
If Antigonus harboured the belief that he alone was the architect of events unfolding in Asia, and potentially now those evolving in Greece, he would have been completely wrong on both campaign fronts. When Arrhidaeus moved against him, the second satrap to declare for the pro-Eumenes alliance, White Cleitus sailed to Macedonia after garrisoning his principal cities to inform Polyperchon of Antigonus’ latest plans. Before returning to the Asian theatre of war he briefly generalled for the new regent and journeyed to Athens to oversee the execution of Phocion who had submitted himself to Polyperchon when Hagnonides, his arch-enemy, was reinstalled.110
In reply to these new threats, Antigonus dispatched 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry to relieve Arrhidaeus’ ‘siege’ of Cyzicus, and he journeyed himself with his remaining forces to take Ephesus in response to Cleitus’ naval actions. Antigonus had opportunistically intercepted four ships under Rhodian captaincy carrying 600 talents of silver ostensibly destined for Polyperchon in Macedonia; this sounds like a shipment Eumenes might have dispatched from Cyinda. Was it in fact bound for the combined front of Cleitus and Arrhidaeus, rather than Macedonia?111 Antigonus refused to give up the captured funds, claiming they were needed for the payment of mercenaries (perhaps the 4,000 he ‘officially’ furnished Cassander with); that he provided an explanation at all reinforces our contention that no formal war had been declared between himself and the Pellan regime under Polyperchon. Cassander’s execution of Nicanor, who had returned from a coordinated action with Antigonus at the Hellespont, suggests there was little trust between the ‘allies’; Antigonus was simply playing both sides of the discord.
Yet the reprimand Antigonus levied on the soon-defeated satrap of Hellespontine-Phrygia evidenced the weight he still placed on his Triparadeisus-granted authority, despite Antipater’s death: ‘He sent envoys to Arrhidaeus, bringing against him these charges… he ordered him to retire from his satrapy and, retaining a single city as a residence, to remain quiet.’112 Arrhidaeus took refuge in adjacent Bithynia and joined up with Cleitus’ fleet upon its return from Macedonia; their new instructions were to block the crossing of enemy troops expected from Europe.
This statement is curious, for Cassander needed all the men he could muster in Greece, and Antigonus was already funding an army of immense size in Asia Minor. Was there the prospect of Lysimachus entering the frame?113 After an early success, Cleitus’ fleet was captured by Antigonus who employed typical cunning in the face of initial defeat; Cleitus was on the run though he was soon captured near the Bosphorus and he was, revealingly, executed by men operating under Lysimachus.114 Nothing more was heard of Arrhidaeus, who either heeded Antigonus’ demands, or was quietly dispatched. The Asia Minor initiative had collapsed; Eumenes and Olympias were left to face Antigonus and Cassander without the support they had hoped to muster.
It was worse in Macedonia. We are told that Olympias’ immediate actions, the violent murder of Philip III and Eurydice alongside the pogrom she launched against Cassander’s family and supporters, caused a popular revulsion against her, something Eumenes may well have feared. Olympias would have justified her actions under a Macedonian law that demanded the death of all those related by blood to those deemed guilty of a crime against the crown.115 But more than one hundred of Cassander’s supporters are said to have been hunted down, including his brother, Nicanor; Iolaos’ grave was desecrated and his body mistreated in true Homeric style.116 As a consequence, King Aeacides lost his support in Epirus and was soon expelled; his daughter, Deidameia, once pledged in marriage to Alexander’s son by Roxane, would be destined for Demetrius Poliorketes instead.117 The murdered Argead king and queen – the son and granddaughter of the still revered Philip II – along with her previously murdered mother, Cynnane, were later honoured by Cassander who held funeral games once he had disposed of Olympias and gained control of Macedonia a year or so on.118
‘THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND’ – THE FORTUNATE, INNOCENT FEW
In securing himself a release from Nora, Eumenes had given a masterclass in diplomatic chicanery, and it led to one of history’s ‘great reversals of fortune’. But now that the prospect of assistance from Cleitus and Arrhidaeus had evaporated, Eumenes and Olympias needed a more significant weapon that would galvanise other satraps into a coalition – a mechanism that would advance the status of supporters, while undermining satraps and generals in the service of the enemy. The two-part Pamphlet, with its conspiracy allegations and the re-issued Will, was designed to achieve just that. Along with what were arguably Eumenes’ ‘self-issued’ ‘letters of marque and reprisal’ that manoeuvred Polyperchon into the frame of war in Asia, it was a production only Eumenes and Olympias between them could pull off; if there was anyone in the empire who would have known the original uncorrupted content of Alexander’s Will, and, moreover, who additionally bore long-term grudges against the family of Antipater, it was the former king’s secretary and the dead king’s mother.
When developing the shape of the Pamphlet and its regicidal finger-pointing, Eumenes and Olympias simply played on several well-known facts: Alexander’s planned retirement of Antipater in favour of Craterus, the regent’s subsequent (alleged) summoning to Babylon (both moves could be interpreted as a suspicion of treason), the subsequent arrival of Cassander in his place, the previous execution of Alexander Lyncestis (Antipater’s son-in-law) and that well-documented bitterness between the regent and the queen mother. All this was neatly enveloped in the rising tensions at the court in Babylon; one of Plutar
ch’s sources claimed Alexander physically and verbally assaulted the newly arrived Cassander, contemptuous of his behaviour and his double-sided arguments. Plutarch additionally stated that the king was now fearful of the threat posed by the presence of the regent’s sons.119
Preceding the Will in the Pamphlet was a list of those at Medius’ banquet at which Alexander was professedly poisoned; the enemies were being sighted in the coalition crosshairs by implication in the crime.120 The Pamphlet also claimed: ‘No one was unaware of what was afoot, with the exception of Eumenes, Perdiccas, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Asander and Holcias.’ The coalition of ‘friends’ being solicited by Eumenes and Olympias was clear.
The names of this select few, hoi enkrithentes, are more valuable to us than the identities of the guilty, for they represent a narrower focus of intent that might point to the Pamphlet’s dating. Moreover, these names are less corrupted. The first two, Eumenes and Perdiccas, need no explanation as a product of the authors’ hands. Rather overtly, the Pamphlet beckoned Ptolemy and Lysimachus into the new order by stating they both were present at the drafting and the first private reading of the Will. Ptolemy had the vast resources of a veteran-strewn Egypt and Lysimachus could control the Hellespont and the route through Thrace to Macedonia.
The Pamphlet Will went on to grant them Argead wives: for Ptolemy it was Alexander’s full-sister Cleopatra; his half-sister, Thessalonice, went to Lysimachus.121 Most likely in her mid-twenties when Alexander died, she was the daughter of the Thessalian Nicesipolis of Pherae, one of Philip II’s early brides who died soon after giving birth; remarkably Nicesipolis and Olympias seem to have struck up a lasting friendship.122 Now a ward of Olympias, Thessalonice’s Argead blood (and the Thessalian noble line) explains her continued spinsterhood in the campaign years, for she would have been a threat if powerfully wedded. But in these dangerous times, Olympias and Eumenes had had reason to use her to galvanise support. Furthermore, these Will pairings were clearly designed to undermine the marriages that Antipater had contrived when proffering his daughters.