by John Howard
The pretext had been some correspondence between Hewson and Chris Miles MP, a parliamentary secretary, over proposals of the federal Government to give effect to a decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee that laws in Tasmania which still treated homosexual relations between consenting adults as criminal conduct were inconsistent with Australia’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
A Tasmanian and a strong believer in states’ rights, Chris Miles had reservations about the legislation. I had long thought it wrong to treat homosexual conduct involving adults as criminal, and felt that the laws of Australia should reflect this. The Coalition rightly decided not to oppose the bill.
When the perception of a slide in a leader’s support takes hold, it contaminates the reporting of subsequent events. This was the case when it was revealed that Downer had apparently addressed what might loosely be regarded as a League of Rights meeting in 1987. The Labor Party created a huge fuss about it. Downer’s explanation that he thought it was a Christian group sounded unconvincing, but the press were in a ‘get Downer’ mood and pretty well painted it in the darkest manner possible for Alexander.
Shortly after assuming the leadership, Alexander Downer and his staff had begun preparing a policy manifesto which would outline in broad detail the approach of a future Coalition Government. It was not meant to be completely prescriptive but would go beyond banal superficialities. It was to strike a sensible balance between the extensive details in Fightback! as opposed to going to a poll with a public perception that the party stood for nothing other than winning government. It was a good product, being released under the commonsense title of The Things That Matter. That title captured the mood of the public. Many Australians felt that the Keating Government had become obsessed with symbolic issues to the detriment of those things that really mattered to men and women in their daily lives.
Tragically for Alexander Downer, his mishandling of the launch of the document, on 5 September 1994, not only destroyed its impact but was also the real death knell of his leadership. Alexander has always had an engaging self-deprecatory tone. On most occasions this works extremely well and is something that people like. He can, however, go too far and sometimes his humour backfires badly. This happened with his policy manifesto. In describing individual sections of the document, he gave them titles which rhymed with the main title of the document. For example, the section dealing with children was dubbed ‘the things that patter’, family policy was dubbed ‘the flings that matter’. Unfortunately, and with great insensitivity, he described the section on domestic violence as ‘the things that batter’. He should have known that domestic violence is never a laughing matter. Not only did he receive enormous criticism for his insensitivity but he had also made fun of his own document. The reaction was one of terrible embarrassment and disbelief. It caused a further nosedive in his poll ratings.
If all of this wasn’t enough, the sudden announcement by Andrew Peacock in September that he would retire from politics added a new dimension. I first heard about Andrew from Peter Reith, who telephoned me from China. He knew instinctively that there would not be a Peacock veto on me if the leadership were once again in play. As always, Reith was the pragmatist and not the dreamer. He was a close friend of Downer’s but knew that Alexander was in deep trouble. He wasn’t being disloyal to Downer, but was making sure that his communication with me remained open.
Within the space of only three months, confidence in Downer had disintegrated and the party was, once again, facing a leadership crisis. All of the ‘future’ options had been tried and had failed. From all sections of the party, almost spontaneously, the view began to emerge that the best way forward might be my recall as leader. Given attitudes of past years, this was hard to believe, yet, looked at rationally, it made sense. Downer and Costello had been the experiment with a new generation, and Downer’s poll position had collapsed, time was moving on and Liberal supporters desperately craved an effective alternative to Keating. It had been an amazing turnaround, and impossible to reconcile with my mood and that of the party just four months earlier.
By October 1994 there was a strongly held view within the party that if Alexander Downer had not noticeably recovered by Christmas then I would replace him. It was largely unspoken but confirmed by my close friends Allan Rocher, the MP for Curtin in Western Australia, and Senator Michael Baume. People as diverse as David MacGibbon, who had been a strong Peacock man, and Rod Atkinson told me directly. Atkinson, a Vietnam veteran, had been John Hewson’s whip. I was told by his closest friend in the parliament that Michael Wooldridge would support me in place of Downer.
At the end of November, what I thought had been beyond all hope a few months earlier was now more within reach than ever before. The leader polls had gone heavily against Alexander Downer and I had become the preferred Liberal leader. Increasing numbers of MPs told me that they would support me. Even journalists long hostile to me began to write differently. Typical was Geoff Kitney of the Sydney Morning Herald, who captioned his regular Friday column of 11 November 1994: ‘Howard hovers ever nearer the leadership’. This piece was still quite grudging, but noteworthy for accepting that I was closer to getting back the leadership than at any time since I had lost it in 1989.
Some of my supporters wanted a leadership challenge before Christmas, but I remained firmly against this. I wanted to be drafted or elected unopposed, because that would be the most effective way of unifying the party behind me. At that point, there were still a few colleagues strongly against my recall. It was clear to me before Christmas that moderates in the party, such as Warwick Smith, Michael Wooldridge and Trish Worth, had decided that I should replace Downer.
