by David Grant
In the case of Peithon and Seleucus, the clues to their original expansive and pan-provincial grants lie in the Successor Wars.
PEITHON THE REVOLUTIONARY AND HIS MERCENARY REVOLT
The Greeks who had been settled by Alexander in the upper satrapies, as they were called, although they longed for Greek customs and manner of life and were cast away in the most distant part of the kingdom, yet submitted while the king was alive through fear, but when he was dead they rose in revolt.39
Soon after news of Alexander’s death reached the upper satrapies, 20,000 discontented Greek mercenary infantrymen and 3,000 allied cavalry, ‘all of whom had many times been tried in the contests of war and were distinguished for their courage’, were making their way through the ‘upper satrapies’ (not Media) in a state of revolt under an Athenian general, Philon. This was the second mass defection of mercenary garrisoneers; the first wave had successfully returned to Greece from Bactria.40 Peithon son of Crateuas, the prominent Somatophylax who, we are told, was given Media to govern (T16, T17, T18, T19, T20) at Babylon, was charged with quelling the uprising.41 He ‘was a man of great ambition, [who] gladly accepted the expedition, intending to win the Greeks over through kindness, and, after making his army great through an alliance with them, to work in his own interests and become the ruler of the upper satrapies’, so Diodorus concluded from his reading of Hieronymus.42
Upon departing Babylon, Peithon’s troop numbers were insignificant; from the royal army he had been supplied with just 3,000 Macedonian infantry (of perhaps 13,000 then in Babylon) and 800 Macedonian cavalry (of possibly some 2,000 remaining), all chosen by lot and many surely unwilling to head back to the East. Perdiccas provided Peithon with letters to the satrapal governors ordering them to furnish him with a further 10,000 Asiatic foot soldiers and 8,000 cavalry.43
Firstly, the numbers look suspicious. Alexander and his generals knew full well no Asiatic force, even with 3,000 Macedonian infantry at its heart, could take on 20,000 Greek mercenary hoplites. In disciplined phalanx formation they would have pierced the more lightly armed Asiatic ranks and outflanked the opposing phalangites, assuming the Macedonian contingent were pezhetairoi unsupported by hypaspistai. If the 3,000 Macedonians were in hoplite panoply, and not pike-bearers, then no ‘first-strike’ weapon had been provided to Peithon; there is no mention of a further 10,000 sarissai being collected along the way with which to equip those local recruits, that is if they had even been trained in the use of the pike as the Susa epigonoi had presumably been.44 Mounted troops would not have been able to charge a tight infantry formation with spears arrayed forward unless they were equipped as sarissophoroi and accomplished in the flying wedge (and perhaps not even then), and if Peithon’s mounted ranks simply acted as static cavalry guarding the infantry flanks, they would have been vulnerable themselves.45
Perdiccas’ distrust of Peithon had led him to issue orders to the effect that all the renegades were to be slaughtered, suspecting he might indeed raise a private army from their ranks.46 This raises the question: why task Peithon with the mission in the first place? Diodorus believed his personal ambition and intriguing was real, the ‘revolutionary behaviour’ Aelian picked up on.47 But Hieronymus may have swung the episode around a little unconvincingly, for Peithon quelled the uprising and managed to rejoin Perdiccas, either in time for the conquest of Cappadocia and Pisidia (if so, he was never mentioned), or before the ill-fated invasion of Egypt where he murdered the chiliarch.48
Although 3,000 Greek infantry were reportedly persuaded by Peithon to betray their comrades, the mercenary numbers look grossly inflated, for it is difficult to imagine that the remaining 17,000 who were ‘distinguished for their courage’ – a formidable army in any circumstances – took flight in confusion, as the text claims. Peithon supposedly gained a victory over them (no detail of how he accomplished this is given) and sent a herald to the ‘conquered’ mass offering false terms of satrapal repatriation if they laid down their arms. Diodorus claimed the Macedonians, remembering Perdiccas’ instructions, were able to ‘shoot them all with javelins’ after betraying the trust of the Greeks. This sounds dubious despite Diodorus’ claim that the Macedonians ‘set upon them unexpectedly’ (which would have been difficult to pull-off as it was against Peithon’s alleged objective) and caught ‘them off their guard’, because the text additionally stated that the unwitting Greeks ‘… were interspersed among the Macedonians’, hardly a situation in which javelins could be hurled.49
We recall how reluctantly hoplites ever gave up their shields, especially to what must here have been a largely Asiatic force half the size of their own. If the Greeks were still equipped with their hopla and grouped together, to quote one scholar on the issue: ‘Missile weapons seem, in fact, to have been comparatively ineffective against the hoplite phalanx’, and as Tarn pointed out, the day of the Persian archer had ended at Plataea.
