Throughout the conflict, the Communists did indeed remain patient as they consistently were successful in executing phases one and two of their strategy. Despite overwhelming U.S. and South Vietnamese superiority in firepower, mobility, and technology, the Communists conducted guerrilla warfare at will and frequently massed for small-scale attacks against units and bases. Whenever they felt threatened, they either withdrew to sanctuaries across the border in Cambodia or Laos or changed into civilian clothing and blended in with the local population.
Despite their patience before the Americans withdrew and left the war to the South Vietnamese, the Communists did attempt on three occasions to escalate their offensive into phase three. In the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, the Tet Offensive of 1968, and the Easter Offensive of 1972, the Communists found that they could not defeat the Americans in sustained open warfare and that the general population did not rise up to help them. After each defeat, the Communists dispersed, withdrew, and waited for more opportune times. Each defeat reinforced the need for patience and the belief by the North Vietnamese leaders that they would be willing to accept defeat longer than the Americans would remain dedicated to the defense of South Vietnam.
To meet the tactics of the enemy and to adapt to the demanding terrain and weather, Marine units at all levels began making adjustments to their methods of operations immediately upon their arrival in Vietnam. From squad to force level, the Marines changed their style of operation in order to provide security for themselves and their South Vietnamese allies while at the same time taking all measures to neutralize as many of the enemy as possible. In a war of attrition, where success came to be measured in enemy body count, the Marines quickly began to contribute to the combined allied total number of VC and NVA killed.
The two divisions, two additional regimental landing teams, and a reinforced air wing of Marines ultimately assigned to Vietnam served in I Corps. Logically, the Marines, trained in amphibious warfare, would have served best in the Mekong Delta region of IV Corps, far to the south. However, true to the spirit of Vietnam’s being “a different kind of war,” the Marines spent the entire conflict in the thick jungles and mountains of the north.
The reasons were simple—if illogical. In 1965, the Honolulu-based Pacific Command Headquarters developed contingency plans for “temporary” support operations in the Pacific that called for an initial Marine, rather than army, landing force. The shortage of deep-water ports in I Corps reinforced that plan since the Marines could be resupplied “over the beach.” In the rapid buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam during the two years after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, no one had time or impetus to transfer units from one end of the country to the other.
Once operations began, the two Force Reconnaissance Companies and the two Division Reconnaissance Battalions made quick adjustments in “outguerrillaing the guerrillas” by conducting small patrols and adopting many of the enemy’s own tactics. Along with the regular infantry companies, the recon units relied heavily on artillery and airpower to support their operations and to engage enemy targets beyond the range of their organic small arms.
Only when the VC and NVA attempted to escalate their offensive into phase three did Marine battalions and regiments fight as unified elements in what closely resembled conventional warfare. Otherwise, small unit counterguerrilla operations, in which squad leaders and platoon commanders operated with great independence, marked the long periods of the enemy’s remaining in phases one and two of their strategy.
During those operations, the Marines discovered that they lacked the ability to quickly engage exposed targets at distances of more than 500 to 600 meters. The M14s, the basic infantry weapon of the first Marine units in-country, had a maximum effective range of 460 meters. The M16, initially issued in 1966 to completely replace the M14 by 1967, supposedly had the same maximum effective range, but true to its design, it proved much more effective in combat at 200 meters or less than it ever did at greater distances.
The massive amount of artillery and air support dedicated to the war zone came from those assets assembled to fight a possible massive land war in Europe against the Soviets. While that almost unlimited source of extremely deadly and reasonably accurate means of engaging enemy forces beyond the range of organic infantry weapons was available, it was also wasteful.* Virtually no target was too insignificant to merit artillery and/or air attack. Ground commanders, artillery forward observers, and forward air observers adhered to no budget and had few qualms about expending hundreds of artillery rounds on a single enemy soldier. Multiple sorties of helicopter gunships and fixed winged fighter aircraft likewise delivered rockets, bombs, napalm, and machine gun fire.
The problem with artillery and air support, aside from their “overkill” results, did not lie in their availability, accuracy, or willingness to respond to the needs of the ground commanders. Rather, the problem lay in the response time required to get the weaponry on target. Frequent delays occurred in getting clearances from adjacent units, air space controllers, and South Vietnamese officials. Further compounding the response time was the safety requirement that ground commanders call for marking smoke—a single round or rocket from the artillery, helicopters, or forward air controllers—to be sure targets were properly identified and targeted. While that usually took only minutes, it often provided the enemy ample time to disperse and disappear into the surrounding jungle or countryside.
The VC and NVA, with their very survival at stake, quickly learned to gauge the effective range of the Marines’ basic rifles and to use the brief warnings prior to assault by artillery and air to avoid being caught in impact zones. Marines at all levels became more and more frustrated at observing the enemy at distances beyond normal rifle range but having no effective means to immediately engage and neutralize him. It did not take long for the “old hands” to recall the effectiveness of snipers in previous conflicts and to once again seek the skills of the long-range killers.
