by John Howard
Iraq’s response to the new SC resolution 1441 was inadequate. In reporting to the Security Council on 27 January, Hans Blix said, ‘Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it.’10 A later report from Blix struck a more optimistic tone, but inevitably pleaded for more time. There was a legitimate fear that this process would go on interminably.
Another widely reported speech, given to the Security Council on 14 February, came from Dominique de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister. An urbane, highly articulate, and somewhat anti-American figure of the soft right in French politics, de Villepin delivered a vituperative speech, full of rhetoric about disarming Iraq, but in reality a thinly veiled attack on American motives and policy. The speech dashed any hopes that the French might, in the final analysis, wave through an additional SC resolution.
De Villepin’s performance produced lasting resentment from the Americans. It was not the speech of an anguished friend unable, after careful consideration of the facts, to agree with what the Americans were putting forward. It was the speech of someone intent on humiliating the Americans before a world political forum.
He further cemented his anti-American credentials with his energetic diplomatic mission in Africa and elsewhere, openly urging non-permanent members of the Security Council to oppose any new British and American resolution.
By early January 2003 the moment of truth was fast approaching. On 10 January, at a news conference, I detailed the composition of any Australian commitment to Iraq. I also foreshadowed that in the weeks ahead there would be a forward deployment of forces. In addition to the Special Forces, Australia would commit a squadron of FA18 fighters, or Hornets. We would maintain the two naval vessels enforcing UN sanctions in the Gulf, and also commit some P3 Orion surveillance aircraft and some navy clearance divers. This was a big commitment, and much larger than the force sent in 1991. From the beginning I told the Americans that if we committed forces, it would be to the invasion phase. We could not be part of any longer-term stabilisation operation. We had our own regional commitments, particularly in East Timor, and the ADF was too small to sustain a sizeable ongoing ground-force contribution in Iraq.
On 22 January, Robert Hill, the Defence Minister, announced the forward deployment of the sea transport HMAS Kanimbla, lead elements of a Special Forces Task Group and a Royal Australian Air Force reconnaissance team to the Middle East to allow the ADF adequate time to prepare, if military action against Iraq should come about. Kanimbla sailed from Sydney the next day. The vessel and her company received a rousing, but emotional send-off. The one discordant note came from Simon Crean, the Opposition leader. After wishing the troops well and expressing his hopes for their personal safety, he said bluntly that they should not be going. Whatever might have been his political feelings, it was an appalling thing to say to men and women who were about to put their lives at risk. He should have wished them well, and left it at that. He had ample opportunities, away from the farewell, to repeat his well-known objections. His judgement was abysmal and his remarks were insensitive.
I spent much of the Australia Day weekend working on the speech I planned to give to parliament as soon as it came back in February. This would need to be scripted as I knew that all of the references to intelligence, and the history of Iraq’s behaviour in response to previous UN resolutions must be factually accurate. Careful checking with my department as well as Foreign Affairs and, most particularly, the Office of National Assessments (ONA), the latter being the final assessment agency of intelligence reports to the Government, was essential.
In all of my speeches I placed heavy reliance on intelligence assessments that Iraq had WMD capacity, and that capacity was at the heart of our case for military action. I was determined that the intelligence case presented was concise, factual and unemotional.
As argued earlier, there was a legitimately held fear by the United States that, given her past record, Iraq under Saddam could be involved in or facilitate a future terrorist attack on the United States. Therefore the Americans were justified in pursuing Iraq over its WMDs, especially given Iraq’s years of contemptuous behaviour towards UN resolutions. Those considerations, coupled with our crucial alliance relationship with the United States, constituted the principal reasons Australia joined the action against Iraq. I did my best to articulate this in my February address to parliament, a later press club speech, and my address to the nation on 20 March.
At this stage a final decision to commit forces had not been taken. It was obvious, though, that only a last-minute and unexpected development would preclude Australia from supporting an American-led operation, if George Bush decided to mount it. Our forces were in position, following months of dialogue between the military leaderships of our two countries. The Australian contribution, numerically, would be small against the more than 150,000 American troops who would finally be committed to Iraq. Nonetheless, the symbolism as well as the reality of what the Australian force could contribute was deeply valued by our American friends.
In February George Bush invited me to come to Washington to discuss the situation. He did it to publicly demonstrate the significance he attached to consulting a key US ally and to a likely Australian contribution. As well as seeing the President and doing the other rounds in Washington, I also went to New York to see Kofi Annan.
It also made sense to go on to London and discuss the Iraqi position with Tony Blair, especially as Blair himself was still passing through a challenging domestic political time on this issue. He was determined to stare down opposition within his own party and Government, even if, in the end, he had to rely on the Conservative opposition to carry the day in the House of Commons.
I also decided, importantly, to call on President Megawati of Indonesia on my way home from London. I knew that any involvement by Australia in an operation against Iraq would raise sensitivities, to say the least, in the Muslim world. As the largest Islamic country and our nearest neighbour, it was important that Indonesia hear first-hand from me the reasons behind any Australian decision to be involved in an operation against Iraq.