People close to Peter Costello, such as Michael Kroger and Ian McLachlan, then shadow minister for the Environment, told me that Peter Costello would not or could not, because of the age of his youngest child, run for the leadership. The reality was that once it had become accepted that Downer’s leadership was finished, and with Andrew Peacock out of the equation, there was no way that Peter Costello could have gathered the numbers to win a leadership ballot against me. The experiment with the next generation had failed with Alexander Downer, so why try another member of that generation in Peter Costello? Moreover, the majority of those who saw themselves as moderates or ‘small l’ Liberals regarded Peter Costello as being more right-wing than I was. Robert Hill, the most senior of this group, would be reluctant to specifically endorse me, but I knew that he would favour me ahead of Costello.
My 1988 remarks about Asian immigration still bothered some of my close friends. Tony Abbott was one of them. From his university and other days, he was a friend of Greg Sheridan of the Australian, who had been highly critical of my controversial remarks seven years earlier. On 30 November, Sheridan had returned to the issue with a column in which he attacked me for not having fully repudiated the 1988 remarks. He at least implied that my failure to do so could be a reason for my not being restored as leader.
Tony took up the issue in December and urged me to go further in disowning the offending remarks. He suggested that I talk to Sheridan about it. I was reluctant at first. I felt that I had dealt quite comprehensively with the matter in May at a dinner in Sydney attended by many Chinese community groups; it had been the day Downer was made leader. I did not think that it needed revisiting. Abbott pressed me on the subject and, on the basis of leaving no stone unturned, I had an interview over lunch at the Buono Gusto restaurant in Chippendale with Sheridan. Not only did it cover Asian immigration, I also roamed over national identity, the republic and other matters. The Australian gave it a big run. Splashing with the lead: ‘I was wrong on Asians, says Howard’,1 it certainly attracted plenty of attention. I had gone as far as I could be expected to in order to erase any lingering hurt feelings over my serious error of judgement back in 1988. It put the issue to bed for Sheridan and, I suspect, many others.
Ian McLachlan and I met Peter
Costello in his office in Canberra on 5 December 1994. We had a wide-ranging discussion about the leadership. As usual, Peter Costello gave nothing away. McLachlan was dismissive of Downer. During the discussion, I said that it would be in the party’s interests for me to be elected unopposed in place of Downer; that there was a big age difference between Costello and me; and that he (Costello) could expect, if we were successful in government, to become prime minister after me.
Costello pressed me heavily on the issue of how long I might serve as prime minister, and I said that I would only serve one to two terms. He did not offer me anything in return. We reached no understanding; at no stage during the discussion did Peter say that in return he would help me to become leader unopposed. I left that meeting with no clear indication from Peter Costello as to where he stood on the leadership. I never discussed the leadership again with McLachlan before I was re-elected, unopposed, as Leader of the Liberal Party at the end of January 1995. That meeting on 5 December 1994 was but one of many meetings I had about the leadership at that time.
In the early weeks of December, I had been briefed by Ron Walker, the party’s honorary federal treasurer, on what he claimed to be private party research. He said the research showed that we would lose 30 seats under Downer’s leadership. He further claimed it showed that I could win, and that Peter Costello was not widely known outside Victoria. According to Walker, Peter Costello, Robert Hill and Richard Alston, the other members of the leadership group, as well as Downer, had been briefed on this research. Alston I spoke to before Christmas. Whilst being very guarded, he acknowledged that ‘we have big problems’. Richard was covering his bases. In private discussions, both Tony Staley and Ron Walker, for some weeks, had been saying that the party had to install me in place of Downer.
In mid-December, at Alexander Downer’s request, he, Peter Costello and I met at the Adelaide Club. There he said that he would hand the leadership to me without a fight if the Government called an election in January for the following March. There had been some speculation about a snap early election, and that was unnerving a lot of our colleagues. Beyond that, he said that the three of us should keep the matter under review, and if at any time in the future he thought there should be a change for the sake of the party, in my favour, that would be facilitated. In return for these commitments from him, I was to agree that I would not challenge for the leadership. I told him that I could not agree not to challenge.
My recollection of that Adelaide meeting, which I wrote down shortly afterwards, is at odds with the version provided by Peter Costello in his memoirs. He claimed that the three of us had agreed that Downer should be given one last opportunity to pick himself up in the polls, but if his position had not improved by Australia Day, he would stand down, I would be elected unopposed and Costello would continue as deputy leader.
On 28 December I had lunch with Peter Costello near his electorate office in Melbourne. It was clear to me from that meeting that, in the end, he would not seek the leadership but was not in a hurry to tell me that or to reach any understanding to facilitate a peaceful leadership transition from Downer to me. Part of this was a genuine desire not to appear a disloyal deputy. He said that Downer could not win a party ballot against me, but if I challenged him, he would be obliged to support Downer but could well ‘dial the phone slowly’.
Costello said he thought that Downer could be persuaded to go and, if the position had not moved in that direction, he might inform Downer after he had returned from a trip to Britain late in January that Downer should resign. Costello reserved the right to nominate for the position himself, which I entirely accepted. He said that he thought a bloodless transfer would be the best outcome for me. We agreed that nothing was likely to change in relation to Downer’s support over the holiday period. I made a detailed note of that discussion shortly afterwards.