We may imagine what was deemed a hostile mass of ‘20,000’ was, in fact, made up from predominantly non-combatants – the families of the forced settlers, and their baggage train – and they were the vulnerable target being threatened in the negotiations.50 Their possessions were plundered; we imagine what amounted to just few thousand remaining infantry were set upon at Peithon’s orders once they were isolated, and the 3,000 complicit hoplites were probably sent back to their satrapies (Peithon did not entirely lose the potential future army) and the surviving women and children were left to march with them.
Peithon’s mission becomes more credible, and explainable, if we accept that he had already become strategos of the upper satrapies, with his authority centred on a Media Major and extending to the Caspian Gates to the west, and to India to the east (authority in India is less clear, Peithon son of Agenor, or Philip son of Machatas – thus Harpalus’ brother – may have governed a region in a similar role).51 So it was his ‘upper satrapy’ regional revolt to deal with, whether Perdiccas liked it or not.52 The contention that this authority was a genuine Will inheritance, and not one of Perdiccas’ designs, is strengthened when we recall that Atropates, Perdiccas’ father-in-law since the Susa weddings, was only granted Lesser Media at Babylon when he appears to have previously governed Media complete, a more powerful mandate his son-in-law could have readily reconfirmed (T16, T20).53 A later statement by Diodorus seems to further support the expanded role: ‘Peithon had been appointed satrap of Media, but when he became general of all upper satrapies, he put to death Philotas, the former general of Parthia, and set up his own brother Eudamus in his place.’54 What is seen as unbridled ambition by Diodorus may have had more legitimate foundations.
It appears that Peithon was nevertheless testing the patience of his subordinate governors and his arrogance soon backfired. But as Anson points out, that Seleucus provided him sanctuary in Babylonia indicates he was not troubled by his colleague’s cross-provincial meddling.55 Although Diodorus explained the ‘upper satraps had concentrated their armies in a single place’ (in response to the threat from Peithon), the coalition that Eumenes met was principally conglomerated from the forces from what we argue was Peucestas’ domain: in other words those ‘lower’ eastern satrapies comprising Peucestas’ own Persian archers and slingers alongside troops from Susiane, Carmania, Arachosia, Areia, Drangiana and Paropanisadae.56 An addition to their ranks was Eudamus who had taken control of the Paurava region in India.57
Diodorus employed the term ‘upper’ loosely when referring to the eastern provinces. But what does remain clear is a clinical regional divide: Peucestas’ coalition did not, for example, feature Peithon son of Agenor, the satrap of the northern Indus region bordering Paropanisadae, who later joined Antigonus. Neither were troop contingents mentioned from Hyrcania or regions north of Bactria and Sogdia, under Stasanor, for example, who was vilified by the Pamphlet, for these were the regions that fell under Peithon’s pan-provincial mandate.58 Though some troops do appear to have originated from Bactria itself, these were raised by Stasander, the satrap
of Areia-Drangiana, and he was probably able to achieve this because he had (curiously) previously governed Bactria and still had loyal contingents.