It was clear from my talks in Washington that the Americans would act against Saddam, with or without a further SC resolution. President Bush wanted another resolution because he knew that it was important to his allies, such as Britain and Australia. In his assessment it was not all that important in the United States itself. Bush was hopeful that both the French and the Russians would ultimately go along with the extra resolution. That proved to be overoptimistic. Only a last-minute and total capitulation by Saddam, or a palace revolution, would remove the need for military action. Neither of us thought that likely.
Bush described the diplomatic manoeuvring over Iraq as akin to being in a mosh pit. When I told him that I would go on to New York to see both Blix and Kofi Annan, he remarked that Australia was well and truly in the mosh pit. Blix was due to make another report to the Security Council in four days’ time. I pressed the Americans as to whether they thought the Blix report on 14 February would be consistent with that delivered on 27 January. Powell said that he thought it would, but in addition a little bit of movement on the Iraqi side would be reported, and more time sought. Powell proved to be spot-on.
Bush praised Powell’s speech to the Security Council on 4 February. I agreed, saying that it had been a class act. Bush said that a lot of material had been ‘left on the floor’, on the insistence of Powell, and that he had been right to do so. I told my American interlocutors that the information about telephone intercepts had been particularly compelling. Powell replied that he had left out the names from the telephone intercepts to protect the safety of the Iraqis involved, but some had come forward to deny that they had been involved in the telephone conversations. The Americans were very confident about the intelligence they had on Iraq. It was also obvious that enormous care and effort had gone into the preparation of Powell’s speech to the Security Council. Both Bush as we
ll as Powell himself regarded the speech as the tour de force of the public presentation of the case against Iraq.
My calls in New York were interesting. I trudged through the snow piled before Kofi Annan’s residence in New York. As always, he was amiable. The impression I took away was of a man who understood the inevitability of American-led military action and, without approving of it, accepted that there was some justification in the attitude of Bush and his colleagues. He was naturally opposed to action outside of a further UN mandate. He thought that the Americans and the British should give the whole process more time. Annan placed considerable stress on what would happen after the conflict, and was concerned with the notion that the Americans and not the United Nations might stay in charge. I said that if the United Nations were involved from the beginning, its post-conflict role would be more automatic. He had plenty to say about the domestic politics of the major UN players, being especially critical of Rumsfeld. Annan said that he was too abrasive. Annan’s goal was, of course, preserving the central place of the United Nations.
Hans Blix called on me at the Pierre Hotel. He gave nothing away regarding Iraq’s weapons position. He would be a company man to the very end. Blix would not contribute to action being taken without a new SC resolution. Deep down, he must have known that the Russians and the French were not going to agree to this. Powell had picked him in one. Blix was critical of Iraq as well as saying that it had become more forthcoming; therefore more time was needed. Blix said that Powell’s presentation had been powerful, but some of his claims were ‘quite shaky’; US intelligence had not revealed a ‘smoking gun’. Then the United States, itself, had not made that claim. He said that the United States and Britain were basing their political decisions on intelligence that, insofar as it had been shared with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), had not revealed much. Given that Blix must by then have realised that there would not be a further resolution from the Security Council, he needed to keep his distance from the United States and Britain.
Blix made the astonishing admission to me that Iraq would ‘not have moved an inch’, without the pressure of the Allied military build-up. In other words, according to the chief weapons inspector appointed by the United Nations, a resolution of the Security Council carried no weight at all. He said that the military pressure must be maintained. I saw this as remarkable because of the double standard it connoted, as well as his acceptance of the inherent impotence of SC resolutions. Blix and others were highly critical of the United States acting outside any remit of the United Nations, yet were perfectly happy to help themselves to the benefits of a massive military build-up which was an essential prelude to a military invasion they would later condemn.
I pointed out to Blix that there came a time when the build-up no longer worked, and action needed to be considered. I said that no one should underestimate the resolve of the United States and Britain to carry through with military action. Blix replied that he had emphasised to the Iraqis that it was ‘five minutes to midnight’, but he had not picked up a sense of desperation from them.
In Downing Street, not only did Tony Blair make plain to me his strong position, and his determination to overcome domestic opposition, he confirmed the scale of the British military contribution. He had invested much personally into his association with Bush, and the alliance between Britain and the United States. He again displayed his exasperation at the blatant anti-Americanism which existed in many parts of Europe.
I then met the head of MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Sir Richard Dearlove, at the High Commissioner’s residence. Dearlove was a real professional. He showed me the most recent British intelligence on Iraq’s weapons. The HUMINT, or Human Intelligence sources, available to the British from Iraqi sources, appeared quite extensive. This intelligence contained references to specific discussions, as well as intercepts, fully consistent with Iraq actually having some stored weapons and active weapons programs. It was quite compelling.