As more Marine units poured into Vietnam in the spring of 1965, it became evident that snipers could contribute in the fight against the Communists. By early summer, Marine commanders were requesting sniper equipment for forward combat units.† Colonel Frank E. Garretson, commander of the 9th Marine Regiment, became one of the first senior officer advocates of reintroducing snipers to the ranks. His commander, Major General Lewis W. Walt, concurred, and in late summer directed that a sniper program be formed in the 3rd Marine Division.‡
The best account of the first Marine snipers in Vietnam comes from Major Robert A. Russell, then assigned to the Ground Combat Division of the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center at Quantico, Virginia. In an address during visits to Marine and army schools and training centers shortly after his return home from Vietnam in 1967, Russell explained that General Walt selected him to establish sniper training and directed the division staff to assist in securing rifles, scopes, and other equipment.
According to Russell, except for expediting the supply system to provide equipment and asking the headquarters at Quantico to develop sniper doctrine, General Walt left the sniper program up to him. In his later speeches, Russell recalled that, despite being only a captain at the time, he was left mostly on his own. His guidance from the 3rd Marine Division Operations officer, Colonel Don P. Wyckoff, was simple and direct: “You’re Russell, huh? Fine. Start a sniper school. Let me know when you’re ready to go.”
Walt had selected exactly the right officer to “start a sniper school.” Russell, a native of Vista, California, and a veteran of three wars, had spent much of his twenty-two years in the corps on firing ranges as a member of various shooting teams. In several later interviews, Russell exclaimed, “For years I’ve been emphasizing the fact that the purpose of the Marine Corps’s Competition-in-Arms (annual shooting matches) is to make a Marine more proficient in combat.”
In Vietnam, Russell had his chance to prove that skills learned in competition shooting could be successfully adapted to the battlefield. Wh
ile the division staff expedited requisitions for equipment, Russell used his carte blanche authority to requisition personnel for his team. According to Russell, “I couldn’t have been more fortunate. There happened to be five of the finest Distinguished Marksmen in the Marine Corps serving in various infantry outfits throughout the division. I knew them well, knew their capabilities, and I knew at that point, we were in business.”
The senior sergeant of the five, and therefore the NCO in charge of the sniper school, was Master Sergeant George H. Hurt, forty-two, of Bristol, Virginia, a veteran of seventeen years of competitive rifle and pistol shooting. Joining Hurt were Gunnery Sergeant Marvin C. Lange, thirty-five; Staff Sergeant Donald G. Barker, thirty-four; Sergeant James R. Bowen, twenty-eight; and Sergeant Robert L. Goller, twenty-six. All four had won individual and team shooting honors at national and international shooting matches. Lange wore the Bronze Star with Combat “V” for valor from the Korean War.
As Russell gathered his instructor team and the logistic system procured equipment, documents to support Marine snipers floated between Vietnam, Pacific Headquarters, and Washington, D.C. Sometimes the messages initiated action; in other cases they acknowledged or approved measures already taken. At times, the need for snipers and Russell’s enthusiasm often exceeded the progress of paperwork. Even though Russell had begun work several weeks earlier, the first official document that mentions “Scout-Sniper Training” is dated September 17, 1965.
Russell assembled his team at the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, Da Nang, and in mid-September received sufficient Winchester Model 70 rifles with 8-power Unertl telescopic sights to begin training.§ In their early meetings, Russell and his sergeants realized that they knew much about marksmanship but little about actual sniping. Because existing sniping literature was insufficient to make up for their own inexperience, Russell understood that the only way to gain sniping expertise was to actually take his team to the field in pursuit of the enemy.
The future sniper instructors began operations with infantry units at the end of September in the sand and scrub jungle area about fifty-five miles south of Da Nang near Chu Lai. They then went forty-five miles north of Da Nang to practice their skills in the mountains and plains around Hue and Phu Bai. During six weeks of operations, Russell and his team developed, practiced, and perfected the sniper tactics they would teach in their school and that Marine snipers would use for the remainder of the war. The Marine marksmen learned their craft well during the training phase, with several successfully engaging enemy personnel. Russell and others credit team member Staff Sergeant Don Barker with their first official sniper kill.
Back in Da Nang in early November, Russell reported that they were prepared to begin sniper training. Division Headquarters then solicited volunteers from the infantry battalions, requiring that applicants be combat veterans, qualified as expert in their last range firing, and recommended by their company commanders. Meanwhile, Russell made arrangements to use an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) rifle range, known as Hoa-Cam (near Hill 327, a few miles south of Da Nang) as his training center.
The ARVN range had several limitations. Because it had been designed for basic rifle marksmanship, the most distant targets were only 300 meters from the firing line. Beyond them stood thick elephant grass and scrub jungle. Russell requisitioned a bulldozer and a crew from a nearby shore party battalion to clear the range to a distance of 1,000 meters. He then gathered mess hall food cans, ammunition containers, and anything else that could serve as targets.