This geographical division of allies appears less than coincidental and falls neatly in line with the regional strategia we propose. In which case the two gold-crowned Somatophylakes, Peucestas and Peithon son of Crateuas, were the overseers of the further-eastern empire to India with its named satrapal governors under them, and there is much evidence that neither had plans of abandoning their considerable inheritances.59 Any confusion within these eastern subdivisions are understandable: Bactria and Media ‘embraced many regions with distinctive names’ and, moreover, they ‘afforded an ejected commander many refuges and retreats’.60 Atropates himself is one example in northwest or ‘lesser’ Media. He eventually declared himself king and his territory was thereafter referred to as Media Atropatene, and that came, significantly, after Peithon’s execution by Antigonus in 315 BCE, though Polybius believed this region had never been previously conquered.61
Following Peithon’s removal, Antigonus granted Nicanor (and possibly Hippostratus before him), potentially the general who received Eumenes’ surrender at Gabiene, strategia over what Diodorus clearly stated as all the ‘upper satrapies’.62 More telling still was his failure to unite the remaining governors to the south, for Peucestas had by then also been removed. It appears the southern and central satraps of the East were reluctant to unite under a non-legitimate strategos, or one who had not adopted their customs. In this newly fragmenting environment it was no surprise that Seleucus was able to inflict a crushing defeat on Antigonus’ divided forces when they put up a ‘perfunctory and negligent guard’.63
BABYLONIA AND BEYOND: SELEUCUS’ HIDDEN INHERITANCE
There is scarcely a mention of Seleucus in the extant texts between Alexander’s death and his re-emergence at Triparadeisus some three years later when a ‘new’ satrapal role was supposedly confirmed on him: the governorship of Babylon. We have already argued why Hieronymus had little interest in featuring his patrons’ opponent and his regional inheritance more prominently. But when Antigonus threatened Seleucus’ tenure of the region after Eumenes’ death in 315 BCE, Diodorus stated that Seleucus claimed he had been given ‘the country’ (not just city) in ‘recognition of his services rendered while Alexander was alive.’64
The reference to ‘Macedonians’ bestowing the role on him discounts it being the manipulative hand of Perdiccas alone. Superficially, at least, it is more representative of either the endorsement of Seleucus’ inheritance at the original Assembly at Babylon, or his reconfirmation at Triparadeisus in 320 BCE; in fact, reminding Antigonus of either of these events would have been a better repost than ‘as per the testament of Alexander’, for Antigonus had already demonstrated by then that he completely ignored satrapal boundaries established by any regal authority.
Diodorus was under the impression that Seleucus had been granted the hipparchy of the Companion Cavalry by Perdiccas at Babylon in 323 BCE, the command Perdiccas had himself inherited at Hephaestion’s death (T16). This is supported by Justin who more generally stated Seleucus received ‘chief command of the camp’ (T20), and it is perhaps strengthened by the fact that Seleucus had already commanded the Royal Hypaspists after Hephaestion was promoted to hipparch, probably in 330 BCE (when Philotas was executed).65 That this post, previously held by the king’s chiliarch, was separated out, clearly indicates that Perdiccas’ own continued ‘chiliarchy’ is to be interpreted as the higher-functioning quasi-regent post, and not the cavalry command. Like the authority it had vested in Hephaestion before him, the title equated to administrator of the kings and their realms and with no power above, save basileia.66
Diodorus further accepted that a more obscure Archon was appointed as the principal Babylonian governor.67 But Seleucus’ hipparchy command cannot be compared to Ptolemy’s inheritance of the ancient land of Egypt, deemed ‘the best’ due to its revenues, a sentiment no doubt originating with the Alexandrian Cleitarchus; and neither was it equal to Peithon’s governance of Media, also referred to as ‘the greatest of all’ due to its regional diversity.68 It did not match Peucestas’ control of the ancient Persian heartlands, or even, for that matter, Eumenes’ grant centred on Cappadocia, which hosted the Royal Road on its northern route from Susa to Sardis.69 Although Justin interpreted Seleucus’ new post as ‘second-in-command’ (in Perdiccas’ immediate camp), he would have been witnessing his colleagues exploit their new chunks of the empire when he had nothing but the prestige of serving Perdiccas on horseback. Named amongst the most eminent of cavalry leaders at Babylon, would Seleucus, the future builder of the most expansive of all the successor empires, have truly been excluded from the territorial honours list in Alexander’s Will?70 Or could Perdiccas himself, in the accepted intestate scenario, have really orchestrated this estateless role?