Then I returned home via Jakarta. Megawati was pleased that I had chosen to include her. The atmosphere was one of cordiality — but at a distance. That was par for the course following East Timor, and not due to Iraq. She both understood and appreciated my gesture in coming. She opposed any action against Iraq outside the express authority of the United Nations under another resolution, which she must have guessed would not materialise. Megawati said that, as a friend, Indonesia hoped that Australia would not be caught up in action against Iraq.
She nonetheless said that she did not see international efforts to disarm Iraq as anti-Islamic. Her reaction pleased me. I knew that our participation alongside the Americans in Iraq would not be popular in Islamic Asia. Anything I could do to reduce concerns was well worth the effort. This was especially so with Indonesia.
Despite my resolve to join the Americans and the British if a military invasion eventuated, I continued to hope that this could be avoided. Like Bush and Blair, I wanted another SC resolution. This was not because I doubted the legal authority available under existing resolutions 687 and 1441. It was because of the extra moral and political value. If there were a further resolution, then it would be harder for the ALP to oppose our involvement, given what Crean had previously said.
By the time of my return from overseas, in the second half of February, there was still no clarity about a fresh resolution. The French and the Russians were playing their usual games on the issue. Some intelligence suggested that France would finally come on board and that Moscow would then go quiet. Chirac’s public comments did not encourage that view. The Americans and the British were reluctant to present another resolution unless it had reasonable prospects of being carried.
Blix reported again to the Security Council on 14 February. This report was more positive than that of 27 January, almost predictably so. He wanted more time to complete the inspections. Iraq was being more cooperative. That sounded fine in isolation. The problem was that Iraq had had 12 years to cooperate. The United Nations itself had done nothing at all about Iraq’s non-compliance for four years, from December 1998 until being prodded into action by George Bush. Despite this, the Americans now were being beaten up for wanting to bring matters to a head.
On 1 March there was a real and unexpected setback for the United States, when the Turkish parliament voted to block the deployment of American troops through Turkey. This denied the United States the chance of a second front and needlessly complicated their military plans. The Americans had complacently assumed that Turkey was in the bag, and had not invested enough diplomatic effort into mustering internal support where it mattered, amongst Turkish legislators.
The parliamentary vote was narrow, thus underlining the fact that a little more legwork would have produced a different outcome.
The French position became more galling by the day. It was by now clear that they would not support another resolution, but Chirac openly acknowledged that the presence of the American and British military force in the Middle East, in preparation for a possible invasion of Iraq, had been highly beneficial, because of the pressure it had put on Saddam.
Speaking on 10 March, Chirac said, ‘… if the Americans and the British had not deployed their substantial forces, it is highly probable that Iraq would not have given this more active cooperation which the inspectors were demanding’.11 The internal inconsistency of refusing any form of ultimatum or use of military force, while acknowledging the efficacy of military pressure, did not concern Paris.
By now Iraq was completely dominating my thinking. Other issues were dealt with, but the prospect of ordering Australian forces into battle in a conflict which would be very divisive in Australia troubled me a lot. I wrote in my diary on 19 February: ‘Anyone who thinks that I’m a warmonger should understand how I feel. I think about it all the time, have broken sleep and hope that a late capitulation (very unlikely) or assassination of Saddam will remove the need for military action.’ As the time for
a likely invasion grew closer, some continued to hope that there would be a palace revolution in Baghdad. It was a hope that proved forlorn.
On 24 February, a fresh resolution was tabled at the Security Council by the United States, Britain and Spain. The gist was that the Security Council was being asked to say that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity afforded it by resolution 1441. That it did not go the step further of authorising action to be taken, as a consequence of that failure, showed that support within the Security Council for military action being taken was at best lukewarm. That resolution was the maximum that the Americans and British thought that they could get. Even that calculation proved, in the end, to be too optimistic.
I knew that time had just about run out. Bush had stretched the process as much as possible to accommodate Blair, who needed to demonstrate to his own parliamentary party that he had exhausted every conceivable avenue in the pursuit of another resolution. By doing that he hoped to minimise defections within the British Labour Party when the House of Commons vote was taken.
As the countdown to D-day continued, we cleared our lines on process with the Americans. On 3 March, Thawley reported on a discussion he had had that day with Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy Defense secretary, in which he conveyed the steps we required in preparation for a final government decision to join an invasion, if one were decided upon.
Writing in my diary again, on 12 March, I said: ‘It is 4 am in the morning. I could not sleep — a bad, but understandable sign. The UN process has bogged down. The French appear hell-bent on a veto. The Russians are making similar noises. There is a sense in which it is all slipping away from Britain and the US. The momentum is all the other way.’
Trying to marshal votes for the fresh resolution, I telephoned three leaders whose nations had rotating seats on the Security Council. They were Perves Masharaff of Pakistan, Bertie Ahern of Ireland and Vincente Fox of Mexico. I knew that Masharaff walked a tightrope as the leader of an overwhelmingly Islamic nation. Yet he had backed the Americans after 11 September. He listened to what I had to say, but was noncommittal; being like me a cricket tragic, we also discussed the latest developments in the great game. Bertie Ahern was also non-committal. I felt that in the end Ireland would simply go with the flow.