The second limitation to the ARVN range was that it was available to the Marines only three days a week. Again Russell had to adapt. Instead of the week-long course the team wanted, the entire sniper training program would last only three days. On day one the sniper instructors issued weapons and scopes and oriented the students on the equipment. Day two included shooting demonstrations by the cadre and dry fire by the students. For the entire day three the sniper students practiced firing at targets at various ranges.
Along with testing the sniper-training curriculum, Russell and his staff established the procedures that stood the rest of the war. In the forefront of these procedures was the marriage of man and gun. The rifle issued to each sniper student remained his weapon when he returned to his unit and stayed in his possession as long as it continued to be serviceable and he served in-country.
During the initial three-day sniper schools, Russell and his staff trained volunteers from all of the 3rd Marine Division’s infantry regiments. Russell later admitted that the emphasis during the early classes focused on quantity rather than quality, but that the brief course still produced “fair snipers.”
It is important to acknowledge that Russell and his team organized, prepared, and actually conducted training in the midst of the escalating fighting. Even their rifle range was not totally secure from enemy attack. Yet, despite the austere and dangerous conditions, Russell’s sniper school provided the training and the weapons that quickly fielded reasonably qualified marksmen to meet the needs of the combat commanders.
Throughout the war, advances in Marine sniper training in Vietnam continued at a pace faster than rear echelon officials could produce the paperwork to authorize or record it. In the midst of combat that was increasing in frequency and intensity, the small sniper-training program received little notice—either at the time or in later official studies.‖
In the nine chronologies by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division about the conflict in Southeast Asia prepared during the decade that followed the Vietnam War, snipers rarely gained a mention. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965 devoted only three paragraphs to sniper development. An entry in the chronology for 1965 at the end of the study notes that on October 14, “a USMC sniper team was formed in the Hue-Phu Bai TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility). The team used Winchester Model 70 rifles with 8-Unertl telescopic sights and killed two Vietcong at a range of more than 700 yards in the first exercise of this new tactic.”
Within the text of the study a single paragraph about sniper development explains, “The Marines experimented with specially trained and equipped sniper teams. Fifty of the best marksmen were selected from each of the regiments. These troops were divided into four-man teams and equipped with Winchester Model 70 rifles and telescopic sights. During November and December, 20–30 teams operated in the Marine TAORs daily.” The paragraph concludes, “On 23 November a sniper team at Phu Bai killed two VC and wounded another at a distance of more than 1,000 meters.”
While the news must have circulated quickly among the VC and NVA that the Marines had suddenly acquired long-range killers, little information about the newly fielded Marine snipers reached the States. On November 3, 1965, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Public Information Office released a news story stating that ninety-two men of the 3rd Marine Division were being trained and armed as snipers. The release generated little interest among the media covering the war, and it was not until about six months later that articles about snipers began to appear in military and civilian magazines, including the Marine Corps Gazette, Leatherneck, Saigon Observer, and American Rifleman. Most of those stories focused on Russell and his fellow instructors rather than actual sniper operations in the field.
The early successes of the snipers brought official recognition and authorization for their continuation. On December 29, 1965, the commandant of the Marine Corps, General Wallace M. Greene, signed a letter that approved the organization of sniper platoons in each infantry regiment and reconnaissance battalion. According to the letter, the sniper platoons were to locate and destroy the enemy by precision fire, destroy or neutralize enemy personnel who opposed the approach of friendly personnel to an objective area, and deny enemy movement in the TAOR.
Along with the approval of sniper platoons came additional requirements for equipment and training. Beginning in December, Russell and his staff increased the number of sniper classes. During the first few mo
nths of 1966, as the regiments requested slots for volunteers who would form their sniper platoons, demands exceeded capabilities. According to participants, a group of thirty-three men from the 3rd Marine Regiment attended sniper training in December 1965, returning to their unit in January 1966. The 4th Marines also organized its platoon about the same time, but there is no official record as to which regiment can legitimately claim to have fielded the first Marine sniper platoon of the Vietnam War.
In a later interview Russell recalled that the sniper school effort could best be described as informal and that he and his staff cared more at the time about producing trained snipers than about recording history. Russell kept the records of the 3rd Marine Division Sniper School in a wooden box, which has since disappeared.
Upon completion of his tour in Vietnam in 1966, Russell, then a major, returned to the United States to continue his advocacy of sniper operations as a member of the Landing Force Development Center at Quantico. In addition to presenting lectures about the progress of sniper training and use in Vietnam, Russell began writing the first official sniper-training manual in Marine Corps history.a
When the lead elements of the 1st Marine Division arrived in Vietnam in August 1965, they quickly discovered the same need for snipers as had their fellows in the 3rd Division. Some companies brought sniper weapons with them and designated their better marksmen snipers. However, the division made no efforts to develop formal sniper training until Major General Herman Nickerson Jr. assumed command in 1966. Nickerson advocated that to successfully combat the VC and the NVA the Marines had to adopt guerrilla tactics and procedures. In addition to emphasizing the use of the battalion and force reconnaissance units, Nickerson firmly believed in the effectiveness of precision marksmanship.
Inside the Crosshairs Page 9