In contrast, we know the Pamphlet-based Will, which had every reason to pass Seleucus over (he was clearly not named ‘innocent’ of regicide, thus not on the coalition team), appears to have unambiguously allocated him Babylonia – city, province and ‘territory adjoining it’; and here the Romance and Metz Epitome texts are in clear accord (T1, T2).71 In which case Archon, and potentially Arcesilaus too, if Mesopotamia came under a Babylonia-centred expansive remit, were operating under Seleucus as subordinate governors.72 Under-governors usually appeared in Diodorus’ narrative when their overlords were on campaign; Seleucus appointed Patrocles to Babylon, for example, when campaigning in Media against Nicanor in 312 BCE.73 If Mesopotamia was a part of that territorial grant, then Amphimachus (appointed at Triparadeisus and also over the Arbelitis region) and Blitor who assumed a similar post after him, operated in similar subordinate roles later. Amphimachus appears to have joined Eumenes when he passed through the region in winter 317 BCE, following which Seleucus replaced him with Blitor who facilitated Seleucus’ escape from Antigonus in 315 BCE.74
Mesopotamia was never mentioned as a distinct satrapy until the dispensation of governorships at Babylon; the name was after all a Greek construction: broadly ‘land between rivers’, the Tigris and Euphrates.75 Sumer, Akkad and Babylonia had once comprised ‘Assyria’ which later denoted the northern part of Mesopotamia, and it was the name the Achaemenid kings would have still used for the region. If our deduction about Seleucus is correct, he was to govern what is broadly Iraq today, and there is evidence that Antigonus did, in fact, combine these satrapies into a single regional mandate once Seleucus fled the territory in 315 BCE.76
So who was Archon? He had been named as a trierarchos of the Hydaspes-Indus fleet but he is otherwise unattested on campaign.77 Perdiccas replaced him with Docimus, and Archon was supposed to retain the role as collector of revenues in the province, a demotion Perdiccas may have assumed (and wished) he would never accept. Archon may have colluded in the interception of Alexander’s funeral hearse by Ptolemy, presumably with the blessing of Seleucus, thus prompting his removal. Enmity was clear; he and Docimus ended up fighting it out for control and Archon lost his life.78 Reconfirmed at Triparadeisus, Seleucus entered the city unopposed when Docimus, now a proscribed Perdiccan, fled to join the ‘royal rebel’ cause.79 None of this excludes Seleucus inheriting the honorific hipparchos of the First (Hephaestion’s) chiliarchia of the Companion Cavalry in Perdiccas’ royal army, or attending to the administration of his wider region. This would explain why he was absent from Babylon when Docimus was installed, and, moreover, why he claimed the region was his ‘by right’ when confronting Antigonid expansion in 315 BCE.
How could Diodorus have arrived at his conclusions about Seleucus’ hipparchy post? The first explanation would once again be to assume Hieronymus omitted his regional mandate as payback for his long history of hostility; publishing his account some fifty years after events, this demotion was easily made, though carefully reconstructed to rebroadcast that he had become Perdiccas’ ‘number two’. Yet we do have a contradiction, for in Photius’ epitome (of
Dexippus’ summary) of Arrian’s Events After Alexander, which is ultimately Hieronymus-sourced, we read that Seleucus did indeed receive control of Babylon from the outset (T18), though this may simply be an epitomised merging of the appointments at Babylon and Triparadeisus once more. Unfortunately, in Photius’ own direct précis of Arrian a lacuna has swallowed this part of the satrapal list robbing us of a useful comparison, whilst a lacuna (we imagine) resulted in the total loss of references to Babylonia in Curtius’ run down, which is otherwise inexplicable when considering the space he dedicated to the infighting at Babylon (T17).80
We cannot discount a further (and perhaps the most obvious) explanation: Diodorus simply misunderstood Hieronymus’ original wording, and it is not difficult to imagine a sufficiently ambiguous statement:
Seleucus campaigned with Perdiccas in the role of hipparch of the Companion Cavalry, a prestigious role amounting to a second in command and formerly held by Perdiccas and Hephaestion before him, and in his absence Archon was appointed governor of Babylon.81
Whatever the cause of the compression of Seleucus’ role, Diodorus’ explanation has been formative to interpretations ever since.
LANDS WEST OF THE HALYS: LEONNATUS’ HIDDEN INHERITANCE
The extant sources unanimously stated that Leonnatus was allocated Hellespontine Phrygia at Babylon (T16, T17, T18, T19, T20).82 Leonnatus was a syntrophos raised with Alexander at the Pellan court and a decorated Bodyguard credited with saving the king’s life.83 His father, Anteas, was a relative of Eurydice, the mother of Philip II; Leonnatus was therefore a member of the Lyncestian royal house and his correspondence with Cleopatra hints that he felt every bit as regal as his heritage suggested.84 Additionally, at Babylon, Leonnatus was clearly chosen beside Perdiccas to be a guardian of the unborn king, and Curtius positioned him as the second most important of the hetairoi then present.85