That evening I spoke to Michael Kroger, who indicated he had also spoken to Costello, and that the latter had told him that nothing should happen in relation to the leadership during January. We agreed that Costello’s true position was that he was not going to do anything to precipitate or facilitate a change of leadership, but would not run himself or actively oppose a change. In any contested ballot he would vote for Downer, and make that known publicly. Michael said to me that we had to ‘plan around Costello’. I agreed with this.
None of these discussions were consistent with the claim, which I have always disputed, that Costello and I, in McLachlan’s presence, did a succession deal about the leadership at the meeting on 5 December 1994. As the year ended, the matter remained unresolved. Peter Costello had not promised me anything. He never did.
The Howard family repaired on what by now had become an annual trek to Hawks Nest. I knew by then that one way or the other the leadership would be mine within a matter of weeks.
Another straw in the wind was a meeting during January with Richard Court, Premier of Western Australia, and his indomitable father, Sir Charles Court. They made a special visit to Sydney to see me. The unspoken background to the meeting was that I was likely to return to the federal leadership, that they were broadly supportive of that, but there were some particular issues they wanted to put on the table for future reference. In so many ways we were natural allies within the Liberal Party. I liked them both, but I sensed a looming problem with the seat of Curtin, our safest in Perth, where Richard’s brother, Ken, was likely to successfully oppose my close friend Allan Rocher for Liberal endorsement. Like true-born West Australians, Sir Charles and Richard thought that I was a bit of a centralist.
The parliamentary party was due to have its first meeting in 1995 on 30 January, in Canberra. A shadow cabinet meeting had been arranged for the Dandenongs, just out of Melbourne, for 24 January. I knew that the matter had to be brought to a head and that although Alexander Downer’s position had not improved at all over the holiday break, the situation could still drift for weeks, doing further damage to the party’s position. The threat of an early election had receded. I had made up my mind to challenge for the leadership if Alexander had not indicated a willingness to resign at the party meeting on 30 January.
The shadow cabinet meeting was conducted in a surreal atmosphere. I had arranged to have dinner with Alexander at the Athenaeum Club that evening. Given the circumstances in which we found ourselves, it was a remarkably civilised dinner. I told him that his position was beyond retrieval, that there had been a very significant shift away from him over the previous two months, and that I would easily win a ballot. He was reluctant to accept this immediately; that was understandable, but he undertook to test the position with his advisors and colleagues and let me know his response the following day. I arranged to call on him at 11 am the next day, in the Opposition leader’s temporary office in Melbourne.
It was Grahame Morris who first gave me the news. This remarkably durable political warrior, who has been at the centre of so many Liberal Party dramas — successes and failures — over the last 25 years, had joined Alexander’s staff but retained very close friendships with many others, including me. Just before I was to see Downer, Grahame told me that his boss would agree to a leadership transition without a ballot, but wanted to discuss issues relating to personnel and timing.
My meeting with Downer was emotional but controlled. It was a big thing for him to do, and it was a huge moment for me. He told me directly that he would resign the leadership at the party meeting, and make it clear that he supported an uncontested transfer of the leadership to me. I told him that I would appoint him shadow Foreign Minister, with the expectation implied that he would be Foreign Minister if we won power. He asked if he could retain one of his valued staff, Greg Hunt, who had a specialty in foreign affairs. I readily agreed. Hunt went on to become the Liberal MP for Flinders in Victoria. Downer also asked that no comment be made until the following day so that he could make the announcement with his family in Adelaide, in a manner and in a setting of his choosing. I readily agreed to this.
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br /> I thanked Alexander Downer for the sacrifice he was making for the good of the Liberal Party. His position was beyond recovery, but that state is often far from clear to those who are directly confronted by it. I know from my own experience that it is a very hard thing to accept that your party has completely turned against you as leader. In agreeing to an uncontested transfer of leadership, Alexander Downer won himself a permanent place of respect in the Liberal pantheon. I have never forgotten that gesture to the Liberal Party and to me, and repaid it as best I could with years of collegiality, support and loyalty as we worked together as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister for almost 12 years.
On Australia Day, surrounded by his family, Alexander Downer would make a gracious speech indicating that he was giving up the leadership because it was in the interests of the Liberal Party to do so. It had been a difficult nine months for him and had ended on a sad personal note. But he had displayed great dignity, which won him many friends and admirers throughout the party and the wider community.
For me, I could only feel a sense of suppressed elation and anticipation. I returned home and quietly reflected with my wife and children on the rollercoaster nature of political life. They had shared so much with me and had borne the brunt of disappointment and sustained me through the difficulties of political life to date. Janette and our three children were united in their enthusiasm and eagerness for what lay ahead. They knew it would be very hard, but they also knew that I had had plenty of preparation for the task which was at hand. Having been through so much, I had no trepidation about the future.
On Australia Day 1995, I attended a citizenship ceremony in my electorate of Bennelong and after the ceremony and on the steps of the City of Ryde Civic Centre, I announced that I would be a candidate for the leadership of the Liberal Party when it met a few days later.